« ZurückWeiter »
as the balance of the principal actually received fee by the court below is within the stipulated by the defendants; $23. 12 for insurance paid; in 5 per cent., the supreme court will not hold it to all, $2,185.60. When this decree was entered the be excessive, when there is no evidence as to the defendants filed a written motion and petition nature of the services rendered or the reasona. for rehearing, in respect to which the same pro- bleness of the charge. ceedings were had as in the preceding cases. А 3. Where the highest legal rate of interest is formal order for rehearing was made June 30, 10 per cent., the payment of a commission of 3 1885, and entered as of October 31, 1884; and per cent to a broker negotiating a loan for five there was a final decree, January 11, 1887, in years, at 9 per cent., does not make the transacfavor of plaintiff for $5,411.23, of which $5,381.83 tion usurious. was found to be the principal sum actually received by the defendants, and $29.40 to have been
Appeal from the circuit court of the paid for insurance. From that decree both par
United States for the southern district of ties have appealed.
Illinois. In reference to the loan in question, Johnston, The trust company, upon the written the local agent of the company at Springfield, application of Sophie Fowler, a citizen of through whom the loan was obtained, testified: Illinois, agreed to lend her the sun of $10,"The trust-deed and bonds were executed and
000 for five years, at 9 per cent. per annum. delivered to me about the 22d day of June, 1874,
She and her husband executed to the comas complete. This was a loan of six thousand, at ten per cent. Seven per cent. of the interest
pany, for the principal of the loan, 10 couwas evidenced by the interest coupons attached to pon bonds, of $1,000 each, dated February the six one-thousand dollar bonds, and the remain. 1, 1876, and payable on thelst day of Febru.at ing three per cent. was discounted for the five ary, 1881, with interest, semi-annually, at? years, and deducted from the $6,000. The trust- the rate of 7* per cent. per annum. They deeds and bonds in this case bear date the 1st
executed at the same time 10 promissory day of May, 1874, and the interest which accrued on them from May 1, 1874, to June 23, 1874, was
notes, of $100 each, for the remaining 2 per paid to the defendant.
cent., the first one being payable August 1, Par value of bonds was.............. $6,000 00
1876, and the others, respectively, on the Discount, 3 %, 5 years, was........
Ist days of February and August, 1877, to
1881, inclusive. To secure payment of the Leaving the sum of..
$5,305 20 bonds, they conveyed to Jonathan Ed. To this was added accrued interest.. 76 63 wards, trustee, certain real estate in Spring
field, and, to secure the 10 promissory Making the total........
notes of $100 each, they conveyed the same For that amount Johnston executed and deliv. property to the same trustee, subject, how. ered to the defendant his sight draft on the trust
ever, to the other trust-deed. These deeds company, which was negotiated by her. Pursu
do not differ in any respect material to this ant to a previous agreement with him, she paid him a commission of $150. The evidence as to
case from the deeds in the preceding cases, the circumstances under which the loan was made,
(12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1,7,) except that the deed and commissions paid, and of Johnston's rela- given to secure the bonds here involved, ag. tions to the trust company, was the same as in gregating $10,000, provides that nothing the other cases.
contained in it shall be so construed “as R. G. Ingersoll and Wm. Richie, for Fowler. to prevent a foreclosure of the same by proW L. Gross, for the Trust Company.
cess of the law or in chancery, " and that
the trustee, or his successor or successors, Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion
shall, upon any foreclosure of this trust.' of the court.
deed, recover, in addition to principal, inThese appeals are from the same decree. The terest, and ordinary costs, a reasonable cases arise under the usury laws of Illinois. They attorney's or solicitor's fee, not exceeddo not differ materially from Nos. 32 and 33, ex- ing five per cent. for the collection therecept as to the amount of the loan. The answer
of, all to be collected without relief from raises the same questions as were raised in those cases. The decree gave no credit on the princi
valuation or appraisement laws. And in pal sum for payments on account of interest, but
case of any such foreclosure it is hereby was for the amount actually received by the bor
stipulated that the decree or order for rower in cash, and the sum paid by the mort. foreclosure shall direct and require that gagee for insurance, with interest on the aggre- the expenses of such foreclosure and sale, gate amount at 6 per cent. from the date of its including the fees of solicitor and counsel, rendition. Under the statute of Illinois relating to he taxed by the court at a reasonable to interest upon the loan or forbearance of money,
amount, shall be paid out of the proceeds and for the reasons given in the opinion in cases Nos. 32 and 33, (12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1,) the loan
of the sale," etc. This suit was brought in question must be held to have been usurious,
to foreclose the defendant's equity of reand the decree should have been in conformity demption, and to have the mortgaged with the principles announced in those cases. property sold to pay the amount due the
The decree is reversed, with costs, and the company. The answer in the case raised cause is remanded, with instructions to make
the same questions that are presented in such inodifications in the decreee as will be con
the four preceding cases. 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. sistent with this opinion.
