in that, committed other excesses, and murdered Don Joseph Heredia, the collector of public rents. During the tumult, which lasted two days, the disembarkation of the English troops was repeatedly called for by the mob, and two British officers being sent on shore as mediators, were received with enthusiasm, and obeyed with respect, a manifest proof of the correct view taken by sir George Smith. The 24th, tranquillity was restored, and on the 25th, general Mackenzie, not having received from Mr. Frere an answer to his letter of the 18th, suggested that of the three English battalions then in the harbour, two should be placed in Cadiz, and that the third, proceeding to Seville, should there unite with the 40th regiment, and both together march to join Cuesta. Mr. Frere, however, instead of addressing the junta with an authority and dignity becoming the representative of a great nation on whose support the independence of the whole Peninsula rested, had been endeavouring to gain his end by subtlety. The object was one that England had a right to seek, the Spanish rulers no right to refuse, for the people wished to further it, and the threat of an appeal to them would soon have silenced the feeble negative of such a despicable and suspected government; Mr. Frere, incapable of taking a single and enlarged view, pressed a variety of trifling points, and discussed them with the secretary of the junta, with more regard to epistolary dexterity than useful diplomacy. And when his opponent conceded the great point of admitting troops at all, he broke off the negotiation, upon the question whether the number to be admitted should be one or two thousand men; as if the way to drive a wedge was with the broad end foremost. Self-baffled in that quarter, the British plenipotentiary, turning towards Cuesta, the avowed enemy of the junta and one much feared by them, sought to secure his assistance by holding out the lure of having a British force added to his command; but the sarcastic old general derided the diplomatist. "Although I do not," said he, "discover any great difficulty in the actual state of things, which should prevent his British majesty's troops from garrisoning Cadiz under such terms, and for the purpose which your excellency proposes, I am far from supposing that the supreme junta, which is fully persuaded of the importance of our union with England, is not grounded in its objections; and your excellency knows that it is sufficient that they should have them, to prevent my giving any opinion on so important a measure, unless they should consult me. With regard to the 4,500 men, which your excellency is pleased to mention, there is no doubt that I stand in need of them; but I flatter myself, England, sensible of the importance of Estramadura, will even lend me much greater assistance, particularly Appendix, No. XXXVIII. if, from any change of circumstances, the supreme junta should no longer manifest the repugnance we speak of." This answer having frustrated the projected intrigue, Mr. Frere, conscious perhaps of diplomatic incapacity, returned with renewed ardour to the task of directing the military affairs, in every part of the Peninsula. He had seen an intercepted letter of Soult's, addressed to the king, in which the project of penetrating into Portugal was mentioned, and immediately concluding that general Mackenzie's troops would be wanted for the defence of that kingdom, counselled him to abandon Cadiz and return to Lisbon; but the general, who knew that, even should he return, a successful defence of Portugal with so few troops would be impossible, and that every precaution was already taken for an embarkation in the last extremity, observed, that "the danger of Lisbon rendered the occupation of Cadiz more important.” General Mackenzie's reply was written the 26th of February. On the 3d of March he received another despatch from Mr. Frere. Cadiz, and the danger of Portugal, seemed to have passed from the writer's mind, and were unnoticed; entering into a minutely inaccurate statement of the situation of the French and Spanish armies, he observed, that Soult having failed in an attempt to penetrate Portugal by the Minho, it was impossible from the position of the Spanish forces, assisted as they were by the Portuguese, that he could persevere in his plan. Wherefore, he proposed that the British force then in the harbour of Cadiz should proceed immediately to Tarragona to aid Reding,' and this wild scheme was only frustrated by an unexpected despatch from sir John Cradock, recalling the troops to Lisbon.3 They arrived there on the 12th of March, and thus ended a transaction clearly indicating an unsettled policy, shallow combinations, a bad choice of agents on the part of the English cabinet, and a most unwise and unworthy disposition in the supreme junta. General Mackenzie attributed the jealousy of the latter to French influence; Mr. Frere to the abrupt proceedings of sir George Smith, and to fear, lest the junta of Seville, who were continually on the watch to recover their ancient power, should represent the admission of the British troops as a treasonable proceeding on the part of the supreme government. It is, however, evident that the true cause was the false position in which the English ministers had originally placed themselves, by inundating Spain with arms and money, without asserting their just influence, and making their assistance the price of good order and useful exertion. Parl. Papers, 1810. 2 Appendix, No. XXXVIII. 3 Appendix, No. XXXVII. CHAPTER III. Weakness of the British army in Portugal - General Cameron marches to Lisbon - Sir Robert Wilson remains near Ciudad Rodrigo - Sir John Cradock prepares to take a defensive position at Passo d'Arcos Double dealing of the regency The populace murder foreigners, and insult the British troops Anarchy in Oporto - British government ready to abandon Portugal Change their intention - Military system of Portugal — The regency demand an English general — Beresford is sent to them Sherbrooke's and Mackenzie's troops arrive at Lisbon Beresford arrives there, and takes the command of the native force- Change in the aspect of affairs — Sir John Cradock encamps at Lumiar - Relative positions of the allied and French armiesMarshal Beresford desires sir John Cradock to march against Soult-Cradock refusesVarious unwise projects broached by different persons. - THE effort made to secure Cadiz was an act of disinterested zeal on the part of sir John Cradock; for the absence of his best troops exposed him to the most galling peevishness from the regency, and to the grossest insults from the populace. Nor with his reduced force, could he expect to hold even a contracted position at the extremity of the rock of Lisbon against the weakest army likely to invade Portugal; and as there was neither a native force nor a government to be depended upon, there remained for him only the prospect of a forced