enced boy with the bullock, who drove the beast into the plaintiff's show-room, where it broke several marble chimneypieces, it was held that the butcher was not answerable for the damage. (e) And where a company empowered by Act of Parliament to construct a railway, contracted under seal with certain persons to make a portion of the line, and by the contract reserved to themselves the power of dismissing any of the contractors' workmen for incompetence, and the workmen in constructing a bridge over a highway, negligently caused the death of a person passing beneath along the highway, by allowing a stone to fall upon him, it was held, in an action against the company by the administratrix of the deceased, that they were not liable. (f) And it is immaterial that the defendant lends some of his own men to the contractor, if they are acting substantially as the contractor's servants at the time of the injury. (g) But where the defendants who were occupiers of a bonded warehouse in Liverpool, employed a masterporter for the purpose of removing some barrels of flour from their warehouse and lowering them into a cart, and the masterporter used his own tackle, and brought and paid his own men; and, through the negligence of the men, or the insufficiency of the tackle, one of the barrels slipped from the tackle whilst it was being lowered into the cart, and fell upon the plaintiff and injured him, it was held that the defendants were responsible for the injury. () Here the work, it has been observed, was in effect done by the defendants themselves at their own warehouse, the workmen, though engaged by the master-porter, being under the control of the defendants, and acting substantially as their servants, (i) and it is upon this ground alone, it seems, that the above case can be supported. (k)

After the contract has been properly completed, and the works handed over to the commissioners or persons who have employed the contractor, the liability of the contractor ceases, and for any subsequent injury caused by the natural result of the work the contractor has completed, the commissioners, and

not the contractor, will be responsible; as where the defendant, under a contract with the Metropolitan Board of Works, opened a highway for the purpose of constructing a sewer thereunder, and after finishing the sewer, properly filled in and made good the road, which, however, subsequently subsided, which is the natural result of such opening the road and loosening the materials of which it is composed, and the plaintiff's horse stumbled into one of the holes so caused and was injured. (

581. Negligence of servants working under builders, contractractors, and sub-contractors.—Where work which can lawfully be done without injury to others is placed in the hands of a builder or contractor, who selects his own workmen and servants for the performance of the work, and directs the manner of doing it, exercising his own judgment in the matter, and having the immediate control over the workmen, such contractor, and not the person who employs him, is the person responsible for injuries to strangers from the negligent execution of the work. (m) If a person orders his wall or his house to be pulled down, he is not responsible for the negligence of the workmen employed by the builders for the purpose. (n) And if the work is done under the immediate control and superintendence of a sub-contractor, then the latter is the party responsible for any wrong done by the workmen he employs in the execution of the work. It must not be understood, however, that a contractor can not become liable for the negligence of his sub-contractor. If the contractor personally interferes and gives directions to the latter, or to the workmen employed by him, he would be responsible for the orders given, but he can not be charged simply on the ground of his filling the character of contractor. (0)

Where a builder had contracted with the committee of a club to make alterations and improvements in the club-house, and prepare and fix the necessary gas-fittings, and the builder made a sub-contract with a gas-fitter to do this latter portion of the work, and the gas-fitter's workmen allowed the gas to

(7) Hyams v. Webster, L. R., 2 Q. B. 264; 4 Ibid. 138. Bartlett v. Baker, 34 Law J., Exch. 8, acc.

(m) Steel v. S. E. Rail. Co., 16 C. B. 550. Gray v. Pullen, 5 B. & S. 790,

981.

(2) Butler v. Hunter, ante.

(0) Overton v. Freeman, 11 C. B. 873; 21 Law J., C. P. 52. Blake v. Thirst,

ante.

escape and cause an explosion, which injured the butler of the club and his wife, it was held that the gas-fitter, and not the builder, was liable for the negligence. (p)

582. Voluntary and involuntary trespasses-Direct and consequential injuries.—If a squib is thrown amongst a crowd in a public place, and is then tossed from one person to another, the first thrower, and all who have tossed the squib otherwise than in pure self-defense, are responsible, as we have seen, for the injury it occasions. (g) "If A takes the hand of B, and with it strikes C, A is the trespasser and not B." (r)

"If," observes Lord DENMAN, "I am guilty of negligence in leaving anything dangerous in a place where I know it to be extremely probable that some other person will unjustifiably set it in motion to the injury of a third party, and if that injury should be so brought about, the sufferer may have redress by action against both or either of the two, but unquestionably against the first. If, for example, a gamekeeper, returning from his daily exercise, should rear his loaded gun against a wall in the playground of schoolboys, and one of these should playfully point the gun at a schoolfellow, and fire it off and maim him, the gamekeeper must answer in damages to the wounded party." (s) If a horse and cart are left standing in the street without any person to watch them, and a person strikes the horse and causes it to back against a shop-window, the owner is liable for damages, for he must, as we have seen, take the risk of all the consequences that result from the horse being left unattended. (t) In such a case the owner, who has left his cart unattended, and the person who struck the horse, are both liable for the injury. (t)

"If I deliver my horse to a smith to shoe, and he delivers him to another smith, who pricks him, I may have an action. on the case against the latter, though I did not deliver the horse to him. So if I deliver goods to A, who delivers them to B, to keep to the use of A, and B wastes these goods, I may have an action on the case against B, though I did not deliver the goods to him." (u)

583. Foint and separate liabilities.-If several co-proprietors.

(p) Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710. (9) Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403. (r) Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 Ld. Raym. 38. Bac. Abr. TRESPASS, D. 2, ante.