1,7. Decree reversed.
By a decree entered October 20, 1884, the (141 U. S. 411)
court adjudged that the company recovFowler et al. v. EQUITABLE TRUST Co. er $5,125.42 as the balance of the princi. (October 26, 1891.)
pal sum actually received by the defend.
ants, $614.72 for insurance and taxes paid USURY - FORECLOSURE OF TRUST-Deep-ATTOR
by it, with interest thereon, and $287 as NEY'S Fees.
solicitor's fee; in all, $6,027.14. When this 1. In Illinois, a stipulation in a trust-deed to secure a loan, for a "reasonable attorney's or
decree was entered the plaintiff filed a solicitor's fee, not exceeding five per cent.,” in
written inotion and petition for rehear. case oi foreclosure, does not, of itself, render the ing, in respect to which the same proceed. contract usurious.
ings were had as in the preceding cases, 2. When the sum allowed as an attorney's and like motions and petitions for ro
bearing were filed. A rehearing having | law of Illinois that a provision of that been granted, the order for which was en character does not, of itself, make the contered as of October 31, 1884, a final decree tract usurious. In Barton v. Bank, 122 was entered January 11, 1887, adjudging Ill. 352, 355, 13 N. E. Rep. 503, it was said: that there was due the plaintiff for the “If enforcing this promise to pay an at. principal and interest of the loan $15,296.- torney's fee would, directly or indirectly, 60, $3,173 26 for insurance, taxes, and spe have the effect of giving the payee, or of cial assessments paid by it, and a reason requiring the payor to pay, a greater comable attorney's fee, which was fixed at | pensation for the loan, use, or forbearance $923.49; in all, $19,393.35, and costs. From of the money than is allowed by law, then, that decree the defendants have appealed. unquestionably, the contract would be
R. G. Ingersoll and Wm. Ritchie, for ap usurious. The law will not tolerate any pellants. W. L. Gross, for appellee.
shift or device to evade its provisions.
* * By the statute, all penalties, Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the whether as additional interest or as comfacts in the foregoing language, delivered pensation for the use of the money, are the opinion of the court.
prohibited; but where, as here, no addi. For the reasons given in the opinion in tional or new compensation is provided Nos. 32 and 33, (12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1,) the for, and the contract is only for such sum question of usury raised must be deter as the payee would be obliged tu expend mined by the law of Illinois. But what in compelling the maker to perform his was there said in reference to usury, com undertaking, the statute contains no inmissions paid to the company's agent by hibition upon the power of the parties to no the borrower, and the application to the contract that the same shall be paid by principal sum of payments made, has no the *party whose default occasions the application to this case. This was a loan necessity for the expenditure.' Again : of $10,000 for five years at 9 per cent. The “Upon the question whether contracts of borrower received the whole amount this nature are void as against public polagreed to be loaned to her. There was icy, this court, as well as those of other not even a reservation of interest in ud. states, is fully committed.
The vance. She only gave notes for 2 per cent. right of the parties to this contract has of the interest payable when the interest been expressly recognized, and wben the under the contract would become due. The contract has been for such reasonable atpayment of $150 to the broker, as his torney's fees only as would indemnify and commission, did not make that contract preserve the payee from loss, and was nsurious; for, if that sum be added to the due at the time of suit brought, this court 9 per cent. interest stipulated to be paid, has in every case sustained the plaintiff's the total amount of interest exacted right of recovery. Nor do we see any. would be less than 10 per cent., the high- thing in the statute quoted that would est rate allowed by law. In Brown V. change the rule." See, also, Clawson v. Mortgage Co., 110 ill. 235, 239, the court Munson, 55 III. 394, 397; Haldeman v. Insursaid: “In the next place, at the time this ance Co., 120 Ill. 390, 393, 11 N. E. Rep. 526; loan was made, (July 15, 1875,) it was law. Telford v. Garrels, 132 III. 550, 555, 24 N. E.
