The French, for the further defence of the town, constructed on the high hills of rubbish, which laid on the north and east fronts of it, small square stone towers, at such distances as to flank each other, and the line of each front was commanded by a principal fort, that to the north was called Fort Camin, that on the east Fort Dupuis. All of these towers were bomb proof, a deep ditch surrounded them, and a gun from the upper story was worked out of a covered embrasure.* Each was provided with a cistern; the door was in the centre, and a moveable ladder the means of ascent: so fortified, they defied assault, and would have required the battering of heavy artillery, when they might have still resisted four or five days; but nevertheless, as they could be passed in an assault by night, they were to be considered rather as a strong chain of works to an entrenched camp, than the defences of a fortified city. Behind these was a line of entrenchments, in front of which was dug a very deep ditch, and the walls of Cairo formed the last line of defence. The southern front was protected by an aqueduct (with the cavity of the arches built up), extending from the citadel to a large building, on the banks of the Nile, and in which were the works to throw up the water into the aqueduct. This building was converted into a fort by the French. In front were several small detached forts, and the remains of Old Cairo, which place was not fortified except by a few batteries on * Each tower was intended to be manned with fifteen men; it was such a tower as those which at Corsica resisted for three days several men of war, one of which was set on fire, and another dismasted; nor was it taken until a landing was made by some troops. † In Old Cairo, except the granaries of the Patriarch Joseph, which are only large pieces of ground enclosed by walls, and divided into compartments, there is nothing remarkable. on the bank of the Nile, open in the gorge, consequently not to be defended against an army which had crossed the river higher, Fort Ibrahim Bey and Fort L'Institute formed the second line. This was the weakest side in regard of fortification, but strong from position, as the Nile was to be passed, and the front was very contracted... The western side is defended by the Nile and the island of Rhoda, on which were several heavy batteries, particularly at the northern point. At the dry season of the At the dry season of the year, the interior channel, which runs by the farm of Ibrahim Bey, is fordable in several places, so that the Nile must be considered then as the only river to be forced. The island of Rhoda is the prettiest spot in Egypt; very fine sycamore trees grow along its banks, affording the most gratifying shade, yet do not prove a sufficient barrier to the whirlwinds and clouds of dust, which, although having to pass the Nile, are still here intolerable. On this island is the celebrated Mekias, by which the height of the Nile is ascertained: a redoubt, with six pieces of cannon, served as the tête du pont to the bridge, which connects Giza. Giza is a dirty village, which the French have improved by building half a dozen houses, and establishing in it their manufactories of arms, shot, &c. The chief ornament of the place is a palace of Morad Bey's, much in ruins; and an excellent coffee-house kept by The greater part of the place is in ruins. Here the Greek Patriarch resided, and who was a very fine venerable old man. Babylon, founded by Cambyses, stood on the scite of this city; a quarter of the town called Baboul, marks now its position. A large canal, supposed by some to have been constructed in the time of Adrian, and by others in the reign of one of the Pharoahs, commences a little above Old Cairo, and crosses the middle of the new town from the west to the north-east, but forms no defence; as it is only filled with water during the months of August, September, and October. A splendid ceremony takes place when the water of the Nile is let into this canal. a French ■ Frenchman, who remained behind, was acknowledged to be its most agreeable embellishment. The works of Giza are very contemptible; a wall surrounds the whole, except on the northern front, where Morad Bey's house forms the defence. This wall is very thin, and not high enough to render an escalade difficult; but to delay the immediate approach, a chain of redoubts was thrown forwards about sixty yards; yet the whole resistance would have proved insignificant, if the strength of the garrison had not prevented an assault. Such were Cairo and its out-works. In this state, defended by ten thousand men, and with three hundred and sixty-three serviceable pieces of cannon, including the fifty removed by the French, did the whole surrender without the firing of a shot. Several questions will naturally arise on which military men must form their own opinions, as one recorded here might be supposed to express the general sentiments of the English army, and thus prejudice the judgment of others not so interested. Four queries are most important. Was Cairo, with the means the French possessed, a tenable place against the army which attacked, until the rising of the Nile ? Or did the force of the combined army and the hostility of the inhabitants subject the garrison, in the event of holding out some time, to the moral certainty of destruction? Should at all events a commander, placed as General Belliard was, have resisted as long as possible? Or did the terms he obtained benefit his country as much as a more vigorous defence? Particular attention must be paid to the period when the Nile is so increased as to overflow its banks, and inundate the country, from which a certain time must then be deducted for for the march of an army, in order to avoid its being overtaken by the waters; therefore as the Nile generally rises to its highest elevation in the beginning of August, the latter end of July will be the latest moment until which an army could remain in the neighbourhood of Cairo without considerable danger. The animosity of the inhabitants is acknowledged; for they would, notwithstanding General Belliard had seized on the persons of the principal Sheiks, have certainly risen on the first occasion, and from the desertion of the auxiliary Coptic battalions (who after the success of the Vizir concealed themselves almost to a man*), many of them would have had arms; but whether his force was strong enough to have opposed his exterior, and kept in subjection the interior enemies, is a question which must now resolve itself on that estimate of strength which may be attributed to a concentrated force of ten thousand picked men, provided with a powerful field artillery, and a considerable cavalry (having the advantage of strong works, in acting against which the assailants must be divided by a broad river), when opposed to enemies thus separated, whose total force did not exceed four thousand five hundred Europeans, and twenty-five thousand Turks, provided with a very feeble field artillery, and a still weaker battering train. To resolve the third subject of enquiry, the discontented state of General Belliard's garrison must be placed against its efficiency, which makes his a peculiar case; and the last must rest on the degree of importance attached to the preservation of Alexandria to France, and how far the surrender of Cairo, even with the advantages of the delay in the evacuation, accelerated the fall of that fortress. The French council of war which deliberated on the mea * The Vizir maintained a constant correspondence with the chiefs of these corps. sure sure afterwards adopted, was composed of eight generals, four of whom, Robin, Lagrange, Duranton, and Bron, voted against the surrender; the chefs des brigades were then called in, when a majority of voices decided for it. But Dupas, who commanded the citadel, positively refused to give it up, declaring that he had orders from General Menou to defend that fort to the last extremity, and that his opinion also coincided with his duty; nor would he, till after repeated injunctions, submit to the orders of General Belliard. General Menou, in sending thus private instructions to Dupas, seemed to anticipate and disapprove of the decision of the council of war; indeed, his orders afterwards respecting the surrender were very severe; but, interested as he was in the event, his opinion must be received with caution. General Reynier justifies the surrender on the previous grounds, adding, that there was a scarcity of ammunition, each gun having only one hundred and fifty rounds; an argument by no means just, for in all moral probability, a third only of those guns would have been in action, as the points attacked could not have employed the service of more; and as 100,000 pounds of powder were found, independent of what was carried away by the garrison, this cannot be admitted as a plea even for deliberation as to the sufficiency. He also represents a scarcity of provisions: the magazines were on the contrary amply provided until the rising of the Nile; and if they were not, he criminates indeed his friend, who had for so long a time an abundant country open to him, and yet did not secure a sufficient subsistence; for however he might have predetermined on the surrender, still he should have been prepared in every possible way for his defence, since contingencies might always occur to change the face of existing circumstances. General Belliard's case is indeed very hard, |