man, November 8, 1886, against the administrators of Joseph Hastings, deceased, in the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Ohio, which set forth that from and including the month of March, 1875, to and including the month of May, 1881, complainant sent to Hastings from time to time various sums of money to be lent by him for complainant at interest, Hastings being instructed and agreeing to reinvest the interest in the same way. The money was first invested at 10 per cent. annual interest, but early in 1881 Hastings informed Dillman that the rate of interest was reduced to 8 per cent. Hastings died on February 12, 1886.

The administrators answered, alleging ignorance of the transactions or agreements between Hastings and Dillman, except that they admitted that, at the time of his death, Hastings had of Dillman's money the sum of $1,875. They also averred that an agreement to account for interest at 10 per cent. was illegal and void; and set up the statute of limitations as to that part of the account which accrued prior to December 25, 1879.

99

Replication was duly filed, and depositions taken, and on January 10, 1888, by agreement of parties, the cause was referred to the clerk of the court, "because of his skill in matters of accounting, as a special master, "to hear, and from the testimony determine and report to the court, what, if anything, is due complainant herein from the defendants herein on account of the matters set forth in complainant's bill filed herein, and; what relief be granted to said complainant; and for the purposes of this reference the said special master is hereby vested with all the power and authority conferred upon masters in chancery by the equity rules of the supreme court, and by the practice of this court. He is authorized to hear testimony, and he will report his findings of law and fact, together with the evidence taken, and also state an account, based upon such facts, between said parties, at the earliest practicable day."

On April 28, 1888, the master filed his report, finding due to the complainant the sum of $14,394.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent. from February 12, 1886. This total was arrived at by charg. ing Hastings with the cash received by him, with interest on each item at 10 per cent., with annual rests, to April 1, 1881, and at 8 per cent. thereafter, making an aggregate of $15,694.50, and deducting therefrom a credit by cash paid on February 2, 1886, of $700, and also the sum of $600 for compensation allowed Hastings, leaving a balance of $14,394.50.

Complainant's counsel filed three exceptions to the master's report, of which the first and second alone were relied on, which were: (1) That the master allowed interest at the rate of only 6 per cent. from the time of the death of Joseph Hastings, whereas he should have allowed 8 per cent.; (2) that the master allowed a compensation of $600 for services of Hastings, whereas no compensation should have been awarded. The defendants filed 10 exceptions, but they have not appealed,

and therefore these need not be considered, except so far as they were sustained by the court.

The case, having come on to be heard on the report and the exceptions on both sides, was argued by counsel, and the court disallowed complainant's exceptions, and also defendants' exceptions, except that the court found "that the master erred in the method of computing interest on the amounts in his report set forth; that the taxes set out in the evidence in the case should have been allowed the respondents; and that the respondents should have been allowed tho sum of one thousand and eighty dollars for compensation for services in the agency. And the court, except as above specified, confirmed and approved the report, and, after making the allowances indicated, found that there was due complainant from the administrators of the estate the sum of $12,172.59, with interest from June 5, 1888, the first day of the term, and decreed accordingly. The case was thereupon appealed to this court by the complainant. In the account stated by the master, interest was included up to April 1, 1881, at the rate of 10 per cent., and at 8 per cent. thereafter, with annual rests. Thig was upon the view that Hastings had invested complainant's remittances at these rates, and received and reinvested the interest in the same way, as shown by the correspondence between the parties. We concur with the master that this is a fair deduction from the evidence, which leaves no reasonable doubt that such was the fact; and if not, that complainant believed it to be so upon the strength of Hastings' assurances to that effect, and left the money in his hands under that conviction.

Not only did the correspondence sustain the master's conclusion, but the administrators did not testify, and produced no books or papers showing the state of accounts between the decedent and the complainant, notwithstanding notice to do so, and although the letters tended to establish that Hastings kept a book containing an account of his investments for complainant. The trust relation between the parties was fully disclosed, and entitled complainant to a complete accounting; and, as the master held, it was clearly Hastings' duty to keep accounts as between him and complainant, and whatever data existed in Hastings' papers, | calculated to throw light upon the transactions, should of course have been furnished. In the absence of such data, and upon a careful examination of the evidence, we hold that the master was right in the course he pursued.

