of the state, for which the act also made provision, for all valid outstanding bonds of the state, at the rate of $60 for $100; and a subsequent amendatory act, known as "No. 11 of 1875," required a favorable decision of the supreme court of the state upon all bonds of questionable and doubtful obligation, as to their legality and validity, as a condition of their fundability; and also required the parties seeking to have them funded to affirm that they were issued in strict conformity to the law, and for a valuable consideration, and that they were constitutional. Upon the issues formed, the testimony of several witnesses was taken, explaining the circumstances under which the bonds were disposed of, from which it appeared, among other things, that they were exchanged for sugar procured by the state. The party to whom the bonds were delivered and from whom the sugar was ob tained testified to that effect, and the private secretary of the governor at that time, and the state quartermaster, who were fully acquainted with the transaction, corroborated his testimony.

In February, 1888, the case was heard by the district court of the parish, which rejected the demand of the plaintiff, and ordered judgment for the defendant, which was accordingly entered. The case was taken to the supreme court of the state, and there the judgment was affirmed. In giving its decision, that court said that the general and special denials of the answer fully put in issue the validity of the bonds and the right of the holder to have them funded, as representing a valid debt of the state; that the second section of the act under which the bonds were issued imperatively required that they should be sold by the governor for the benefit of the state, or exchanged for treasury notes, state or Confederate: that it was plain that the governor, as the chief executive officer of the state, had no power whatever to deal with those bonds, or to dispose of them, except in the precise manner, and for the distinct purpose, pointed out by the law; and that any act of his in contravention of its provisions in that regard would be void, and could not con. fer on any person or holder of the bonds a right to recover them, or to enforce their liquidation or payment. This proposition, said the court, it did not understand to be controverted by the plaintiff, but to be virtually admitted as correct, by his contention that the bonds were sold by the governor in compliance with the terms of the act. It then holds that the exchange of the bonds for sugar was not a compliance with the act which authorized only a sale of the bonds for treasury notes, state or Confederate. would also appear that the plaintiff invoked the legal presumption that the officer charged by the law with the sale of the bonds discharged his duty, and that, therefore, the bonds were sold and not exchanged, and, confirmatory of this presumption, he cited an entry in the receipt ledger of the state auditor's office, in which the transaction is alluded to as a purchase. But the court said, as against the admission of the plaintiff himself that

It

the bonds were exchanged, and the posttive testimony of witnesses to the same effect, that presumption could not prevail, which was not a conclusive presumption, but one that prevailed only till the contrary appeared. The supreme court of the state therefore aflirmed the judgment of the lower court, and to review that judgment the case is brought here on writ of error. 37 La. Ann. 412.

The case does not present any federal question for our consideration. The only question before the court below, and which was decided negatively, was whether the bonds were sold by the gov ernor of the state within the authority vested in him by the law under which they were issued, by being exchanged for sugar, and were therefore valid obliga-tions of the state, which could be funded under its statute. There is, in the consideration and determination of this question, no resort to any federal law. It is purely a question of the construction of a state statute, and of the power which was conferred by it upon her agents; nothing more nor less. The governor, acting in their disposal, was limited by the language of the statute. He could sell the bonds or exchange them for treasury notes, state or Confederate; he could not dispose of them in any other way.

There being no federal question involved, the writ of error must be dismissed, and it is so ordered.

(144 U. S. 651) ADAMS et al. v. BOARD OF LIQUIDATION OF LOUISIANA. (No. 187.)

(April 18, 1892.)

SUPREME COURT-JURISDICTION-ERROR TO STATE

COURT-FEDERAL QUESTION.

A decision by the supreme court of Louisiana that a question as to the validity of certain bonds of the state was res adjudicata by reason of a prior suit involving other bonds of the same series, and that, on the merits, such bonds were invalid, because issued by the state authorities in exchange for merchandise instead of for state or Confederate currency, as required by the act authorizing their issuance, involved no federal question, and is not reviewable in the United States supreme court.

