that this guide is not altogether infaliine, but in fome cafes is apt to lead is nu era and milace. One, who, in our dimas, hout ergen beter we ther in any week of Fine siar me Denver, would reafon juEy and cormatie tergerec; but 'tis certain, the my pen, a de evar, 19 find himself maken. Hover, we may cierre, that, in fuch a cé, le mond have no caute 2 mmplain of experience; became it commonly laforma 13 beforehand of the mcertainty, by that continery of events, which we may learn from a dugent obfer. vation. All effects & low act with like certainty from their foppos'd caules Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been contantly conjoin'd together: Cthers are found to have been more variable, and fometimes to dilappoint our expectations; fo that in cur reafonings concerning matter of fact, there are all imaginable degrees of affurance, from the higheft certainty to the loweft fpecies of moral evidence.

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In fuch conclufions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of affurance, and regards his past experience as a full proof of the future exiftence of that event. In other cafes, he proceeds with more caution: He weighs the oppofite experiments: He con

alder: which, side 1. forte y the greaf rember

evneriments that nat e meimes, with doubt am neitator and when a lak he fums his jodgevent exteen: hit what we regerly call probabilit All probably men furquies an opposition of experments and anivations; where the rm has found u ve balans the ocher, and to pibouti a derret i evidence, proportion to the ་་་་་་་་་་་་་་ 4. numareć inftances or experiments on one fat, ac fi or another, afford a very doubtfu emettim of an en: the a hundred uniForm einerments, with my one contradictory one, scalonany began a preto trang degree of aferance. In all cases, we mak balance the opposite experiments, where there topola, dede the lef ser number from the greater, in order to know the cah force of the Cuperior evidence.

To apply the principles to a particular inftance; we may obferve, that there is no fpecies of reafoning more common, more useful, and eceflary to Laman life, than that deriv'd from :: tatimo;

men, and the reports of eye-witneffes and

tors. This species of reafoning, perhi

than our obfervation of the veracity of human teffimony, and of the ufual conformity of facts to the reports of witneffes. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any difcoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their conftant and regular conjunc

tion; 'tis evident that we ought not to make an ex. ception to this maxim in favour of human teftimony, whose connexion with any events feems, in itself, as little neceffary as any other. Did not mens imagination naturally follow their memory; had they not commonly an inclination to truth and a fentiment of probity; were they not fenfible to shame, when detected in a falfhood: Were not thefe, I fay, discover'd by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never repofe the leaft confidence in human teftimony. A man delirious, or noted for falfhood and villany, has no manner of weight or authority with us.

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ftances to be taken into confideration in all judg ments of this kind; and the ultimate ftandard, by which we determine all disputes, that may arise concerning them, is always deriv'd from experience and obfervation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any fide, 'tis attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and with the fame oppofition and mutual destruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence. We frequently hefitate concerning the reports of others. We balance the oppofite circumftances, which caufe any doubt or uncertainty; and when we difcover a fuperiority on any fide, we incline to it; but ftill with a diminution of afsurance, in proportion to the force of its antagonist.

manner

Tuis contrariety of evidence, in the prefent cafe, may be deriv'd from several different causes; from the oppofition of contrary teftimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from tì of their delivering their teftimony; or fro on of all these circumftances. We entertai cion concerning any matter of fact, when fes contradict each other; when they are b of a fufpicious chara

in what they affir ny with doubt an

too violent affevers

ticulars of the fame kind, which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument, deriv'd from human teftimony.

SUPPOSE, for inftance, that the fact, which the teftimony endeavours to establish, partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous; in that cafe, the evidence, refulting from the teftimony, receives a diminution, greater or lefs, in proportion as the fact is more or less unufual. The reafon, why we place any credit in witneffes and hiftorians is not from any connexion, which we perceive à priori betwixt teftimony and reality, but because we are accuftom'd to find a conformity betwixt them. But when the fact attefted is such a one as has feldom fallen under our obfervation, here is a conteft of two oppofite experiences; of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes, and the fuperior can only operate on the mind by the force, which remains. The very fame principle of experience, which gives us a certain degree of affurance on the testimony of witnesi.. afe, another degree of af

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