A writ of injunction was issued as prayed for, and upon a supplemental petition, showing Mayer to be a non-resident of Louisiana, a curator ad hoc was appointed to represent him. Mayer appeared and filed exceptions and pleas of estoppel and res adjudicata. Subsequently, June 5, 1885, Mrs. Marshall filed a petition, accompanied by a proper bond, for the removal of her suit into the circuit court of the United States, upon the grounds that she was a citizen of New York, and the defendants, respectively, were citizens of Mississippi and Louisiana; that the controversy was wholly between citizens of different states; and that it could be fully tried and determined between them. The court made an order refusing the application for removal. The pleas were referred to the merits, and ordered to stand as an answer. Mayer an pleas previously filed by him, excepting to the petition as not disclosing any cause of action, denying each averment of the petition not admitted in the pleas, and praying that the plaintiff's demand be rejected. that said Boyd, if he made any such contract as alleged, had no power, right, or authority to do so; that a trial was had of the suit No. 607, and the said Mayer introduced evidence of the existence of a let ter from your petitioner to the said Boyd, authorizing him, the said Boyd, to make a contract by which her lien as lessor on the crops produced by the several defendants and other tenants on said plantation should be waived in favor of the said Mayer or of others as furnishers of supplies to said tenants; that upon such evidence so offered, and of the existence of which petitioner could not possibly be aware, and of which she had no knowledge until subsequent to the trial, judgment was rendered against her in said suit and in the several other suits mentioned. Your petitioner shows that the said Boyd, who was an agent, with only a general power of administration, had no author-swered, reiterating the allegations of the ity to bind her or to waive her lien as lessor in order to procure supplies for the several defendants and other tenants, and that the pretended letter, authorizing him to make such contract, if it ever had an existence, which petitioner denies, was a false and forged document, not written and not signed by her; that your petitioner has never authorized the said Boyd, or any other person whatsoever, to waive her lien as lessor in favor of the said Mayer or any other furnisher of supplies, and has never written the pretended letter, or any other letter, to the said Boyd, or to any other person whatsoever, containing such authority; that, to the contrary, as soon as she was informed after the death of said Boyd that he had made such pretended contract and other contracts by which it was sought to bind her, she instructed her agents and attorneys to take immediate steps to disavow the authority of said Boyd to make such contracts; that the testimony of said Mayer as to the existence of said pretended letter is false, and in pursuance of a conspiracy to defraud petitioner, or that said pretended letter, if it ever had an existence, is a false and forged document; that this testimony, and much more testimony necessary to establish the falsity of said evidence upon which said judgments were obtained, and the forgery of said pretended letter to said Boyd, was unknown to petitioner at the time of the trial, and could not have been known to or anticipated by her, and has been discovered by her since the rendition of said judgments in said suit, and since the lapse of the legal delays within which a motion could be made for a new trial, and that there has been no laches on her part in failing to show the falsity of such evidence and the forgery of such pretended letter on the trial of the cause. " Such was the case made in the petition. The relief asked was an injunction against Mayer and the defendant in error, Holmes, sheriff of the parish, restraining them from executing the above judgments, or any of them; that Mayer be cited to answer the petitioner's demand; that the judgments be annulled and avoided as obtained upon false testimony and forged documents; and that the petitioner have general and equitable relief. Upon the trial of the case judgment was rendered, dissolving the injunction, and authorizing Mayer to execute the judg ments enjoined. Judgment was also rendered in his favor on the injunction bond for 10 per cent. on the amounts enjoined, (special damages as attorney's fees,) and for 20 percent. on such amounts as general damages. An appeal by the plaintiff to the supreme court of Louisiana was dismissed for want of jurisdiction in that court to review the judgment. It was held that the appeal should have gone to the proper state court of appeals. 