that Victor had suddenly forced the passage of the Tagus at Almaraz, and was in pursuit of Cuesta on the road to Merida; that Soult, having crossed the Minho, and defeated Romana and Sylveira, was within a few leagues of Oporto; and that Lapisse had made a demonstration of assaulting Ciudad Rodrigo. The junta of Oporto now vehemently demanded aid from the regency; and the latter, although not much inclined to the bishop's party, proposed that sir John Cradock should unite a part of the British forces to the Portuguese troops under marshal Beresford, and march to the succour of Oporto. Beresford was averse to trust the Portuguese under his immediate command among the mutinous multitudes in that city; but he thought the whole of the British army should move in a body to Leiria, and from thence either push on to Oporto, or return, according to the events that might occur in the latter town, and he endeavoured to persuade Cradock to follow this plan.” Again, at page 429. —“Marshal Beresford's plan, founded on the supposition, that Cradock could engage Soult at Oporto, and yet quit him, and return at his pleasure to Lisbon, if Victor advanced, was certainly fallacious: the advantages rested on conjectural, the disadvantages on positive data: it was conjectural that they could relieve Oporto, it was positive that they would endanger Lisbon."

Authorities.-10. Extracts from marshal Beresford's letter to sir John Cradock, 29th March, 1809 :

"Upon the subject of marching a British force to Oporto under the actual circumstances, and under the consideration of the various points from which the enemy at present threaten us, we had yesterday a full discussion, and which renders it unnecessary for me now to recapitulate the several reasons which induced me to submit to your excellency's consideration the propriety of advancing the British force to Leiria, to be thence pushed on to Oporto, or otherwise, as the information from different parts may render expedient. But my principal reason was, that as there appeared an intention of cooperation (of which, however, there is no certainty) between the marshals Victor and Soult, it would be most desirable, by either driving back or overcoming one, before the other could give his co-operating aid to defeat their plan, and if we should, or not, be able to do this, would be merely a matter of calculation of time; as, supposing on our arrival at Leiria, Oporto offered a prospect of holding out till we could reach it, and that Victor continued his southern pursuit of Cuesta, he would get so distant from us, as to permit the army pushing from Leiria to Oporto without apprehension from the army of Victor."—"It is for your excellency to judge, under the ac tual circumstances, of the propriety of this movement towards Oporto."

2o. Extracts from sir John Cradock's reply to the above. 29th March, 1809. "I have the honour to acknowledge, at the earliest moment, your excellency's letter of this evening, conveying a copy of the request from the regency, etc. that I should move the British troops to the succour of Oporto," etc.-" To venture upon an advance to Oporto, two hundred miles from Lisbon, when the very object is, perhaps, at this moment lost, seems to be a point only to gratify the good feelings of every soldier, but quite opposed to the sober dictates of the understanding. If the British army sets out with the declared object to succour Oporto, or expel the enemy, the impression on the public mind is the same. Nothing but the accomplishment will suit the English character!"

These extracts show that the author of the pamphlet is not justified in asserting that I "completely misunderstood the nature of marshal Beresford's views and intentions; that I have injuriously treated that distinguished officer, and that I have strangely perverted his meaning by making him say it was doubtful whether Victor and Soult intended to co-operate on a single plan' "— above all, it is most disingenuous, first to assume that I objected to a march upon Leiria, and then to argue upon the misrepresentation in the following

manner:-1

"This same military movement cannot be both right and wrong, politic and impolitic, correct and erroneous.... If the proposal of advancing the army to Leiria was evidently unsound when suggested by marshal Beresford, the movement itself ought, in impartial justice, to have been condemned by the historian as at least equally unsound when put in execution by sir John Cradock."

But in what manner was it the same military movement? Every circumstance was different. 1o. It was a movement to Leiria not to Oporto. 20. It took place ten or twelve days later, during which time 5,000 British infantry, and 300 artillery horses, had re-enforced Cradock's army; and a regiment of dragoons was hourly expected. "Since the present accession of strength," says sir J. Cradock," "it may be advisable to make a short movement in advance as far as Leiria." 5o. Victor, instead of threatening Portugal, as the reports of the 26th March had represented him to be doing, had engaged himself with Cuesta, and had just fought the battle of Medellin ; moreover, a march to Leiria only did not open Lisbon to that marshal. 4o. Lapisse, instead of joining Soult, was moving towards the Tagus by the passes of the Gredos; and thus, while the enemy were weakened by a diversity of plans, the allies were become infinitely stronger. But what, in fact, can be more absurd than this writer's notion that the same military movements must be equally good at one time as at another? and, after all, Cradock's march to Leiria was made entirely at the request of lord Beresford. "I consented to general Beresford's wish to make a movement in advance, as he said it would give confidence to the body of Portuguese troops assembled at Thomar, and enable him to undertake the defence of the bridge and station at Abrantes."-Sir John Cradock to general Richard Stewart, April 8, 1809.

