being without fighting men, to plead for quiet submission. The fugitive troops also readily collected again at any given point, partly from patriotism, partly because the French were in possession of their native provinces, partly that they attributed their defeats to the treachery of their generals, and partly that, being deceived by the gross falsehoods and boasting of the government, they, with ready vanity, imagined that the enemy had invariably suffered enormous losses. In fine, for the reasons mentioned in the commencement of this history, men were to be had in abundance, but, beyond assembling them and appointing some incapable person to command, nothing was done for defence. The officers, who were not deceived, had no confidence either in their own troops or in the government, nor were they themselves confided in or respected by their men: the latter being starved, misused, and ill-handled in the field, possessed neither the compact strength of discipline nor the daring of enthusiasm. Under such a system, the peasantry could not be rendered energetic soldiers, nor were they active supporters of the cause; yet with a wonderful constancy they endured for it, fatigue, sickness, nakedness and famine, displaying in all their actions, and in all their sentiments, a distinct and powerful national character. This constancy, although rendered nugatory by the vices and follies of the juntas and leading men, hallowed the people's efforts, and the flagitious violence of the invasion almost justified their ferocity.

Palacios, on the receipt of the orders above mentioned, advanced, with five thousand men, to Vilharta, in La Mancha; the duke of Infantado, anticipating the instructions of the junta, was already in motion from Cuenca, and his army, re-enforced by the divisions of Cartoajal and Lilli, and by fresh levies, was about twenty thousand men, of which two thousand were cavalry. To check the incursions of the French horsemen, the duke had, a few days after the departure of Napoleon from Madrid, detached general Senra and general Venegas with eight thousand infantry, and all the horse, to scour the country round Tarancon and Aranjuez. The former entered Horcajada, the latter endeavoured to cut off a French detachment, but was himself surprised and beaten by a very inferior force; nevertheless, Victor, in some alarm, withdrew his advanced posts, and, concentrating Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions of infantry, and Latour Maubourg's cavalry, at Villa de Alorna, in the vicinity of Toledo, left Venegas in possession of Tarancon. But, among the Spanish generals, mutual recriminations had succeeded this new failure: the duke of Infantado possessed neither authority nor talents to repress their disputes, and in this untoward state of affairs, having received the orders of the junta, projected a movement on Toledo, intending to seize that place and Aranjuez, to break down the bridges, and maintain the line of the Tagus. The 10th he quitted Cuenca with ten thousand men, intending to join Venegas, who, with the rest of the

army, was at Tarancon, but the 15th, he met a crowd of fugitives near Carascosa, and heard, with equal surprise and consternation, that the division under Venegas was beaten, and the pursuers close at hand.

ROUT OF UCLES.

It appeared that Victor, ignorant of the exact situation and intentions of the Spanish generals, and yet uneasy at their movements, had marched from Toledo to Ocaña the 10th, and that Venegas then abandoned Tarancon and took post at Ucles. The French again advanced on the 12th in two columns, of which one, composed of Ruffin's division and a brigade of cavalry, lost its way, and arrived at Alcazar; the other, led by Victor in person, arrived in front of the Spanish position at Ucles early in the morning of the 13th. This meeting was unexpected by either party, but the French attacked without hesitation, and the Spaniards, making towards Alcazar, were cut off by Ruffin, and totally discomfited. Several thousands were taken, others fled across the fields, and one body preserving some order, marched towards Ocaña, where meeting the French park, it received a heavy discharge of grape, and dispersed. Of the whole force, only one small detachment, under general Giron, forced a passage by the road of Carascosa, and so reached the duke of Infantado, who immediately retreated safely to Cuenca, as the French cavalry was too much fatigued to pursue him briskly. From Cuenca the duke sent his guns towards Valencia by the road of Tortola, but marched his infantry and cavalry by Chinchilla, to Tobarra on the frontiers of Murcia, and then to Santa Cruz de Mudela, a town situated near the entrance to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, which he reached in the beginning of February, after a painful and circuitous retreat of more than two hundred miles, in a bad season; his artillery had been captured at Tortola, and his troops were reduced by desertion and straggling, to a handful of discontented officers, and a few thousand men worn out with fatigue and misery.

Meanwhile, Victor, after scouring a part of the province of Cuenca and disposing of his prisoners, made a sudden march upon Vilharta, intending to surprise Palacios; but that officer, aware of Infantado's retreat, had already effected a junction with the latter at Santa Cruz de Mudela, wherefore the French marshal relinquished the attempt and reoccupied his former position at Toledo. The captives taken at Ucles were marched to Madrid, those who were weak and unable to walk, being, says Mr. Rocca, shot by order of Victor, because the Spaniards had hanged some French prisoners. If so, it was a barbarous and a shameful retaliation, unworthy of a soldier, for what justice or propriety

1 Rocca's Memoirs.

is shown in revenging the death of one innocent person by the murder of another?