39 La. Ann. 313, 1 South. Rep. 610. Thereupon an appeal was prosecuted to the court of appeals for the second circuit of the state of Louisiana, where the original judgment, after being amended by reducing the general damages to 10 per cent., was affirmed. From that judgment Mrs. Marshall has prosecuted the present writ of error. W. H. Peckham and A. Q. Keasbey, for plaintiff in error. C. J. Boatner, for defendants in error. HARLAN, J. After the filing of the petition for removal, accompanied by a sufficient bond, and alleging that the controversy was wholly between citizens of different states, the state court was without authority to proceed further in the suit if, in its nature, it was one of which the circuit court of the United States could rightfully take jurisdiction. If, under the act of congress, the cause was removable, then, upon the filing of the above petition and bond, it was, in law, removed so as to be docketed in that court, notwithstanding the order of the state court refusing to recognize the right of removal. Steam-Ship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118, 122. 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58; Railroad Co. v. McLean, 108 U. S. 212, 216, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498: Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 430, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799; Crehore v. Railroad Co., 131 U. S. 240, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 692. Is the right of removal affected by the fact that no one of the judgments against the plaintiff in error exceeded the amount 595 כן Eq. Jur. §§ 887, 1574; Floyd v. Jayne, 6 But it is contended that it was not competent for the circuit court of the United States, by any form of decree, to deprive Mayer of the benefit of the judgments at law; and that Mrs. Marshall could obtain the relief asked only in the court ins dered. Is it true that a circuit court of the United States, in the exercise of its equity powers, and where diverse citizenship gives jurisdiction over the parties, may not, in any case, deprive a party of the benefit of a judgment fraudulently obtained by him in a state court, the circumstances being such as would authorize relief by the federal court, if the judgment had been rendered by it and not by a state court? -$500, exclusive of costs-limited by the act of 1875 for the jurisdiction, whether original or upon removal, of a circuit court of the United States, in suits between citizens of different states? We think not. The judgments aggregate more than $3,000. They are all held by Mayer, and are all against Mrs. Marshall. Their validity depends upon the same facts. If she is entitled to relief against one of the judg-which the judgments at law were renments, she is entitled to relief against all of them. The cases in which they were rendered were, in effect, tried as one case, so far as she and Mayer were concerned; for the parties stipulated that the result in each one not tried should depend upon the result in the one tried. As all the cases not tried went to judgment in accordance with the result in the one tried, as the property of Mrs. Marshall was liable to be taken in execution on all the judgments, as the judgments were held in the same right, and as their validity depended upon the same facts, she was entitled, in order to avoid a multiplicity of actions, and to protect herself against the vexation and cost that would come from numerous executions and levies, to bring one suit for a decree finally determining the matter in dispute in all the cases; and as, under the rules of equity obtaining in the courts of the United States, such a suit could be brought, the aggregate amount of all the judgments against which she sought protection upon grounds common to all the actions is to be deemed, under the act of congress, the value of the matter here in dispute. According to the averments of the original petition for injunction filed in the state court,-which averments must be taken to be true in determining the removability of the suit,-the judgments in question would not have been rendered against Mrs. Marshall but for the use in evidence of the letter alleged to be forged. The case evidently intended to be presented by the petition is one where, without negligence, laches, or other fault upon the part of petitioner, Mayer has fraudulently obtained judgments which he seeks, against conscience, to enforce by execution. While, as a general rule, a defense cannot be set up in equity which has been fully and fairly tried at law, and although, in view of the large powers now exercised by courts of law over their judg. ments, a court of the United States, sitting in equity, will not assume to control such judgments for the purpose simply of giving a new trial, it is the settled doctrine that "any fact which clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party ould not have availed himself in a court of law, or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will justify an application to a court of chancery. Insurance Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch, 332, 336; Hendrickson v. Hinckley, 17 How. 443, 445; Crim v. Handley, 94 U. S. 652, 653: Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U. S. 93, 96; Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3, 11, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25; Knox Co. v. Harshman, 133 U. S. 152, 154, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 257; 2 Story, 99 A leading case upon this subject is Barrow v. Hunton, 99 U. S. 80, 82. That was a suit in one of the courts of Louisiana to annul a judgment rendered in a court of that state upon the ground that it was founded upon a default taken, without lawful service of the petition and a citation, and