In error to the supreme court of the state of Louisiana.

Petition in the district court of the parish of East Baton Rouge by John I. Adams & Co. against the board of liquidation of the state of Louisiana to have certain state bonds declared legal and valid, and exchangeable for consolidated state bonds under the funding act of 1874. Judgmen was rendered for defendant, and affirmed by the state supreme court. Plaintiffs bring error. Writ of error dismissed.

B. J. Sage and Chas. W. Hornor, for plaintiffs in error. W. H. Rogers, Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.

This, like No. 21, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 755, was a suit against the board of liquidation of the state of Louisiana to compel it to fund four bonds of the state, held by the plaintiffs, and to exchange them for its consolidated bonds, as provided in the

act of the legislature known as "No. 3 of 1874," at the rate of 60 per cent. of their valuation.

The board of liquidation appeared to the suit, and interposed the plea of res adjudicata, based upon the judgment in the suit No. 21, brought by B. J. Sage against the board, that is, that the question involved in this case (the fundability of the bonds) was conclusively determined in the negative in that case, and that the plaintiffs here are thereby estopped from its assertion; and also set up as a defense that the bonds were not fundable, because they were not issued in conformity to the statute of the state, which required that they should be sold at par for Confederate or state treasury notes, whereas here they were exchanged for sugar. The district court of the parish of East Baton Rouge, in which this suit was commenced, sustained both defenses, and gave judgment for the defendant. That judgment, on appeal, was affirmed by the supreme court of the state; the latter court placing its decision chiefly upon the ground that the fundability of the bonds of the series was, by the law No. 11 of 1875, to be determined in a single suit by the holder of such securities, and those in this suit were held by Sage when he commenced his suit. To review this latter judgment the case is brought to this court.

The 4 bonds in this suit are a part of the same series of 184 bonds issued at the same time as the 5 bonds which were considered in the suit of B. J. Sage v. The Board of Liquidation. that suit being brought by him to obtain a like funding of those bonds, and their exchange. The validity of the bonds was there the subject of consideration, and it was adjudged that they were not valid obligations of the state. Bonds exchanged for merchandise were considered not to have been issued in strict conformity to law, as required by the terms of the supplementary funding act of Louisiana known as "No. 11 of 1875," and therefore were not fundable.

The bonds in this case were transferred by Sage to the plaintiffs while his own suit was pending, but were left in his own hands for collection. The court was of opinion that the judgment as to certain of the bonds of one series determined the character of the other bonds of the same series, and, without deciding in terms the plea of res adjudicata interposed by the state, based upon the judgment in the Sage Case, held that the fundability of the bonds in this suit was settled by the decision in that case, which is practically applying that doctrine. The transcript of the judgment presented to us, which contains the proceedings of the court below, does not present any federal question which authorizes us to review the decision of the state court. Whether or not the adjudication upon the first bonds of the same series could be pleaded as an estop. pel to the proceeding for the fundability of other bonds of the same series is not a federal question. Nor does the ruling of the court upon the validity of the bonds present any question under federal law, but solely a question upon the construction of a statute of the state, and whether

an exchange of the bonds for merchandise was a sale within its meaning. The writ of error must therefore be dismissed.

(144 U. S. 573)

BROWN V. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.

(April 18, 1892.)

SUPREME COURT-JURISDICTION-FEDERAL QUESTION-CRIMINAL LAW.

