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"business at Chattanooga, Tennessee; (including Gordon's notes,) placed at and that the defendant "lived” or “resid $11,600, being scheduled among the liabili. ed" at Decatur, Ala.

ties of the Tabler-Crudup Coal & Coke The notes sued on were as follows: Company. " $2,500.00.

On September 2, 1897, a deed was given "Chattanooga, Tenn., Feb’ry 15th 1887. by Crudup's father of certain lots in Chat.

"Sixty days after date I promise to pay tanooga to one Richmond, who gave to the order of myself twenty-five hun back a defeasance declaring the property dred dollars at 3rd Nat'n'l Bank, Chatta to be conveyed in trust to secure an inpooga, Tenn., value received.

debtedness to the Third National Bank of “E. C. Gordox." Chattanooga of about $11,600 and interUpon the back of this were the follow est, due from the Tabler-Crudup Coal & ing words:

Coke Company, aud D. G. Crudup & Co., Demand, protest, and notice of protest and that it was agreed that the real waived, and payment guarantied within estate should be held for 12 months, upfive days from date of maturity.

less sooner sold by direction of D. G. Cru“E. C. GORDON.

dup, and that, if the bank's debt was not “D. G. CRUDUP & Co." then paid, the lots should be sold in such “ $2,500.00.

manner as should be agreed on by the Chattanooga, Tenn., Feb'ry 15, 1887. bank and Crudup. Another assignment

Ninety days after date I promise to by D. G. Crudup, D. G. Crudup & Co., and pay to the order of myself twenty-five the Tabler-Crudup Coal & Coke Company, hundred dollars at 3rd Nat'n'l Bank, Chat. dated October 1, 1887, was also offered in? tanooga, Tenn., value received.

evidence. This referred to the first assign“ E. C. GORDON." ment, and recited that "neither of the as. Upon the back of this note were in signees had taken charge of the property dorsed the names “E. C. Gordon" and “D. assigned to them, por assumed to execute G. Crudup & Co.," and below the indorse the trusts. The bank was not included ment“E. c. Gordon,” and above the in in the schedule of creditors. The trusteen dorsement “D. G. Crudup & Co.," was named in the first assignment were Ewing stamped in pripted letters the following and Baskett, and Ewing died shortly words: “Demand, protest, and notice of after, while Baskett, who was the bank's protest waived, and payment guarantied cashier, declined to act as assignee. After within five days from date of maturity. the first assignment was made, the credit

It appeared from the testimony that the ors had several meetings, at which the words on the back of the notes besides bank was represented, either by Hart, its the signatures were stamped thereon president, or Baskett, its cashier. when the notes fell due, at the request of The court sustained an objection to tesCrudup & Co., to save protest fees and timony as to what was done by the cred. costs; that Crudup & Co. agreed to the itors at these meetings, and to an offer to waiver and guaranty so expressed, but prore that the creditors, including the defendant had nothing to do with that bank, agreed that, as the property conagreement; that it was intended to stamp veyed by the assignment of July 30th was the words over the name of D. G. Crudup more than sufficient to pay all the debts, & Co. alone, but in stamping one of the and as they desired tu save the assignors notes the words were put op upside down all unnecessary expense, the property con(as the note showed,) and that, in re veyed by that assignment should be restamping, they were put over defendant's conveyed to the assignors, and that the name also.

latter should make other arrangeinents The defendant objected to the introduc for securing their creditors, which they tion of the notes in evidence, and also did; and also excluded all evidence as to moved to exclude the first one, but the what was done by the creditors under the court overruled the objection and motion, assigoment of July 30th, and as to a reand defendant excepted.

