is entitled to a review of such ruling whether his claim be founded upon the statute or upon principles of general juris. prudence. We regard this as a legitimate deduction from the opinions of this court in Buck v. Colbath, 3 Wall. 334; Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 289; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113; Etheridge v. Sperry, 139 U. S. 266, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 565; and Bock v. Perkins, 139 U. S. 628, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 677. The motion to dismiss must therefore be denied. 3. But as there was, for the reasons above stated, color for the motion to dismiss, we are at liberty to inquire whether there is any foundation for the position of the receiver in this case that he is not liable to suit without permission of the federal court, and we are of the opinion that there is not. The act of March 3, 1887, declares that "every receiver * * may be sued in respect of any act or transaction of his in carrying on the business connected with such property, without the previous leave of the court in which said receiver or manager was appointed." We agree with the supreme court of Illinois that it was not intended by the word "his" to limit the right to sue to cases where the cause of action arose from the conduct of the receiver himself or his agents, but that, with respect to the question of liability, he stands in place of the corporation. His position is somewhat analogous to thatof a corporation sole, with respect to which it is held by the authorities that actions will lie by and against the actual incumbents of such corporations for causes of action accruing a under their predecessors in office. Polk v. Plummer, 2 Humph. 500; Jansen V. Ostrander, 1 Cow. 670. If actions were brought against the receivership generally, or against the corporation by name, "in the hands of" or "in the possession of" a receiver, without stating the name of the individual, it would more accurately represent the character or status of the defendant. So long as the property of the corporation remains in the custody of the court, and is administered through the agency of a receiver, such receivership is continuous and uninterrupted until the court relinquishes its hold upon the prop. erty, though its personnel may be subject to repeated changes. Actions against the receiver are in law actions against the receivership or the funds in the hands of the receiver, and his contracts, misfeasances, negligences, and liabilities are of ficial, and not personal, and judgments against him as receiver are payable only from the funds in his hands. As the right given by the statute to sue for the acts and transactions of the receivership is unlimited, we cannot say that it should be restricted to causes of action arising from the conduct of the receiver against whom the suit is brought or his agents. 1. Act Cong. March 3, 1863, § 1, (12 St. p. 772, c. 98,) granted to the state of Kansas, to aid in the construction of certain lines of railroad now owned by the Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston Railroad Company, every alternate odd-numbered section of land within 10 miles on each side of the road, as finally located, and pro vided that, in case it were found on the location of the road that the United States had sold any of such lands, or that the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement had attached thereto, it should be the duty of the secretary of the interior to select a sufficient number of odd sec tions to make up the deficiency from the public lands lying nearest to the tiers of sections so granted, and within 20 miles of the road. Section 2 provided that "the sections and parts of sections which, by such grant, shall remain to the United States within 10 miles on each side of said road," being the even-numbered sections, "shall not be sold for less than double the minimum price of the public lands when sold, nor shall any of said lands become subject to sale at private entry, until the same shall have been first offered at public sale to the highest bidder, at or above the increased minimum price;" saving to bona fide settlers under the pre-emption and homestead laws the right to purchase "at the increased minimum price," and provided that settlers on any of said "reserved sections," under the homestead law, should be entitled to patents for an amount not exceeding 80 acres. Held, that the even sections within the 10-mile limit were "reserved" by the United States, within the meaning of Act Čong. July 26, 1866, making similar grants to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Southern Branch, (now the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company,) with right to make up similar deficiencies "from the public lands of the United States nearest to" the sections granted, and not "heretofore reserved to the United States by any act of congress," for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal improvement "or other purpose whatever;" and hence, although the 10-mile limit of the former road was overlapped by the 20-mile indemnity limit of the latter, such even sections could not be selected as indemnity to the latter. 