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well chosen, in which the eight hundred cavalry with their cannon formed, have rendered any movement across the canal dangerous? Certainly the French cavalry, acting with the greatest advantages, had been beaten by infantry on the 8th, 13th, and 21st; but was what had been the surprising effect of desperate emergency to justify a general's despising his enemy?

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On the other hand there are officers who assert (certainly on presumptive premises), that the French, from the choice of their position in the morning, shewed their inclination to surrender, if this could be done with any tolerable pretence of justification; that the Turks and British were numerous enough to have assaulted or invested the place; and that as for the cavalry, former successes justified the inference that their attacks were not to be dreaded; that the general movement in the evening was useless, if such was not the object; and, in short, that Rhamanieh might have been the theatre of as much brilliant success as the isthmus of Aboukir.

The questions may be resolved into two.

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Ought General Hutchinson to have attacked the entrenched position of Rhamanieh, defended by 4000 infanrry, 800 cavalry, 33 field pieces, and 17 pieces of position, without waiting for Colonel Stuart's co-operation by the erection of batteries in the Delta? or was he enabled to have invested the camp, and maintained the blockade during the night, after the necessary extension of his line three miles, with the force he had under his command?

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The French unfortunately combine with their opinions so much national vanity, that from them an honest judgment can with difficulty be obtained; they however unanimously ridicule the idea of an investment or attack; and a French general of character has declared, that on the contrary, he proposed at

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General Reynier, who has said every thing he could against the English, never accuses them for their conduct on this day: he is indeed wrong in describing a corps as passing by Damanhour, and turning the canal, since although the movement would have been judicious, the force of the army did not admit of the necessary detachment; he is equally inaccurate in asserting, that General Hutchinson prevented a movement of General Doyle's in support of the Turks rot ofodw sdt dtiw 19

Others pretend as an additional reason for the attack or investment, that the French troops began to evacuate the position during the day.The account of the French themselves afterwards confuted this report, and therefore those troops which were seen passing up the Nile, could only be detachments .oecupying villages and other posts, to secure the retreat. brew

But whatever difference might exist on this subject, the possession of Rhamanieh was in itself most important, acquired also with a facility beyond the most sanguine hope. The armies of Generals Menou and Belliard were now divided by a vast extent of desert, combined offensive operations rendered impossible, the command of the Nile secured, and a communication with the whole interior of Egypt established.

Considerable, however, as were these advantages, much remained to be done. The French had retired, if repulsed, not weakened; their concentrated force from Cairo might always advance; they had lost a position, yet still possessed the capital and principal fortress of the country. Great successes had been gained certainly, but the fate of the campaign was by no means fixed.

On General Hutchinson's judgment was to depend its issue. Should he pursue to Cairo, or return to Alexandria, was the

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anxious alternative. On the one hand, he had to consider, what would be the probable consequences of exposing the Turks under the Grand Vizir to the attacks of the French, then not confined in their operations by any fear of the advance of the English? Whether the Mamelukes, who had as yet not openly avowed their alliance, would be friendly or hostile, if he did not move to their assistance, as Morad Bey had declared was necessary? Whether the Indian army would not be subjected to disaster, if he tamely allowed the French to oppose them with their whole force? Whether the junction with the Grand Vizir, the Mamelukes, and his army, did not ensure success at Grand Cairo? If, on the contrary, General Hutchinson returned to Alexandria, could he besiege the place? Had he men enough to defend the Nile, the entrenched camp before Alexandria, and to admit of his detaching a corps to the westward, which was deemed absolutely necessary for the siege, and which corps would have not only to resist the sortie of the garrison, but any attack which General Belliard, with his army, might make from the side of the Desert?

On the other hand it was maintained, that the march to Cairo ensured ruin, since there were no magazines formed: that the army must live on salt provisions, as fresh meat could not be ensured, and the state of the Boccage rendered that supply even precarious; that the diseases of plague, dysentery, and blindness, the heat of the climate, the fatigue to be undergone, the want of shoes, &c. must soon reduce the troops, and even any number did arrive at Cairo, they would be incapacitated to fight the enemy, or begin the siege of what was thought a strong fortress, the citadel; finally, the conquest of Cairo was not decisive: for so long as the French retained Alexandria, so long were the English in fact not masters of Egypt; whereas if Alexandria was taken, Cairo must be glad to capitulate.

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These objections distracted for some time the Commander in Chief's mind; he was aware of the truth of the last argument, but could not himself discover, or had pointed out to him the means of attacking Alexandria, while General Belliard's army remained in force. (beis vihas

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He dreaded the difficulties which were to be surmounted by the troops under his command, but at last he decided that the movement was indispensible. "My natural habits and present state of health would persuade me not to attempt: a march where such exertion must be necessary, and in which, proba bly, I shall fall a sacrifice to the climate; but my duty to my king, country, and the gallant men who have been employed in this expedition, determine me to undertake it. If I succeed, great will be my satisfaction to find that my capacity did not betray their interests: if I fail, the consciousness of integrity, and the most ardent devotion for their glory and welfare, will support me in retirement.". Such was the language which accompanied this decision; and even those who disagree with his opinion, must applaud his zeal.

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The opposition to the measure was considerable; but General Hutchinson, notwithstanding, continued firm to his decision, shewing that perseverance, where he thought himself right, was a quality he amply possessed.

The entrenched camp of Rhamanieh was given up to the Turks, who left a garrison of about three hundred men in the fort, the dgerms taken were divided amongst them and the English, which proved a vast benefit, since they enabled, in two or three days, the quarter master general to convey the men's knapsacks by water, and facilitated the conveyance of the stores, Hitherto the troops had carried every thing themselves, nor had the officers any more baggage than what was placed on their own backs. This of course was not much on a march,

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where the thermometer was never less than 95. A shirt pulled off, and dried in the sun, under this necessity, became a real luxury.

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On the morning of the 11th of May the army advanced, passing through a fine corn country already ripe. The Turks were guilty of excesses, which the Caia Bey attempting to restrain, he was hooted at, and obliged to desist. The English officers, however, preserved some authority over them, and by their exertions checked the disorders; but they had already done the great mischief, rifling the pest-houses, whose wretched tenants were abandoned to die. The people of the villages with gratitude crowded around their deliverers; they beheld with wonder the British columns follow in regular order the Ottoman troops, and preserve the strictest discipline, since they had, by fatal experience from Mahometans and Christians, expected a very different conduct.

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The British soldiers only required water, frequently even rewarding the trembling natives who brought it, and whose only prayer but feeble hope had been to escape ill usage.

All language is insufficient to give a just idea of the misery of an Egyptian village; but those who have been in Ireland, may best suppose the degree, when an Irish hut is described as a palace, in comparison to an Arab's stye, for it can be called by no other name.

Each habitation is built of mud, even the roof, and resembles in shape an oven: within is only one apartment, generally of about ten feet square. The door does not admit of a man's entering upright; but as the bottom is dug out about two feet, when in the room, an erect posture is possible. A mat, some large vessels to hold water, which it is the constant occupation of the women to fetch, a pitcher made of fine porous clay, found best in Upper. Egypt, near Cunei, and in which the

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