In a prosecution for an attempt to defraud a town or county, (the two being coterminous,) defendant moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the grand and traverse juries were composed wholly of citizens of the town and county, who would necessarily have been affected by the alleged fraud; that both juries were drawn by the selectmen from a list prepared by them while actively engaged in furthering the prosecution; and that some of the grand jurors were present at a town meeting at which the prosecution was resolved on, and voted in favor thereof. For these reasons, defendant alleged that he was deprived of due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Defendant also filed a paper entitled an "Exception to the Jurisdiction, reciting the same facts, and claiming that, by reason thereof, neither the grand nor traverse jury nor the court had jurisdiction of the cause. The state supreme court held that the so-called exception amounted to no more than the motion in arrest, and that the motion was properly overruled, under Pub. St. Mass. c. 170, $$ 39, 40, and Id. c. 214, § 27, which provide that an offender is not entitled after verdict to object to the qualifications of jurors, or to any irregularity in drawing them, nor to move in arrest of judgment for any cause existing before verdict, and not affecting the jurisdiction of the court. Held, that this decision involved no federal question, and as it was broad enough to dispose of the case, independently of the question as to due process of law, there was nothing for the United States supreme court to review.

In error to the superior court of the state of Massachusetts.

Indictment of John F. Brown for forg ing and uttering a discharge for money. Defendant was convicted, and his exceptions were overruled by the supreme judicial court. 18 N. E. Rep. 587. He then moved in arrest of judgment, and filed an "exception to the jurisdiction. These were overruled by the trial court, and on appeal its action was again affirmed. 23 N. E. Rep. 98. Defendant then brought the cause on a writ of error to this court. Writ dismissed.

STATEMENT BY MR. JUSTICE GRAY. An indictment was found by the grand jury in the superior court for the county of Nantucket and commonwealth of Massachusetts on chapter 204, §§ 1, 2, of the Public Statutes of Massachusetts, containing 24 counts, each of which was for forging or for uttering a discharge for money payable by the county of Nantucket or by the town of Nantucket, with intent to defraud the county or the town.

The town and county of Nantucket are geographically identical. The selectmen of the town have the powers of county commissioners. The town may raise money to pay the expenses of the county, and the treasurer of the town is county treasurer. Pub. St. Mass. c. 22, § 29; Id. c. 23, § 4.

By the general jury act of Massachusetts,* in every town, lists of persons qualified to serve as jurors are prepared annually

by the selectmen, and are subject to revision by the town in town meeting; and all grand jurors and traverse jurors are drawn by lot from the names on such lists. Id. c. 170, §§ 6-22. That act contains the following provisions:

"Sec. 38. In indictments and penal ac. tions for the recovery of a sum of money or other thing forfeited, it shall not be a cause of challenge to a juror that he is liable to pay taxes in a county, city, or town which may be benefited by such recovery.

"Sec. 39. If a party knows of an objec. tion to a juror in season to propose it before the trial, and omits to do so, he shall not afterwards be allowed to make the same objection, unless by leave of the court.

"Sec. 40. No irregularity in a writ of venire facias, or in the drawing, summoning, returning, or impaneling of jurors, shall be sufficient to set aside a verdict, unless the party making the objection was injured by the irregularity, or unless the objection was made before the returning of the verdict."

The act of Massachusetts concerning proceedings before judgment in criminal cases contains this provision: "No motion in arrest of judgment shall be allowed for a cause existing before verdict, unless the same affects the jurisdiction of the court." Id. c. 214, § 27.

The defendant pleaded in abatement to the array of the grand jury, and afterwards to the array of the traverse jury, upon several grounds, the only one of which relied on at the argument in this court was "because the names of said jurors were not drawn from the list of jurors in the manner provided by law." The district attorney filed a replication to each plea; and, at the hearing thereon, it appeared that the crimes charged in the indictment were committed, if at all, in regard to vouchers presented to the town and county treasurer, with intent to defraud the town or the county; and the defendant requested the court to rule "that by reason of bias and interest a grand jury" (or "a jury ") "drawn and made up from the inhabitants of the town and county of Nantucket was not competent to make a presentment" (or “to try an indictment") "for crimes against the county or town treasury." The court declined so to rule, and overruled each plea. The defendant duly excepted to each ruling, and pleaded not guilty, and was thereupon tried and convicted; and his exceptions were overruled by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts, for reasons stated in the rescript sent down to the superior court, as follows: "The jurors were not disqualified to serve by reason of interest as inhabitants of the town or county of Nantucket. The opinion then delivered is annexed to the transcript of the record, as required by rule 8 of this court, and is reported in 147 Mass. 585, 18 N. E. Rep. 587.