2. But as the act of 1863 did not apply its provisions respecting the sale of the even sections at double the minimum price of public lands at public auction, etc., to the lands lying outside the 10-mile limits, and inside the indemnity limits, the even sections in the latter tract were not "reserved," and were subject to selection for indemnity to the Missouri-Kansas Company, under the provision of the act of 1866, allowing it to be indemnified "from the public lands of the United States nearest to the sections above specified,' namely, the odd sections within the place or grant limits of the latter road. 3. The full legal title to the even-numbered sections within the indemnity limits of the Leavenworth road remained in the United States until those sections were actually selected and set apart for indemnity to the Missouri-Kansas Company; and hence such sections were subject, in the mean time, to the homestead pre-emption laws, and any rights acquired thereunder by third parties were not displaced by subseThe defense is frivolous, and the judg-quent selection and patent to the railroad comment of the supreme court of Illinois must be affirmed. The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice GRAY, having been absent when this case was submitted, took no part in its decision. pany. 4. The United States may maintain a bill in equity for the cancellation of patents alleged to have been issued by it to certain railroad com panies without authority of law, especially so when homestead and pre-emption rights have attached to the same lands in favor of numerous 360 198. third persons, whose individual assertion thereof would lead to a multiplicity of suits, all depending upon the same facts and provisions of law. 5. When such a bill alleges in general terms that a large number of citizens, over 21 years of age, and otherwise having all the qualifications required by the homestead laws, went upon the lands before their selection for indemnity purposes, and did every act necessary to procure patents under the homestead and pre-emption laws, except that the receiver and register would not permit any act to be done with or by them officially for the purpose of procuring title, and the bill is demurred to generally for want of equity, and no specific objections are made, the defendant, on appeal, cannot question the sufficiency of these allegations as to the persons who have acquired homestead and pre-emption rights, or as to the particular pieces of land to which their rights have attached. 87 Fed. Rep. 68, reversed. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas. This is a suit in equity by the United States for the cancellation of certain patents for lands in Allen county, Kan., of date, respectively, November 3, 1873. March 19, 1875, August 17, 1876, and April 23, 1877, and alleged to have been issued to the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company without authority of law. such unclaimed lands were required to be The institution of such a suit as this was recommended by the secretary of the interior in a communication addressed to the attorney general, under date of June 10, 1886. 4 Dec. Dep. Int. 573, 578; 5 Dec. Dep. Int. 280, 481. The present suit was not, however, brought until after the passage of the act of congress of March 3, 1887, requiring the immediate adjustment by the secretary of the interior, in accordance with the decisions of this court, of all unadjusted land grants made by congress to aid in the construction of railroads. 24 St. p. 556, c. 376. That act made it the duty of the attorney general to commence and prosecute suits for the cancellation of all patents, certification, or other evidence of title issued for public lands, and to restore the title to the United States in all cases of lands appearing, upon the completion of such adjustments or sooner, to have been “erroneously certified or patented by the United States, to or for the use or benefit of any company claiming by, through, or under grant from the United States, to aid in the construc-emption or homestead laws of the United tion of a railroad," if such company neg. lected or failed, upon demand by the secretary of the interior, to relinquish or reconvey to the United States all such lands, whether within granted or indemnity limits. Sections 1, 2. The act also provided that a bona fide settler whose homestead or pre-emption entry had been erroneously canceled on account of any railroad grant, or the withdrawal of public lands from market, should, upon application, be reinstated in all his rights, and allowed to perfect his entry, by complying with the public land laws, provided he had not located another entry in lieu of the one so erroneously canceled, or voluntarily abandoned his original entry; and if a settler did not, within a reasonable time to be fixed by the secretary of the interior, make his application to be reinstated, all States, and whose claims and occupation had not since been voluntarily abandoned; as to which excepted lands* the said pre-* emption and homestead claimants were permitted to perfect their proofs and entries and receive patents. These last provisions do not apply "to lands settled upon subsequent to the first day of De cember, eighteen hundred and eighty-two, by persons claiming to enter the same under the settlement laws of the United States, as to which lands the parties. claiming the same as aforesaid shall be entitled to prove up and enter as in other like cases. Section 5. Demurrers to the bill having been sustained, (37 Fed. Rep. 68,) and the suit dis. missed, the United States prosecuted the present appeal. Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury and Wm. Law rence, for the United States. A. L. Williams, A. T. Britton, A. B. Browne, James Hagerman, and Simon Sterne, for appellees. Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court. The lands in dispute are of two classes: (1) Even-numbered sections that are within the original 10-mile or place limits of the Leavenworth, Lawrence & Ft. Gibson Railroad Company, subsequently named the Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston Railroad Company, and to be hereafter, in this opinion, referred to as the Leavenworth Company. Those sections are also within the indemnity limits of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railroad Company, originally named the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Southern Branch, and to be bereafter referred to as the Missouri-Kansas Company. (2) Even-numbered sections within the common indemnity limits of both roads. No question is presented in this case as to the odd-numbered sections within either the place or the indemnity limits of the Leavenworth road. In respect to each of the above classes of lands, the bill alleges that rights had attached under the homestead and pre-emption laws in favor of settlers,-some, be fore the passage of the act, to be presently referred to, under which the Missouri-Kansas Company claims; and others after that date, but before the selection of such lands, by the direction of the secretary of the interior, as indemnity lands for that company. But the principal question raised by the demurrer is whether the Missouri-Kansas Company was entitled, under any circumstances whatever, to make up lusses or deficiencies, occurring in its place limits, from even-numbered sections within either the place or the indemnity limits of the Leavenworth road.* This question depends upon the construction of three acts of congress, passed, respectively, March 3, 1863, July 1, 1864, and July 26, 1866, granting lands to the state of Kansas to aid in the construction of these railroads. The grant made by the act of March 3, 1863, was of every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for 10 sections in width on each side, in aid of the construction of the following roads, and each branch thereof: First, a railroad and telegraph from the city of Leavenworth, Kan., by the way of Lawrence and the Ohio City crossing of the Osage river, to the southern line of the state in the direction of Galveston bay, in Texas, with a brauch from Lawrence, by the valley of the Wakarusa river, to the point on the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad where that road intersects the Neosho | river; second, a railroad from the city of Atchison, Kan., via Topeka, to the western line of that state, in the direction of Fort Union and Santa Fe, N. M., with a branch where the latter road crosses the Neosho, down said Neosho valley, to the point where the road first named (the Leavenworth road) enters the Neosho valley. In respect to each road and branches, it was provided that "in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the lines or routes of said road and branches are definitely fixed, sold any sec. tion or any part thereof granted as aforesaid, or that the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement has attached to the same, or that the same has been reserved by the United States, for any purpose whatever, then it shall be the duty of the secretary of the interior to cause to be selected, for the purposes aforesaid, from the public lands of the United States nearest to tiers of sections above specified, so much land, in alternate sections, or parts of sections, designated by odd numbers, as shall be equal to such lands as the United States have sold, reserved, or otherwise appropriated, or to which the rights of pre-emption or homestead settlements have attached as aforesaid; which lands, thus indicated by odd numbers, and selected by direction of the secretary of the interior as aforesaid, shall be held by the state of Kansas for the use and purpose aforesaid: provided, that the land to be so selected shall, in*no case, be located further than twenty miles from the lines of said road and branches: provided, further, that the lands hereby granted for and on account of said roads and branches, severally, shall be exclusively applied in the construction of the same, and for no other purpose whatever, and shall be disposed of only as the work progresses through the same, as in this act hereinafter provided.' 12 St. p. 772, c. 98, § 1. 99 The second section of the act provided that "the sections and parts of sections of land which, by such grant, shall remain to the United States, within ten miles on each side of said road and branches, [that is, the even-numbered sections within the place or granted limits,] shall not be sold for less than double the minimum price of the public lands when sold; nor shall any of said lands become subject to sale at private entry until the same shall have been first offered at public sale to the highest bidder, at or above the increased minimum price, as aforesaid: provided, that actual and bona fide settlers, under the provisions of the pre-emption and homestead laws of the United States, may, after due proof of settlement, improvement, cultivation, and occupation, as now provided by law, purchase the same at the increased minimum price aforesaid: and provided, also, that settlers on any of said reserved sections, under the provisions of the homestead law, who improve, occupy, and cultivate the same for a period of five years, and comply with the several conditions and requirements of said act, shall be entitled to patents for an amount not exceeding eighty acres each, anything in this act to the contrary notwithstanding. Section 2. The state of Kansas, by an act approved February 29, 1864, accepted the above grant, upon the terms and conditions prescribed by congress; and gave the benefit of it, in respect to the railroad and telegraph first mentioned in the act of 1863, to the Leavenworth Company; and, in respect to the other railroad and *366 telegraph, to the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company, formerly the Atchison & Topeka Railroad Company, to be hereafter referred to as the Atchison Company. or that the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement has attached to the same, or that the same has been reserved by the United States for any purpose wtever, then it shall be the duty of the secretary of the interior to cause to be selected, for the purposes aforesaid, from the public lands of the United States nearest to the sections above specified, so much land as shall be equal to the amount of such lands as the United States have sold, reserved, or otherwise appropriated, or to which the right of homestead settle By the act of July 1, 1864, congress granted to Kansas, to aid in the construction of a railroad and telegraph line from Emporia, by the way of Council Grove, to a point near Ft. Riley, on the branch Union Pacific Railroad, in that state."every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers for ten sections in width on each side of said road, "subjectment or pre-emption has attached as aforeto the provisions, restrictions, limitations, and conditions prescribed in the above act of March 3, 1863; and also changed the branch railroad and telegraph line from Lawrence by the valley of the Wakarusa river to a point on the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad where that road intersects the Neosho river, so as to run from Lawrence to Emporia, and, thus changed, to have the grant of lands made by the act of 1863. 