ful to exact ten per cent. per annum inter- Rep. 573; McIntira v. Yates, 104 III. 491, est on money loaned. The note given 503.
bears interest only at the rate of nine per The only question of any difficulty is cent.'per annum, and runs for five years. whether the fee stipulated was not excesIt has been held, and is the well-settled sive. But as the character and extent of law of this court, that it is not usurious to the services performed by the plaintiff's exact the payment of interest in advance. attorney were best known to the court be. Mitchell v. Lyman, 77 III. 525; Goodrich v. low, and in the absence of any evidence Reynolds, 31 III. 490; McGill v. Ware, 4 as to whether the fee was reasonable, conScam. 21. One per cent. on $4,500 (the sidering the amount involved, and the amount borrowed) for five years makes nature of the services rendered, we are not just $225; and so, in any view, interest has prepared to reverse the decree because of not been exacted beyond the rate of ten the allowance to the plaintiťf of an attorper cent. per annum,-the then legal rate." ney's fee which does not exceed the high. So in McGovern v. Insurance Co., 109 Ill. est sum fixed in the deed of trust. 151: “When this loan was made the legal We find no error in the decree to the rate of interest was ten per cent. per an prejudice of the appellants, and it is num when the contract provided for this a ffirmed. amount. The loan in this case was for
(141 U. S. 415) three years, at nine per cent. interest.
HICKMAN V. CITY OF FT. SCOTT. Now, the three per cent. commissions only amounted to one per cent. per annum, so
(October 26, 1891.) that if the commissions are regarded as REVERSAL ON APPEAL-PETITION FOR NEW TRIAL. interest, and added to the interest at vine When a jury is waived, and special findper cent. provided for in the note, the rate ings of fact made, and the cause is reversed, with would still be only ten per cent., and not directions to enter a specified judgment, a petiusurious."
tion to the trial court for a new trial for errors The loan was not, therefore, infected
in findings of fact, and to amend the record by with usury, unless the provision in the
additional findings, was properly denied. trust-deed providing for the payment by In error to the circuit court or the the borrower, in addition to ordinary United States for the district of Kansas. costs, of a reasonable solicitor's fee, not * Hickman brought suit, July 1, 1980, in exceeding 5 per cent., for collection, in the the circuit court of the Uvited States for event of a suit tu fureclose. But it is the the district of Kansas, against the city of
Ft. Scott, a municipal corporation of that proof of them, “and that the omissions state, to recover the amount of 27 bonds, and mistakes in the findings of fact herein. of $500 each, issued by that city. The ac- before stated be supplied and corrected, tion was tried by the court without a to the end that the record of said cause jury. One of the issues was whether thie may be a true record, before judgment is suit was barred by the Kansas statute of entered in pursuance of said mandate; or, limitations, declaring that an action on if such judgment is first entered, then that an agreement, contract, or promise in su judgment may be opened and a new writing could be brought within five trial ordered. years after the cause of action accrued, The mandate of this court was issued and not afterwards; but providing that February 19, 1885, and was filed in the "in any case founded on contract, when court below. A judgment in conformity any part of the principal or interest shall with it was entered by the circuit court on have been paid, or an acknowledgment of the 2d of March, 1885. Subsequently, the an existing liability, debt, or claim, or application to amend the record, as prayed any promise to pay the same, shall have fur in the petition, was overruled, and an been made, an action may be bronght in order to that effect was entered. From such case within the period prescribed for that order the present writ of error was the same, after such payment, acknowl: prosecuted. edgment, or promise; but such acknowl. Wayne MacVeagh and A. H. Wintersteen, edginent or promise must be in writing, for plaintiff in error. J.D. McCleverty, for signed by the party to be charged there- defendant in error. hy."