The defendant then filed in the superior court a motion in arrest of judgment, re newing the same objections to the grand and traverse juries, and further alleging that before the finding of the indictment

the selectmen had been directed, by a vote of the town at a meeting duly warned, to prosecute the defendant for the offenses described in the indictment, and pursuant to that vote employed counsel, and a majority of them, with the approval of the others, made a complaint against the defendant for those offenses before a trial justice, who was himself an inhabitant and voter of the town, and had taken part in the town meeting and in its vote, and had there declared that the defendant was guilty, and before the making of the complaint had advised and counseled with the selectmen as to the furtherance of the prosecution; that the selectmen prosecuted the complaint, and obtained an order from the justice requiring the defendant to recognize for his appearance before the superior court, and prepared evidence and sought out witnesses to be produced against him before the grand jury; that while engaged in furthering such prosecution the selectmen prepared the list from which were drawn the grand and traverse jurors who found and tried the indictment against the defendant; that, at the town meeting at which such jurors were drawn, no one was present except the selectmen, and the constable who had served the warrant for the meeeting; that of the 23 grand jurors who found the indictment, all but 5 had been present at the town meeting first mentioned, and had joined in the vote there adopted; and that for these reasons "the presentment and the trial and conviction of the defendant were in conflict with the provisions of the constitution of this commonwealth, and in particular of the provisions of the twelfth article of the declaration of rights, and were in conflict with the constitution of the United States of America, and in particular with the provisions of the fourteenth amendment thereto."

Together with the motion in arrest of judgment, the defendant filed an "excep tion to the jurisdiction," containing like allegations, and further alleging that by reason of the facts alleged the grand ju rors had no authority to present, and the traverse jurors had no authority to try, the indictment against the defendant, and the court had no jurisdiction to receive the presentment, or to try the matter thereof.

At the hearing of this motion and exception the district attorney admitted the facts alleged therein. The court overruled the motion and the exception. The defendant appealed from the order overruling the motion in arrest of judgment, and alleged exceptions to the overruling of his exception to the jurisdiction.

The supreme judicial court of Massachusetts affirmed the order, and overruled the exceptions, for reasons stated in its rescript to the superior court, as follows: "A motion in arrest of judgment can be sustained only for errors apparent on the record. The record discloses no error. The exception to the jurisdiction is nothing but a motion in arrest of judgment, under another name."

In the opinion then delivered and duly transmitted to this court with the record, the supreme judicial court, after de

ciding the case upon the grounds stated In this rescript, added: "It is difficult to see how any question deserving serious consideration arises under the constitution, either of this state or of the United States. In view of the authorities cited in the former opinion in this case, it can hardly be argued that a legislature has no constitutional authority to provide that mere inhabitancy in a town or county shall not disqualify one from sitting as a juror to try a prisoner for unlawfully obtaining money from the treasury of the town or county. It has not been contended before us that our statute forbidding the allowance of a motion in arrest of judgment, for a cause existing before verdict, unless it affects the jurisdiction of the court, is unconstitutional, nor that the rule which confines proceedings upon motions in arrest to matters apparent upon the record is in conflict either with the federal or state constitution. We are of opinion that there was no error in the proceedings in the superior court." 150 Mass. 334, 343, 23 N. E. Rep. 98, 99.

The superior court thereupon sentenced the defendant to imprisonment in the house of correction for two years and six months, and he sued out this writ of er

ror.

By the practice in Massachusetts, where a bill of exceptions or an appeal in matter of law is taken to the supreme judicial court, the question of law only goes to that court, and the record, unless ordered up by that court, remains in the court below and therefore this writ of error was addressed to the superior court. Pub. St. Mass. c. 150. §§ 7, 12; Id. c. 153, § 15; McGuire v. Com., 3 Wall. 382; Bryan v. Bates, 12 Allen, 201, 205; Com. v. Scott, 123 Mass., 418.