conveyance by Baskett to the assignore It further appeared that the notes of the property conveyed by the assignwere discounted by the bank in the due ment; and also excluded the assigoient of course of business, and that the bank had October 1, 1887. The court ruled that no notice tbut Gordon signed them for what was said and done by the plaintiff the accommodation of D. G. Crudup & in connection with the other creditors in Co., and was not informed thereof until regard to the general assignment, and in about a month after the notes matured, regard to reconveying the property and (demand of payment having been previ. agreeing to take otber security, could not ously made and refused,) when, in reply be proved in defense unless it was shown, to one of several letters urging paymient, or could be shown, that the plaintiff Gordon wrote that he signed the notes either agreed to extend the payment of for Crudup & Co.'s accommodation. The the notes sued on, or to forbear the enevidence showed that July 30, 1887, D. G. forcement of such payment for some peCrudup & Co., Tabler, Crudup & Co., and riod of time. tbe Tabler-Crudup ('oal & Coke Conipany, Crudup testified to a conversation with the two partnerships being composed of Hart in regard to securing the indebted. D. G. Crudup and J. H. Tabler, and the upss, and that Hart agreed to accept the other a corporation created under the security of the three lots in Chattanooga, laws of Tennessee, Crudup and Tabler and to give twelve montbs' time, and owning nearly the entire stock, made gen. that he handed a copy of the defeasance eral assignments in one instrument for the of Richmond to Hart or Baskett; that in benefit of their respective creditors, the in. the intervew with Hart the Gordon notes debtedness to the Tbird National Bank, were uot specifically referred to in speak.



ing of the matter of securing the indehted- lar, and therehy rendering them inadmis. ness, and no part of the indebtedness was; sible in evidence. Gordon was the maker that there was no agreement made with of the notes, and had indorsed them sinthe bunk other than as shown by the ply to give them negotiability. No waiv. Richmond defeasance; and that plaintiff er of demand or protest was necessary to bad not sued Crudup & Co.

hold him liable. It was put on the notes Hart testified that he never

saw the

on account of Crudup & Co., the indorsers, deed to Richmond or the defeasance until and at their request; and the mere inad. two days before the trial; that Crudup vertence in placing the words above the said he would secure the bank with three name of Gordon, as well as above tbat of lots for their indebtedness of $6,500 or Crudup & Co., on the back of one of the $6,700, which did not include the Gordon notes, had no effect upon Gordon's rights. notes; that the bank never agreed to ex This brings us to consider the main positend the Gordon notes or any other notes tion taken in the argument of counsel for of Crudup & Co. for twelve months, nor did plaintiff in error,-that the court erred in witness have any understanding or agree. excluding evidence offered on his behalf. ment with Crudup or his attorney for the The contention is that although the bank extension of the Gordon notes; that the took the notes for value in ignorance that indobtedness of Crudup & Co., Tabler, they were accommodation paper, yet, aft. Crudup & Co., and the coal and coke com. er they inatured, the bank was informed pany to the bank amounted to $6,500 or that such was the fact, and then extended $6,700, not including the Gordon notes, the time of payment by agreement with which notes did not appear on the books Crudup & Co. without Gordon's knowle of the bank as part of the indehtedness of edge or consent, and also waived its right the two firms and the corporation; that to have the notes paid out of the proper. witness had no idea that the Richmond ty conveyed under the deed of general as. transaction secured anything more than signment; and that this constituted a dethe $6,500 indebtedness; that Crudup did fense whicb the excluded evidence tended not deliver the deed or defearance to wit. to make out. It is a sufficient answer to ness nor to Baskett; and that the bank this contention that there was no evidence looked alone, as to the potes sued on, to tending to show a contract of extension their maker, Gordon.

for a valid consideration and for a definite The defendant requested the court to and certain time, binding in law upon the give to the jury the following instruction : parties, and changing the nature of the

"The circumstance that no suit has been contract to the prejudice of Gordon. Mc. brought by plaintiff against Crudup & Co. Lemore v. Powell, 12 Wheat. 554; Creath's is such a circumstance as sbould be con Adm'r y. Sims, 5 How. 192. The hands of sidered by the jury, in connection with all the bank were not tied by anything it the other evidence in the case, in determin. had done, and Gordon could have paid the ing whether an agreement was made be. potes and sought his remedy against tween the plaintiff and Crudup & Co., by Crudup & Co. at any moment. The bank which an extension of time of payment of did not know that the transaction with said notes was given them.' This in. Richmond was made to include these struction the court refused to give, and the notes; but, even were this otherwise, the defendant duly excepted.

defeasance did not amount to a contract The jury found a verdict for plaintiff for of extension on its part. Nor did the evi. the full amount of the notes and interest, dence tend to show any ngreement be. judgment was entered thereon, and the tween Gordon and the bank that the lat. cause brought to this court by writ of ter would look to the assets of the Crudup error.

concerns for payment, and a loss by rea. Milton Humes, for plaintiff in error. son of laches on the bank's part. David D. Shelby and Wm. Richardson, for The second assignment provided that defendant in error.

