valuable a weapon to be given up, that terms of employment would be settled by courts biassed against labour, and that trade unions would be weakened. Support for the proposals came from the weaker unions on the ground that strikes could not be organised in badly paid industries, had proved of little value in the past, and that wages and conditions of employment were bound to be improved by State regulation. Since 1905, however, opinion in the Congress has become more and more unfavourable to restrictions in any shape or form on freedom to strike. Owing largely to disappointment at the result of Labour representation in Parliament, the influence of which is considered to have been seriously weakened by the Osborne judgment, faith in legislative action has declined. The working of the Arbitration Acts of Australia and New Zealand has been seen to arouse dissatisfaction among work-people in those countries, and a bitter and able opponent of such measures who has witnessed their operation has appeared in the person of Mr. Tom Mann. On the other hand, the unskilled labour unions have become wealthier, better organised and more militant, and their leaders show a strong leaning towards Syndicalism. It is not therefore surprising to find that, not only in the Trade Union Congress but in most of the evidence given before the Industrial Council, the strongest feeling is expressed against any restriction upon freedom to strike. The opposition is not to voluntary arbitration or conciliation, but to depriving labour of what is regarded as its most powerful weapon in the last resort. The strength of this opposition may be gauged by the feeling aroused by Mr. Crooks' Bill on the lines of the Canadian Act introduced in 1911 into the House of Commons. Not only did the Trade Union Congress protest against this action, but declared that we will by every means in our power resist every attempt to prevent or hinder the right of workers to 'strike at any time when they consider such action necessary.' The feeling in Great Britain against restrictions on freedom to strike shows no tendency to decline: on the contrary, such evidence as there is points to its becoming stronger. It has been suggested that the difficulty could be surmounted by limiting the operation of a restrictive law to trades which voluntarily submit to it, somewhat on the lines of the New Zealand law. Such a policy, however, offers little or no advantage over existing methods of securing industrial peace, while throwing a burden upon the State. There is no reason to suppose that the industries coming under the law, which would presumably be those in which labour organisations were weak or in which sweating was common, would also be those in which a continuous supply of their product is essential to public welfare. The law of New Zealand has in fact had to recognise this, and by forbidding strikes without notice in certain industries has to some extent thrown over the principle of voluntary submission. One last argument of those who support restrictions on strikes and lock-outs must, however, not be neglected. It is urged that the mere fact of the law being on the Statute Book may arouse opinion in its favour, and thus on the one hand strengthen the hands of the State in enforcing the law and on the other diminish the need for enforcement. This argument neglects the influence of a law which obviously fails in attaining its ends in turning opinion. against the principle on which it is based, and in weakening the authority both of the legislature and the executive. The general conclusion is, therefore, that in present circumstances any attempt to prevent strikes and lock-outs by coercive measures would be unwise; and that the only sure foundation for industrial peace is the growth of mutual respect and good-will between employers and employed, together with the recognition by both of their obligations toward the organised society of which they form a part. W. G. CONSTABLE. THE NEW MONROISM 1. Die Monroedoktrin, in ihren Beziehungen zur amerikanischen Diplomatie und zum Völkerrecht. By Dr. jur. HERBERT KRAUS. Berlin. 1913. 2. Monroïsme ? Notes-études sur la politique américaine à l'égard de l'Europe. continentale By F. CAPELLA Y PONS, 3. Some original documents on the genesis of the Monroe Doctrine. By WORTHINGTON C. FORD. Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Second Series. Vol. XV. 1901, 1902. N the 31st of March of last year, a little more than a month after the coup d'état which overthrew President Madero and ended in his murder, the British Government formally recognised General Huerta as President ad interim of Mexico. This was done, as the Prime Minister explained in his speech at the Guildhall banquet on the 10th of November, first, because Great Britain had herself neither the will nor the power to intervene, and was therefore bound to deal, as she would do in the case of any Central or South American State, with whatever might be for the time being the de facto Government; secondly, because, according to the information then obtainable, there appeared to be no element except that of 'General Huerta and his supporters which offered any prospect ' of the restoration of stability and order.' A proceeding so proper in itself, and so perfectly in accord with the traditional British policy in similar cases, would have needed no apology in the face of instructed foreign opinion. But opinion in the United States, so far as the principles of international relations are concerned, is anything but instructed, and-again to quote Mr. Asquitha rumour found credence in some quarters. 