Frederic Dodge and R. D. Weston-Smith, for plaintiff in error. A. E. Pillsbury, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

*Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

In order to give this court jurisdiction, under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, to review on writ of error a decision of the highest court of a state against a title, right, privilege, or immunity claimed under the constitution of the United States, it must, as observed by Chief Justice WAITE in Spies v. Illinois, "appear on the record that such title, right, privilege, or immunity was 'specially set up or claimed' at the proper time in the proper way." 123 U. S. 131, 181, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21, 31.

In the case at bar the only ground on which it has been argued that the judgment of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts should be reversed is that the plaintiff in error has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, because the grand jury by which he was indicted, and the traverse jury by which he was tried and convicted, were wholly composed of inhabitants of the town and county of Nantucket, which the indictment charged him with intending to defraud, and because the selectmen of the town, who pre

pared the jury list, and took the principal part in drawing the jurors, were at the same time actively promoting this prosecution.

No objection that the proceedings were in violation of the constitution of the United States was taken in any form, either expressly or by any possible inference or implication, before verdict.

Nor was any such objection duly presented afterwards. In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, the errors suggested could not be availed of by motion in arrest of judgment unless appearing on the face of the record. Com. v. Edwards, 12 Cush. 187; Carter v. Bennett, 15 How. 354. And by the statutes of the state the defendant was not entitled, after verdict, to object to the qualifications of the jurors, or to any irregularity in drawing them; nor could he move in arrest of judgment for any cause existing before verdict, and not affecting the jurisdiction of the court. Pub. St. Mass. c. 170, §§ 39, 40; Id. c. 214, § 27. The objections taken did not affect the jurisdiction of the court in which the plaintiff in error was indicted and convicted, but only the regularity of the proceedings in obtaining the grand and traverse jurors. Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780. The anomalous "exception to the jurisdiction," filed after verdict, was held, and rightly held, by the state court, to be nothing but a motion in arrest of judgment, under another name.

The judgment of the highest court of the state was put upon the ground that these objections were not open after verdict, in dependently of the opinion of that court that the objections had no merits. As that ground was sufficient to support the judgment, no federal question is involved, and this court has no jurisdiction. The case cannot be distinguished in principle from Baldwin v. Kansas, 129 U. S. 52, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193.

Writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

CRAWFORD V. NEAL.

(144 U. S. 585)

NEAL V. CRAWFORD et al.

(April 18, 1892.)

JURISDICTION-DIVERSE CITIZENSHIP-TRANSFER OF CLAIM-MASTER'S REPORT-Fraudulent ConVEYANCES EVIDENCE.

1. Where the transfer of a judgment gives the diversity of citizenship necessary to render a suit thereon cognizable in the federal courts, the fact that this is one of the motives of the transfer does not affect the federal jurisdiction, if the change of title is in fact absolute, aud for a good consideration.

2. Where the trial court, on a review of the evidence, concur in the master's findings of fact and conclusions of law, the same are presump. tively correct, and will not be disturbed, unless for obvious errors in the application of the law, or important mistake in the consideration of the evidence.

3. In Oregon a transfer of property by an insolvent debtor for the bona fide purpose of satisfying a debt equal or greater in amount than the value of the property is not constructively fraudulent as to other creditors, even though the grantee is aware of the insolvency.

4. Where an insolvent debtor transfers to a certain creditor his dwelling and mill property, the fact that he is allowed to remain in possession, and run the mill on a salary, is not con

clusive evidence of a purpose to defraud other creditors, and is susceptible of explanation on the ground that the parties were lifelong friends.

5. Where two brothers, both claiming to be creditors of a failing debtor, on the same day procure, through the agency of one of them, conveyances of property from the debtor, these conveyances are not necessarily so connected, as parts of the same transaction, that one may not be held valid and the other invalid, as to other creditors, when the instruments run to each separately, and convey different property, and the alleged considerations are separate.

