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contract of life insurance. The insured test the tax titles, and that the sum paid to ex. died before the policy was actually issued.
tinguish them was chargeable to the mortgagor If it had been issued it would have con
under the terms of the mortgage. tained a stipulation that “payment of the
2. In the foreclosure suit the mortgagor could
not set off against plaintiff's demand a claim for loss would be made within ninety days
a general retainer for future professional servafter notice of the death, and due proof of ices, in the absence au express agreement to the just claim of the assured.” The benefi. pay a retainer. ciury was the wife of the insured. On the
36 Fed. Rep. 838, afirmed. trial the plaintiff offered evidence to prove the contract and the death of her bus Appeal from circuit court of the United band; that she had filled up in the pres
States for the northern district of Illinois. ence of the company's agent the blank Bill by Union Mutual Life Insurance forms which it had furnished, and wbich Company of Maine against Arthur W. were always used in making proofs of Windett to foreclose a deed of trust. death; and that he had received witbout From a decree for plaintiff, rendered opon objection and retained them; but offered the report of a referee, defendant appeals. 00 evidence as to the contents of those | Affirmed. papers. She rested her case upon this tes Arthur W. Windett, for appellant. P. timony, and the court refused an instruc S. Gruscupp and Josiah H. Drummond, tion that she could not recover This for appellee. court hold that such instruction was properly refused. Of course, as a wife, she had *Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of an insurable interest. Proof of the contract the court. and of ber husband's death established the This was a bill in equity by a corporafact of her right to recover, unless she had tion of Maine against a citizen of Illinois wa failed to furnish due proufs or her just to foreclose a deed of trust in the nature claims; but as the company received them *of a mortgage of land in Chicago, made without objection, and did not return by the defendant to the plaintiff on July them for correction, it was properly held | 12, 1869, to secure the payment of his note that they were sufficient All that was in of that date for $7,500, payable in five fact determined was that, if the proofs years, with interest at the rate of 8 per were retained without objection, the court cept.; and containing covenants that the could not declare them insufficient.
premises were “free and clear of all liens Further, in the case before us the blank and incumbrances ;” and that the mort. which was furnished to the plaintiff by gagor would “in due season pay all taxes the company, and upon which he prepared and assessments on said premises, and exthe statements, contained this notice: hibit once a year receipts of the proper
“This blank is furnished (upon applica persons to said party of the second part, tion) for the convenience and assistance showing payment thereof;” and a power of the representatives of the insured, and to sell on any breach of condition, and the company reserves the right to consid out of the proceeds, after paying all exer and determine the question of its liabil. penses, “including all moneys advanced Ity under any policy, without prejudice or for taxes, insurance, or other liens and aspresumption by reason of the delivery here sessments, with the interest thereon at of."
the rate of ten per cent. per annuin from So the party had full information in ad the date of payment, all which advances vance that the company's right to chalshall be secured by this trust,” to pay the lenge its liability would not be in any principal and interest of the note to the manner prejudiced by the receipt of these mortgagee, and any surplus to the mort. proofs of death, or any statements therein. gagor.
We see no error in the ruling of the court This bill was filed February 10, 1882, below, and its judgment is a tfirmed. after default in payment of principal and
interest of the mortgage debt. The mas. Mr. Justice GRAY was not present at the ter, to whom it was referred to state the argument, and took no part in the decis
account betweeu the parties, reported ion of this case.
that there was due to the plaintiff the (144 U. S. 581)
sum of $20,556.11. The defendunt except. WINDETT v. UNION MUTUAL LIFE Ixs. Co.
ed to the master's report in two respecte, OF MAINE.
and appealed from a final decree rendered
for the plaintiff in accordance with that (April 18, 1892.)
report. MORTGAGES-FORECLOSURE-CLAIM POR Taxes i. The defendant failed to pay the taxes PAID.