the proceeds of the property should be to

a considerable extent differently applied Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating than under the first one, and the bank was the facts in the foregoing language, deliv not a party to it. Crudup & Co., could ered the opinion of the court.

pot resume the title to their property, • Seven teen errors are assigned, of which and the first assignment was operative, those in relation to the jurisdiction of the notwithstanding the death of one trustee circuit cuurt, to the admission of the and the declination of the other; and in notes in evidence, and to the rulings of the any view there was no legal suspension of court in the exclusion of testimony are the right to proceed upon the notes which relied on.

would have prevented Gordon, on taking The question of jurisdiction is raised them up, from enforcing them. The evi. for the first time in this court, and as we dence was clearly immaterial and irrele. are of opinion that the diverse citizenship vant, and properly excluded; and, as there of the parties appears affirmatively and was no error in the rulings of the court, with sufficient distinctness from the rer. the judgment must be affirmed. ord, of which the summons forms a part, we must decline to reverse the judgment

(144 U. S. 119) on this ground, although greater care

LACASSAGNE V. CHAPUIS. should have been exercised by the plaintiff

(March 21, 1892.) in the averments upon that subject.

Lis PENDENS — INJUNCTION - REMEDY AT LAW Nor do we regard the stamping of the

IMPEACHING DECREE-JURISDICTION. waiver and guaranty upon the back of

1. Under Code La. art. 2453, relating to the the notes as altering them, so far as Gor.

effect of pending suits, one who obtains a sherdon was concerned, in a material particu iff's deed through the enforcement of a mortgage,





pending an action by a third person to recover her four minor children, named Remick, the lands from the mortgagor, takes subject to

and as tutrix administering the estate of the result of such action, and may be ejected by

said C. H. Remick, was defendant. In a writ of possession, notwithstanding that his

that suit the widow Cave claimed, as the mortgage was on record at the commencement of the action, and that he was not made a party

widow in community of Baptiste Cathereto.

vailhez, to be the owner of one undivided 2. Injunction, being merely a preventive half interest in said plantation, and that remedy, will not lie for the purpose of restoring the other undivided one-half interest to possession one who claims to have been wrong therein was burdened with a tacit mort. fully evicted from lands under a writ of possession issued in a suit to which he was not a party.

gage to secure $5,310 para pbernal property, 3. Where the controversy involves merely Cavailhez. The prayer of the bill in that

due her by the succession of Baptiste the legal title to lands, there is an adequate rem edy at law, and equity has no jurisdiction. suit was that the plantation be decreed to

4. Where the relief prayed for by a bill in be still the property “in division" of theequity is of a nature that can only be granted in estate of Baptiste Cavailhez; that the widan action at law, the bill should be dismissed, ow Cave be recognized as the owner of without prejudice to such an action.

one undivided half of the plantation, and 5. The circuit court has jurisdiction over a proceeding to impeach its own former decree,

mortgage creditor of Baptiste although the parties are new and are both aliens.

Cavailhez, in the sum of $5,310, with legal 6. Where the federal court has exercised ju- | interest from judicial demand, on the undi. risdiction on the ground of diverse citizenship, vided half of the plantation belonging to the proceedings cannot be attacked in another Baptiste Cavailbez; and that process action between different parties, on the ground issue against Marceline Cuvailhez, widow that the citizenship was not diverse.

of C. H. Remick, in her individual capacity, Appeal from the circuit court of the and as tutrix of her minor children, and United States for the western district of as tutrix administering the estate of said Louisiana Modified and a tirmed.

Remick; but the bill in the suit by the Alfred Goldthwaite, for appellant. A.

widow Care nowhere averred that A. Leonard and Morris Marks, for appel. Marceline Cavailbez was in possession of lee.

the plantation when the suit was brought,

either for herself individually, or as tutrix Mr. Justice BLATCAFORD delivered the us aforesaid, or by agent or employe. opinion of the court.