13 St. p. 339, c. 198. The above acts of congress of 1863 and 1864 were accepted; and thereafter, by writing of date March 19, 1866, the Atchison Company sold, assigned, and transferred to the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Southern Branch, a corporation of Kansas,-the Missouri-Kansas Company, -all the rights, titles, interests, franchises, privileges, immunities, and liabilities held, acquired, possessed, and enjoyed for constructing, maintaining, operating, and enjoying a railroad, from a point at or near Ft. Riley down the Neosho valley to where the Leavenworth road might enter the Neosho valley; "which rights, titles, interests, franchises, authorities, immunities, and liabilities accrued to and became vested" in the assignor company "by virtue of its acceptance of the provisions of the act of the legislature of the state of Kansas;" the assignee company agreeing to perform all the duties, and to meet all the obligations and liabilities, assumed by the other company in respect to the said road. This assignment was ratified by a joint resolution of the legislature of Kansas passed February 26, 1867. The act of July 26, 1866, provided, among other things, that, for the purpose of aiding the Union Pacific Railroad Company, Southern Branch, (the Missouri-Kansas Company,) a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Kansas, "to construct and operate a railroad from Ft. Riley, Kan., or near said military reservation, thence down the valley of the Neosho river to the southern line of the state of Kansas, with a view to an extension of the same through a portion of the Indian Territory to Ft. Smith, Ark., there is hereby granted to the state of Kansas, for the use and benefit of said railroad company, every alternate section of land or parts thereof designated by odd numbers to the extent of five alternate sections per mile on each side of said road, and not exceeding in all ten sections per mile; but in case it shall appear that the United States have, when the line of said road is definitely located, sold any section or any part thereof, granted as aforesaid, said; which lands, thus indicated by the direction of the secretary of the interior, shall be reserved and held for the state of Kansas for the use of said company by the said secretary for the purpose of the construction and operation of said railroad, as provided by this act: provided, that any and all lands heretofore reserved to the United States by any act of congress, or in any other manner by competent authority, for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal improvement or other purpose whatever, be, and the same are hereby, reserved and excepted from the operations of this act, except so far as it may be found necessary to locate the route of said road through such reserved lands, in which case the right of way, two hundred feet in width, is hereby granted, subject to the approval of the president of the United States: and provided, further, that said lands hereby granted shall not be selected beyond twenty miles from the line of said road." 14 St. p. 289, c. 270. The contention of the government is that the lands in dispute-the even-numbered sections within both the place limits and the indemnity limits of the Leaven-* worth road-had been "reserved to the United States" by the act of 1863, and therefore were excluded from the operation of the act of 1866; consequently they could not be taken for or patented to the Missouri-Kansas Company. If the premise of this contention be true, the conclusion just stated would necessarily follow; because, although by the first section of the act of 1866 that company was entitled to indeninity from "the public lands of the United States nearest to the sections" within its granted or place limits, and within 20 miles of its line, for all granted sections or parts of granted sections which, at the time of the definite location of its road, appeared to have been sold by the United States, or to which the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement had attached, or which had been reserved to the United States for any purpose whatever, the first proviso of the same section reserved and excepted from the operation of the act all lands reserved to the United States by any act of congress, or in any other manner by competent authority, for the purpose of aiding in any object of internal improvement, or any other purpose whatever. Of course, lands so reserved and excepted from the operation of the act could not be selected as indemnity lands for the road in aid of the construction of which the grant of 1866 was made. The important inquiry, therefore, is whether, within the meaning of the act *370 of 1866, the lands in dispute, or any of them, were reserved to the United States by the act of 1863. the tiers of sections in place limits, and within 20 miles of the road,-the lands thus selected for indemnity to be odd-numbered sections. It is too obvious to require argument to show that, as losses to the Leavenworth road in its place limits were required to be made up from odd-numbered sections inside of the exterior line of its indemnity limits, the even-numbered sections in its place limits could not be used to supply such deficiencies. Such even-numbered sections in the place limits were, therefore, referred to in the second section of the act of 1863, as "reserved sections" that "remain to the United States." A reservation clause, such as the one in the act of 1866, first appeared in the act of congress of September 20, 1850, granting lands to the state of Illinois in aid of the construction of what is now the Illinois Central Railroad. 