On the 2d of April, 1881, complainant wrote Hastings that, according to his account, if he bad calculated correctly, the sum in Hastings' hands on April 1st amounted to about $10,500; and this does not appear to have been questioned by Hastings. According to the master's report the sum at that time, interest being included at 10 per cent., with annual rests, was $10,495.18, and interest after that was calculated at 8 per cent., with which rate complainant wrote he should be entirely satisfied, but wished his money returned

to him so far as that rate could not be obtained.

Defendants' third exception questioned the allowance of interest upon the ground that an agreement to account to plaintiff at such rates would be illegal and void, and because it was not shown that such interest was received by the deceased; but it was not contended that, if the interest were received, defendants were not obliged to account therefor, and we think, for the reasons given, that this exception should not have been sustained. The circuit court does not seem to have delivered any opinion, and there is nothing in the decree giving a sufficient basis to ascertain, with precision, in what respect the court held that the master erred in the method of computing interest. But this is not material, inasmuch as we are of opinion that the master's report was correct in this regard.

After the death of Hastings, which occurred, as already stated, on February 12, 1886, his administrators should not be held to respond at a greater rate of interest than 6 per cent., which was the legal rate in Ohio, in the absence of special agreement, it not sufficiently appearing that they themselves* received interest at a higher rate; and therefore the complainant's first exception was properly overruled.

The master allowed $600 compensation, which was raised by the court to $1,080. A portion of this increase, we presume, was for interest upon the proper compensation from time to time, during the period covered by the transactions. At all events, while the proof is not satisfactory that Hastings was to obtain his compensation from complainant rather than from the borrowers, we are not inclined to modify the decision of the court upon this point, and this disposes of the second exception.

It was found by the court that the taxes set out in the evidence as paid by Hastings should have been allowed the defendants. As we understand the record, these taxes amounted, with the interest thereon, calculated at 10 per cent. and 8 per cent. up to February 12, 1886, to $770.45, and we agree with the master that it does not appear for whom these taxes were paid. It was provided by the statute of Ohio that "every person required to list behalf property on of others shall list it separately from his own, specifying in each case the name of the person, company, or corporation to whom it belongs. Rev. St. Ohio, 1890, § 2735. No such listing of Dillman's money is shown. The evidence established the payment of certain taxes by Hastings, but not that they were paid on account of Dillman, or of anybody other than himself. It appeared that Hastings had money of his own, and that he received money from other persons than Dillman, which he loaned for them, taking the securities in his own name. If Dillman could have been taxed in respect of his moneys in Ohio, it is enough that the record does not show that these taxes were levied as against such moneys, and paid on his ac

count. And here, again, the absence of evidence on defendants' behalf should be borne in mind; for, we repeat, it was Hastings' duty to have kept accounts, and the case inade justifies the inference that there were such. The bill avers that, when complainant presented his claim against the estate, he credited these taxes, & with interest, upon the faith of a memorandum furnished by defendants, but, finding that the credit was unfounded, he insisted that he should not be charged therewith. In our judgment the court ought not to have allowed the taxes under the circumstances.

We notice that interest should have been allowed at the rate of 8 per cent. on the $700 paid by Hastings to Dillman, February 2, 1886, from that date to February 12th, being $1.55, as shown by the ac. count annexed to the bill.

The amount found due by the master was $15,694.50, from which he deducted $700 in cash, paid February 2, 1886, and $600 for compensation. We think from the $15,694.50 there should be deducted $701.55, and also $1,080 as compensation, as found by the court. This leaves a balance of $13,912.95, and to that extent the decree is modified.

The result is that the decree will be reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded, with a direction to enter a decree for $13,912.95, with interest at 6 per cent. from February 12, 1886, to the date of the decree. Decree reversed.

RICE V. SANGER.

(March 28, 1892.)

(144 U. S. 197)

APPEAL-FINAL JUDGMENT.

The judgment of a state court, reversing and remanding a case for further proceedings, is not a final judgment, and will not be reviewed by the supreme court of the United States, especially after a second trial has been had below.

In error to the supreme court of the state of Kansas.

Action by Oscar Rice against Jane Sanger, administratrix. Judgment for plaintiff, which was reversed and remanded by the state supreme court. 23 Pac. Rep. 633. Plaintiff brings error. Dismissed.

