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General Mackenzie to sir John Cradock. Cadiz, February 9, 1809.

"The Spaniards here seem lulled in the most fatal security. They are ignorant of the events in the north of Spain, or will not give credit when they do hear them. Vague reports of the emperor of Austria's having declared war, and Bonaparte's return to France gains unlimited credit. . . . The equipment of the fleet goes on very slowly, though there is no want of exertion now on the part of admiral Purvis or Mr. Stuart; offers of every assistance are daily made, but they will neither work themselves nor perinit our people to work for them. The preparation of the ships for carrying off the French prisoners goes on equally ill.”

Duke de Albuquerque to Mr. Frere. Talavera, July 31, 1809. "During our marches we stop to repose, like flocks of sheep, without taking up any position, so that, if the enemy knew the condition we were in, they would defeat us wherever they attacked us. If, in the evening of the 26th, I had not gone out directly with my division, and succeeded in checking the enemy, the whole army would have dispersed, and all the artillery and baggage, which were in the streets of St. Olalla, would have been lost; and as a proof of what would have happened, had not the enemy, who was within musket-shot, been checked, for many had already thrown away their arms, etc., the commissaries abandoning more than fifteen hundred rations of bread, the carts occupying and blocking up the streets of the town; and to this, I repeat, we are daily exposed, as we march, as if it were on a pilgrimage, without any regard to distance, order, or method, and with the whole park of artillery, which ought always to remain at the distance of two, three, or more leagues."

Sir Arthur Wellesley to lord Wellesley. Merida, September 1, 1809.

"I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the central junta, that, in the distribution of their forces, they do not consider military defence and military operations so much as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objects."

1809.

Lord Wellesley to Mr. Canning. Seville, September 2, "While the intelligence received from sir Arthur Wellesley, to the date of the 24th instant, continued to furnish irresistible proofs of the failure of every promise or effort made by this government for the immediate relief of our troops, no satisfaction was afforded to me respecting any permanent plan for their future supply. . . . The troops of Portugal, which entered Spain, under general Beresford, suffered similar distress, and experienced similar ill-treatment; although the efforts of Portugal, in the cause of Spain, have been as gratuitous as those of Great Britain; and although Spain possesses no claim, of any description, to the aid of a Portuguese army. . . . In this calamity, the people of Spain cannot fail to acknowledge the natural consequences of their own weakness, nor to discover the urgent necessity of enforcing a more steady, pure, and vigorous system, both of council and action. A relaxed state of domestic government and an indolent reliance on the activity of foreign

assistance have endangered all the high and virtuous objects for which Spain has armed and bled. It must now be evident that no alliance can protect her from the inevitable result of internal disorder and national infirmity. She must amend and strengthen her government; she must improve the administration of her resources, and the structure and discipline of her armies, before she can become capable of deriving benefit from foreign aid. Spain has proved untrue to our alliance, because she is not true to herself. . . . Until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can safely attempt to co-operate with the Spanish troops in the territory of Spain."

No. XXXII.

JUSTIFICATORY EXTRACTS FROM SIR JOHN CRADOCK'S CORRE-
SPONDENCE, MSS.

SECTION 1.-STATE OF PORTUGAL.

Sir J. Cradock to sir Robert Wilson. Oporto, December 8, 1808. "I press this measure" (to move the legion from Oporto to Villa Real) 'upon your adoption, for many reasons, etc., etc.; but the more especially that it will give an impulse to military preparation in general, and tend to eradicate the notion that, since the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the prospect of a future war is at an end."

Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore. December 9, 1808.

"I have pressed the adoption of such measures as appeared most likely to rerive some notion of danger, and the necessity of activity and energy."

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh. December 14, 1808, Lisbon. "The inaction of the regency was apparent at Oporto to a lamentable degree; and, though I saw general Bernardin Freire, I could not gain from him any information as to the state or numbers of the Portuguese troops, where they were stationed, or who commanded them. I apprehend, from his conversation, that the general officers are all of equal authority; and that even seniority had not its usual effect. He concluded his observations to me with the strong expression, 'That, from the evacuation of Portugal by the French, the nation had thought all war at an end.” ”

Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore.

December 28, 1808.

"Mr. Villiers and myself have both concurred upon the absolute necessity to arouse and animate the Portuguese to some sense of their situation."

Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock. Elvas, December 30, 1808. "The apathy of the Portuguese is not to be expressed. Their general,

Leite, is a most excellent character: a theorist, and, like his countrymen, supine."

Extract from the Report of lieutenant Brotherton (an officer employed to obtain intelligence in the north of Portugal). February 11, 1809, Headquarters of Romana's army.

"From the totally defenceless state in which the two northern provinces are left, it will require at least eight days (I speak from authority) to prepare anything like adequate means of defence."

SECTION II.-LUSITANIAN LEGION.

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Lord Castlereagh to sir J. Cradock. November 27, 1808. "Its formation was proposed by the chevalier de Souza. . . . The pay, allowances, and clothing were settled by the chevalier de Souza. The former regulated, as I understood, upon the scale of increased pay, which the provisional government of Oporto had adopted for all the troops they were in progress of levying."

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh. December 24, 1808.

"I have considerable doubt if ever they" (the legion)" can be incorporated, with effect and conciliation, with the body of the Portuguese army. . . . They are viewed with extreme jealousy by the regency; and the commanding officers of the Portuguese battalions resisted, universally, the allowing of volunteers from their regiments to enter into the legion."

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh. January 19, 1809.