because, prior to the judgment, the party seeking to have it set aside had been adjudged a bankrupt. The case was removed to the circuit court of the United States, and was subsequently remanded to the state court. This court held that the jurisdiction of the circuit court depended upon the question whether the action to annul the judgment was or was not in its nature a separate suit, or only a supplementary proceeding, so connected with the original suit as to form an incident to it, and to be substantially a continuation of it. It said: "If the proceeding is merely tantamount to the commonlaw practice of moving to set aside a judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of error, or to a bill of review or an appeal, it would belong to the latter category, and the United States courts could not properly entertain jurisdiction of the case; otherwise, the circuit courts of the United States would become invested with power to control the proceedings in the state courts, or would have appellate jurisdiction over them in all cases where the parties are citizens of different states. Such a result would be totally inadmissible. On the other hand, if the proceedings are tantamount to a bill in equity to set aside a decree for fraud in the obtaining thereof, then they constitute an original and independent proceeding, and according to the doctrine laid down in Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, the case might be within the cognizance of the federal courts. The distinction between the two classes of cases may be somewhat nice, but it may be affirmed to exist. In the one class there would be a mere revision of errors and irregularities, or of the legality and correctness of the judgments and decrees of the state courts; and in the other class the investigation of a new case arising upon new facts, although having relation to the validity of an actual judgment or decree, or of the party's right to claim any benefit by reason thereof.' Referring to the provisions of the Louisi 662. ana Code of Practice authorizing an action to annul a judgment obtained through fraud, bribery, forgery of documents, etc., the court said that it was not disposed to allow the fact that by the local law an action of nullity could only be brought in the court rendering the judgment, or in the court to which the judgment was taken by appeal, to operate so far as to make it an invariable criterion of the want of jurisdiction in the courts of the United States. "If," the court said, "the state legislatures could, by investing certain courts with exclusive jurisdiction over certain subjects, deprive the federal courts of all jurisdiction, they might seriously interfere with the right of the citizen to resort to those courts. The character of the cases themselves is always open to examination for the purpose of determining whether, ratione materiæ, the courts of the United States are incompetent to take jurisdiction thereof. State rules on the subject cannot deprive them of it.' As that proceeding was equivalent in common-law practice to a motion to set aside the judgment for irregularity, or to a writ of error coram vobis, and as the cause of nullity related to form only, the case was held not to be cognizable in the courts of the United States. the exercise, from time to time, of the authority so obtained. As the case is within the equity jurisdiction of the circuit court, as defined by the constitution and laws of the United States, that court may, by its decree, lay hold of the parties, and compel them to do what, according to the principles of equity, they ought to do, thereby securing and establishing the rights of which the plaintiff is alleged to have been deprived by fraud and collusion." These authorities would seem to place beyond question the jurisdiction of the circuit court to take cognizance of the present suit, which is none the less an original, independent suit because it relates to judgments obtained in the court of another jurisdiction. While it cannot require the state court itself to set aside or vacate the judgments in question, it may, as between the parties before it, if the facts justify such relief, adjudge that Mayer shall not enjoy the inequitable advantage obtained by his judgments. A decree to that effect would operate directly upon him, and would not contravene that provision of the statute prohibiting a court of the United States from granting a writ of injunction to stay proceedings in a state court. It would sim ply take from him the benefit of judgments obtained by fraud. It was contended at the bar that the cases of Nougué v. Clapp, 101 U. S. 551, and Graham v. Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 161, 177, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1009, announce a different rule. We do not understand those cases to proceed upon any ground inconsistent with the principles announced in the cases above cited. It is true that in Nougué v. Clapp the circuit court of the United States was asked to set aside a decree of a state court, as well as a sale had under it, upon the ground that the decree was obtained and the sale conducted pursuant to a fraudulent conspiracy, to which the person obtaining the decree, and who became the purchaser at the sale, was a party. Here the resemblance in-between that case and the one before us The rules laid down in Barrow v. Hunton were applied in Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640, 667, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 619, and Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86, 101, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 237. In Johnson v. Waters this court upheld the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States, by a decree in an original suit, to deprive parties of the benefit of certain fraudulent sales made under the orders of a probate court of Louisiana, which court, by the law of that state, had exclusive jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the proceedings out of which the sales arose. After observing that the court of chancery is always open to hear complaints against fraud, whether committed in pais or in or by means of judicial proceedings, the court said: "In such cases the court does not act as a court of review, nor does it quire into any irregularities or errors of proceeding in another court; but it will scrutinize the conduct of the parties, and, if it finds that they have been guilty of fraud in obtaining a judgment or decree, it will deprive them of the benefit of it, and of any inequitable advantage which they have derived under it." In Arrowsmith v. Gleason the grounds of the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States to entertain an original suit-the parties being citizens of different statesto set aside a sale of lands fraudulently made by the guardian of an infant, under authority derived from a probate court, are thus stated: "These principles control the present case, which, although involving rights arising under judicial proceedings in another jurisdiction, is an original, independent suit for equitable relief between the parties; such relief being grounded upon a new state of facts disclosing not only imposition upon a court of justice in procuring from it authority to sell an infant's lands when there was no necessity therefor, but actual fraud in v.12s.c.-5 For ends; for in Nougué v. Clapp it did not appear, nor was it alleged, that the facts constituting the fraud were not, before the rendition of the decree, within the knowledge of the party seeking its annulment, or could not have been discovered in time to bring them in some appropriate mode to the attention of the court while the decree was within its control. aught that appears, that suit was brought simply to obtain a rehearing in the circuit court of the United States, sitting in equity, of issues that were, or, by proper diligence, could have been, fully determined in the suit at law in the state court. The relief there asked could not have been granted consistently with the rule that equity will not interfere with a judgment at law, even where the party has an equitable defense, if he could, by the exercise of diligence, have availed himself of that defense in the action at law to which he was a party. This requirement of diligence is, as it ought to be, enforced with strictness. The case of Graham v. Railroad Co. *600 *601 does not differ in principle from Nougué v. Clapp. The case before us is unlike the two last cited. While the court, upon final hearing, would not permit Mrs. Marshall-being a party to the actions at law-to plead ignorance of the evidence introduced at the trial, it might be that relief could be granted by reason of the fact, distinctly alleged, that some of the necessary proof establishing the forgery of the letter was discovered after the judgments at law were rendered, and after the legal delays within which new trials could have been obtained, and could not have been discovered by her sooner. It was not, however, for the state court to disregard the right of removal upon the ground simply that the averments of the petition were insufficient or too vague to justify a court of equity in granting the relief asked. The suit being, in its general nature, one of which the circuit court of the United States could rightfully take cognizance, it was for that court, after the cause was docketed there, and upon final hearing, to determine whether, under the allegations and proof, a case was made which, according to the established principles of equity, entitled Mrs. Marshall to protection against the judgments alleged to have been fraudulently obtained. For the reasons stated we are of opinion that this suit was removable from the state court; and that the court below should have reversed the judgment of the eighth district court for the parish of Madison, and remanded the cause to the latter court, with direction to get aside all orders made after the filing of the petition and bond for the removal of the suit into the circuit court of the United States, and to proceed no lurther in it. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for such proceedings as consistent with this opinion. (141 U. S. 539) are ADAMS V. BELLAIRE STAMPING Co. et al. (November 16, 1891.) PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AGGREGATION OF OLD ELEMENTS-LANTERN TOPS-INSTRUCT:ONS. 1. Letters patent No. 50,591, issued October 24, 1865, to John H. Irwin for an improvement in lanterns, whereby the metal top is secured to the wire guard-frame by a hinge on one side and a spring catch on the other, are void for want of patentable invention, as the alleged invention only consists of an aggregation of old devices, without producing any novel result. 