Gen. St. Kan. c. 80, art. 3, pp. 633– -635. That issue depended upon the in- Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the quiry whether the city had made such an facts in the foregoing language, delivered acknowledgment of its liability on the the opinion of the court. bonds as took the case vut of the limita- * In the original action upon the bonds tion of five years.
held by Hickman, a jury having been The court made a special finding of facts, waived by written stipulation of the parand gave judgment in favor of Hickman ties, the circuit court proceeded to final for $26,385.23. Upon writ of error to this judgment upon special finding of facts. court that judgment was reversed, No- The judgment was the one the court invember 3, 1887, and the cause was re- tended to enter, and the facts found were manded, with direction to enter a judg. those only which the court intended to ment for the plaintiff on one bond, No. 78, find. There is here no clerical mistake. for $500, with proper interest, less a credit Nothing was omitted from the record of paid of $200, November 8, 1875, and, in re- the original action which the court inspect to all the other bonds in suit, to en- tended to make a matter of record. The ter judgment for the city with costs. Ft. case, therefore, does not come within the Scott v. Hickman, 112 U. S. 150, 160, 165, 5 rule that a court, after the expiration of Sup. Ct. Rep. 56.
the term, may, by an order nunc pro tunc, A petition for rehearing was filed in this amend the record by inserting what had court, asking a reconsideration of its judg- been omitted by the act of the clerk or of the ment to the extent, at least, of ordering court. In re Wight, 134 U. S. 136, 144, a venire de novo or a reargument of the 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 487; Fowler v. Trust case. That petition was overruled.
Co., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Galloway V. McOn the 3d of February, 1885, the present Keithen, 5 Ired. 12; Hyde v. Curling, 10 procoeding was instituted by a petition Mo. 227. Nor is this a suit in equity to set filed in the court below by Hickman aside or vacate the judgment upon any against the city of Ft. Scott. Its general of the grounds on which courts of equity object was to obtain a new trial on ac- interfere to prevent the enforcement or count of gross and vital errors in the find- / judgments at law. It is simply an apply. ing of facts;" and also to have the record cation by petition to a court of law, after amended “by allowing certain findings of its judgment has been reversed, and a diffacts to appear, some of which findings ferent judgment directed to be entered, were unavoidably and others accidentally to so change the record of the original omitted." The petition, among other judgment as to make a case materially things, states: “It is desired only that different from that presented to the court the record should be so amended as to of review. The application derives no state as well as import the truth, and strength from the fact that it was by pethat the plaintiff should have an oppor- tition, and not by motion supported by tunity of having the actual facts of the affidavits. controversy taken into consideration by We know of no precedent for such a prothis court, and, if necessary, by the su- ceeding as this, nor is there any principle preme court, before the matter finally of law upon which it could be based. In passes in rem judicatam. The decision of Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 415, the supreme court was based upon an im- the court, after adverting to the general perfect and erroneous report of the rule that the judgments, decrees, or other cause, and all that the plaintiff now de. orders of a court, however conclusive in sires to do is to have the record placed in their character, are under its control dursuch shape that the truth may be judi. ing the term at which they are rendered, cially ascertained before final judgment and may be set aside, racated, modified, against him."
or annulled by it, said: “It is a rule The petition sets forth the particular equally well established that, after the facts which, it is alleged, do not suffi-term has ended, all final judgments and deciently appear in the findings, and prays crees of the court pass beyond its control, that the plaintiå may be allowed to make unless steps be taken during that term,
by motion or otherwise, to set aside, | cerned, evidently proceeded upon the opin. modify, or correct them; and, if errors ion that the obligation of attornofs and exist, they can only be corrected by such counselors imposed upon them from their proceeding by a writ of error or appeal as office was, among other things, ro obmay be allowed in a court which, by law, serve at all times, both in their manner can review the decision. So strongly has and language, the respect due to courts of this principle been applied by this court justice and judicial officers; and that inthat, while realizing that there is no court sulting and defamatory language, pro aptwhich can review its decisions, it bas ined by malice, respecting their conduca in variably refused all applications for re- court, was a breach of that obligation, for hearing made after the adjournment of which they could properly he disbarred. the court for the term at which the judg: It declared that the attorney's priviloge ment was rendered. And this is placed does not permit him to enter the couiis. upon the ground that the case has passed and spread upon the judicial recorus beyond the control of the court. The charges of a shocking and felonious charsame principles had been announced in acter against brother attorneys, and Sibbald v. Ù. S., 12 Pet. 488, 492. The ex- against judges engaged in the administraceptions to the general rule, such as suits tion of justice, upon mere rumors, coupled in equity, and writs of error coram vobis with facts which should of themselves at law, do not embrace the present appli. create no suspicion of official corruption cation. See, also, Phillips v. Negley, 117 in a just and fair mind. The applicant U. S. 665, 674, 675, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 901; affirms that the order of disbarment was Cameron v. McRoberts, 3 Wheat. 591; MC- unwarranted, arbitrary, tyrannical, and Micken v. Perin, 18 How. 507, 511.
