king, and brought up the second corps to Arzobispo. Meanwhile, the duke of Belluno, who had, on the 5th, ascertained the retreat of the allies from Talavera, and retraced his steps, entered that town on the 6th. Thus the English hospital containing fifteen hundred wounded men, besides sick, fell into his hands, and their treatment was such as might be expected from a gallant and courteous nation; between the British soldiers and the French there was no rancour, and the generous usages of a civilized and honourable warfare were cherished. The 7th, Victor crossed the Tagus, at the bridge of Talavera, and pushed his advanced guard to Aldea Nueva de Balbaroya on the left bank, that is, within a few leagues of the Spanish position which Soult was now preparing to attack in front; for he had observed that, at a certain point, the Spanish horses, when brought to drink, came far into the stream, and the place being sounded in the night of the 7th, a deep but practicable ford was discovered, about half a mile above the bridge.

The second and fifth corps, and a division of the sixth were concentrated to force this passage early on the morning of the 8th; but Soult hearing of Victor's movement, and perceiving that Albuquerque had withdrawn the Spanish cavalry, leaving only a rear-guard in the works, judged that the allies were retreating. Wherefore, without relinquishing the attack at Arzobispo, he sent the division of the sixth corps back to Naval Moral, and at the same time transmitted a plan of the ford below Almaraz to Ney, whom he directed to cross the Tagus there, seize the Puerto de Mirabete, and be in readiness to fall upon the allies, as they came out from the defiles between Deleytosa and Truxillo.

COMBAT OF ARZOBISPO.

The heat of the day had induced Albuquerque to seek shelter for his horsemen in a wood, near Azutan, a village about five miles from the bridge; the Spanish infantry, keeping a bad guard, were sleeping or loitering about without care or thought, when Mortier, who was charged with the direction of the attack, taking advantage of their want of vigilance, commenced the passage of the river. The French cavalry, about six thousand in number, had been secretly assembled near the ford, and, about two o'clock in the day, general Caulincourt's brigade suddenly entered the stream. The Spaniards, running to their arms, manned the batteries, and opened upon the leading squadrons, but Mortier immediately overwhelmed the Spanish gunners with a concentric fire of artil lery; Caulincourt reached the other side of the river, turned to his right, and taking the batteries in reverse, cut down the cannoniers, and dispersed the infantry with great facility. But the duke of Albuquerque, who had mounted at the first alarm, came down with all his horsemen in one mass, though without order, upon Caulincourt, and the latter

was in imminent danger, until the rest of the French cavalry, passing rapidly, joined in the combat; one brigade of infantry followed at the ford, another burst the barriers on the bridge itself, and, by this time, the Spanish foot were flying to the mountains. Albuquerque's effort was thus frustrated, a general route ensued, and five guns and about four hundred prisoners were taken.

Soult's design being to follow up this success, he directed that the first corps should move, in two columns, upon Guadalupe and Deleytosa, intending to support it with the second and fifth, while the sixth corps crossed at Almaraz, and seized the pass of Mirabete. This would undoubtedly have completed the ruin of the Spanish army, and forced sir Arthur to make a rapid and disastrous retreat; for so complete was the surprise, and so sudden the overthrow, that some of the English foragers also fell into the hands of the enemy; and that Cuesta's army was in no condition to have made any resistance, if the pursuit had been continued with vigour, is clear from the following facts:

1o. When he withdrew his main body from the bridge of Arzobispo to Peralada de Garbin on the 7th, he left fifteen pieces of artillery by the road-side, without a guard. The defeat of Albuquerque placed these guns at the mercy of the enemy, who were, however, ignorant of their situation, until a trumpeter attending an English flag of truce, either treacherously, or foolishly, mentioned it in the French camp, from whence a detachment of cavalry was sent to fetch them off. 2o. The British military agent, placed at the Spanish headquarters, was kept in ignorance of the action; and it was only by the arrival of the duke of Albuquerque at Deleytosa, on the evening of the 9th, that sir Arthur Wellesley knew the bridge was lost. He had before advised Cuesta to withdraw behind the Ibor river, and even now contemplated a partial attack to keep the enemy in check; but when he repaired in person to that general's quarter on the 10th, he found the country covered with fugitives and stragglers, and Cuesta as helpless and yet as haughty as ever. All his ammunition and guns, forty pieces, were on the right bank of the Ibor, and of course at the foot of the Meza, within sight and cannon-shot of the enemy on the right bank of the Tagus; they would have been taken by the first French patroles that approached, if sir Arthur Wellesley had not persuaded the Spanish staff-officers to have them dragged up the hill, in the course of the 10th, without Cuesta's knowledge.

In this state of affairs, the impending fate of the Peninsula was again averted by the king, who recalled the first corps to the support of the fourth, then opposed to Venegas. Marshal Ney, also, was unable to discover the ford below the bridge of Almaraz, and by the 11th the allies had re-established their line of defence. The headquarters of the British were at Jaraceijo, and those of the Spaniards at Deleytosa; the

former guarding the ford of Almaraz, formed the left; the latter, occupying the Meza d'Ibor and Campillo, were on the right. The 12th, Cuesta resigned. General Eguia succeeded to the command, and at first gave hopes of a better co-operation, but the evil was in the character of the people. The position of the allies was now, however, compact and central; the reserves could easily support the advanced posts; the communication to the rear was open, and if defended with courage the Meza d'Ibor was impregnable; to pass the Tagus at Almaraz, in itself a difficult operation, would, while the Mirabete and Meza d'Ibor were occupied, have been dangerous for the French, as they would be enclosed in the narrow space between those ridges and the river.