assessed on the land from 1869 to 1879, and 1. A deed of trust in the nature of a mort
the land was sold and conveyed for nongage, given to secure the payment of a note, con
payment of these taxes to Asahel Gage. tained covenants that the mortgagor would pay all taxes upon the land, and also a power to sell
The plaintiff's president urged the defend. and pay all expenses, including all money ad
ant to redeem the land from the tax sales, vanced for taxes. The land was sold for nonpay
(as he might, under the Revised Statutes ment of taxes, and there was some doubt, from of Illinois, c. 120, § 210, by paying the the evidence, whether the purchaser did or did amounts for which the land was sold, not give notice of the tax sales to the tenants, with interest at the rate of 10 per cent., but no evidence of invalidity in any other re
and certain penalties,) and told him that spect. The mortgagee, after waiting two years for the iand to be redeemed, bought the tax title
otherwise the plaintiff would be obliged for a sum exceeding the amount of unpaid taxes
to take steps to protect itself. The de. and interest, but very much less than the penal.
fendant promised to pay the taxes and ties accrued, and then brought suit to foreclose. interest, but insisted that the tax deeds Held, tbat the mortgagee was not bound to con. were void, for want of previous notice to
the tenants of Gage's purchases as in addition,) as “webbing, gorings, * eto, made quired by chapter 120, § 216, of the same of wool, worsted, etc.; the classification depend. statutes. The defendant never paid the ing upon the question whether the goods were
known to the trade simply as "webbing," or as taxes, or took any steps towards redeem
both “webbing” and “goring;” and, in an action ing the land. After waiting two years,
to recover duties paid, this question was one for the plaintiff, on August 1, 1881, bought in
the jury, and not for the court. Gage's tax titles for the sum of $3,750, which exceeded the amount of unpaid In error to the circuit court of the United taxes and interest by the sum of $300 States for the southern district of New only, equal to a very small part of the York. Reversed. penalties accrued. The master allowed Asst. Atty. Gen. Parker, for plaintiff in the plaintiff this sum of $3,750, with inter error. S. G. Clarke and E. B Smith, for est at the rate of 10 per cent., amounting
defendant in error. to $1,809.24.
The defendapt argued that the plaintiff * Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the could not be allowed for the taxes, be- opinion of the court. cause they had been extinguished by the This is an action at law, brought Octo. tax sales and deeds; and could not recover ber 15, 1884, in the superior court of the on the tax titles, because they were void, city of New York, by Bernard J. Salomon and because eguity would not enforce and Sainel Mendel Phillips against Wiilthem.
jam H. Robertson, late collector of the But the plaintiff did not set up the tax port of New York, to recover an alleged deeds as a ground of suit, but only as evi excess of duties, amounting to $288.20, on dence of clouds upon his title, arising out certain goods imported into that port in of the mortgagor's own neglect to pay March and June, 1884. The case was rethe taxes. It is at least doubtful, upon moved by the defendant, by certiorari, inthe evidence, whether Gage did not give to the circuit court of the United States notice to the tenants of the tax sales; and for the southern district of New York, and there is no evidence whatever of any in. was tried there, before a jury, in January, validity in the taxes, the sales, or the 1888. There was a verdict for the plain. deeds, in any other respect. In this state tiffs for $157.08 as to certain of the goods, of things, the mortgagee was not bound and for the defendant as to certain others to take the risk of contesting the tax of them; whereupon a judgment was entitles, and the sums puid to extinguishtered for the plaintiffs ior $157.08 damthose titles were reasonable expenses ages, $46.85 costs, and $6.67 interest, inak. chargeable to the mortgagor by the ing in ail $210.60. To review that judgterms of the mortgage.
ment the defendant has sued out a writ of 2. The defendant, who is an attorney at error. law, claimed by way of set-off the sum of The goods in question were in voiced as $2,500 for professional services, and the "elastic webbings.” Some of them were.. further sum of $5,000 for a general retainer, composed of worsted and India rubber, by reason of the president having, as the and the remainder of* cotton, silk, and In. defendant testified, said that he “wished dia rubber. The collector assessed duties to engage him professionally in behalf of on the worsted and rubber goods at the the company with reference to fifteen or rate of 30 cents per pound and 50 per cent. twenty cases,- litigated or complicated ad valorem, and on the cotton, silk, and cases,-growing out of their foreclosure rubber gouds at the rate of 35 per cent, ad proceedings and claims upon property.” valorem. The plaintiffs paid such duties
The master allowed the defendant the under a protest, which stated the grounds sum of $600 for professional services act. of their dissatisfaction to be " that under ually rendered, and the evidence does not existing laws, and particularly by Schedsatisfy us that they were worth more. ule N of the tariff act of March 3, 1883, said
The defendant's claim for a retainer for goods were liable at no more than 30 per services in suits to be brought in the cent. ad valorem, as fabrics in part ludia future was rightly disallowed by the mas rubber, not otherwise specially enumerat. ter. No express agreement to pay a re ed or provided for.” The duties claimed tainer was proved, and an agreement to to have been levied and paid in excess of pay a retainer for services which are never the lawful rate amounted, with interest, performed is not to be implied.
in the case of the worsted and rubber Decree affirmed.
goods, to $125.04, and in the case of the
cotton, silk, and rubber goods to $32.04. (144 U. S. 603)
The bill of exceptions states as follows: ROBERTSON v. SALOMON et al.
