great eagerness fince the firft origin of science and philofophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at leaft, fhould have been agreed upon among the dif putants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real fubject of the controverfy. For how eafy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employ'd in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere found of words, the object of future fcrutiny and examination? But if we confider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite oppofite conclufion. From that circumftance alone, that a controverfy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may prefume, that there is fome ambiguity in the expreffion, and that the difputants affix different ideas to the terms employ'd in the controverfy. For as the faculties of the foul are fuppos'd to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruit. lefs than to reafon or difpute together; 'twere impoffible, if men affix the fame ideas to their terms, that they could fo long form different opinions of the fame fubject; especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all fides, in fearch of arguments, which may give them the victory over their antagonists. 'Tis true; if men attempt the difcuffion of queftions, which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, fuch as thofe concerning the origin of worlds, or the œconomy of the intellectual fyftem or region of fpirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contefts, and never arrive at any determinate conclufion. But if the que ftion regard any fubject of common life and experience; nothing, one would think, could preferve the difpute fo long undecided, but fome ambiguous expreffions, which keep the antagonists ftill at a diftance, and hinder them from grappling with each other. THIS has been the cafe in the long difputed que ftion concerning liberty and neceffity; and to fo remarkable markable a degree, that, if I be not much mistaken, we shall find all mankind, both learned and ignorant, to have been always of the fame opinion with regard to that fubject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy. I own, that this difpute has been fo much canvafs'd on all hands, and has led philofophers into fuch a labyrinth of obfcure fophiftry, that 'tis no wonder, if a fenfible and polite reader indulge his eafe fo far as to turn a deaf ear to the propofal of fuch a question, from which he can expect neither instruction nor entertainment. But the state of the argument here proposed may, perhaps, ferve to renew his attention; as it has more novelty, promises, at least, fome decifion of the controverfy, and will not much disturb his eafe, by any intricate or obfcure reasoning. I HOPE, therefore, to make appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrines both of neceffity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on these expreffions; and that the whole controversy has hitherto turn'd merely upon words. We shall begin with examining the doctrine of neceffity. 'Tis univerfally allow'd, that matter, in all its operations, is actuated by a neceffary force, and that every effect is fo precisely determin'd by the nature and energy of its caufe, that no other effect, in such particular circumstances, could poffibly have refulted from the operation of that caufe. The degree and direction of every motion is, by the laws of nature, prefcrib'd with fuch exactness, that a living creature may as foon arise from the shock of two bodies, as motion in any other degree or direction, than what is actually produc'd by it, Would we, therefore, form a juft and precife idea of necessity, we must confider, whence that idea arifes, when we apply it to the operation of bodies. Ir feems evident, that, if all the fcenes of nature were shifted continually in such a manner, that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any fimilitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have attain'd the leaft idea of neceffity, or of a connexion amongst these objects. We might fay, upon fuch a fuppofition, that one object or event has follow'd another; not that one was produc'd by the other. The relation of caufe and effect muft be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reafoning concerning the operations of nature would, from that moment, be at an end; and the memory and fenfes remain the only canals, by which the knowlege of any real existence could poffibly have accefs |