this was the spring-time of folly. In the second corps the conspirators were numerous, and by their discourses and their slow sullen execution of orders, had continually thwarted the operations of marshal Soult, without exciting his suspicions; but as he penetrated into Portugal, their counteractions increased, and, by the time he arrived at Oporto, their design was ripe for execution.

In the middle of April, John Viana, the son of an Oporto merchant, had appeared at marshal Beresford's headquarters, with proposals from the French malecontents, who desired to have an English officer sent to them, to arrange the execution of a plan, which was to be commenced by seizing their general, and giving him over to the British outposts. This was a detestable project, for it is not in the field, and with a foreign enemy, that soldiers should concert the overthrow of their country's institutions. It would be idle and impertinent in a foreigner to say how much and how long men shall bear with what they deem an oppressive government; yet there is a distinct and especial loyalty due from a soldier to his general in the field; a compact of honour, which it is singularly base to violate, and so it has in all ages been considered. When the Macedonian Argyraspides delivered their general, Eumenes, in bonds to Antigonus, the latter, although he had tempted them to the deed and scrupled not to slay the hero, reproached the treacherous soldiers for their conduct, and with the approbation of all men destroyed them yet Antigonus was not a foreign enemy, but of their own kin and blood.

An English lieutenant-colonel attached to the Portuguese service reluctantly undertook the duty of meeting these French conspirators, and penetrated, by night, in uniform, behind the French outposts, by the lake of Aveiro or Ovar. He had previously arranged that one of the malecontents should meet him on the water, but the boats unknowingly passed each other in the dark, and when the Englishman returned to Aveiro, he found John Viana, in company with the French adjutantmajor, D'Argenton. The latter confirmed what Viana had declared at Thomar, and he expressed great respect for Soult, yet dwelt upon the necessity of removing him before an appeal could be made to the soldiers; he readily agreed to wait in person upon Beresford, saying he was himself too strongly supported in the French army to be afraid. Marshal Beresford was then at Lisbon, thither d'Argenton followed, and having seen him and sir Arthur Wellesley, remained five days in that capital, and then returned to Oporto. While at Lisbon, in addition to his former reasons for this conspiracy, he stated that Soult wished to make himself king of Portugal; an errour into which many persons naturally fell, from the circumstances I have already noticed.

When sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Coimbra, D'Argenton appeared again at the English headquarters; this time however, by the order of

sir Arthur, he was conducted through by-paths, and returned convinced, from what he had seen and heard, that although the allies were in force on the Mondego, many days must elapse before they could be in a condition to attack Oporto. During his absence, he had been denounced by general Lefebvre, who was falsely imagined to be favourable to the conspiracy, and being arrested, passports signed by admiral Berkeley, which this unfortunate man, contrary to sir Arthur Wellesley's urgent recommendation, had insisted upon having, completely proved his guilt. Soult, until that moment without suspicion, beheld with amazement the abyss that yawned beneath his feet, but his firmness did not desert him. He offered D'Argenton pardon, and even reward, if he would disclose the names of the other conspirators and relate truly what he had seen of the English and Portuguese armies. The prisoner, to save his life, readily told all he knew of the British; but sir Arthur Wellesley's foresight had rendered that tale useless; and with respect to his French accomplices, D'Argenton was at first firm. Exaggerating the importance of the conspiracy, he even defied the marshal's power, and advised him, as the safest course, to adopt the conspirators' sentiments; nor was his boldness fatal to him at the moment, for Soult, anxious to ascertain the extent of the danger, delayed executing him, and he effected his escape during the subsequent operations. He was not the only person who communicated secretly with the British general: colonel Donadieu and colonel Lafitte were also engaged in the conspiracy; and the latter is said to have had an interview with sir Arthur, between the outposts of the two armies, and from the first the malecontents were urgent that the movements of the allied forces should be so regulated as to favour their proceedings: sir Arthur Wellesley, however, having little dependence upon intrigue, sternly intimated that his operations could not be regulated by their plots, and hastened his military mea

sures.

Under the impression that Sylveira was successfully defending the line of the Tamega, the British general at first resolved to re-enforce him by sending Beresford's and Wilson's corps across the Duero at Lamego, by which he hoped to cut Soult off from Tras os Montes; intending, when their junction was effected, to march with his own army direct upon Oporto, and to cross the Duero near that town, by the aid of Beresford's corps, which would then be on the right bank. This measure, if executed, would, including Trant's, Wilson's, and Sylveira's people, have placed a mass of thirty thousand troops, regulars, and irregulars, between the Tras os Montes and Soult; the latter must then have fought a battle under very unfavourable circumstances, or have fallen back on the Minho, which he could scarcely have passed at that season while pressed by the pursuing army. But the plan was necessarily abandoned when intelligence arrived that the bridge of Amarante was

forced, and that Sylveira, pursued by the enemy, was driven over the Duero. The news of this disaster only reached Coimbra the 4th of May, and, on the 6th, a part of the army was already in motion to execute a fresh project, adapted to the change of affairs. But as this eagerness to fall on Soult may appear to justify those who censured sir John Cradock's caution, it may here be well to show how far the circumstances were changed. When Cradock refused to advance, the Portuguese troops were insubordinate and disorganized; they were now obedient and improved in discipline. Sir John Cradock had scarcely any cavalry; but four regiments had since been added. In the middle of April, Cuesta was only gathering the wrecks of his forces after Medellin; he was now at the head of thirty-five thousand men. The intentions of the British government had been doubtful, they were no longer so. Sir John Cradock's influence had been restricted, the new general came out with enlarged powers, the full confidence of the ministers, and with Portuguese rank. His reputation, his popularity, and the disposition of mankind, always prone to magnify the future, whether for good or bad, combined to give an unusual impulse to public feeling, and enabled him to dictate at once to the regency, the diplomatists, the generals, and the people; to disregard all petty jealousies and intrigues, and to calculate upon resources from which his predecessor was debarred. Sir Arthur Wellesley, habituated to the command of armies, was moreover endowed by nature with a lofty genius, and a mind capacious of warlike affairs.