"To furtber sustain the issue upon their (April 18, 1892.)
part, the plaintiffs called witnesses who Customs DUTIES–CLASSIFICATION-ELASTIC WEB
testified substantially that the goods in BING.
question are used to insert in the upper Under the tariff of 1883, elastic goods used
part of shoes and gaiters; that the rubber to insert in the upper part of shoes or gaiters is an essential part of the article; and could not be classified as “fabrics in part India
that it could not be used for the purpose rubber, not otherwise provided for,” dutiable for which it is intended without rubber. at 80 per cent., under Schedule N. p. 513; but, That it is sometimes known as 'elastic when composed of cotton, silk, and India rubber, webbing,' and that it is also known unwere dutiable at 35 per cent. as “webbing, com.
der the name of 'elastic goring. That posed of cotton, flax, or other material,” under Schedule N, p. 514; and, when composed of worst
there are webbings in which rubber is not ed and India rubber, were dutiable either under
a component part. That there are many Bchedule N, p. 514, or under Schedule K, p. 509, (at kinds of webbings, such as surgical webB0 cents per pound, and 50 per cent. ad valorem I bing8, suspender webbioge, and upholstery
webbings. That all parrow woren fab- fringes, gimnps, cords and tassels, dress rics are considered webbings. That the trimmings, bead nets, buttons, or barrel articles in question in this action were buttons, or buttons of other forms for tasworen on the loom. That webbings are sels or ornaments, wrought by hand, or always woven on the loom.
braided by machinery, made of wool, The defendant put in evidence which worsted, the hair of the alpaca, goat, or tended to show that the elastic, webbing other animals, or of wbich wool, worsted, in controversy was bought and invoiced the hair of the alpaca, goat, or other anas “elastic webbing," but was sold in the imals is a component material, thirty market in the United States as “goring;" cents per pound, and, in addition thereto, that the general trade name for it in tlie fifty per centum ad valorem." United States was “goring;” that it was Schedule N, “Sundries, (page 514:) never made on bruiding machines or by Webbing, composed of cotton, fax, or hapd; that "elastic webbing” was a term any other materials, not specially enunier. known in trade and commerce in the ated or provided iorin this act, thirty-five United States prior to 1883, applicable to per centum ad valorem. goods like the plaintiff's importation; And the same schedule, (page 513:) that the term “elastic webbing," applied “India rubber fabrics, composed whullý
to goods like those in question, had been or in part of India rubber, not specially known in trade and commerce, as the for enumerated or provided for in this act, eign name, since and prior to 1883, in and thirty per centum ad valorem. Articles
umong importers* and large dealers, but composed of India rubber not specially tbut “goring" was the American name, enumerated or provided for in this act, and the article was 80 called because it twenty-five per centum ad valorem.” was used to make gores of, and formed The collector levied on the goods comthe goring of a congress shoe; and that posed of worsted and India rubber 30 cents the shoe manufacturer called them gores. per pound, and, in addition thereto, 50 per It was also admitted at the trial that all cent. ad valorem, and on those composed the testimony contained in the bill of ex of cotton, silk, and India rubber 35 per ceptions as to trade designation and use cent. ad valorem. was likewise true immediately prior to The plaintiffs claimed that the goods and on March 3, 1883.