2. When the question of the patentability of an invention, which is merely a new aggregation of old elements, is submitted to a jury, it is proper to refuse an instruction that before the patent can be held invalid by reason of a prior patent it is not sufficient to find one of the elements in one patent, a second in another, and a third in another. 3. When the question before the jury is whether a patent covers a patentable invention, it is proper to refuse an instruction that the fact that the patented article has practically superseded all others is strong evidence of its novelty. 28 Fed. Rep. 360, affirmed. In error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio. Affirmed. Action at law by J. McGregor Adams against the Bellaire Stamping Company, J. T. Mercer, and C. H. Tallman for infringement of letters patent No. 50,591, issued October 24, 1865, to John H. Irwin, for an improvement in lanterns. Judgment for defendants on special findings by the jury. 28 Fed. Rep. 360. Plaintiff brings error. J. H. Raymond, for plaintiff in error. Lysander Hill, for defendants in error. Mr. Justice FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action to recover damages for the alleged infringement of a patent fore an improvement in lanterns, granted to John H. Irwin in October, 1865, and assigned to the plaintiff in October, 1874. It was brought in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Ohio. The plaintiff is a citizen of Illinois, and the defendant is a corporation formed under the laws of Ohio. Previous to the invention claimed, lanterns were in use constructed in a similar manner to the one upon which the alleged improvement is made. They had a like metallic bottom and top, a glass globe, and a guard formed of upright wires attached to rings at the top and bottom,the guard, bottom, and top forming together something like a basket, into which the lamp with a glass chimney was placed, the glass protecting the flame from the wind, and the wire guard protecting the glass from injury by collision. The lantern was carried by means of a swinging bail, connected with the guard or the top. The lamp, placed inside of the globe, rested on the bottom of the lantern, which was so connected with the lower ring of the guard that it could be detached and removed when the lamp was to be trimmed or filled or the chimney to be cleaned. The top of the lantern also aided in securing the globe in place. To a lantern of this kind Irwin added his alleged improvement. In his patent he states that what he claimed was “securing a removable lantern top to the upper part of the guard, substantially as therein specified and described." And in his specification he says that the invention "consists in attaching the metallic top of the lantern, in which the top of the glass globe or protector enters and by which it is held in place by a hinge, to the upper part of the wire guard surrounding the globe and securing it at the wide opposite said hinge by a removable fastening or spring-catch, so that by detaching said catch from the said upper part of the lantern guard the top of the lantern may be thrown back, opening upon the aforesaid hinge, thus enabling the globe to be removed, or for any other purpose." The terms "removable fastening' or "spring-catch," as observed by counsel, cover every conceivable device applicable; to lanterns, and adapted to connect one edge of the lid with the top of the lantern⚫ or guard, or to disconnect it. It was simply the application to the ordinary lantern of a lid secured by a hinge on one side, and by any kind of locking device on the opposite side. An invention having no greater extent than this was not deemed 540 542 by the defendant as possessing any virtue deserving a patent. It consisted simply in the use of a hinge and a catch instead of two equivalent fastenings generally employed before, and only possessed this merit: that by the use of the hinge the cover could not be separated and lost in case the catch on the other side should, from any cause, become unfastened. So that the alleged invention only amounted to securing a lid to a lantern by means of a catch on one side and a hinge on the other. The plaintiff in his declaration alleges that this invention was of great utility, and was extensively introduced into public use, and generally acquiesced in. The defendant in his general and special pleas alleged-First, that the supposed invention of Irwin did not, in view of the state of the art, require the exercise of the inventive faculty, but only mechanical skill and good judgment; second, that it was not for a patentable combination of parts, but only for an aggregation of old and well-known parts, each of which performed only its old and well-known function unchanged by the combination; third, that at the time Irwin filed his application there was pending in the patent-office another application for the same invention in the name of one Duburn, upon which application a patent was afterwards issued; and, fourth, that the said supposed invention