Lillis v. St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern R. Co. months from the date of the one thousand mile ticket had expired, he had a right to ride on the defendant's road until he had travelled the one thousand miles. He had travelled four hundred and fifty miles on that ticket, and if valid there were enough miles remaining to carry him to St. Louis. The injuries received by plaintiff did not disable him, or interfere with his business, except to detain him at Kansas City until the next train went east, not exceeding twenty-four hours. Plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages, and on a trial in the Circuit Court of Jackson county had a verdict for $3,000, but at the suggestion of the court entered a remittitur of $1,000, and judgment was then rendered in his favor for $2,000, from which defendant has appealed to this court. [Omitting instructions.] Instruction refused: 6. "If the jury find, from the evidence, that the plaintiff knew the terms and conditions of the ticket read in evidence, and that with such knowledge he did, on the 9th day of February, 1874, enter and remain in a baggage car attached to a passenger train on the defendant's road, with a design of being conveyed upon said ticket from Kansas City to St. Louis, without paying or intending to pay to the defendant any fare, and that he refused to pay his fare after the same was demanded of him by the conductor, then the jury is instructed that the plaintiff did not become a passenger upon said train, and the conductor thereof had a right to stop said train at any place, and use sufficient force to expel or eject the plaintiff and his baggage from said car without rendering the defendant liable in this action." The court refused to give the said instruction No. 6, and defendant excepted. The instruction asked by defendant and refused by the court presents the question, whether on the facts in this case plaintiff was a passenger on defendant's train, and as such entitled to the rights and immunities secured to passengers by the law. It is evident that plaintiff entered the train determined not to pay any fare, but to travel upon his one thousand mile ticket, or be ejected from the train. He at no time offered to pay any fare, declared repeatedly that he would not, and had previously taken the opinion of a lawyer, who had advised him that he had a right to ride on defendant's road until he had travelled the entire number of miles specified, without regard to time. Lillis v. St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern R. Co. He knew the conditions printed on the back of the ticket; and on its face was an express printed stipulation that the ticket was good, "when properly stamped and presented within six months from date by Lawrence Lillis, under the conditions printed on the back." He testifies that he knew what the conditions were. When the conductor refused to carry him on that ticket, he did not leave the train when ordered to do so — which he might have done and instituted a suit if he desired to test the correctness of his lawyer's opinion, that he had a right to ride on that pass — but by physical resistance compelled the conductor to call to his assistance three or four other employees to eject him from the car. That he went into that car with the deliberate purpose of laying the foundation for a lawsuit, with no intention of becoming a passenger unless he could by muscular power compel the conductor to carry him, is from the evidence in the case beyond all controversy, and he was as much a trespasser as if he had gone into that express car to rob it of its contents. Under these circumstances, is he to be regarded as a passenger? We think not, and to hold otherwise would be to disregard well-established principles, which in cases between individuals no court would hesitate to recognize. Merchants, shop-keepers and hotel-keepers, by the very nature of their respective occupation, give a general invitation to all persons to enter their house of business, but if one entered one of these business houses for the purpose of pilfering or committing some other depredation, and is ejected, he cannot have an action for the trespass, and the general license given to enter would avail him nothing in a suit against the proprietor. He might recover if more force were used than was necessary to put him out, but the general implied invitation would not be allowed to be considered by a jury in determining the amount of his damages. 12 In the Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Nichols, 8 Kans. 505; s. c., Am. Rep. 475, the facts were that plaintiff was introduced to the conductor of the train by the express messenger, as an express messenger learning the route; that the conductor, supposing him to be as represented, allowed him to ride in the baggage car without paying any fare. The baggage car was turned over, injuring the plaintiff seriously for which he sued the company and recovered a judgment for $22,500. The Supreme Court held that "the plaintiff Lillis v. St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern R. Co. was not a passenger, within the true legal signification of the term, he did not get into or ride in any passenger car, and he did not pay or agree to pay any hire or reward for his passage.” Here plaintiff did not pay any fure but positively refused to do so expressly refused to make a contract by which the relation of passenger and carrier would be established between him and the company. The case of Robertson v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 22 Barb. 92, was one in which plaintiff, with knowledge that the engineer had no authority from defendant to permit him to ride upon the engine by the permission of the engineer did ride upon it and was injured, by reason of the negligence or want of skill of defendant's employees, while so riding. The Supreme Court of New York held that "he was a wrongdoer