were India rubber fabrics, composed At the close of the case, the defendant wholly or in part of India rubber, not moved the court to direct a rerdict for specially enumerated or provided for in tbe him, upon the general ground that the act, and therefore subject to a duty of plaintiffs had not estabìished their con only 30 per cent. ad valoren. tention, and specifically as to the goods We are of opinion that the judgment composed of worsted and rubber, that it must be reversed. It appears distinctly appeared from the testimony that they that the goods in question were used to were known in this country under the spe insert in the upper part of shoes or gai. cific name of “goring;" and that, especial. ters, and that, while each of the two kinds ly since the word “goring" was inserted was called “webbing," it was also known first into the worsted clause by the act of as “goring. The worsted and India rubMarch 3, 1983, it more specifically described ber article was dutiable as webbing or as the goods in question than “fabrics in goring, at 30 cents per pound, and, in ad. part of India rubber." That motion was dition, 50 per cent. ad valorein; while the denied by the court, and the defendant ex. cotton, silk, and India rubber article was cepted.
dutiable as webbing composed of cotton, The defendant then asked to have sub any other materials not specially mitted to the jury the question whether enumerated or provided for in the act, at
35 per cent. ad valorem. and commerce, and among large dealers and “gorings" make their first appearance in this country, under the name of “gor. in the act of March 3, 1883; and their inser ing;” which motion was denied by the tion in that act must have had reference court, and the defendant excepted.
worsted and rubber was known 'in trade she is very clear that the words “goring
not merely to their absence from previous The court tben directed a verdict for the statutes, but, in connection with such ab. plaintiffs for the respective amounts sence, to the construction which this court sought to be recovered by them. To this had put upon prior statutes in which ruling the defendant excepted.
those words did not appear, in reference At the time the goods in question were to the duties leviable ou articles of the Imported they were subject to duty under character of those in question in this suit. section 2502 of title 33 of the Revised Stat. Although the goods in question were com. utes, as enacted by section 6 of the act of posed wholly or in part of India rubber, March 3, 1883, c. 121. (22 St. p. 488.)
those composed of worsted and India Schedule I,“ Cotton and Cotton Goods, rubber were specially enumerated or proof section 2502, provided as follows (page vided for as “gorings, " under Schedule K; 506) in regard to duties: “Cotton cords, and those composed of cotton, silk, and braids, gimps, galloons, webbiug, goring, India rubber were specially enumerated suspenders, braces, and all manufactures and provided for in Schedule N, as “ webof cotton, not specially enumerated or bing, composed of cotton, fax, or any provided for in this act, and corsets, of other materials; and all of them, therewhatever material composed, thirty-five fore, were excepted from the 30 per cent. per centum ad valorem.
duty imposed on India rubber fabrics by Schedule K,“ Wool and Woolens,” (page Schedule N. 309:) “Wobbings, gorings, suspenders, The cases of Arthur v. Davies, 96 0. 8. bryces, beltings, bindings, braids, galloons, 135, in 1877, in regard to goods imported
in 1873, and of Beard v. Nichols, 120 U. S. the fact whether the article contains India 260, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548, in regard to goods | rubber or not; and by Schedule N of the iniported in 1878 and 1879, relied upon by sane act a duty is imposed on webbing the plaintiffe, do not control the present composed of cotton, flax, or any other case,
materials, without reference to the fact In Arthur v. Davies the articles in ques. whether it contains lodia rubber or not. tion were suspenders or braces, made of We are of opinion that the goods comIndia rubber, cotton, and silk, cotton posed of worsted and India rubber were being the component inaterial of chief dutiable as gorings at 30 cents per pound, value, and suspenders or braces made of and, in addition theretn, 50 per cent. ad India rubber, cotton, and silk, cotton valorem, if tbey were known in this coun. being the component inaterial of chief try, in trade and commerce, under theo value, a few threads of silk being lotro. specific name of “goring;” that whetler duced for purposes of ornament. It was they were or pot 80-known was, on the held that the goods were dutiable under eridence, a question for the jury; that the section 22 of the act of March 2, 1861, (12 court erred in not submitting that quesSt. p. 191,) which impoved a duty of 30 per tion to the jury; that the goods composed cent. on “hraces, suspenders, webbing, or of cotton, silk, and India rubber were subother fabrics, composed wholly or in part | ject to a duty of 35 per cent. ad valorem; of India rubber, not utherwise provided and that the court erred lu directing a for," and to an additional duty of 5 per verdict for the plaintiffs. cent. ad valorem imposed on the same ar The judgment is reversed, witb a direc. ticles by section 13 of the act of July 14, 1862, tion to grant a new trial, and to take fur. (12 St. p. 556,) and not to a duty of 50 per ther proceedings in conformity with this cent. ad valorem, imposed by section 8 of opinion. the same act, (12 St. p. 552,) on inanufac
(144 U. 8. 601) tures of India rubber and silk, or of India rubber and silk and other materials. "
MEYERHEIM et al. v. ROBERTSON. This was held on the ground that, if the
(April 18, 1892.) articles were technically and commercially CustomS DOTIES-CLASSIFICATION-LACES. braces and suspenders, composed in part Under Rev. St. U. S. $ 2504, p. 462, Sched. of India rubber, they took their dutiable ule C, laces made by machinery out of linen cbaracter from that source.
