CHA P. III.

OBJECTIONS TO TESTIMONY, DRAWN FROM THE CONTRADICTION OF MIRACLES TO THE COURSE OF NATURE, OR FROM THE OPPOSITION BETWEEN EXPERIENCE AND THE TESTIMONY GIVEN TO MIRACULOUS FACTS.ANSWERS:

HOW

OWEVER positive and perfect any human evidence may appear, is it sufficient to establish the certainty, or even the probability, of facts contrary to the ordinary course of nature?

Now it is obvious, in the first place, that what I denominate a miraculous fact, is nevertheless an object of sense; and in the order of divine wisdom, it must be extremely clear and perceptible: such a fact, therefore, being submitted to the inquisition of my senses, may consequently be the subject of testimony.

The senses are surely competent to ascertain that a man is alive, or falls sick; that his disease increases, that he dies, that he is dead, and that his body emits a cadaverous stench: the senses are also sufficient to convince us, that the same man who was dead, is risen; that he walks, eats, drinks, &c.

These perceptible, palpable facts, may therefore be as well the object of testimony, as any other physical or historical fact. If the witnesses, therefore, of whom I speak, confine their testimony to these facts, I cannot reject their evidence, unless I reject the rules of testimony which I have laid down, and which are prescribed by the soundest logic. But if these witnesses did not confine their testimony simply to these facts; if they pretended to attest the secret cause which wrought this miracle; if they assured me, that it depended on a physical pre determination, their testimony on this point of cosmology would seem to me to lose much of its weight.

The reason of my scepticism with respect to this circumstance would be, because

this predetermination, which the witnesses allege, not being submitted to the senses, could not be a direct object of their testimony, as I think I have proved Chap. iii. Part xvi. of the Philos. Palingenesis.

These witnesses might however attest, that it was revealed to them by the divine legislator himself: but miracles would still be necessary to prove that they actually had that revelation, that is, facts out of the ordinary course of nature, and which ought to be submitted to the senses *.

There are therefore in a miracle two things, essentially different, and to be carefully distinguished:-The fact and the manner of the fact.

The first has a direct relation to the faculties of man; the second has relation only to the faculties of those intelligences who are acquainted with the secret œconomy of the world t.

* Vide Chap. vi. Part i.

Vide Philos. Paling. Parts xii xiii.

If, however, the witnesses attributed the extraordinary facts they attest to an act of GOD, that private opinion of the witnesses would not discredit their testimony in my mind; because it would be most natural for them to attribute to immediate divine intervention, facts, the near and efficient cause of which is not revealed to them. Undoubtedly, however, the first condition of testimony is, that the facts attested be not physically impossible, that is, not contrary to the laws of nature.

1

Experience discloses these laws, and by reasoning we deduce those theoretic and practical consequences, the systematical collection of which constitutes human sci

ence.

Now, the most constant experience of all times and all places militates against the physical possibility of the resurrection of a dead man.

Witnesses, however, whom I suppose highly worthy of credit, attest that a dead man did actually rise; they are unanimous

in their account, and that account is clear and circumstantial.

Thus am I situated between two testimonies directly opposite to each other; and if I considered them of equal weight, 'I should remain doubtful, and suspend my judgment.

Were the truth of atheism clearly demonstrated, I apprehend I should not suspend my judgment; nature would then have no legislator. She would be her own legislator, and her best interpreter would be the constant experience of all times and all places. But if it be proved that nature has a legislator, the proof admits, that the legislator can modify its laws.*

If these modifications be palpable facts, they may become the direct object of testimony.

If this testimony unite in the highest degree all those conditions which reason requires to confirm any testimony whatever; if, further, it unite even those which reason

* Vide Ch. iii. iv. and vi. of the first Part.

F