J. D. McCleverty, for the motion. E. F. Ware, opposed.

was

THE CHIEF JUSTICE. This was an action commenced by one Rice against Sanger et al. in the district court of Bourbon county, Kan., wherein judgment rendered February 27, 1888, in favor of plaintiff. The cause was thereupon tuken by the defendants to the supreme court of that state, the judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accordance with the views of the court as expressed in its written opinion. To review this judgment a writ of error from this court was allowed, but after that the case went back to the state district court in accordance with the mandate of the supreme court, and was subsequently tried therein.

The judgment attempted to be brought here was not a final judgment, and the writ of error is dismised.

(144 U. S. 142)

BEDON V. DAVIE et al.

(March 28, 1892.)

RES ADJUDICATA-PARTIES AND PRIVIES. Testator died in 1820, having devised certain land to his youngest son, subject to certain contingencies which would carry it successively to his second and eldest sons, and to specified issue of them respectively. The youngest son occupied the land until his death, and, some of the contingencies having happened, it then passed into the possession of the son of the eldest son, who leased it to the executor of the testator's youngest son. This executor afterwards filed a bill to determine the title under the will, making all the descendants of the three sons parties, and alleging that the title was not in the son of the eldest son. The bill was taken pro confesso against all the parties. Subsequently it was dismissed after hearing, and the decree was not appealed from. Several years later the successor of this executor, being in possession under the lease, was sued in ejectment by the trustees under the will of the testator's second son, and judgment was rendered against him, and affirmed on appeal. Held, that this judgment did not conclude the children of the eldest son's son, who were not parties to the suit, and that, in a suit by them to recover the land, a person claiming title by descent from the second son, through his daughter and her son, who were both parties to the first suit, was precluded by that suit from setting up such claim as a defense.

In error to the district court of the United States for the western district of South Carolina. Affirmed.

Mills Dean and S. P. Hamilton, for plaintiff in error. Edward McCrady, Jr., for defendants in error.

* Mr. Justice BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action at law, in ejectment, brought in the district court of the United States for the western district of South Carolina, in June, 1873, by Dr. William Richardson Davie and others against James B. Heyward, the younger, and others, to recover a plantation situated in Chester district, in South Carolina, on the Catawba river, and known as "Landsford."

Both the plaintiffs and the defendants respectively claimed the property under the will of Gen. William Richardson Davie, the elder, made in September, 1819. The testator died in November, 1820. His will was duly executed to pass real estate, and was duly admitted to probate in the proper court. The plaintiffs were greatgrandchildren of the testator, and were four in number. They were the children, and only heirs at law, of William Richardson Davie, doctor of medicine, who was the eldest male issue of William Jones Davie, who was a son of the testator.

The defendants were James B. Heyward, the younger, and*Sarah B., his wife; Mary Wysong and her husband, Dr. R. Wysong; Alice Bedon and Josiah Bedon, minor children of the late Josiah Bedon and Mary, his wife, now the said Mary Wysong; Hyder D. Bedon; William Z. Bedon; Julia Izard and her husband, Allen C. Izard; Jeannie B. Farrow and her husband, T. Stobo Farrow; A. Stobo Bedon; Richard Bedon; and Robin Carr Bedon, a minor.

Sarah B. Heyward, the wife of James B. Heyward, the younger, was called Sarah Bedon before she was married, and was

the daughter of Julia A. Davie and her husband, Richard S. Bedon, the said Julia A. being the only daughter of Hyder Alli Davie, who was a son of the testator.

Mary Wysong, the wife of Dr. R. Wysong, was the widow of Josiah Bedon, who was a son of Richard S. Bedon and his wife, the said Julia A. Davie. Alice Bedon and Josiah Bedon were the children of the said Josiah Bedon and Mary, his wife. Hyder D. Bedon, William Z. Bedon, Julia Izard, Jeannie B. Farrow, A. Stobo Bedon, Richard Bedon, and Robin Carr Bedon were children of the said Richard S. Bedon and Julia A., his wife. The defendant Josiah Bedon was a minor when this suit was brought, and during the entire time of its pendency, to a final judgment.

The clause of the will of the testator under which the title was claimed by both parties is set forth in the margin.1

Frederick William Davie, named in the will, died in April, 1850, leaving no issue surviving him. He left a last will and testament, duly executed, appointing as his executors Frederick G. Fraser and William Davie De Saussure.

