should have held out but one day, the event itself did not destroy the ground of Moore's resolution to advance. Undoubtedly it was so much lost; it diminished the hope of arousing the nation, and it increased the danger of the British army, by letting loose a greater number of the enemy's troops; but as a diversion for the south it might still succeed, and as long as there was any hope, the resolution of the English general was fixed, to prove that he would not abandon the cause, even when the Spaniards were abandoning it themselves.

CHAPTER IV.

British army advances towards Burgos-French outposts surprised at Rueda-Letter from Berthier to Soult intercepted-Direction of the march changed-Mr. Stuart and a member of the junta arrive at headquarters-Arrogant and insulting letter of Mr. Frere -Noble answer of sir John Moore-British arry united at Mayorga; their force and composition-Inconsistent conduct of Romana; his character-Soult's position and forces; concentrates his army at Carrion-Combat of cavalry at Sahagun-The British army retires to Benavente - The emperor moves from Madrid, passes the Guadarama, arrives at Tordesillas, expects to interrupt the British line of retreat, fails-Bridge of Castro Gonzalo destroyed-Combat of cavalry at Benavente-General Lefebvre takenSoult forces the bridge of Mansilla; takes Leon-The emperor unites his army at Astorga; hears of the Austrian war; orders marshal Soult to pursue the English army, and returns to France.

THE forward movement of the British army commenced on the 11th of December. Moore's first intention was to march with his own and Hope's division to Valladolid, with a view to cover the advance of his stores and to protect the junction of sir David Baird's troops, the rear of which was still behind Astorga; nevertheless preparations for a retreat upon Portugal were continued, and sir David was ordered to form magazines at Benavente, Astorga, Villa Franca and Lugo, by which arrangement two lines of operation were secured, and a greater freedom of action obtained.

The 13th, headquarters were at Alaejos; two brigades and lord Paget's cavalry at Toro; general Hope at Torrecilla; general Charles Stewart's horsemen at Rueda, having the night before surprised there fifty infantry and thirty dragoons, who declared, that in the French army it was believed that the English were retreating to Portugal.

At Alaejos an intercepted despatch of the prince of Neufchatel was brought to headquarters, and the contents were important enough to change the direction of the march. It was addressed to the duke of Dalmatia, and described Madrid as perfectly tranquil, the shops open, and the public amusements going forward as in a time of profound peace. The fourth corps of the army was said to be at Talavera, on its way towards Badajoz, and this movement, it was observed, would force the English to retire to Portugal, if, contrary to the emperor's belief, they had not already done so. The fifth corps was on the march to Zaragoza, and the eighth to Burgos. Soult was therefore directed to drive the

Spaniards into Gallicia, to occupy Leon, Benavente, and Zamora, and to keep the flat country in subjection, for which purpose his two divisions of infantry, and the cavalry brigades of Franceschi and Debelle, were considered sufficient.

It is remarkable that this, the first correct information of the capitulation of Madrid, should have been thus acquired from the enemy, ten days after the event had taken place; nor is it less curious, that while Mr. Frere's letters were filled with vivid descriptions of Spanish enthusiasm, Napoleon should have been so convinced of their passiveness, as to send this important despatch by an officer, who rode post, without an escort, and in safety, until his abusive language to the postmaster at Valdestillos created a tumult, in which he lost his life. Captain Waters, an English officer sent to obtain intelligence, happening to arrive in that place, heard of the murder, and immediately purchased the despatch for twenty dollars; and the accidental information thus obtained was the more valuable, as neither money nor patriotism had hitherto induced the Spaniards to bring any intelligence of the enemy's situation, and each step the army had made was in the dark.' It was now however certain that Burgos was or would be strongly protected, and that Baird's line of march was unsafe if Soult, following these instructions, advanced. On the other hand, as the French appeared to be ignorant of the British movements, there was some chance of surprising and beating the second corps before Napoleon could come to its succour. Hope, therefore, was ordered to pass the Duero at Tordesillas, and direct his march upon Villepando; headquarters were removed to Toro; and Valderas was given as the point of junction to Baird's division, the head of which was now at Benavente.