36 Fed. Rep. 29, affirmed.

Appeals from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Oregon. Affirmed.

STATEMENT BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FUller.

This was a bill filed by Charles A. Neal in the circuit court of the state of Oregon, for the county of Linn, July 1, 1886, against James H. Foster, John A. Craw. ford, William Crawford, Ashby Pearce, John R. Baltimore, J. L. Liles, E. Walden, and W. H. Goltra, and subsequently removed, on the application of the complainant, to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Oregon. The bill was in the nature of a creditor's bill, seeking to set aside certain conveyances of real (and some personal) property by the defendant James H. Foster to the defendants John A. Crawford, William Crawford, and Ashby Pearce, upon the ground that they were made to hinder, delay, and defraud the complainant and certain of the defendants, as judgment creditors of the said Foster. Complainant was a citizen of the state of Illinois, and defendants were citizens of the state of Oregon, and complainant claimed as the assignee of two judgments,-the first rendered in the state circuit court March 8, 1886, in favor of Sibson, Quackenbush & Co., for $14,037.87, with costs and interest; and the second rendered in the same court, and on the same day, in favor of W. C. Noon & Co., for the sum of $1,920.35, with interest. The defendants Goltra, Walden, Liles, and Baltimore were also judgment creditors of Foster.

Answers and replications having been filed, the cause was referred to a master to take testimony, and to report his findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon.

The master found the various judg ments, and that execution had been issued and returned unsatisfied upon those in favor of Sibson, Quackenbush & Co. and W. C. Noon & Co.; that Foster was insolvent on February 6, 1884, and had so continued since that time, and had no property out of which the judgments of complainant and the other creditors could be satisfied; that on February 6, 1884, Foster conveyed to John A. Crawford certain parcels of real estate numbered from 1 to 5, and certain personal property, and to William Crawford another parcel of real estate. known as the "Brick Store Property, numbered 6, and that on February 7th Foster conveyed to Ashby Pearce a certain other parcel, numbered 7, and a small amount of personalty; and that the parties to these transfers, at the time they were made, agreed upon the prices of the property, which aggregated $79,000.

The master further found"(18) That in 1867 J. H. and John Foster were partners in a mercantile business under the firm name of J. H. Foster & Co., and in that year bought the Magnolia mill from Wm. Crawford for $16,000, paying $6,000 cash and executing five notes for $2,000 each, of date July 20, 1867. These notes were secured by a mortgage on the mill property and a brick store, which mortgage was duly recorded.

"That in 1876 J. H. Foster bought out John Foster's interest in the mills and business and assumed all the debts and liabilities of J. H. Foster & Co., and thereafter individually continued the business under the same firm name.

"That the business of the Crawfords with J. H. Foster was for a considerable time conducted under the name of Crawford Bros., and was transacted by John A. Crawford, who was the agent and representative of Wm. Crawford.

"That on or before the 6th day of February, 1884, J. H. Foster was owing said J. A. Crawford on notes and accounts for money lent and water rent the sum of $27,733, which was then due and unpaid, and that at the time said J. A. Crawford was also liable as surety for $16,000, or thereabouts, upon indorsements which he had made for the accommodation of said Foster.

"That on said 6th day of February, 1884, said J. A. Crawford, as a part of the consideration for said transfer, executed and delivered to J. H. Foster his note for $10,000, with the understanding that said Foster should hold said note as a security that said Crawford should perform a verbal agreement then made between said J. A. Crawford and said Foster, to the effect that said Crawford should purchase the wheat of, or satisfy divers persons who held warehouse receipts of, said Foster, for wheat stored by them with said Foster in his warehouse, and which wheat Foster had converted to his own use, to the amount, in all, of about 20,000 bushels, and save said Foster harmless therefrom.

"That said J. A. Crawford then agreed with said Foster that, as a part consideration for the transfer of said property, he would assume and pay the said $16,000 for