After the French had thus withdrawn, Infantado and Palacios proceeded to reorganize their forces, under the name of the Carolina Army; and when the levies in Grenada and other parts came up, the duke of Albuquerque, at the head of the cavalry, endeavoured to surprise a French regiment of dragoons at Mora; but the latter rallied quickly, fought stoutly, and effected a retreat with scarcely any loss. Albuquerque then retired to Consuegra, where he was attacked the next day by superior numbers, and got off with difficulty. The duke of Infantado was now displaced by the junta, and general Urbina, conde de Cartoajal, the new commander, having restored some discipline, advanced to Ciudad Real and took post on the left bank of the Upper Guadiana. From thence he opened a communication with Cuesta, whose army had been increased to sixteen thousand men, of which three thousand were cavalry for the Spaniards suffered more in flight than in action, and the horsemen escaping with little damage, were more easily rallied, and in greater relative numbers than the infantry. With these forces, Cuesta had advanced to the Tagus, after Moore's march upon Sahagun had drawn the fourth corps across that river; the French, however, by fortifying an old tower, still held the bridge of Arzobispo, and Cuesta extending his line from the mountains in front of that place, to the Puerto de Mirabete, broke down the bridge of Almaraz, a magnificent structure, the centre arch of which was above one hundred and fifty feet high.

In these positions both sides remained tranquil in La Mancha, and in Estramadura, and so ended the Spanish exertions to lighten the pressure upon the British army; two French divisions of infantry, and as many brigades of cavalry, had more than sufficed to baffle them, and thus it is made clear, that the southern provinces were in very imminent danger, and owed their safety to the vigorous operations of sir John Moore, which drew the emperor to the north.

CHAPTER II.

Operations in Aragon-Confusion in Zaragoza-The third and fifth corps invest that city -Fortification described-Monte Torrero taken-Attack on the suburb repulsed-Mortier takes post at Calatayud―The convent of San Joseph taken―The bridge-head carried-Huerba passed-Device of the Spanish leaders to encourage the besieged-Marquis of Lazan takes post on the Sierra de Alcubierre-Lasnes arrives in the French camp-Recalls Mortier-Lazan defeated-Gallant exploit of Mariano Galindo-The walls of the town taken by assault-General La Coste and colonel San Genis slain.

CONTINUATION OF THE OPERATIONS IN ARAGON.

FROM the field of battle at Tudela, all the fugitives from O'Neil's, and a great part of those from Castaños's army, fled to Zaragoza, and with such speed as to bring the first news of their own disaster. With the troops, also, came an immense number of carriages, and the military chests, for the roads were wide and excellent, and the pursuit was slack. The citizens and the neighbouring peasantry were astounded at this quick and unexpected calamity. They had, with a natural credulity, relied on the boasting promises of their chiefs, and being necessarily ignorant of the true state of affairs, never doubted that their vengeance would be sated by a speedy and complete destruction of the French. When their hopes were thus suddenly blasted, when they beheld troops from whom they expected nothing but victory, come pouring into the town with all the tumult of panic, when the peasants of all the villages through which the fugitives passed, came rushing into the city along with the scared multitude of flying soldiers and camp followers, every heart was filled with consternation, and the date of Zaragoza's glory would have ended with the first siege, if the success at Tudela had been followed up by the French with that celerity and vigour which the occasion required.

Napoleon, foreseeing that this moment of confusion and terror would arrive, had, with his usual prudence, provided the means, and given directions for such an instantaneous and powerful attack as would inevitably have overthrown the bulwark of the eastern provinces. But the sickness of marshal Lasnes, the difficulty of communication, the

1 Appendix, No. V.

consequent false movements of Moncey and Ney, in fine, the intervention of fortune, omnipotent as she is in war, baffled the emperor's longsighted calculations; the Spanish leaders had time to restore order amongst the multitude, to provide stores, to complete the defensive works; and by a ferocious exercise of power, they ensured implicit obedience, for the danger of resisting the enemy appeared light when a suspicious word or gesture was instantly punished by death.

The third corps having missed the favourable moment for a sudden assault, and being reduced by sickness, by losses in battle, and by detachments, to seventeen thousand four hundred men, including the engineers and artillery,' was too weak to invest the city in form, and therefore, remained in observation on the Xalon river, while a battering train of sixty guns, with well-furnished parks, which had been by Napoleon's orders previously collected in Pampeluna, was carried to Tudela, and embarked upon the canal leading to Zaragoza. Marshal Mortier, with the fifth corps, being directed to assist in the siege, marched to join Moncey, but he also was arrested by sir John Moore's advance towards Burgos, so wide was the scope of that general's operation; but when that was determined by Napoleon's counter-movement, Mortier resumed his march to re-enforce Moncey, and, on the 20th of December, 1808, their united corps, forming an army of thirty-five thousand men of all arms, advanced against Zaragoza. At this time, however, confidence had been restored in the town, the preparations necessary for a vigorous defence were completed, and the obstacles opposed to the French were not like those of the first siege. The nature of the plain in which the city is situated, the course of the river, the peculiar construction of the houses, and the multitude of convents remained the same; but at that time little assistance had been derived from science; now instructed by experience and inspired as it were by the greatness of their resolution, neither the rules of art nor the resources of genius were neglected by the defenders. Zaragoza was on every side fortified, and presented four irregular fronts : 3

The first, reckoning from the right of the town, extended from the Ebro to a convent of bare footed Carmelites, and was about three hundred yards wide;

The second, twelve hundred yards in extent, reached from the Carmelites to a bridge over the Huerba;

The third, likewise of twelve hundred yards, stretched from this bridge to an oil manufactory built beyond the walls;

The fourth, on an opening of four hundred yards, reached from the oil manufactory to the Ebro.

1 Muster-roll of the French army, MS. 2 Cavallero-Doyle's correspondence, MS. 3 Rogniat's Siege of Zaragoza -Cavallero's Siege of Zaragoza.