'that, at a moment when the Government of the United 'States were taking a line of their own with regard to Mexico, we entered upon a new departure of policy deliberately, or at least if not deliberately, at any rate in effect, opposed to that ' of the United States and calculated to thwart it.' Had the Prime Minister been more explicit as to the contents of this' rumour' he would probably have been compelled to use language which would have tended to defeat his immediate object, that of soothing the ruffled feelings of the American public by proving once more how completely Great Britain is prepared to subordinate her own views, so far as the two Americas are concerned, to those of Washington. For the rumours in question took a form by no means flattering to the British Government, which was, and in certain quarters still is, accused of having hurriedly recognised General Huerta in return for an undertaking on his part to support certain large British industrial and commercial interests in Mexico against their American rivals, whose hopes had been based on the favour of the fallen Government of President Madero. That this country, from so base a motive, should pursue a policy 'cal'culated to thwart' the disinterested aims of the United States, very naturally exasperated American opinion. The friendly feeling towards Great Britain which during recent years has shown so gratifying a development received a sudden check on platforms and in the Press the outcry was loud against the 'unfriendly act' of which the British Government had been guilty; and in the lobbies of the Capitol at Washington there was open talk of reprisals in the future. Clearly the Prime Minister was in the right to take advantage of the occasion of the Guildhall banquet to correct so patent a misconception of our policy; and American susceptibilities should have been sufficiently calmed by his plain exposé of its motives and by his explicit declaration that 'there is not a vestige of foundation' for the rumour' referred to. But in his desire to emphasise the perfect cordiality of the diplomatic relations between this country and the United States, Mr. Asquith used language which seemed to commit Great Britain, not only to an attitude of friendly neutrality towards the United States in respect of its Mexican policy, but to a general approval of any means which the Government of Washington might in the future adopt in order to carry this policy into effect. 'Our diplomatic relations with the United States [he said] have for a long time been such that, with the freest and frankest discussions of all matters that may from time to time arise, we both feel the fullest assurance that nothing can happen to disturb our common resolve to attain and maintain a friendly and sympathetic understanding.' This declaration, which might otherwise have passed for no more than a general expression of good-will, received a peculiar significance from the publication in 'The Times' of Nov. 11-the very day on which the report of Mr. Asquith's speech appeared of an 'Authoritative Statement' of the United States point of view. Of this statement, coming 'from a quarter eminently qualified to interpret the attitude 'of the United States in the dispute with Mexico, and in par'ticular to explain the motives of President Wilson,' it is not too much to say that it puts forward new principles, or rather revives old principles, of the most fateful import for the future of international relations. The following are the essential passages: 'The underlying motive of his [President Wilson's] action is not merely a desire to vindicate what the French call le droit de voisinage-that is to say, the expediency of restoring order in a country bordering for thousands of miles upon the territory of the United States. His motive is rather the vindication of the principle of representative and constitutional government. The policy hitherto followed of recognising as President of the Mexican Republic any man who might succeed, by force or otherwise, in imposing his authority upon the country, is felt to have been mistaken, inasmuch as it placed a premium on revolutionary outbreaks and seemed to promise international recognition to any successful adventurer. If it be clearly understood, not only in Mexico but in other Central and Southern American Republics, that a successful adventurer is not sure of recognition, a check will be placed upon revolutionary initiative and it will be demonstrated that the United States can only regard as the constitutional head of any American community a man who enjoys the support, properly expressed and registered, of a majority of his enfranchised. fellow citizens. Idealistic and unpractical though this principle may be deemed in some parts of Europe, it is one on which the people of the United States are earnestly agreed. Should it not be feasible to secure its application in Mexico otherwise than by force of arms, force will inevitably be employed; and when the United States Army shall have vindicated the principle, Mexico will be left to govern itself in accordance with the constitutional precepts which it will be the duty of the Army to inculcate.' On the day following the publication of this statement, the six points' of the policy formulated by President Wilson |