The author, having made this use of the march to Leiria, changes his ground to magnify lord Beresford's military genius in recommending a march to Oporto.

"It appears," he says, " from the evidence afforded by colonel Napier himself, that lord Beresford had exactly divined the intention of the enemy -nay, that he had anticipated the very orders of Bonaparte, in which the three corps of Soult, Victor, and Lapisse, are directed to co-operate—and ret his reasoning, the wisdom of which is proved by facts and by the documents recorded in the author's own volume, is condemned. . . . Colonel Napier, forsooth, with a very superficial knowledge of the circumstances of the time, and scarcely any of the localities, has the presumption to record that those views are evidently unsound.”

Hard words these, if founded in reason; if otherwise, foolish words. Let us examine their value. Three invading corps were hanging on the frontier :

Strictures, page 35. 2 Sir John Cradock to general Richard Stewart, 8th April, 1809.

"there appeared," says lord Beresford,1 “an intention of co-operation.” Here was no great divination; moreover other things were divined, such as the taking of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida, which did not happen. Let that pass. The preservation of Lisbon was the primary object of the allies. Beresford proposed that their combined forces should march against one of the three invading corps, and he was bound to show, 10. That while thus operating against one enemy, another could not take possession of Lisbon. 2o. That there should be some prospect of beating that body which the allies intended to fight. Were either of these things reasonably secure?

Victor, rated 35,000 strong, and having just defeated Cuesta, was at Merida and Caceres, the head of his columns reported to be pointing towards Portugal. Was the safety of Lisbon cared for in a plan to march all the allied forces against Soult, who was two hundred miles from that capital, when Victor, a more powerful enemy, was thus threatening it from a nearer point?

The author of this pamphlet says yes, because "Victor had no means of crossing the Tagus; he had with him neither pontoon nor bridge equipage of any kind, and the river from the frontier of Portugal was rolling down, as is always the case at this season of the year, a rapid, heavy, mighty, unfordable mass of water.”

Indeed! What, then, is the meaning of the following extract from admiral Berkeley's correspondence with sir John Cradock, April 6th, 1809?—“There is a circumstance upon which, if both yourself and general Beresford are absent from Lisbon, it may be necessary that some decisive knowledge should be obtained—I mean the boats and craft upon the Tagus, the disposal of which seems to be confided to the commissary-general. That gentleman, I suppose, will naturally attend the army, and, of course, if we should suddenly require them, or if the enemy made a rapid movement across the Alemtejo, he might become master of the boats before an express could reach the commissary-general to remove them." What also is the meaning of the following passages in sir John Cradock's despatches to lord Castlereagh, 12th April, 1809.-"There is a ferry at Salvatierra, near Alcantara, and another up the left bank of the Tagus, in the Alemtejo, where there is also a ford, and the river may be easily passed.”

The admiral and general, however, soon discovered, that the control of the craft was not in the commissary-general's hands, but in those of the regency, and that the latter had “made no register of the boats," and that, in fact, “nothing useful was done, or likely to be done, in the matter." Thus it seems that Victor need not have been stopped by the Tagus, and that there was no security for Lisbon during the march of the army to Oporto.

We now come to the second object,—namely, the chance of success against Soult. That general had more than 20,000 men, comprising a great body of excellent cavalry. Could 12,000 British infantry, without cavalry, with scarcely any artillery, and unprovided with means of transport, — could they, although assisted, or rather embarrassed, by an ill-disciplined native force, have brought the French general to action and beaten him?-or if they had, could they have rendered their victory so decisive as to leave him and return in time to cover Lisbon? and was Lapisse, who had 12,000 men and 50 guns, to remain a passive spectator of such operations?-could he not

See his letter to sir John Cradock-Appendix, No. XLI, sect. 1.