Hyder Alli Davie, named in the will, died in June, 1848, before the death of Frederick William Davie. He left no male children, but only a daughter, the said Julia A., who, after the death of Gen. William Richardson Davie, married the said Richard S. Bedon.

1Item. I give and devise all the rest and residue of my lands and real estate in the state of South Carolina to my son Frederick William Davie to him and his heir forever, subject however to the incumbrances mentioned in this will. And it is my will and I do hereby devise that in case of the death of my said son Frederick William, without issue male living at the time of his death, then in that case I give and devise the lands and real estate, so devised as above to the said Frederick William to his brother Hyder Alli Davie to him and to his heirs forever, subject however to the incumbrances in this will mentioned. And in case the said Hyder Alli Davie die without issue male living at the time of his death, then in that case 1 give and devise the said lands and real estate to the eldest issue male of my son Allen Jones Davie then living when such event shall take place; that is of the sons he may have living at my death, to him and his heirs forever, subject to the incumbrances, directed in this will. And should my said son Frederick William have issue male, and such issue male of my said son Frederick William should, or shall die without issue male living at the time of his death, then in that case it is my will and I do devise the lands and real estate, so devised and described above first to my son Hyder Alli Davie and his heirs, and then to the eldest issue male living at the time, of Allen Jones Davie, under the same limitations, and on the same contingencies, and in the same order and manner, as above directed, and devised, should my son Frederick William die without any issue male living at the time of his death, to them and their heirs forever. And should my son Hyder Alli Davie have issue male living at the time of his death and such issue male shall die without leaving issue male living at his death then in that case I give and devise the said lands and real estate so described and devised above should they so have vested under the above contingencies in such issue male to the eldest issue male then living of my son Allen Jones Davie being of his sons living at my death to him his heirs and assigns forever.

Allen Jones Davie, named in the will, was the eldest son and the eldest child of the testator, and, when the testator died, had three sons and a daughter, the eldest of which sons was Dr. William Richardson Davie, father of the four plaintiffs.

Frederick William Davie, under the will, entered into possession of the plantation, and held the same during his life-time. At his death, Dr. William Richardson Davie entered into the possession of it, and held it until he died, in January, 1854, intestate. In January, 1873, the defendant Heyward and his wife entered into possession of the plantation.

In July, 1873, on the petition of the defendant James B. Heyward for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the infant defendants Alice Bedon and Josiah Bedon, as minor children of the late Josiah Bedon and Mary, his wife, then Mary Wysong, the said infants residing in the state of Maryland, an order was made by the circuit court appointing said Heyward their guardian ad litem in this cause, and authorizing and directing him to appear and defend the action on their behalf. On August 1, 1873, Heyward, as their guardian ad litem, filed an answer for them, stating that, by reason of their tender years, they were wholly ignorant of the facts and statements set forth in the complaint, and therefore not able to admit or deny the same, but that they submitted their case to the discretion of the court, and prayed its judgment for their costs and disbursements.

The defendants Heyward and wife. Dr. and Mrs. Wysong, Hyder D. Bedon, William Z. Bedon, Julia Izard and her husband, Jeannie B. Farrow and her husband, A. Stobo Bedon, and Richard Bedon answered the complaint, in July, 1873, setting up, as a special defense, that Dr. William Richardson Davie, in his life-time, while in possession of the plantation, executed to Frederick G. Fraser, as executor of Frederick William Davie, deceased, a lease of the plantation; that afterwards, Dr. William Richardson Davie and said Fraser both of them died, and William Davie De Saussure became the sole executor of Frederick William Davie; that as such executor the said De Saussure, being in possession of the plantation under said lease, was impleaded in the court of common pleas for Chester district, to answer to Lewis A. Beckham and William F. De Saussure, survivors of themelves and Frederick William Davie, trustees under the will of Hyder Alli Davie, in an action of trespass for breaking and entering the premises in question; that said defendant pleaded not guilty, and the cause was tried before a jury at the fall term, 1855, and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs; that the defendant appealed, and the case was heard upon exceptions, in the constitutional court of errors, the highest court of the state of South Carolina, at May term, 1856; that the appeal and motion of the defendant for a new trial were dismissed, and a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in that action, September 29, 1856, reciting a special verdict in the court of common pleas, which found certain facts set forth therein, and con

cluded by stating that if, upon those facts, the court should be of opinion that the' plaintiffs were entitled to the land, then the jury found for the plaintiffs, with five dollars damages, but if, upon those facts, the court should be of opinion that the plaintiffs had no title to the land, then the jury found for the defendants; and that the judgment of the court thereupon was that the plaintiffs were entitled to the land in question, and that they recover them against the defendants, with five dollars damages and costs. The answer set up that by said judgment of the court of common pleas, and by the adjudication of the questions in litigation therein between the parties, by the constitutional court of errors of the state, the rights of the plaintiffs in the present suit were fully and finally determined and adjudged, and they were barred thereby of all right of recovery against the defendants.