CHAPTER II.

Campaign on the Duero-Relative position of the French and English armies-Sir Arthur Wellesley marches to the Vouga-Sends Beresford to the Duero-A division under general Hill passes the lake of Ovar-Attempt to surprise Franceschi fails-Combat of Grijon-The French recross the Duero and destroy the bridge at Oporto-Passage of the Duero-Soult retreats upon Amarante-Beresford reaches Amarante-Loison retreats from that town-Sir Arthur marches upon Braga-Desperate situation of Soult His energy-He crosses the Sierra Catalina-Rejoins Loison-Reaches Carvalho d'Este -Falls back to Salamonde-Daring action of major Dulong-The French pass the Ponte Nova and the Saltador, and retreat by Montalegre-Soult enters Orense - Observations.

CAMPAIGN ON THE DUERO.

AFTER the action of Amarante, Laborde's troops were recalled to Oporto, a brigade of cavalry and a regiment of infantry being left to keep up the communication with Loison; general Botilho, however, soon reappeared upon the Lima, Lorges' dragoons were detached to watch him, and meanwhile Mermet's division was pushed towards the Vouga. The French army was thus extended in detachments from that river to the Tamega, occupying two sides of a triangle; its flanks were presented to the enemy, the wings separated by the Duero and without communication, except by the boat-bridge of Oporto. It required three days to unite on the centre, and five days to concentrate on either extremity.

The situation of the allies was very different;-sir Arthur Wellesley having assembled the bulk of his troops at Coimbra, had the choice of two lines of operation: the one, through Viseu and Lamego, by which, in four or five marches, he could turn the French left and cut them off from Tras os Montes; the other leading upon Oporto, whereby, in two marches, he could throw himself unexpectedly and in very superior numbers, upon the enemy's right, with a prospect of crushing it between the Vouga and the Duero. On the first of these two lines, which were separated by the lofty ridges of the Sierra de Caramula, the march could be covered by Wilson's corps which was at Viseu, and by Sylveira's which was near Lamego. Along the second, the movement could be screened by Trant's corps on the Vouga.

The duke of Dalmatia's dispositions were made in ignorance of sir

Arthur Wellesley's position, numbers, and intentions. He was not even aware of the vicinity of such an antagonist, but sensible that to advance directly upon Lisbon was beyond his own strength, he meditated to cross the Tamega, and then, covered by that river and the Duero, to follow the great route of Braganza, and so enter the Salamanca country. It was in this view that Loison had been directed to get possession of Mezamfrio and Pezo de Ragoa, Mermet's advance towards the Vouga being only to support Franceschi's retreat, when the army should commence its movement towards the Tamega. The 9th of May, D'Argenton was arrested, the film fell from Soult's eyes, and all the perils of his position broke at once upon his view. Treason in his camp which he could not probe; a powerful enemy close in his front; the insurgents again active in his rear; the French troops scattered from the Vouga to the Tamega, from the Duero to the Lima, and commanded by officers, whose fidelity was necessarily suspected, while the extent of the conspiracy was unknown.'

Appalling as this prospect was, the duke of Dalmatia did not quail at the sight. The general officers having assured him of the fidelity of the troops, he ordered Loison to keep Mezamfrio and Ragoa, if he could, but under any circumstances to hold Amarante fast; the greatest part of the guns and stores at Oporto were then directed upon the Tamega; the ammunition was, part removed, part destroyed, and Lorges was directed to withdraw the garrison of Viana and make for Amarante; D'Argenton was then closely and successfully pressed to discover his accomplices, and all the arrangements necessary for a movement upon the Tras os Montes were actively followed up. But the war was coming on with a full and swift tide, Loison, upon whose vigour the success of the operation depended, was giving way, Wellesley was already across the Vouga, and Franceschi was struggling in his grasp.

The English general had resolved to operate along both the routes before spoken of, but the greater facility of supplying the troops by the coast-line, and, above all, the exposed position of the French right wing, so near the allies and so distant from succour, induced him to make the principal attack by the high road leading to Oporto. He had one division of cavalry and three of infantry, exclusive of Beresford's corps. The first division, composed of two brigades of infantry and twelve guns, was commanded by lieutenant-general Paget. The second, of three brigades of infantry and six guns, by lieutenant-general Sherbrooke. The third, of two brigades of infantry and six guns, by major-general Hill. The cavalry, by lieutenant-general Payne. The whole amounted to about fourteen thousand five hundred infantry, fifteen hundred cavalry, and twenty-four guns, of which six were only three-pounders.

1 S. Journal of Operations, MS.