had been patented, or described in printed publications or patents, prior thereto. On the trial special questions were submitted to the jury, and they found that the Irwin patent disclosed no improvement which required invention, as distinguished from mere mechanical skill or judgment; that the invention claimed had been patented or described in previous publications; that Irwin was not the original or first inventor or discoverer of any material or substantial part of the thing patented; and that the defendant had not infringed the alleged patent. Judgment was accordingly entered for the defendant in the action. We do not perceive that in the rulings of the court any substantial error was committed. The elements combined to form the alleged invention merely constituted an aggregation of old devices, each working out its own effect, without producing anything novel, and such an assemblage or bringing together of old devices, without securing some new and useful result as the joint product of the combination,-something more than a mere aggregation of old results,-does not constitute a patentable invention. Hailes v. Van Wormer, 20 Wall. 353; Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U. S. 310. The court did not, therefore, err in refusing the instruction requested, that before the patent could be held invalid by reason of a prior patent it was not sufficient to find one of the elements in one patent, a second in another, and a third in another. If the patent were for a combination of new or old elements, producing a new result, such instruction might have been correct; but as it was merely a new aggregation of old elements, in which each element performed Its old function, and no new result was produced by their combination, the instruction was not applicable, and was properly refused. Nor, under the circumstances, did the court err in declining to instruct the jury that the fact that the Irwin lantern had practically superseded all others was strong evidence of its novelty. The question before the court upon the main issue was not of the novelty of the invention, but rather of its patentable character. Where there is no invention, the extent of the use is not a matter of moment. We think that all the important questions of fact in the case were properly submitted to the jury. The judgment is therefore af firmed. (141 U. S. 528) CROSS et al. v. ALLEN et al. (November 16, 1891.) FEDERAL JURISDICTION-COLLUSIVE ASSIGNMENT OF NOTE NEGOTIABILITY — LACHES-WIFE'S SEPAKATE ESTATE FOLLOWING STATE DECISIONSMORTGAGES. 1. When notes and mortgages are transferred to a non-resident of the state for a valuable consideration, and the assignor's interest thereupon entirely determines, the mere fact that one of the purposes of the transfer is to establish the diversity of citizenship necessary to make the case transaction collusive within the meaning of Act cognizable in a federal court does not render the Cong. March 3, 1875, § 5. 2. A note which is not paid at maturity does not cease to be "negotiable by the law merchant" within the meaning of Act Cong. March 3, 1875, § 1, providing that no suit founded on contract shall be maintained in a federal court in favor of an assignee unless maintainable therein before the assignment was made, "except in cases of promissory notes negotiable by the law-merchant and bills of exchange." School-Dist. v. Hall, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 371, 113 U. S. 135, and New Providence Tp. v. Halsey, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 764, 117 U. S. 336, followed. 3. Where a wife in Oregon mortgages her separate property to secure a note given by her hus band alone, and thereby, under the law of that state, becomes his surety in respect to the mortgaged lands, though not bound personally, and then dies before the debt matures, subsequent payments of interest by the husband before the statute of limitations has run against the note will keep the debt alive as to the surety. 4. The husband having also mortgaged lands of his own to secure the same debt, the fact that after his wife's death, and after the maturity of the notes, he conveyed all the mortgaged property to a member of the creditor firm by deed absolute, but really upon trust to cultivate or lease them, and apply the net proceeds to the payment of the debt, and, with the grantor's consent, to sell the same for a like purpose, and that part of the lands were actually sold under the trust, did not effect such an alteration of the original contract as would release the lands of the wife from the obligation of suretyship. 5. When property sold under a trust deed to secure a debt brings more than its appraised value, the mere fact that five persons testify that it "was worth" 50 per cent. more than the price realized is insufficient to show want of good faith in the transaction. 6. Where a note secured by mortgage is not barred by limitations, there can be no laches in enforcing the mortgage. 7. Under the constitution and laws in force in Oregon on November 1, 1871, and January 23, 1872, a married woman could by mortgage bind her separate property for her husband's debt. Moor v. Fuller, 6 Or. 274, and Gray v. Holland, 9 Or. 513, followed. 8. In cases in which the supreme court of the |