oppressive, and asks the interposition of Judgment affirmed.
this court by mandanus for his relief. We cannot give him the aid he seeks by
that writ, whatever may be the ground (141 U. S. 325)
upon which the state court proceeded, In re GREEN.
and in whatever light its action may be (October 19, 1891.)
regarded. A writ of mandamus can only
be issued from this court in aid of its apMANDAMUS TO STATE SUPREME COURT_JURISDIC- pellate jurisdiction, exceptin a few enumerTION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
ated cases, not embracing the one before The supreme court of the United States has us. The judiciary act of 1789,"adopted at: no power to issue a writ of mandamus to a state
the first session of congress, after declar. supreme court, requiring it to vacate an ordering that the supreme court should have disbarring an attorney for using vituperative and denunciatory language concerning a state judge courts and courts of the several states, in
appellate jurisdiction from the circuit in pleading filed in the United States circuit court; since Rev. St. U. 8. $ 688, only confers
certain cases, provided that it should power to issue writs of mandamus warranted by have power to issue writs of mandamus, the principles and usages of law “to any courts in cases warranted by the principles and appointed, or persons holding office, under the
usages of law, " to any courts appointed, authority of the United States. »
or persons holding office, under the au
thority of the United States." And the Motion of Thomas A. Green for leave to Revised Statutes (section 688) re-enacted file a petition for a writ of mandamus to this provision in a modified form without the supreme court of Colorado.
removing the limitation as to the courts B. W. Perkins, for the motion.
to which and the officers to whom it may
issue. If the applicant has any remedy in Field, J. It appears from the petition this court for his alleged grievance, upon of the applicant, which he asks leave to which we express no opinion, it must be file, that he has been disbarred from the sought in another way. Motion denied. practice of law as an attorney and coun. selor in the courts of Colorado by order
(141 U. S. 327) of the supreme court of that state, and be
MCNULTA v. LOCHRIDGE. prays for a writ of mandamus from this court commanding the judges of that
(October 26, 1891.) court to restore him to his office and
SUPREME COURT-JURISDICTION – FEDERAL QUESto vacate the order of disbarment. The TION-RECEIVER OF FEDERAL COURT-RIGHT TO ground of the disbarment, as shown by SUE. the petition and the opinion of the su.
1. Whether a receiver appointed by a federal preme court of Colorado, (13 Pac. Rep. court can be sued for the act of his predecessor 514.) to which it refers, was vituperative in office without leave of court, by virtue of Act and denunciatory language used by the ap. Cong. March 3, 1887, $ 3, (24 St. 552,) which proplicant in the pleadings in a suit brought
vides that a receiver may be sued in respect of in the circuit court of the United States re- any act of his” in carrying on the business withspecting the conduct of a judge of the su
out previous leave of the court appointing him,
is a question of general law; and the decision perior court of the city of Denver, Colo.,
of a state supreme court that such a suit may be in certain proceedings bad before him, and maintained will not entitle the receiver to a rerespecting the conduct of counsel therein, view of the ruling by the United States supreme amounting to charges of corruption and court. bribery on their part in that suit, which
2. A claim by a receiver appointed by a fedthe supreme court of the state found to
eral court that he is not subject to suit for the act be unwarranted by any evidence and of his predecessor in the office, without previous
leave of such court, is the claim of an immunity prompted by the malice of the applicant.
under an “authority exercised under the United That court, so far as the charges against States,” within the meaning of Rev. St. U. S. the judge of the superior court were con- $ 709, giving the right to a review by the United
States supreme court when such authority is de court of Illinois erred in holding that such nied by a decision of a state supreme court. suit could be maintained against the pres
3. Act Cong. March 3, 1887, § 3, (24 St. 552,) providing that every receiver appointed by a fed
ent receiver for the acts of his predecessor eral court may be sued “in respect of any act or
without the previous leave of the court transaction of his in carrying on the business" appointing him. without leave of the court appointing nim, ap
* 1. Plaintiff in error relies in this connecplies to such a receiver in respect of an act of his tion upon the act of congress of March 3, predecessor in the office.