4 Dec. Dep. Int. 575. Congress, by an act passed March 2, 1827, had made a similar grant in aid of the construction of the Illinois & Michigan Canal, with a reservation of each alternate section to the United States. In order that the canal might have the full benefit of the lands covered by the grant of 1827, the following clause was inserted in the act of 1850: "And provided, further, that any and all lands reserved to the United States by the act entitled 'An act to grant a quantity of land to the*state of Illinois for the purpose of aiding in opening a canal to connect the waters of the Illinois river with those of Lake Michigan,' approved March 2, 1827, be, and the same are hereby, reserved to the United States from the operations of this act. 9 St. p. 466, c. 61; 21 Cong. Globe, p. 900. The policy indicated by this reservation was pursued in all subsequent acts granting lands to aid in the construction of railroads; the only difference between the reservation clause in the act of 1850, and those inserted in subsequent acts, being that the former was special in its application to a particular previous grant, while each one of the latter class was general in its application to prior grants of every kind. The manifest object of the general proviso was to exclude from the particular grant all lands previously reserved to the United States for any specific object whatever, and thereby enable the government to accomplish those objects without confusion or conflict in the administration of the public domain, and thus keep faith with those to or for whose benefit prior grants were made. Railroad Co. v. Litchfield, 23 How. 66; Wolcott v. Des Moines Co., 5 Wall. 681, 687; Homestead Co. v. Valley R. Co., 17 Wall. 153; Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U. S. 755; Litch-provement, cultivation, and occupancy, field v. County of Webster, Id. 773; Dubuque & S. C. R. Co. v. Des Moines Val. R. Co., 109 U. S. 329, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188; Railway Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566; Bullard v. Railroad Co., 122 J. S. 167, 176, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1149; Railroad Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112. Having regard to the words and the conceded object of the reservation clause, we are of opinion that the position of the government, in respect to the even-numbered sections, within the 10-mile or place limits of the Leavenworth road, is well taken. The grant, in the act of 1863, was of every alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for 10 sections in width on each side of the road, with the right, in case of loss of lands within the place limits, from any of the specified causes, to select indemnity lands (not, generally, from the public lands of the United States, but) from "the public lands of the United States nearest to tiers of sectious above specified;" that is, nearest to v.12s.c.-2 The defendants insist, however, that they were not "reserved to the United States," within the meaning of the act of 1866. It is true they were not reserved to aid in the construction of the Leavenworth road, or for any specified object of internal improvement. But the act of 1866 does not restrict the objects of the reservation to works of internal improvement. If the reservation in question was by congress, or other competent authority, for any purpose whatever, then the lands so reserved were excluded from the operation of the act of 1866. Now, it is clear that the even-numbered sections, within the place limits of the Leavenworth road, were reserved, by the act of 1863, for purposes distinctly declared by congress, and which might be wholly defeated if the Missouri-Kansas Company were permitted to take them as indemnity lands under the act of 1866. The requirement in the second section of the act of 1863, that the reserved sections" which "remain to the United States," within 10 miles on each side of the Leavenworth road, “shall not be sold for less than double the minimum price of the public lands when sold," nor be subject to sale at private entry until they had been offered at public sale to the highest bidder, at or above the increased minimum price; the privilege given to actual bona fide settlers, under the preemption and homestead laws, to purchase those lands at the increased minimum price, after due proof of settlement, im 46 and the right accorded to settlers on such sections under the homestead laws, improving, occupying, and cultivating the same, to have patents for not exceeding 80 acres each, are inconsistent with the theory that the even-numbered sections, so remaining to the United States, within the place limits of the Leavenworth road, could be taken as indemnity lands for a railroad corporation. As the natural result of the construction of the road aided would be an increase in the market value of the reserved sections remaining to the United States, within the place limits of the Leavenworth road, those sections were not left to be disposed of under the general laws relating to the public domain. But, in order that the government might get the benefit of such increased value, and thereby reimburse itself to some extent for the lands granted, the title to which vested in the state or the company upon the definite location of the line of the road, and, by relation, as of the date of the grant,-the act of 1863 |