(s) Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 36. (t) Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 192. (u) Roll. Abr. 90. Loeschmann v. Machin, 2 Stark. 311.

of a stage-coach intrust the driving of the coach to one of them, all will be responsible for injuries caused by his negligent driving. (x) And if two omnibuses are racing, and one of them runs over a man who is crossing the road and has not time to get out of the way, the injured person has a remedy against the proprietor of either omnibus. (j')

584. Declarations for injuries from negligence must set forth either an injury to the property or to the person of the plaintiff, or to both. If the injury is an injury to goods and chattels, the declaration must allege them to be the goods and chattels of the plaintiff: for if there is no averment to this effect, and nothing on the record to show the plaintiff's right or title to the chattels or to the possession of them, there is no cause of acton. (~) The declaration for an injury to a ship or carriage through the negligent management of another ship or carriage by the defendant or his servants, should set forth the plaintiff's possession of his ship on the high seas or in a certain river, or of his carriage on a certain highway, and the defendant's possession of another ship on the high seas, or in the same river, or of another carriage on the same highway, and that the defendant navigated his ship or drove his carriage in so negligent a manner, that the defendant's ship or carriage, through his carelessness and mismanagement, ran foul of the plaintiff's ship or carriage, and injured the same, and spoiled divers goods and chattels in the said ship, and caused the plaintiff to incur great expense in repairing, &c., and caused the plaintiff to be deprived of the use of his ship, &c., and to lose the profits of a voyage, concluding with a claim of damages. (a)

If the plaintiff complains of an injury to the person, the declaration will either be for an immediate injury, such as an assault, or trespass; or a consequential injury, such as the breaking of the plaintiff's leg through the upsetting of a coach negligently driven by the defendant, (b) or the loss of the plaintiff's eye through the negligence of the defendant in intrusting a loaded gun to the care of a young and inexperienced person, who carelessly shot off the gun pointed at the plain

(x) Moreton v. Hardern, 4 B. & C. 223.

(y) Creswell, J., in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 121.

(2) Pritchard v. Long, 9 M. & W. 666. Forman v. Dawes, Car. & M. 129. (a) Leame v. Bray, 3 East, 593. (b) Curtis v. Drinkwater, 2 B. & Ad.

tiff. (c) If the cause of action be a breach of duty, arising ex contractu, the circumstances and the nature of the contract or employment creating the duty must be truly set forth on the face of the declaration, and be supported by the evidence at the trial. (d)

A declaration alleging that the plaintiff was the servant of the defendant, and that the defendant ordered the plaintiff to ascend and use certain scaffolding, &c., well knowing it to be dangerous and unfit for use, and that the plaintiff, in obedience to the order of the defendant, used the scaffolding, &c., believing it to be safe and fit for use, and not knowing the contrary, and not having the same means that the plaintiff had of forming a correct opinion upon its sufficiency and safety, and that the scaffolding, &c., by reason of its being unsafe and unfit for use, gave way with the plaintiff upon it, and precipitated the plaintiff upon the ground, &c., discloses a good cause of action. (e)

If the plaintiff complains of injuries received by the upsetting of a coach in which he was riding as a passenger, the declaration should allege that the defendant was the proprietor of a stage-coach, and that the plaintiff was received by him as a passenger, to be carried safely for hire, and that the defendant did not take proper care in the driving and management of the coach, but suffered the coach to be overloaded, &c., stating the facts constituting the act of negligence, and the injury resulting to the plaintiff, and claiming damages.

The allegation in the declaration that the plaintiff was to be safely carried, does not mean that he is to be conveyed safely absolutely, like a bale of goods, but that he is to be carried with due care. (ƒ)

585. Plea of not guilty.-The plea of not guilty in actions for injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant, operates as a denial only of the wrongful act alleged to have been committed by the defendant, and no defense other than such -denial is admissible under that plea. All other pleas in denial must take issue on some particular matter of fact alleged in

(c) Dixon v. Bell, 5 M. & S. 198. (d) Lopes v. De Tastet, 4 Moore, 279, anic.

(e) Williams v. Clough, 3 H. & N. 258 27 Law J., Exch. 325.

(f) Harris v. Costar, I C. & P. 636. Aston v. Heaven, 2 Esp. 535. See ante.