have joined Soult, or have marched upon Coimbra, in rear of the allied forces. It is intimated, by the writer of this pamphlet, that lord Wellington did thus march upon Oporto, and defeat Soult; but that happened five weeks later, and when the intentions of the English cabinet were no longer doubtful. It happened when, partly by the exertions of marshal Beresford, partly by the effect of the fall of Oporto, but chiefly by the reputation of lord Wellington, the Portuguese troops, from a "lawless mob,"-I use the writer's own expression,-" were become an orderly force." It happened also when the allied army was increased by at least 7,000 English infantry, four regiments of cavalry, horses for the artillery, money and commissary stores from England, and when more troops were on their voyage to Lisbon. It happened when Cradock's efforts, followed up by lord Wellington's, had procured supplies for the movement; when Lapisse had passed into Lower Estramadura, and by this false march had marred the French combinations, placing a whole nation, with all its fortresses and all its forces, whether regular troops or auxiliaries, between Soult and Victor, so that neither concert nor communication could longer exist between them. It happened also when Victor, whose troops were suffering dreadfully from the Guadiana fever, was known to be forming an intrenched camp at Medellin, instead of moving on Portugal. It happened when Cuesta, who was again at the head of more numerous forces than before, had promised to follow Victor closely in any march towards Portugal; when, also, intercepted letters of king Joseph's indicated that Seville, not Portugal, was Victor's object; when Venegas was threatening La Mancha with a fresh army; and when Soult, after having lost time at Amarante, and men at Chaves, had spread his troops over a wide extent of country; when his offensive strength was exhausted, and when there was a powerful conspiracy in his camp, the leaders of which were in communication with the English general; and when, to crown all, the real numbers of the French being unknown, were underrated. Notwithstanding all this, the operation would have failed of any great result, had it not been for the astonishing passage of the Duero, an action not to be expected from ordinary generals.

Let us also observe the difference of the measures taken to secure the Tagus. Beresford wanted Cradock to move at once with the whole allied force, depending only on some calculations of time; but when lord Wellington moved, the false march of Lapisse had enabled him to draw down the Lusitanian legion, and the militia of the Beira frontier to defend the bridge of Alcantara, which was mined. Three British battalions were also drafted from the army at Leiria; to these were added two other British battalions, and two regiments of cavalry, just landed at Lisbon; and finally, 8,000 Portuguese regulars, forming altogether an army which, placed under one general, could defend the line of the Tagus from Abrantes to Lisbon. An additional corps of observation was also formed from the garrisons of Badajoz and Elvas, to watch the movements of Victor on the Guadiana; and finally, the seamen and ma_ rines, and the civic legions of Lisbon, formed a body of reserve. Hence it was that I said lord Wellington's plans were "neither hastily adopted nor recklessly hurried forward." He made, indeed, a daring movement, but it was the daring of a great general; whereas marshal Beresford only proposed a rash march of two hundred miles to succour a place which had actually fallen the very day on which he made the proposal. Nor is this all. Beresford proposed to march

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with the Portuguese and British troops combined, and the pamphleteer says ', that the allied force would have been in every respect superior to Soult's whole army." Now this movement was proposed the 29th of March, the British had two hundred miles to move; wherefore, allowing two days for preparations and unforeseen obstacles, the allies would have been in front of Soult about the 9th of April. Let us see then what, at that period, was marshal Beresford's own description of the Portuguese portion of this army, so "superior in every respect " to the enemy,- this force, which was not only to manœuvre before, but to drive Soult, with his veteran infantry and powerful cavalry, out of the kingdom.

"I this morning met no less than three expresses, communicating to me the horrible state of mutiny-for I can call it no less - in which the troops everywhere are, and the inhabitants are in equal insubordination, and they encourage each other." And what says sir J. Cradock? - 3

"No reliance whatever can be placed on the Portuguese troops. If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford's sentiments. "

But why prolong this examination, when the broad facts that Beresford could not control the Portuguese troops, and that Cradock could not procure equipments or supplies for the British, are proved by the letters of those generals themselves? Cradock's difficulties, the pamphleteer says, could not have been known to marshal Beresford at the moment of his suggesting his plan; be it so; his proposition, then, was founded in utter ignorance of the real state of affairs, and therefore "evidently unsound.”

V. Of the points which I have enumerated as marking the difference between marshal Beresford's proposal and sir Arthur Wellesley's operation, the following have been either denied, doubted, or ridiculed, by the writer of this pamphlet.

1o. Cuesta's promise to wait on Victor's movements. 2o. The amount of Cuesta's force. 3o. That the conspiracy in Soult's army was known to the allies when sir Arthur Wellesley decided to march against that general. 4o. That a whole nation, with all its fortresses, elc. etc. was, by the false march of Lapisse, placed between Victor and Soult. 5o. That Abrantes was a fortress. 6o. That Soult's offensive was exhausted. 70. That the intention of the English cabinet to defend Portugal had been doubtful.

1o. Cuesta's promise. Authority.-Mr. FRERE to sir JOHN CRADOCK.

Seville, 21st April, 1809.

"If general Victor should evacuate the country which he now occupies, and undertake a march to the relief of marshal Soult, general Cuesta would advance in proportion, and endeavour to harass and detain him, as far as possible, without risking a general action. This latter part I consider as agreed." There was a direct communication between Seville and Lisbon, and this letter reached sir A. Wellesley either the 24th or 25th of April.

-

This was rated by me at 35,000 in the

2o. Amount of Cuesta's force. · gross, and 25,000 actually in his camp.

1 Strictures, page 59, Marshal Beresford to sir John Cradock; Santarem, April 7, 1809.. 3 Sir John Cradock to lord Castlereagh, April 3.