A series of statutes have lately been passed making restrictions on the employment of persons in manufacturing operations. Their chief object appears to be to prohibit contracts between employers and employed, in which the cupidity of the individuals might induce them to outrage public decency and morals, or tyrannically to exact from persons of tender years an extent of labour injurious to their health and moral training. These statutes belong more properly to the department of Public Police, than to the present which relates to the mutual rights and obligations of Employer and Employed. The acts are 3 & 4 Vict. c. 85, "For the regulation of chimney sweepers ;" 5 & 6 Vict. c. 99, "To prohibit the employment of women and girls in mines and collieries, to regulate the employment of boys, and to make other provisions for persons working therein;" 7 & 8 Vict. c. 15," To amend the laws relating to labour in factories;" 8 & 9 Vict. c. 29, " To regulate the labour of children, young persons, and women in printworks," PART X. THE CONTRACT OF LETTING AND HIRING OF PROPERTY. CHAPTER I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CONTRACT. THE Contract of letting and hiring, or as it is termed by civilians, of Location, has but a very small place in the practice of the law, unless in its two great branches, the law of Shipping and the law of Landlord and Tenant, which on the present occasion have each a separate chapter devoted to them. The few questions that arise as to other instances of the contract, generally relate to the hiring of horses and vehicles. It may be observed that the hiring of labour and service comes according to the divisions of the civil law within the contract of location; but these departments of hiring are so much more intimately blended, in practice, with the other instances, such as Agency and Trusteeship, where individuals perform services to each other, that it has been considered expedient to apply a department of the work to a joint consideration of all these descriptions of contracts of service. Erskine observes that the principles applicable to the contract of letting and hiring, are in general those applicable to the contract of sale, it being in reality a sale and purchase of the use of a subject. Thus the owner of the commodity -the Lessor, must transfer its temporary custody to the Lessee in terms of the contract, and the lessee must pay the stipulated price or hire.1 There are, however, two obligations in this contract which * See above, p. 231, et seq.--1 E. iii. 3, 14, 15, 16. distinguish it from the law of sale. First, the lessee is bound to return the subject to the lessor when the stipulated duration of the hiring has expired. Second, he must preserve and return it in sound condition, no more injured through his operations, than it would naturally be by a legitimate application to the purposes for which it is hired. It is a general rule, that when a party hires a piece of property-as a vehicle or a horse-and returns it to the owner damaged, he is not relieved from responsibility, unless he can show that the damage was not occasioned by his own fault; and he must establish "that the injury sustained could not be prevented by due care and attention on his part, and was occasioned by that in which he was in no respect to blame." This rule was applied in favour of the party hiring, when he showed that a horse and gig had been injured by the backing of the horse.3 CHAPTER II. SHIPPING. THE method by which property is held and transferred in British vessels has been considered in connexion with the tenure of property and the contract of sale.* The rights and liabilities of the mariners have been noticed in connexion with labour and service.† In another part of the work there will be occasion to notice two descriptions of security connected with this subject, viz. Bottomry and Respondentia.‡ Another very important contract connected with the navigation laws, viz. Sea Insurance,§ has been separately considered. There are perhaps other portions of the law regarding shipping, which ought, logically speaking, to be discussed under some head different from the present; but as they are all more or less connected with the employment of the vessel, and of the persons connected with it, practical expediency has suggested the propriety of avoiding further subdivision. 1 Binny v. Veaux, M. 10079.-2 Ibid. Marquis v. Ritchie, 11th June 1823.-3 Pyper v. Thomson, 4th February 1843.-* See above, pp. 64, 174. -See p. 261.- See below, Part XII. Chap. 5, § 3.-§ See above, p. 196. SECT. 1.-Responsibility of Owners for Contracts as Where the owners themselves enter into a contract for repairs or furnishings to the ship, each owner is liable only for his own proportional share in the contract; but where the furnishings or repairs are on the order of the shipshusband or of the master, any one owner may be made liable for the whole, having recourse against the rest. Although registration is the criterion of right in questions as to ownership, it is not always the criterion of responsibility for furnishings, &c.; the person who consented to the contract, and whose security was trusted to, must be liable. So if a purchaser or mortgagee order repairs to a ship, the seller or mortgager cannot be made liable although his name still appears in the register as proprietor; nor could a purchaser be made liable for furnishings contracted for by the seller before the sale. But if the contract is entered' into by the shipmaster, a creditor ignorant of the real ownership, and content to take his chance of it, will have a claim against the persons appearing as owners in the register, who may be able to relieve themselves by the title which the register gives them.2 It seems to be now held, however though the decisions formerly left the matter doubtful-that if the person contract with the party who really has the beneficial interest in the ship, knowing him to have it, he will not have recourse against any individual whose name he may find on the register and on whose credit he did not act.3 The master, by acts in the legitimate course of his duty, may subject the owners to obligations to himself. Where a master (who was part owner) had insured his own effects, and finding it necessary to deviate, wrote to the joint owners to renew the insurance, which they failed to do-they were held liable for the omission. In such cases, moreover, it is necessary to consider for whom the master is presumed to act; and so if the ship have been let on lease, the master is properly the agent for the lessee, who is the person liable for furnishings or other engagements incurred by him.5 In making a claim against one merely because his name is on the register, it is necessary to show that it has been put there with his own. consent. Where a ship has been repaired in a home port, B. C. i. 519, 520.-2 Russell v. Baird, 13th June 1830. B. C. i. 520, 521. Abbot (by Shee), 33.- Abbot, 33.- Petrie's Executors v. Aitchison & Co., 6th February 1841.-5 B. C. i. 521. Abbot, 33, 42.6 B. C. i. 521. the builder has a lien on the vessel for the repairs; where there is a necessity for repairs abroad, a hypothec may be created.1 1 % SECT. 2.-Employment of the Ship in Conveying Goods. There are two forms in which the services of the ship may be let on hire, Charter-party and General freight. The former is a contract by which the use of the ship is let for a certain period or a certain purpose; the latter is merely an engagement to carry goods in the ship. In the former case, the vessel is called a Chartered ship, in the latter a General ship. The former is usually a specific contract, while the latter arrangement is generally accomplished by the ship being advertised to receive all ordinary goods on board, and carry them to the port of destination, without any specific contract between the parties. Both contracts come under the general term Affreightment. In a Charter-party the contract may be for the whole ship or a certain portion of it, or a certain number of tons or barrel-bulks. If a portion of the ship be taken, that portion is entirely at the disposal of the freighter, who must pay the freight or consideration whether the whole space agreed for is filled up by his goods or not. The engagement may be for one or more specified voyages, or for a definite time, and the freight may be so much per ton, or so much per period of time, according to circumstances.2 The contract does not require to be in writing, it being capable of proof by oath, by testimony, and by circumstances. If committed to writing, it must be stamped. It does not require any particular form. It may contain a clause of registration for summary diligence.3 The owners and master in the ordinary case become bound by the legal interpretation of the contract, that the vessel shall be seaworthy, and in all respects fitted for the voyage; that she shall be at the port ready for being loaded during a reasonable time; that she shall sail at the appointed day, wind and weather permitting; that she shall be properly navigated, and be directed by the usual and approved course to the destined port; and that the goods shall be taken proper care of, and delivered as directed. The freighter or merchant becomes obliged to furnish a sufficient cargo, to 1 B. C. i. 526, 527.-* See below, Part XII. Chap. V.- Abbot, 241, et seq.-3 B. C. i. 539. |