minds so limited as ours. We hardly know any thing, we are hardly capable of knowing any thing. Our very desire of increasing our knowledge, if we be not very cautious, will lead us into frequent and fatal mistakes, by hurrying us to determine a point before we have well examined it; we shall take probability for demonstration, a spark for a blaze, an appearance for a reality. A liberty of suspending our judgment is the only mean of preventing this misfortune; it does not secure us from ignorance but it keeps us from error. While I enjoy the liberty of affirming only that, of which I have full evidence, I enjoy the liberty of not deceiving myself. : Further, the desire of knowing is one of the most natural desires of man, and one of the most essential to his happiness. By man I mean him, who remains human, for there are some men, who have renounced humanity. There are men, who, like brutes, inclosed in a narrow circle of sensations, never aspire to improve their faculty of intelligence any further, than as its improvement is necessary to the sensual enjoyment of a few gross gratifications, in which all their felicity is contained. But man hath a natural avidity of extending his sphere of his knowledge. I think, God commanded our first parents to restrain this desire, because it was one of their most eager wishes. Accordingly, the most dangerous allurement that satan used to withdraw them from their obedience to God, was this of science; ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil, Gen. iii. 5. The state of innocence was a very happy state, however, it was a state of trial, to the perfection of which something was wanting. In every dispensation, God so ordered it, that man should arrive at the chief good by way of sacrifice, and by the sacrifice of that, which mankind holds most dear, and this was the reason of the primitive prohibition. The Lord God said, of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die, chap. ii. 16, 17. I presume, had man properly borne this trial, he would have been rewarded with that privilege, the usurpation of which was so fatal to him. A mind, naturally eager to obtain knowledge, is not really free, if it have not the liberty of touching the tree of knowledge, and of deriving from the source of truth an ability to judge clearly, particularly of those objects, with the knowledge of which its happiness is connected. Without this the garden of Eden could not satisfy me; without this all the delicious pleasures of that blessed abode would leave a void in the plan of my felicity, and I should always suspect, that God entertained but a small degree of love for me, because he reposed no confidence in me. This idea deserves the greater regard, because it is an idea, that Jesus Christ taught his apostles, Henceforth I call you not servants; for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doth, but I have called you friends; for all things, that I have heard of my Father, I have made known unto you, John xv. 15. 2. I call that volition free, which is in perfect harmony with an enlightened understanding, in opposition to that, which is under the influence of irregular passions condemned by the understanding. The slavery of a will, that hath not the liberty of following what the understanding offers to it as advantageous, is so incompatible with our notion of volition, that some doubt, and others possitively deny the possibility of such a bondage. Not to decide this question at present, it is certain, one of the most common artifices of a will under the influence of inordinate affections is to seduce the understanding, and to engage it in a kind of composition with it. Any truth considered in a certain point of view may seem a falshood, as any falshood in a certain point of light may appear a truth. The most advantageous condition, considered in some relations, will appear disadvan-. tageous, as the most inconvenient will seem advantageous. A will under the influence of disorderly desires solicits the judgment to present the evil object of its wishes in a light, in which it may appear good. That will then I call free, which is in perfect harmony with an enlightened understanding, following it with docility, free from the irregular desire of blinding its guide, I mean of seducing the judgment. Perhaps I ought to have observed, before I entered on a discussion of the judgment and the will, that these are not two different subjects; but the same subject, considered under two different faces. We are obliged, in order to form complete ideas of the human soul, to consider its divers operations. When it thinks, when it conceives, when it draws conclusions, we say it judges, it understands, it is the understanding: when it fears, when it loves, when it desires, we call it volition, will. We apply to this subject what St. Paul says of another, there are diversities of operations; but it is the same spirit, 1 Cor. xii. 6. 3. As we give different names to the same spirit on account of its different operations, so also we give it different names on account of different objects of the same operations. And as we call the soul by different names, when it thinks, and when it desires, so also we give it different names, when it performs operations made up of judging and de-.. siring. What we call conscience verifies this remark. Conscience is, if I may venture to speak so, an operation of the soul consisting of volition and intelligence. Conscience is intelligence, judg ment, considering an object as just or unjust; and conscience is volition inclining us to make the object in contemplation an object of our love or hatred, of our desires or fears. If such be the nature of conscience, what we have affirmed of the liberty of the will in general, and of the liberty of the understanding in general, ought to determine what we are to understand by the freedom of the conscience. Conscience is free in regard to the understanding, when it hath means of obtaining clear ideas of the justice or injustice of a case before it, and when it hath the power of suspending its decisions on a case until it hath well examined it. Conscience is free in regard to the will, when it hath the power of following what appears just, and of avoiding every thing, that appears contrary to the laws of equity. This article, we hope, is sufficiently explained. 4. But it sometimes happens, that our will, and our conscience incline us to objects, which our understanding presents to them as advantageous: but from the possession of which some superior power prevents us. A man is not really free, unless he have power over his senses sufficient to make them obey the dictates of a cool volition directed by a clear perception. This is liberty in regard to our conduct. There is something truly astonishing in that composition, which we call man. In him we see an union of two substances, between which there is no natural relation, at least we know none, I mean the union of a spiritual soul with a material body. I perceive, indeed, a natural connection between the divers faculties of the soul, between the faculty of thinking, and that of loving. I perceive, indeed, a natural connection between the divers properties of matter, between extension and divisibility, and so of the rest. I clearly perceive, that because an intelligence thinks, it must love, and because matter is extended, it must be divisible, and so on. But what relation can there subsist between a little particle of matter and an immaterial spirit, to render it of necessity, that every thought of this spirit must instantly excite some motion in this particle of matter? And how is it, that every motion of this particle of matter must excite some idea, or some sensation, in this spirit? yet this strange union of body and spirit constitutes man. God, say some, have brought into existence a creature so excellent as an immortal soul, lest it should be dazzled with his own excellence, united it to dead matter incapable of ideas and designs. I dare not pretend to penetrate into the designs of an infinite God. Much less would I have the audacity to say to my Creator, Why hast thou made me thus ? Rom. ix. 20. But I can never think myself free while that, which is least excellent in me, governs that part of me, which is most excellent. Ah! what freedom do I enjoy, while the desires of my will, guided by the light of my understanding, cannot give law to my body; while my senses become legislators to my understanding and my will. 5. It only remains, in order to form a clear notion of a man truly free, that we consider him in regard to his condition, that is to say, whether he be rich or poor, enveloped in obscurity or exposed to the public eye, depressed with sickness or regaled |