The plaintiffs filed a reply to that answer of Heyward and others, denying that the rights of the plaintiffs were determined and adjudged or in any way affected by the judgment in the case of Beckham v. De Saussure, and alleging that the proceedings and judgment were not had between the same parties as the parties to the present cause, and did not involve the same subject-matter; that the plaintiffs herein were not privies in blood or estate to any party or parties in that cause; and that the plaintiffs were not bound by the judgment therein. The reply also denied that the defendant in the case of Beckham v. De Saussure was in possession of the premises in question at the time of the commencement of that suit, or at any other time. It alleged that before the institution of proceedings in that cause, to wit, on June 28, 1850, a bill in equity was filed by said Fraser, as executor of Frederick William Davie, wherein Dr. William Richardson Davie, (the father of the plaintiffs,) Richard S. Bedon and Julia A. Bedon, his wife, (the father and mother of the defendants Hyder D. Bedon, William Z. Bedon, Julia Izard, Jeannie B. Farrow, Sarah B. Heyward, Richard Bedon, and Robin C. Bedon,) Josiah Bedon, (the father of the infant defendants Alice Bedon and Josiah Bedon,) Hyder D. Bedon, and William Z. Bedon, defendants in this suit, and the said Beckham and William F. De Saussure, surviving trustees under the, will of Hyder All Davie, (and plaintiffs in the suit mentioned in the answer of Heyward and others,) were impleaded as defendants, the subject-matter of which action was the title of Dr. William Richardson Davie (the plaintiffs' father) to the said premises, under the will of Gen. William Richardson Davie; that, the said cause having been heard, a decree of the court was duly entered, at Columbia, for the district of Richland, on March 19, 1851, whereby the title in fee of the said father of the plaintiffs in the land was confirmed, and he was declared to be in rightful possession thereof; that that decreestands as the judgment of the court, unreversed and of force; and that the respective defendants in this cause, as parties, or privies to parties, in the cause of Frederick G. Fraser, Executor, v. Dr. William Rich

ardson Davie and the other defendants therein, were bound, concluded, and determined by the decree therein, confirming the title of the said father of the plaintiffs in this cause to the premises in question.

The present case was tried before a jury. It found, on August 8, 1873, a special verdict, which is set forth in full in the margin.1 Upon that special verdict the district court entered a judgment, on the 16th of Angust, 1873. That judgment recited service of process on the various defendants, and, among others, on the infant defendants, Alice Bedon and Josiah Bedon, minor children of the late Josiah Bedon and Mary, his wife, then Mary Wysong, by publication and mailing through the post-office, and the appearance of said Alice Bedon and Josiah Bedon, by James B. Heyward, their guardian ad litem, appointed by order of the court on July 28. 1873, and the service of their answer, and the service of the other answer and of the reply. The judgment also set forth at length the special verdict, and stated that the questions of law reserved for argument had been argued, and that it

(1) Allen Jones, (son,) born 16th February, 1785, (who resided out of the state of South Carolina,) married, and who then had issue, three sons and one daughter, the eldest of whom was William Richardson, the father of the plaintiffs in this case, which son, Allen Jones, by a second marriage had issue, five daughters and another son.

(2) Hyder Alli, (son,) born 29th October, 1786, (who resided near, but not with, the testator,) married, and who then had issue, one daughter, Julia A., then a minor unmarried, but who afterwards married Richard S. Bedon, and was mother of the defendants, as hereinafter mentioned.

(3) Mary Haynes, (daughter,) born 25th June, 1790, then unmarried, residing with the testator; afterwards the wife of John Crockett, with issue, two sons and two daughters.