The plaintiff and Maxwell were mortThis is a suit in equity, brought by a gage creditors of Marceline Cavailhez, and bill fled April 15, 1886, in the circuit court their mortgage was duly recorded in the of the United States for the western*dis. mortgage office of the parish of Vermillion trict of Louisiana, by Laurent Lacassagne, at the time, and before the suit brought a citizen of France, against Francois by the widow Cave against Marceline Chapuis, a citizen of Switzerland, in his Cavaillez was instituted; the recording capacity of testamentary executor of operated as notice to the widow Cave and Jeanne Caroline Cave Cavailhez, (herein. all the world; and no right or interest of after called the widow Cave,) and in his the plaintiff or of Maxwell could be passed individual capacity. The subpæna was on in that suit, or be affected by the deserved on the defendant in person, at New cree therein made, without their being Orleans, La., May 5, 1886, and he, as such made parties to the suit. testamentary executor and individually, The court was without jurisdiction to appeared and put in a demurrer to the entertain that suit; the widow Cave was bill. The denurrer was sustained, and a pot a citizen of France, as she falsely al. decree was entered disinissing the bill, leged herself to be, to give the court juris. from which decree the plaintiff has ap- diction of the parties, but was a citizen of pealed to this court.

Louisiana, residing at New Orleans; a The contents of the bill are as follows: fraud was practiced on the court; and the The plaintiff is the owner of a plantation proceedings were null and void, and situated in the parish of Vermillion, La., should be so decreed to be. on the east side of Bayou Vermillion, hav. The judgment rendered in that suit, on ing a front of 10 arpents by 40 arpents in January 11, 1856, decreed that the widow depth, with the buildings and improve Cave be “recognized as the lawful widow ments thereon, and the plantation equip of Baptiste Cavailhez," and as such "eument. He acquired the ownership of the titled to and decreed to be the owner of property. with Albert G. Maxwell, in the undivider half of all the property judicial proceedings prosecuted in the dis. above described." including with other trict court for the parish of Vermillion, in property the said plantation and its parathe suit of Albert G. Maxwell vs. Marceline phernalia ; that she have judgment against Cavailhez, and by sheriff's deed signed by the estate of Baptiste ('availhez in the the sberiff of the parish, dated August 15, sum of $5,310, with legal interest froin 1885. The plaintiff acquired the interest | February 25, 1884; and that her mort. of Maxwell in the property by act of sale, gage to secure said sum and interest, on October 22, 1885, and thereby the whole the property of Baptiste Ca vailhez, to take of the plantation became his property. effect from April 13, 1863, be recognized and The widow Cave, alleging herself to be a enforced. On the 2d of February, 188C, a pe-a citizen of France, and to be the widow of tition was presented to the court for a writ Raptiste Cavailhez, deceased, on or about of possession under*said decree, and was March 5, 1881, instituted a suit in equity granted, and a writ of possession was isin the same circuit court of the United sued to the marshal, by which he was States, wherein she was complainant, and ordered to eject Marceline Ca vailhez and Marceline Cavailhez, widow of C. H. those who might be holding said propRemick, in her own right, and as tutrix of erty under her, “by private deed of trans

fer or otherwise, since the institution of to he made perpetual at the inal hearing, the aforesaid suit, to-wit, March 5, 1884, commanding the defendant, as testament. and during the pendency of said suit, ary esecutor and individually, his agents, and to put the widow Cave in full posses servants, and employes generally, and sion of said property. Said writ was Brulard in particular, to desist from inter. not warranted by the decree, was issued fering with or molesting the plaintiff in improvidently and upon a wrongful sug the possession of the plantation, or his gestion, and was null and void. It was laborers, servants, and employes; that a executed on February 5, 1886, “ by serving restraining order issue, pending the mothe writ and copy of judgment” on one tion for an injunction; and for general Armintor, “who was living in the house relief and process. and had cbarge of the property, and he The demurrer of tbe defendant, as tes. being a major;” and the return of the tamentary executor and individually, almarsbal, tiled February 10, 1886, states leges, as cause of demurrer, a want of eq. that he took possession of the plantation uity in the bill. and improvements, and then placed them We are of opinion that the decree must in the possession of one Brulard, as the be affirmed. The suit by the widow Cave agent of the widow Cave.

was brought in March, 1884. The deed of The plaintiff, Lacassagoe, was in pos the plantation from the sheriff to the session of the plantation, as owner, by plaintiff and Maxwell was dated August his laborers, servants, and employes, 15, 1885. That deed was given in judicial when the marshal pretended to execute proceedings brought by Maxwell against the writ. Brulard came upon the planta Marceline Cavailhez, widow of C. H. Remtion, and now occupies a portion of the ick. The title of Maxwell and the plaindwelling thereon, but the carpenters and tiff was acquired during the pendency of laborers thereon have been continuously, the suit brought by the widow Cave. The and still a re, in the service and pay of the marshall properly executed the writ of plaintiff. He is deterred from going upon possession, and put the property into the the plantation, and exercisiug his rights possession of Brulard, as the agent of the of ownership, by the violence and threats widow Cave, and such possession* was. of Brulard. The plaintiff claims to be in held by Brulard when the present suit was possession, though his possession is dis instituted by the plaintiff. The plaintif: turbed and interfered with by Brulard, was out of possession when he instituted acting under direction of, and advice from, this suit, and by the prayer of this bill be the defendant.