thread, and known as “torchons, were dutiable In Beard V. Nichols the goods were at 40 per cent. ad valorem, as "manufactures of webbing made of India rubber, wool, and flax," and could not be classed under Schedule C, cotton, and were used for gores in making
p. 463, as "thread lace,” dutiable at 30 per cent
ad valorem, which is always handmade. congress boots, and without the rubber would not have been adapted to that use. In error to the circuit court of the Unit. They were not wrought by hand nor ed States for the southern district of New braided by machinery, but were woven York. Affirmed. iu a loom, and appear to have been sub Wm. Stanley, S. G. Clarke, and E. B. stantially like the goods in question in the Smith, for plaintiffs in error. Asst. Atty. present case, made of worsted and India Gen. Parker, for defendant iu error. rubber. They were held to be dutiable at 35 per cent. ad valorem, under section 2504 * Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the of the Revised Statutes, Schedule M, opinion of the court. “Sundries,” (page 477,) which imposed that This is an action at law, brought to the rate of duty on "braces, suspenders, superior court of the city of New York, in webbing, other fabrics, composed November, 1882, by Sieguvuod Meyerheim, wholly or in part of India rubber, not William Kempner, and Henry Strahlheim, otherwise provided for;" and not to a against William H. Robertson, late col. duty of 50 cents per pound, and, in addio lector of the port of New York, and retion thereto, 50 per cent. ad valorem, un moved by the defendant into the circuit der Schedule L of section 2504, “ Wool and court of the United States for the southWoolen Goods, " (page 472,) as “webbings" ern district of New York, to recover of which wool or worsted was a com. $764.50, as an alleged excess of duties exponent material. That decision was put acted on the importation of certain goods upon the ground on which it is there into the port of New York in the years stated that the decision in Arthur V. 1881 and 1882. The case was tried before Davies had been put, namely, that, ever a jury in June, 1888, and a verdict rendered since 1812, webbing composed wholly or in for the defendant, on which there was a part of India rubber had been a subject of judgment in his favor for costs. duty eo nomine.
The importation was of certain laces But the act of March 3, 1883, does not made by machinery out of linea thread, impose a duty on webbing composed and with them certain laces of the same wholly or in part of India rubber," as did material, made by band. The defendant subdivision 10 of section 5 of the act of assessed duty upon all the laces at 40 per August 30, 1842, (5 St. p. 553,) and as did cent. ad valorein under the provision of Schedule C of section 11 of the act of July Schedule C of section 2504 of the Revised 30, 1846, (9 St. p. 44,) and as did section 22 Statutes, (page 462,) which imposed that of the act of March 2, 1861, (12 St. p. 191,) rate of duty on “fax or linen thread, and did section 13 of the act of July 14, twine, and pack thread, and all other 1862, (12 St. p. 556.)
manufactures of fax, or of which fax By the act of March 3, 1883, Schedule K, shall be the component material of chiet A duty is iinposed ou webbings and value, not otherwise provided for." The gorings of which wool or worsted is a plaintiffa claimed that the goods were do. component material, without reference to tiuble at only 30 per cent. ad valorem,
as "thread lace and insertings," under the the legislature known as “lo. 3 of 1874," same schedule, (page 463.)