1887, (24 St. 5.32 ) determining the jurisdicIn error to the supreme court of the tion of the circuit courts, which provides, state of Illinois.
in section 3, that "every receiver or This was a motion to dismiss a writ of inanager of any property appointed by error or affirm the judgment of the court any court of the United States may be below upon the following state of facts: sued in respect of any act or transaction *In July, 1887, Lochridge, the defendant of his in carrying on the business connectin error, began two suits in the circuit ed with such property without the previ. court of Christian county, Ill., against ous leave of the court in which such reMcNulta, the plaintiff in error, as receiver ceiver or manager was appointed.” It is of the Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Rail
difficult to see what right can be claimed way Company, to recover damages for by the receiver under this act. The right the death of James and Mary E. Niolohon, he claims is immunity from suit without alleged to have been occasioned by the the prior leave of the court appointing negligent management of an engine at a
him; but this is a right not given by the public crossing. At the time the cause of
statute, but in obedience to a general and action arose Thomas M. Cooley was re.
familiar principle of law recognized by ceiver of the road under an order made by
this court in Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, the circuit court of the United States for
and Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126. The the southern district of Illinois in a suit right conferred by the statute to sue withto foreclose a mortgage upon the road. out the prior leave of the court is not give Judge Cooley having resigned his receiver.
en t , the defendant, but to the plaintiff; ship, plaintiff in error, John McNulta, was
and the only question which could propappointed his successor, and was in pos. erly arise under the not in this case is session of and operating the road at the
whether the receiver so sued could be held time the suits were brought. Demiurrers
liable for the acts of a prior receiver. were interposed to the declarations, and
The act does not deprive any one of the overruled, and the suits were subsequent. right to sue where such right previously ly consolidated by agreement of parties, existed, but gives such right in certain tried, and a verdict rendered in favor of
cases; and it was for the court to say the plaintiff for $6,000. This judgment whether the plaintiff's cause of action !ell was subsequently affirmed by the ap
within the statute, or whether the defend. pellate court of the third district, (32 Ill.
ant was entitled to the exemption given App. 86,) and again by the supreme court
him by the general law Had the supreme of the state, (27 N. E. Rep. 452.) Defend
court of Illinois decided that under this ant thereupon sued out this writ, and
act the defendant could not be sued with. assigned as error-First, that the supreme out the prior leave of the federal court, court erred in holding that, under the act
the plaintiff might doubtless have obof cougress below cited, the plaintiff was
tained a writ of error from this court upentitled to maintain the action, when it
on the ground that he had been denied a appeared from the record that McNulta right given him by a “statute” of the was not the receiver when the cause of ac United States, (Rev. St. U. S. § 709;) but tiun accrued; and, second, in holding that it does not follow that the other party is under said act McXulta could be sued as
entitled to the same remedy. The case in receiver with respect to any act or trans
this particular is analogous to that of action which occurred before his appoint
Missouri v. Andriaño, 138 U. S. 496, 11 Sup. ment, without previous leare of the court
Ct. Rep. 385. (decided at the last term,) of the United States by which he was ap in which we held that it was only the pointed. Defendant in error thereupon
party whose right under a statute had moved to dismiss upon the ground that
been denied who was entitled to a writ no federal question was involved.
of error to review the final judgment of G. L. Burnett, for plaintiff in error. v.
the state court. W. Patton, for defendant in error.
2. But, while we think that plaintiff in
error is not entitled to immunity by vir. *Mr. Justice Browx, after stating the tue of the statute of 1887, we are author. facts as above, delivered the opinion ofized by Revised Statutes (section 709) to the court.
review the final judgment or decree of a The substance of the first assignment of state court where “any title, right, privi. error is that under the act of March 3, lege, or immunity is claimed under 1887, plaintiif was not entitled to main
authority exercised tain a suit against McVulta, as receiver, under the United States, and the decision for a cause of action which accrued when is against the title, right, privilege, or the road was in possession of and oper- immunity specially set up or claimed by ated by a former receiver. This is clearly either party under such
authori. not a federal question, but a question of ty,” etc. Now, as McNulta was exercisgeneral law, riz., whether one person ing an authority as receiver under an holding the office of receiver can be held order of the federal court, and claimed imresponsible for the acts of his predecessor munity as such receiver from suit within the same office. The substanie oi the out the previous leave of such court, and second assignment is that the supreme the decision was adverse to such claim, he