attempts to regain possessiop by means The plaintiff has not been a party to of the injunction asked for. In other any suit, and is not bound by any order words, the effort to restore the plainof a court until he has an opportunity to tiff, by injunction, to rights of which he be heard. Though the acts were in the had been deprived. The function of an in. name of the widow Cave, yet the plain- junction is to afford preventive relief, not tiff charges that she was instigated to do to redress alleged wrongs which have all that she did by the defendant. Brulard been committed already. An injunction is an agent, and under the control, of the will not be used to take property out of defendant and of the court. The whole the possession of one party and put it proceeding was void for want of jurisdic. into that of another. 1 High, Inj. (2d tion of the parties. The plantation is de Ed.) § 355. teriorating in value, and the season for The question here involved is a dispute planting and preparing for crops is pass. about title. The plaintiff has a full, ade. ing, and irreparable injury is being done quate, and complete remedy at law, and to the plaintiff. An injunction pendente the case is not one for the jurisdiction of lite is necessary to restrain the defendant, a court of equity. If the plaintiff was in mas testamentary executor and individual the possession of the plantation when the ly, and his agents and employes, from in- judgment in favor of the widow Cave was terfering with the possession of the plain. rendered, on January 11, 1886, and when tiff, or molesting him or his agents and the marshal executed the writ of possesservants on the plantation. A restraining sion on February 5, 1886, it does not fol.. order ought to issue, pending the motion low that the fact that he was not a party for an injunction, and the injunction be to the suit in which it was issued could made perpetual on a final hearing. The prevent his being evicted under the writ plaintiff is without a full, complete, and of possession. A pending suit in regard adequate remedy at law, and must resort to real estate is notice to all the world. to a court of equity to have his rights de During the pendency of the suit brought termined and secured.

by the widow Cave against Marceline The prayer of the bill is that the suit so Cavailhez, the plaintiff undertook to acbrought by the widow Cave be declared quire rights in the plantation under Mar. an absolute nullity, because there was no celine Cavailhez, by the sheriff's deed, to jurisdiction in the court over the parties; the prejudice of the widow Cave; and his that, in case said suit was properly possession, so far as it affected the latter, brought between the parties thereto, it be was the possession of Marceline Cavailhez, decreed to have no force or effect against and the writ was properly issued and the plaintiff herein, he not having been a executed. It is provided as follows by party to it, and the decree not operating the Civil Code of Louisiana, (article 2453:) against him; that the writ of possession “The thing claimed as the property of the be decreed to be void, and the possessio: claimant cannot be alienated pending the of Brulard illegal, and Brulard advised to action, so as to prejudice his right. If vacate the premises occupied by him on judgment be rendered for him, the case in the plantation; that an injunction issue, considered as a sale of another's property,

and does not prerent him from belog put, suit, there appeared to be jurisdiction, in possession by virtue of such judgment. and the plaintif cannot question it by

As the plaiutiff was evicted, and the means of this suit, when the question is plantation was put into the possession of not raised by Marceline Cavailhez, who the widow Cave, a court of equity cannot was the defendant in the former suit. give the plaintiff any relief until he has Although the present suit is one between established his title by an action at law. two aliens, yet inasmuch as it is brought

Under the jurisprudence of Louisiana, the in the same circuit court in which the claim of the plaintiff is a “third opposi- former decree was rendered, and to im.

tiun." By the Code of Practice of Louisiana | peach that decree, we think that the court (article 401) a third opposition is defined as had jurisdiction. That being so, it had "a demand brought by a person not orig. | authority to make a decree on the merits. inally a party in the suit, for the purpose The decree dismissing the bill absolutely of arresting the execution of an order of must be so modified as to declare that it seizure or judgment rendered in such suit, is without prejudice to an action at law, or to regulate the effect of such seizure in and, as so modified, it is affirmed, with what relates to him.” It is a suit at law, costs. Horsburg v. Baker, 1 Pet. 232; a short, summary proceeding, and not a Barney v. Baltiinore City, 6 Wall. 280; formal one in chancery. Code Pr. art. Kendig v. Dean, 97 U. S. 423; Rogers y. 298; Van Norden v. Morton, 99 U. S. 378, Durant, 106 U. S. 644, 1 Sup. Ct. Rer. 623; 381.

Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 117, 11 Sup. It is well settled, in regard toland, that, Ct. Rep. 712. when a suit is pending in regard to it, a

(144 U. S. 136) person who purchases under the defendant pendente lite is subject to the operation of

DILLMAN V. HASTINGS et al. a writ of possession if one is finally issued

(March 28, 1892.) on a judgment in the suit. Walden V. Bodley, 9 How. 34, 49; Terrell v. Allison,


COUNTING-EVIDENCE. 21 Wall. 289; Tilton v. Cofield, 93 U. S. 163; County of Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S.

1. In a suit against administrators for an ac

counting in respect to moneys sent at various 96, 105; Union Trust Co. v. Southern, etc.,

times to their decedent with directions to loan Nav. Co., 130 U. S. 565, 570, 571, 9 Sup. Ct. the same at 10 per cent., and to reinvest the inRep. 606: Mellen v. Iron-Works, 131 U. S. terest at the same rate, the evidence strongly 352, 371, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781.

tended to show that the moneys had been so The fact that the plaintiff and Maxwell

loaned. The administrators did not testify, or prowere mortgage creditory of Marceline Ca.

duce any accounts kept by the decedent of the vailhez, and that their mortgage was duly

moneys invested, though notified to do so, and

though the correspondence between the parties recorded in the mortgage office of the tended to establish that such accounts were kept. parish before the suit brought by the It appeared that, after several years, complain. widow Cave was instituted, is of no con. ant had written the decedent that, according to sequence, so far as the present suit is con his account, the latter then had $10,500 belong. cerned. If the rights of the plaintiff or

ing to complainant, and this statement did not those of Maxwell under that mortgage

appear to bave been questioned by the decedent. could not be affected by the decree made

According to the master's report, the sum at in the suit brought by the widow Cave be

that time, interest being computed at 10_per

cent., with annual rests, was $10,495. 18. Held cause they were not made parties to that that, under all the circumstances, the master suit, the result is simply that the decree in was warranted in concluding that the money bad that suit had no effect upon their rights been invested at that rate; and he properly under the mortgage. But that fact has charged the administrators therewith, even no bearing upon the matters sought to be

though an agreement to account for money at the litigated in the present suit. The mort

rate of 10 per cent., with annual rests, would

have been illegal. gage, if valid, still remains valid, and law.

2. But from the date of the decedent's deatb ful proceedings can be had upon it, sub

the administrators were only liable for interest ject to such defenses as may be interposed at the legal rate, in the absence of sufficient ev. in regard to it. If the title of the widow idence that they themselves received interest at Cave to the plantation, under the suit a higher rate. brought by her, is subject to the rights of

3. The evidence showed that the decedent the plaintiff under the mortgage executed

had paid certain taxes, but not that he paid them by Marceline Cavailhez, this bili in the nat

in behalf of any person other than himself. It

appeared that he had money of his own, and that ure of a bill of review is not the proper

he loaned money in his own pame for other permode of enforcing the rights under that sons besides complainant. The loans were made ee mortgage. The widow Cave was not in Ohio, but there was no compliance with the bound to make the plaintiff or Maxwell,

Ohio statute (Rev. St. 1890, $ 2735) requiring as mortgage creditors of Marceline*Ca every person listing property for taxation in vailhez, parties to the suit she brought,

behalf of others to list it separately from his and their rights as such creditors were not

own, specifying the name of the person to whom

it belongs. Held that, in view of the failure to affected by the decree in that suit.

produce accounts, the administrators were not As to the allegation in the bill that the entitled to any credits for taxes paid. court was without jurisdiction of the buit brought by the widow Cave, because Appeal from the circuit court of the Unit. she alleged falsely therein that she was a ed States for the northern district of Ohio. citizen of France, when in fact she was a Reversed citizen of Louisiana, and thus the court A. S. Worthington, for appellant. had no jurisdiction of the suit as between her and Marceline Cavailhez, that quer. *Mr. Chief Justice FULLER delivered the tion cannot be raised and adjudicated in opinion of the court. this suit. By the record of the former This was a bill filed by Jared W. Dill

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