at the rate of 60 per cent. of their value. After the suit was brought, the secreta- tion. The petition of the plaintiff waar ry of the treasury refunded to the plain filed in April, 1851, in the civil district tiffs all excessive sums exacted upon such court of the parish of New*Orleans, and* of the above importations of laces of linen set forth that he beld, as assignee of the thread as were made by hand, leaving the agent of Mrs. J. D. Wells and others, five controversy only as to those laces of linen bouds of the state, of $1,000 each, with thread which were made by machinery. coupons attached, dated August 1, 1864, All the laces, whether made by band or payable 25 years after date, with 6 per machinery, were known, bought, and sold cent. interest, payable semiannually; that as "torchons," and the issue presented these bonds were issued by the state at was wbether or not machine-made tor- that date, under the law of February 8, cbuns were dutiable as“ thread lace," oras 1864, and other law's, and were properly "manufactures of flax, or of wbich flax indorsed and assigned to the plaintiff, or Bhall be the component material of chief the holders thereof; that they were legal value, not otherwise provided for."
and valid obligations of the state, were The articles were made wholly of linen issued in strict conformity to law, and thread, and, therefore, of ilax. It clearly not in violation of the constitution of the appeared bs the testimony of one of the state or of the United States, and were plaintiffs that be never heard the machine issued and transferred for a raluable conmade goods bought and sold as thread sideration, and were entitled to be funded laces, but invariably as “torchons. The as such valid obligations; that the plain. testimony on the part of the defendant tiff desired and was entitled to liave them was to the same effect, and showed tbat funded under Act No. 3 of 1874, known as thread lace was always handmade.
the “Funding Act, " and to have them The defendant requested the court to dio exchanged for consolidated bonds of the rect a verdict in his favor, while the plain. state, as provided in that act, at the rate tiffs claimed to go to the jury. A verdict of 60 per cept. of their valuation; and for the defendant was directed, and the that he had presented the bonds for such plaintiffs excepted.
funding and exchange to the board of liq. We do not think there was any question | uidation, making an amicable dein and of for the jury on the evidence.
the board therefor, but that it had reJudgment affirmed.
fused to fund them, and make the ex
change. (144 U. 8. 647)
The petition further set forth that the SAGE V. BOARD OF LIQUIDATION OF LOul bonds were issued by the regular state BIANA. (No. 21.)
government of Louisiana in dun course of
administration and performance of gore (April 18, 1892.)
ernmental business, in paying for properSUPREME COURT-JURISDICTION — FEDERAL QUES. ty needed to facilitate ani aid civil opera
tions, and that the transaction had no A decision by the supreme court of Loui.
connection with contemporaneous milisiana that certain state bonds, issued in 1864, were invalid, because they were exchanged by targ affairs, and was in no wise touched or the state authorities for sugar, instead of for
tainted with any Confederate cause, constate or Confederate currency, as required by the
sideration, or motive; and that they were act authorizing their issuance, and that, there issued in proper form and by proper fore, the holder was not entitled to exchange ufficers, according to law, sealed with the them for consolidated state bonds, under the fund. | seal, and secured by the faith, of the state. ing act of 1874, involved no federal question, and is not reviewable in the United States supremo
The plaintiff therefore prayed that the
buard of liquidation might be cited, and court
that it be decreed that the bonds were In error to the supreme court of the legal and constitutional obligations of state of Louisiana.
the state of Louisiana; that they were Petition in the civil district court of the issued in conformity with law, and not in parish of New Orleans by B. J. Sage violation of state or federal constitution, against the state board of liquidation of and were given to the original holders for the state of Louisiana to have certain a valuable consideration, and were entistate bonds declared legal and valid, and tled to be funded and exchanged in con. exchangeable for consolidated state formity with Act No. 3 of 1874; and also bonds, under the funding act of 1874. for all orders, judgments, and decreesa Judgment was rendered for defendapt and that justice might require iu the premises. affirmed by the state supreme court. 37 • To the petition the board of liquidation* La. Ann. 412. Plaintiff brings error. appeared and answered by a general deWrit of error dismissed.
nial of its allegations. It also made B. J. Sage and Chas. W. Hornor, for special denial that the bonds were valid plaintiff in error. W. H. Rogers, Atty. | obligations of the state, and alleged that Gen., for defendant in error.
the parties who signed and issued them
were not the authorized agents of the Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion state; that the bonds were not issued for of tbe court.
a valuable consideration; and that they This was a suit against the board of were issued in violation of the constito. liquidation of the state of Louisiana to tion of the United States. compel it to fund certain bonds of the The statute No. 3 of 1874, referred to in state held by the plaintiff, of August ), the petition, enacted that the board of 1864, and to exchange them for its consoli. liquidation, which was created by it; dated bonds, as provided in the act of should exchange the consolidated bonds