the life-time of that philofophical patriot. The incredibility of a fact, it was allow'd, might invalidate fo great an authority.

THE Indian prince, who refus'd to believe the first relations concerning the effects of froft, reafon'd justly; and it naturally required very ftrong teftimony to engage his affent to facts, which arofe from a ftate of nature, with which he was unacquainted, and bore fo little analogy to thofe events, of which he had had conftant and uniform experience. Tho' they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it †.

* Plutarch. in vita Catonis.

↑ No Indian, 'tis evident, could have experience, that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a fituation quite unknown to him ; and 'tis impoffible for him to tell, à priori, what will refult from it. 'Tis making a new experiment, the confequence of which is always uncertain. One may fometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but ftill this is but conjecture. And it must be confeft, that, in the prefent cafe of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water paffes, in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardnefs. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty ftrong teftimony to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the courfe of nature in cafes where all the circumftances are the fame. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always feen: water liquid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deem'd a prodigy : But they never faw water in M-jcovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reafona. bly be pofitive what would there be the confequence.

BUT

BUT in order to increase the probability against the teftimony of witneffes, let us fuppofe that the fact, which they affirm, instead of being only marvellous, is really miraculous; and fuppofe alfo, that the teftimony, confider'd apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that cafe there is proof against proof, of which the strongest muft prevail, but still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.

A MIRACLE is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has eftablish'd thefe laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can poffibly be imagin'd. Why is it more than probable, that all men mußt die ; that lead cannot, of itself, remain fufpended in the air; that fire confumes wood, and is extinguifh'd by water; unless it be that thefe events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is requir'd a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteem'd a miracle if it ever happen in the common course of nature. 'Tis no miracle that a man in feeming good health fhould die on a fudden; becaufe fuch a kind of death, tho' more unufual than any other, has yet been frequently obferv'd to happen. But 'tis a mi

racle, that a dead man fhould come to life; because that has never been obferv'd, in any age or country. There muft, therefore, be an uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwife the event would not merit that appellation. And as an uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can fuch a proof be defroy'd, or the miracle render'd credible, but by an oppofite proof, which is faperior *.

THE plain consequence is (and 'tis a general maxim worthy of our attention) "That no testimony is fuf

* Sometimes an event may not, in itself, feem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reafon of fome circumstances, be denominated a miracle, because, in fact, it is contrary to thefe laws. Thus if a perfon, claiming a divine authority, fhould command a fick perfon to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in fhort, fhould order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might juftly be esteem'd miracles, because they are really, in this cafe, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any fufpicion remain, that the event and command concurr'd by accident, there is no miracle and no traní. greffion of the laws of nature. If this fufpicion be remov'd, there is evidently a miracle, and a tranfgreffion of thefe laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man fhould have fuch an influence. A miracle may be accurately defin'd, a tranfgreffion of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interpofal of some invifible agent. A miracle may either be difcoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and effence. The raifing of a house or ship into the air is a vifible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever fo little of a force requifite for that pur pofe, is as real a miracle, tho' not fo fenfible with regard to us,

"ficient

"ficient to establish a miracle, unless the teftimony "be of fuch a kind, that its falfhood would be

more miraculous, than the fact, which it endea"vours to establish: And even in that cafe, there is " a mutual destruction of arguments, and the fuperior "only gives us an afsurance suitable to that degree “of force, which remains, after deducting the infe"rior." When any one tells me, that he faw'a' dead man reftor'd to life, I immediately confider with myself, whether it be more probable, that this perfon should either deceive or be deceiv'd, or that the fact which he relates, fhould really have hap pen'd. I weigh the one miracle against the other, and according to the fuperiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decifion, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falfhood of his teftimony

would be more miraculous, than the event, which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion.

PART II.

In the foregoing reasoning we have fuppos'd, that the teftimony, upon which a miracle is founded, may possibly amount to an entire proof, and that the falfhood of that testimony would be a kind of pro

digy. But 'tis easy to fhew, that we have been a great deal too liberal in our conceffions, and that there never was a miraculous event, efstablish'd on so full an evidence.

FOR first, there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attefted by a fufficient number of men, of fuch unquestion'd good-fenfe, education, and learning as to fecure us against all delufion in themselves; of fuch undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all fufpicion of any defign to deceive others; of fuch credit and reputation in the eyes of man. kind as to have a great deal to lose in case of being detected in any falfhood; and at the fame time at testing facts, perform'd in fuch a public manner, and in fo celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: All which circumstances are requifite to give us a full afsurance in the teftimony of men.

SECONDLY. We may obferve in human nature a principle, which, if ftrictly examin'd, will be found to diminish extremely the affurance, which we might have, from human teftimony, in any kind of prodigy. The maxim, by which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings, is, that the obje of which we have no experience, refemble the which we have; that what we have found to

n.