"The Lusitanian legion continues to give considerable uneasiness, from its peculiar state, under present circumstances."

Captain Morgan (Lusitanian legion) to sir J. Cradock.

January 19, 1809.

"Should a retreat be adopted, sir Robert would not retire to Oporto. It is the government of a mob, of which he has had too much experience.”

SECTION III.—PORTUGUESE ARMY.

Sir J. Cradock to sir John Moore. December 9, 1808.

"I am sorry to state that I find, as far as my limited observation reaches, the Portuguese army, and every other military concern, in the worst possible state."

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers. December 18, 1809.

"I am sure that the state of the Portuguese army is quite misunderstood in England; and that a reliance is placed upon it for the defence of the country that is entirely without foundation. Their" (Portuguese) "ministers will avow this to you after ten minutes' conversation. . . . Even of the reduced numbers of their men enrolled, (not amounting to twenty thousand, at the very

highest computation,) to make anything out of them, it is necessary to recur to first principles, and give them officers, arms, clothing, accoutrements, horses, etc.; and I need not say that money is wanting to effect this; and the ministers positively declare that they have none; and that no collection of their forces can take place, much less a movement to the frontier, without a supply. . . . M. Forjas, secretary to the government, in answer to a strong question from me, stated that their army have not in possession ten thousand firelocks fit for use."

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh. December 24, 1808.

"I am exerting myself to bring to account the supposed Portuguese army.'"-"Your lordship will perceive that I talk of the regulars as if it were a regular force; but I should be guilty of a deceit, that might lead to bad consequences, if I did not fairly state that I conceive them to be of no

moment at this time."

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers. January 8, 1809.

"I am ready to go to the utmost verge of prudence; but Mr. Frere, when he talks of Portuguese troops and arrangements, really (as I believe you will allow) fait bâtir des châteaux."

Major-general Cotton to sir J. Cradock. "I yesterday inspected the Portuguese cavalry. unformed, and totally unfit for any sort of service.”

April 7, 1809.

This cavalry is

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh. February 12.

"It appears that a report has reached your lordship that a conscription for horses in this country had been attended with great effect, and that above three thousand had been collected. It is, indeed, a matter of serious concern that such serious misrepresentations should be transmitted; for it is a wellknown fact that many of the Portuguese regiments of cavalry are without horses; and, if I am to pursue the subject, their battalions of infantry are one-half without arms or clothing! But the total want of all means of regulations for subsistence form so deplorable a view, in the event of co-operation, that the result, in my opinion, cannot be attended with success. It is, however, but justice to say, that the disposition of the Portuguese seems well-inclined and faithful to the common cause; and that a very efficient soldiery may be formed under more favourable circumstances."

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Frere. February 27, 1809.

"I fear that your excellency is led to entertain a more favourable notion of the efficacy of the Portuguese army than, in any shape, it is entitled to. In short, my opinion is that they want everything that constitutes a respectable force, except about ten thousand English arms. I believe they have no others. Many of their cavalry regiments are without horses, without swords, pistols, etc. Their battalions are not clothed; and, as to subsistence, they live at free quarters upon the villages where they are stationed. To take the field with effect, or an assurance of food, seems to me out of the question. Since the first moment of my arrival, I wished to procure the advance of a small Portuguese force to Alcantara; but it has been impossible. It is a matter

of serious lamentation that such misrepresentations of the Portuguese force should go home, or reach your excellency."

Sir J. Cradock to lord Castlereagh. April 3.

"No reliance whatever can be placed upon the Portuguese troops in their present state. If I said that the whole were ready to mutiny or revolt, I believe I speak general Beresford's sentiments. They will not be commanded by their own officers, and they do just as they please.”

SECTION IV.-CONDUCT OF THE REGENCY-TREATMENT OF FRENCH PRISONERS.

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers. January 26, 1809.

"I have hitherto directed that these prisoners should be subsisted at our charge, but I have no authority in this measure; they are in a most deplorable state, and really are a disgrace to all concerned."

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers. February 5, 1809.

"It is absolutely necessary that the regency should give in an answer about the French prisoners. The whole is an unauthorized heavy charge, for which I give my warrant; and I see no end to the case; and, added to this, their situation is a reflection upon humanity.”

SECTION V. NEGLECT, DUPLICITY, AND TIMIDITY.

Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock. Elvas, December 17.

“La Lippe, on which the very existence of Elvas depends, has notībeen supplied with provisions as I have been taught to expect."

Colonel Kemmis to sir J. Cradock. Elvas, December 25.

"The great importance of this fort" (La Lippe) "is well known to the Portuguese; and, therefore, they are jealous, notwithstanding the miserable condition of their troops, and total incapacity to defend the fort, if attacked."

December 26, 1808.

Sir J. Cradock to Mr. Villiers. "The promises and apparently satisfactory language of the Portuguese government are, in my opinion, by no means sufficient to meet the case. I want to see some steps actually taken before my mind is decided that the nation will defend itself. . . . Indeed, I am told, on good authority, that the government are afraid to allow the people to arm. . . . The moment I see any materials to work upon, it will be my most anxious duty to give every effect, etc.... But, under the present inactivity and indifference, it is, etc."

...

Reports of colonel Donkin (quartermaster-general) to sir John Cradock. March 21.

"I cannot, however, order officers of my department to check this irrregularity" (forcing quarters) "when it originates solely in the neglect of the Portuguese civil magistrates; for troops will not obey orders which expose them wantonly to great privations"

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