The 16th, Mr. Stuart arrived at Toro, accompanied by Don F. X. Caro, a member of the Spanish government, who brought two letters, the one from the junta, the other from Mr. Frere. That from the junta complained, that when Romana proposed to unite fourteen thousand picked men to the British army, with a view to make a forward movement, his offer had been disregarded, and a retreat determined upon, in despite of his earnest remonstrances this retreat they declared to be uncalled for, and highly impolitic, as the enemy was never so near his ruin as in that moment." If the Spanish and British armies should unite, they said, it would give "liberty to the Peninsula ;" that “Romana, with his fourteen thousand select men," was still ready to join sir John Moore, and that "thirty thousand fresh levies would, in a month, be added to the ranks of the allied force."2

66

This tissue of falsehoods, for Romana had approved of the intention to retreat, and never had above six thousand men armed, was addressed

1 Appendix, No. XIII, § 1v. a Sir John Moore's Papers, MSS.

to Mr. Frere, and by him transmitted to the general, together with one from himself, which, in allusion to the retreat upon Portugal, contained the following extraordinary passages: "I mean the immense responsibility with which you charge yourself by adopting, upon a supposed military necessity, a measure which must be followed by immediate, if not final, ruin to our ally, and by indelible disgrace to the country with whose resources you are intrusted..... I am unwilling to enlarge upon a subject in which my feelings must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of offence, which, with such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite, but this much I must say, that if the British army had been sent abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mischief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing a shot against their troops, they would, according to the measures now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled their purpose."

ance.

These letters were dated at Truxillo; for the junta, not thinking themselves safe at Badajoz, had proceeded so far on their way to Seville, and on that side the French had continued to advance, the remnants of the Spanish armies to fly, and everything bore the most gloomy appearMr. Frere knew this. In a subsequent letter he acknowledged that the enthusiasm was extinguished, and a general panic commencing at the moment when he was penning these offensive passages. He was utterly ignorant of the numbers, the situation, and the resources of the enemy, but he formed hypotheses, and upon the strength of them insulted sir John Moore, and endangered the interests of his country. In this manner the British general, while struggling with unavoidable difficulties, had his mind harassed by a repetition of remonstrances and representations, in which common sense, truth, and decency were alike disregarded; but he did not fail to show how little personal feelings weighed with him in opposition to the public welfare. He had reason to suppose Mr. Frere had received his letter relative to Charmilly's mission, yet as it was not acknowledged, he took advantage of the omission, and with singular propriety and dignity thus noticed the plenipotentiary's second insulting communication. "With respect to your letter delivered to me at Toro by Mr. Stuart, I shall not remark upon it. It is in the style of the two which were brought to me by colonel Charmilly, and consequently was answered by my letter of the 6th, of which I send you a duplicate; that subject is I hope at rest!"

At Toro sir John Moore ascertained that Romana, although aware of the advance of the British, and engaged to support them, was retiring into Gallicia. Nominally commander-in-chief of the Spanish armies, he was at the head of a few thousand miserable soldiers,3 for the Spaniards,

1 Sir John Moore's Papers, MSS. 2 Appendix, No. XIII, § vi. 3 Sir John Moore's Papers; Colonel Syme's correspondence—General Leith.

with great ingenuity, contrived to have no general when they had an army, and no army when they had a general. After the dispersion of Blake's people at Reynosa, Romana rallied about five thousand men at Renedo, in the valley of Cabernuigo, and endeavoured to make a stand on the borders of the Asturias, but without any success, for the vile conduct of the Asturian junta, joined to the terror created by the French victories, had completely subdued the spirit of the peasantry, and ruined the resources of that province. Romana complained that, when checked for misconduct, his soldiers quitted their standards, indeed, that any should have been found to join their colours is to be admired; for, among the sores of Spain, there were none more cankered, more disgusting, than the venality, the injustice, the profligate corruption of the Asturian authorities. Without a blush, they openly divided the English subsidies, and defrauded, not only the soldiers of their pay and equipments, but the miserable peasants of their hire, doubling the wretchedness of poverty, and deriding the misery they occasioned by pompous declarations of their own virtue.'

2

From the Asturias Romana had led the remnants of Blake's force to Leon about the period of Moore's arrival at Salamanca; like others, he had been deceived as to the real state of the country, and at this time repented that he had returned to Spain. He was a person of talent, quickness, and information, but disqualified by nature for military command; a lively principle of errour pervaded all his notions of war, and no man ever bore the title of a general who was less capable of directing an army. Neither was he exempt from the prevailing weakness of his countrymen. At this moment, when he had not strength to stand upright, his letters were teeming with gigantic offensive projects; and although he had before approved of the intention to retreat, he was now as ready to urge a forward movement, promising to co-operate with twenty thousand soldiers when he could scarcely muster a third of that number, and those only half armed, and scarcely capable of distinguishing their own standards and at the very time he made the promise, he was retiring into Gallicia, not meaning to deceive, for he was as ready to advance as to retreat; but this species of boasting is inherent in his nation. It has been asserted that Caro offered the chief command of the Spanish armies to sir John Moore, and that the latter refused it. This is not true. Caro had no power to do so, and there were no armies to command; but that gentleman, in his interview, either was, or affected to be, satisfied of the soundness of the English general's views, and ashamed of the folly of the junta.

:

The 18th, headquarters were at Castro Nuevo, from which place Moore wrote to Romana, informing him of his intention to fall upon Soult; he

Appendix, No. XIII, S v. 2 Ibid. § VII.