and, consequently, disgraceful embarkation, and the undeserved obloquy that never fails to follow disaster. In this disagreeable situation, as Elvas and Almeida no longer contained British troops, his attention was necessarily fixed upon Lisbon, and upon Oporto which the violence of the gales had rendered a sealed port; meanwhile, the hospitals and magazines of Almeida, and even those of Salamanca being sent to Lamego, had crowded that place with fifteen hundred sick men, besides escorts and hourly accumulating stores; and as the Duero had overflowed, the craft could not ply; one large boat attempting to descend was overset, when eighty persons, soldiers and others, perished. General Cameron also, hearing of this confusion, relinquished the idea of embarking at Oporto, and recrossing the Duero made for Lisbon, where he arrived in the beginning of February with two thousand men, worn with fatigue by a march of eight hundred miles under continued rains. Sir Robert Wilson had sent his guns to Abrantes, by the road of Idanha Nova, but partly from a spirit of adventure, partly from an erroneous idea that sir John Cradock wished him to defend the frontier, he remained with his infantry in the neighbourhood of Ciudad Rodrigo. His force had been increased by a Spanish detachment under Don Carlos d'España, and by some volunteers, yet it was still weak, and his operations were necessarily confined to a few trifling skirmishes: however his imagination so far outstripped his judgment, that when he had only felt the advanced post of a single division, he expressed his conviction that the French were going to abandon Spain altogether." Sir John Cradock entertained no such false expectations, he was informed of the battle of Coruña and the death of Moore, and he knew too well the vigour and talent of that general to doubt that he had been oppressed by an overwhelming force. He knew that Zaragoza had fallen, and that twenty-five thousand French troops were thus free to act in other quarters; that Soult with at least twenty thousand men was on the Minho; that Romana was incapable of making any head; that Portugal was one wide scene of helpless confusion; that a French army was again in the neighbourhood of Merida, threatening Lisbon by the line of the Tagus; in fine, that his own embarrassments were hourly increasing, and that the moment was arrived when the safety of his troops was the chief consideration. The tenour of the few despatches he had received from England led him to suppose that the ministers designed to abandon Portugal;3 but, as their intentions on that head were never clearly explained, he resolved to abide by the literal interpretation of his first instructions, and to keep his hold of the country as long as it was possible to do so without risking the utter destruction of his army. To avoid that danger, he put every encumbrance at Lisbon on board the transposts in the Tagus, dismantled the batteries at the mouth of the river, and in concert with the admiral, made preparations for carrying away or destroying the military and naval stores in the arsenal. At the same time he renewed his efforts to embark the sick men and stores at Oporto; but the weather continued so unfavourable that he was finally obliged to remove the invalids and stores by land; yet he could not procure carriages for the whole. After the arrival of Cameron's detachment, the effective British force under arms, including convalescents and fifteen hundred stragglers from sir John Moore's army, was about eight thousand men; and when the security of the forts and magazines, and the tranquillity of Lisbon, was provided for, only five thousand men, and those not in the best order, could be brought into the field.4 As this force was infinitely too weak to cover such a town as Lisbon, the general judged that it would be unwise to take up a position in advance, whence he should be obliged to retreat through the midst of a turbulent and excited po Appendix, No. XXXV, section 1. a Ibid. 3 Appendix, No. XXXIX, section 1. 4 Appendix, No. XL. pulation, which had already given too many indications of ill-temper to leave any doubt of its hostility under such circumstances. He, therefore, came to the resolution of withdrawing from Saccavem and Lisbon, to concentrate his whole force on a position at Passo d'Arcos near the mouth of the river, where he could embark with least danger, and where he had the best chance of defending himself, if necessary, against superior numbers." This reasoning was sound, and Cradock's intention was, undoubtedly, not to quit Portugal, unless driven from it by force, or in pursuance of orders from England; his arrangements, however, seem to have carried more the appearance of alarm than was either politic or necessary; the position of Passo d'Arcos might have been prepared, and the means necessary for an embarkation secured, and yet the bulk of the troops kept in advance until the last moment. To display a bold and confident front in war is, of all things, the most essential, as well to impose upon friends as upon enemies, and sir John Cradock did not fail to experience the truth of this maxim. The population of Lisbon, alarmed by the reverses in Spain, yet, like all the people in the Peninsula, confident in their own prowess and resolution until the very moment of attack, became extremely exasperated; the regency, partly from their natural folly and insincerity, but more from the dread of the lower orders, countenanced, if they did not instigate, the latter to commit excesses, and to interrupt the proceedings of the British naval and military authorities. The measures of precaution relative to the forts had originated with the regency, yet they now formally protested against them, and with a view to hamper the general, encouraged their subalterns to make many false and even ridiculous charges against the British executive officers; and it would appear that the remonstrances of the admiral and generals were but imperfectly supported by Mr. Villiers." In this manner the people's violence was nourished until the city was filled with tumult; mobs armed with English pikes and muskets collected night and day in the streets and on the high-roads, and under the pretext of seeking for and killing Frenchmen, attacked indiscriminately all foreigners, even those in the British service wearing the British uniform.3 The guards who endeavoured to protect the victims of this ferocity were insulted; couriers passing with despatches were intercepted and deprived of their papers; English officers were outraged in the streets, and such was the audacity of the people, that the artillery was placed in the squares in expectation of an affray. The state of Lisbon was similar to what it had been at the period of Junot's convention, and if the British had abandoned the country at this time, they would have 1 Appendix, No. XXXIX, sections 11 and 11. 2 Appendix, No XXXII, sect.v. 3 lbid. section vi. |