(4) Sarah Jones, (daughter,) born 12th March, 1793, then the wife of William F. De Saussure, with issue then born, two daughters, and a son who was born December, 1819, and was called after the testator, William Davie De Saussure, and which daughter afterwards had issue, another daughter and two sons.

(5) Martha Rebecca, (daughter,) born 13th October, 1796, then unmarried, residing with the testator, afterwards the wife of Churchill B. Jones, with issue, a son and daughter.

(6) Frederick William, (son,) born 11th April, 1800, then residing with the testator, an infant and unmarried.

Third. That, upon the death of General Davie, Frederick William entered into and took possession of the said plantation under the devise in his father's will, and held the same until his death, which took place on the 29th April, 1850, he having had but one child, a son, who died in infancy before his father's death, to-wit, in 1832.

Fourth. That Hyder Alli died before Frederick William, to-wit, 13th June, 1848, having had issue but one child, a daughter, before mentioned, towit, Julia A., who after General Davie's death had In armarried with Richard S. Bedon, by whom she

was adjudged that the plaintiffs recover of the defendants (including Alice Bedon and Josiah Bedon, minor children of Josiah Bedon and Mary, his wife, then Mary Wysong) the possession of the real property mentioned in the complaint, and the sum of five dollars for the withholding thereof, and the costs of the action.

The infant defendant Josiah Bedon, hav. ing become of age on December 21, 1885, sued out a writ of error from this court on December 9, 1887, to review the said judgment. The writ was allowed by Judge SIMONTON, under section 1008 of the Revised Statutes, having been brought within two years after the judgment was entered, exclusive of the term of the disability of Josiah Bedon as an infant. 33 Fed. Rep. 93.

We are of opinion that the judgment must be affirmed, on the ground that the question raised by the plaintiff in error was adjudicated conclusively, so far as he is concerned, by the decree in the suit in equity of Fraser v. Davie. To that suit Josiah Bedon, the father of the plaintiff in error, and Mrs. Julia A. Bedon, the grand

had issue as follows: (1) Josiah Bedon, now deceased, leaving a widow, Mary, now the wife of Doctor R. Wysong, and two children, Josiah and Alice Bedon, minors; (2) Hyder Davie Bedon; (3) William Z. Bedon; (4) Julia, wife of Allen C. Izard; (5) Jeannie B., wife of T. Stobo Farrow; (6) Sarah B., wife of James B. Heyward, the younger, (the said James B. Heyward and Sarah B., his wife, being now the true tenants of the lands in question;) (7) A. Stobo Bedon; (8) Richard Bedon; and (9) Robin Carr Bedon, -the last of whom is still a minor, and all of whom now living are defendants in this cause, and of whom Josiah. Hyder D., and William Z. were living at the death of their grandfather, Hyder Alli, and A. Stobo born after his death, and before the death of Frederick William Davie.

Fifth. That Hyder Alli, by his last will and testament, a copy of which is made part of this verdict, devised and bequeathed his whole estate, real and personal, to Frederick William Davie, Lewis A. Beckham, and William F. De Saussure, in trust for his daughter, Mrs. Bedon, and her children.

Sixth. That Frederick William, during his last illness, sent for Dr. William R. Davie, then a resident of Alabama, to come to him and Landsford to arrange with him for the continued occupation of the lands by the widow of Frederick William after his death; that Dr. William R. Davie did accordingly make a journey to South Carolina, but did not reach Landsford until after his uncle's death; that upon the arrival of the said Dr. William R. Davie from Alabama, after the death of the said Frederick William, he entered upon and took possession of the said lands, and, in compliance with his uncle's wishes, leased the same to Freder ick G. Fraser, the brother of the widow and the qualified executor of Frederick William, for a term of ten years, at an annual rent of 20,000 pounds of ginned cotton; that Frederick G. Fraser, as executor, having thus, in compliance with the wish of Frederick William Davie, secured a lease of the place for a number of years, placed Churchill B. Jones, son of Martha Rebecca Jones and nephew of the said Frederick William, in charge of the place, and the widow, with the said Charchill B. Jones, continued to reside upon the said lands, and, with the said Churchill B. Jones, worked the said plantation in the interest of the estate of Frederick William until dispossessed under the proceedings in the case of Beckham and De Saus sure against De Saussure.

That on the 28th of June, 1850, Frederick G. Fra ser, brother of the said widow and the said exec