The duke of Dalmatia, thus thwarted, conceived that sir Arthur Wellesley would endeavour to repass the Tagus by Alcantara, and so rejoin Beresford and the five thousand British troops, under Catlin Craufurd and Lightburn, which were, by this time, near the frontier of Portugal. To prevent this he resolved to march at once upon Coria, with the second, fifth, and sixth corps; to threaten both Beresford's and sir Arthur's communication with Lisbon, and at the same time, prepare for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; but marshal Ney absolutely refused to concur in this operation. He observed that sir Arthur Wellesley was not yet in march for Alcantara; that it was exceedingly dangerous to invade Portugal in a hasty manner; and that the army could not be fed between Coria, Placencia, and the Tagus; finally that Salamanca, being again in possession of the Spaniards, it was more fitting that the sixth corps should retake that town, and occupy the line of the Tormes to cover Castille. This reasoning was approved by Joseph, who dreaded the further fatigue and privations that would attend a continuance of the operations during the excessive heats, and in a wasted country; and he was strengthened in his opinion by the receipt of a despatch from the emperor, dated Schonbrunn, the 29th of July, in which any further offensive operations were forbade, until the re-enforcements which the recent victory of Wagram enabled him to send should arrive in Spain. The second corps was consequently directed to take post at Placencia ; the fifth corps relieved the first at Talavera; and the English wounded, being, by Victor, given over to marshal Mortier, the latter, with a chivalrous sense of honour, would not permit his own soldiers, although suffering severe privations themselves, to receive rations until the hospitals were first supplied. The sixth corps was directed upon Valladolid, for Joseph was alarmed lest a fresh insurrection, excited and supported by the duke del Parque, should spread over the whole of Leon and Castille.

Ney marched on the 11th; but to his surprise found, that sir Robert Wilson, with about four thousand men, part Spaniards, part Portuguese, was in possession of the pass of Baños. To explain this, it must be observed, that when the British army marched from Talavera on the

5d, Wilson, then at Nombella, was put in communication with Cuesta. He had sent his artillery to the army on the 3d, and on the 4th, finding that the Spaniards had abandoned Talavera, fell back with his infantry to Vellada, a few miles north of Talavera. He was then twenty-four miles from Arzobispo, and as Cuesta did not quit Oropesa until the 5th, a junction with sir Arthur Wellesley might have been effected; but it was impossible to know this at the time, and Wilson very prudently crossed the Tietar and made for the mountains, trusting to his activity and local knowledge to escape the enemy. Villatte's division pursued him on the 5th to Nombella; a detachment from the garrison of Avila was watching for him in the passes of Arenas and Monbeltran; and general Foy waited for him in the Vera de Placencia. Nevertheless, baffling his opponents, he broke through their circle at Viandar, passed the Gredos at a ridge called the Sierra de Lanes, and getting into the valley of the Tormes reached Bejar from thence, thinking to recover his communications with the army, he marched towards Placencia by the pass of Baños, and thus, on the morning of the 12th, met Ney returning to the Salamanca country.

The dust of the French column being seen from afar, and a retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo open, it is not easy to comprehend why sir Robert Wilson should have given battle to the sixth corps. His position, although difficult of approach, and strengthened by the piling of large stones in the narrowest parts, was not one in which he could hope to stop a whole army, and accordingly when the French, overcoming the local obstacles, got close upon his left, the fight was at an end; the first charge broke both the legion and the Spanish auxiliaries, and the whole dispersed. Ney continued his march, and having recovered the line of the Tormes, resigned the command of the sixth corps to general Marchand and returned to France. But while these things happened in Estramadura, La Mancha was the theatre of more important operations.

CHAPTER IV.

Venegas advances to Aranjuez-Skirmishes there--Sebastiani crosses the Tagus at Toledo -Venegas concentrates his army-Battle of Almonacid-Sir Arthur Wellesley contemplates passing the Tagus at the Puente de Cardinal, is prevented by the ill-conduct of the junta-His troops distressed for provisions-He resolves to retire into Portugal -False charge made by Cuesta against the British army refuted-Beresford's proceedings-Mr. Frere superseded by lord Wellesley-The English army abandons its position at Jaraceijo and marches towards Portugal-Consternation of the junta-Sir Arthur Wellesley defends his conduct, and refuses to remain in Spain-Takes a position within the Portuguese frontier-Sickness in the army.

WHEN the duke of Belluno retired from Salinas to Maqueda, the king, hearing of Wilson's march, and fearing that the allied army was moving up the right bank of the Alberche, carried his reserve in the night of the 3d to Mostoles, but the fourth corps remained at Illescas sending strong patroles to Valdemoro. Wilson retired, as we have seen, from Nombella on the 4th; and the king, no longer expecting the allies in that quarter, marched in the night to Valdemoro, where he was joined by the fourth corps from Illescas. The 5th, the duke of Belluno returned to St. Olalla; and the king marched against general Venegas, who, in pursuance of the secret orders of the junta before mentioned, had loitered about Damyel and Tembleque until the 27th of July. It was the 29th before he reached Ocaña, his advanced posts were then at Aranjuez, his rear-guard at Yebes, and one division, under Lacy, in front of Toledo; the same day, one of the partidas attending the army, surprised a small French post on the other side of the Tagus, and Lacy's division skirmished with the garrison of Toledo. The 50th, Venegas heard of the battle of Talavera, and at the same time Lacy reported that the head of the enemy's columns were to be seen on the road beyond Toledo. The Spanish commander immediately re-enforced Lacy, and gave him Mora as a point of retreat; but on the 2d of August, being falsely informed by Cuesta, that the allied troops would immediately march upon Madrid, Venegas recalled his divisions from Toledo, pretending to concentrate his army at Aranjuez, in order to march also upon the capital. Yet he had no intention of doing so, for the junta did not desire to see Cuesta at the head of sixty thousand men in that