the moment he stepped his foot upon the engine, and so continued until he was injured, and could not recover." If a wrong-doer, it must have been because he had no right to ride on the engine. In the case at bar, plaintiff had no right to ride on that train on his one thousand mile ticket, and he knew it because the stipulation on the face, and the indorsements on the back of the ticket, were clear and explicit to that effect. He went into that car not intending to acquire a right to ride on that train, but to compel ths conductor to pass him on a void ticket, or to make a case for a suit for damages. His entry into the car was made with an evil intent, and he is entitled to no favor, but only to the rights which the law gives a trespasser. The cases cited by appellee's counsel as authorities for the position that plaintiff is to be regarded as a passenger do not support it. In 53 Ill. plaintiff entered the caboose car of a freight train, which, by a rule of the company, was forbidden to carry passengers, but sometimes did carry passengers, and there were passengers then on the train with tickets procured from the company. Plaintiff tendered his fare to the conductor, who refused to receive it, and put plaintiff of the train. The court held that he was a passenger. The difference between that and the case at bar is so palpable that it needs no comment, and an equally striking difference will be observed between this and the case in Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510; s. c., 5 Am. Rep. 60; Dunn v. Grand T. Ry., 58 Me. 187; s. c., 4 Am. International Bank of St. Louis v. Franklin County. Rep. 267; Mobile & O. R. R. Co. v. McArthur, 43 Miss. 180, and O'Donnell v. Alleg. R. R. Co., 59 Penn. St. 239. If plaintiff had no right to ride on defendant's train, on that ticket, the conductor had a right to put him off; and not being a passenger, it makes no difference, whether at the station, or near a dwellinghouse or not, because § 28 (Wagn. Stat. 307) has in that case no application. He had no right to use any more force than was necessary to eject plaintiff, but had a right to use as much force as was necessary for that purpose. [Omitting some minor considerations.] Judgment reversed and cause remanded. INTERNATIONAL BANK OF ST. LOUIS V. FRANKLIN COUNTY. (65 Mo. 105.) County warrants — acknowledgment of indebtedness. A county warrant, payable "out of any money in the treasury appropriated for county expenditures," is both a judicial ascertainment and a written acknowledgment of indebtedness by the county, and, if not paid, an action may be maintained on it whether there is money in the treasury to pay it or not. ACTION on county warrants. The opinion states the facts. John W. Booth, for appellant. J. C. Kiskaddon, for respondent. SHERWOOD, C. J. Action on ten county warrants made payable "out of any money in the treasury appropriated for county expenditures." The single issue tendered by the answer was contained in the denial that the warrants "were due and payable." Judgment went for plaintiffs. The motion in arrest having questioned the sufficiency of the petition necessitates an examination of its allegation; not to determine whether a demurrer would have been well taken, for we have no doubt on this score, but in order to determine whether the allegations are of such a nature as International Bank of St. Louis v. Franklin County. will, with the intendments which the law will supply, be sufficient after verdict. The petition in brief states the drawing of the warrants in favor of and their delivery to Bauer, that subsequently for a valuable consideration plaintiff became the holder and owner of the warrants, presented the same to the treasurer for payment, which was refused because of no money in the treasury, and that fact duly indorsed on the warrants; that the same were duly registered by the treasurer, who, on the order of the county court, in the year 1871, paid plaintiff two years' interest on the warrants; that the warrants were due plaintiff and unpaid, and therefore judgment was asked. [Omitting the question of plaintiff's title.] The conclusion reached on these points must acccomplish a reversal of the judgment, but inasmuch as a new trial may probably occur, it is thought best to discuss other matters. 66 It will be observed respecting warrants of the sort under consideration that the statute (1 W. S., § 32, p. 415) provides that every such warrant shall be drawn for the whole amount ascertained to be due to the person entitled to the same." So that, according to express statutory provision, each warrant is an ascertainment that the sum therein mentioned is "due" to the person in whose favor the warrant is drawn. And it will be further observed that the preceding section (31) makes it the duty of the court before ordering their clerk to issue a warrant, to ascertain the "sum of money to be due from the county." In consequence of these provisions of the statute, it follows that each warrant, whether drawn on a general or special fund, for the statute makes no distinction, is both a judicial ascertainment and a written acknowledgment of indebtedness by the county. In short, it is to all intents and purposes the promissory note of the county. Abundant authorities, if indeed authorities are needed, where the expression of the legislative will is so plain, sustain this position. In Terry v. City of Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 490, where the action was brought ou certain orders made payable out of any money belonging to the school fund, drawn on the city treasurer by the board of school commissioners, the law authorizing such orders to be thus drawn, and payment having been by the treasurer refused, it was said: "The holder of these orders, it is claimed, stands in precisely the same relation to the city that a holder of a check upon a bank, drawn by a party having no funds in the bank, does in respect to |