ESSAY XII.

Of the ACADEMICAL or SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.

TH

PART I.

HERE is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings, display'd upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most reliious philofophers still dispute whether any man can to be a fpeculative atheist. How

contradi ? The knightWorld of

graver philofophers; tho' 'tis certain, that no one ever met with any such abfurd creature, or convers'd with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, either of action or fpeculation. This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a fceptic? And how far it is poffible to push these philofophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?

THERE is a species of fcepticism, antecedent to all study and philofophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a fovereign prefervative againft error and precipitate judgment. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whofe veracity, fay they, we must affure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduc'd from fome original principle, which cannot poffibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any fuch original principle,which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: Or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are fuppos'd to be already diffident. The Cartefian doubt, therefore, were it ever poffible to be attain'd by any human creature (as it plain' be altogether incurable; and no

ever bring us to a state of afsurance upon any subject.

creature, or conve

nion or principe

action or
elkon ; Warszs
is poffible to pa
ubt and uncertain

is much incalta
Sovereign peer
judgment.
ony of all our f

Iso of our very far they, we mut it, foning, deducte

ch cannot polic

neither is there as a prerogative

d convincing: aftep beyond i ies, of which we

Ir muft, however, be confefs'd, that this fpecies of scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a neceffary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preferving a proper impartiality in our judgments, and weaning our minds from all those prejudices, which we may have imbib'd from education or rafh opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and fure fteps, to review frequently our conclufions, and examine accurately all their confequences; tho' by this means we fhall make both a flow and a fhort progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations.

THERE is another species of scepticism, confequent to fcience and enquiry; where men are fuppos'd to have difcover'd, either the abfolute fallaciousness of *ental faculties, or their unfitnefs to reach any tion in all thofe curious fubjects of they are commonly em

spec
ploye

ite.by

ims of c

's the m

vfics and
may be

dif

wt a fone paltolopers, and the refutation of them a fever, the naturalis excift our curiofity, and make a enquire int the arguments, on which the way is founded.

I NDAs no infif. por fix more cite topics, emplor ́f tw the icetics in all ages, against the evidience of iné ; inci as the deriv'd from the im periežtor and fallaciouiness of our organs, on numbeties occations, the crooked appearance of an oar in water, the various apes of objects, according to their different diances; the double images, which arife from the prefing one eye; with many other appearances of the like nature. These fceptical topics, indeed, are only fufficient to prove, that the fenfes alone are not implicitely to be depended on; betthat we muft correct their evid by confiderations, deriv'd from t dium, the distance of the object, of the organ, in order to render fphere, the proper criteria of There are other more profound the fenfes, which admit not of fo

reason, and

of the medifpofition hin their

lfhool

external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exift, tho' we and every sensible creature were abfent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are govern'd by a like opinion, and preferve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, defigns, and actions.

Ir feems also evident, that when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always fuppofe the very images, presented by the fenfes, to be the external objects, and never entertain any fufpicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we fee white, and which we feel hard, is believ'd to exift, indepen dent of our perception, and to be fomething external to our mind, which perceives it. Our prefence be flows not being on it: Our abfence annihilates it not. It preferves its exiftence, uniform and entire, ependent of the fituation of intelligent beings, perceive or contemplate it.

opinion of all men ophy, which

Cent to the

fenfes

are re

in