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as master " has been previously employed, nor any thing to connect the first-mentioned "person" with "a vessel," it is hard to see how any person could "have on board any [other] "unless it is an offence for one man to carry another

person, puss-back.

More seriously, at any rate, I commend this legislative patch to the attention of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, to whom the House Bill has been referred, as a piece of nugatory amendment which they will have to re-form, before it can convey any legal designation of a prohibited offence.

The same copying, from a British model, of the patch on the elbow, or, rather, of leaving the elbow naked where the British act had patched it over, as that just noticed in the instance of the third section of the new project, is also observable in the fifth section of that project. In this last section, our legislators "have forbidden "any person ... [to] have on board any person" (as before), — with a view to augmenting the force of a ship of war already armed. It is rather difficult to comprehend how the process of one person's having on board another can conduce to the end here sought to be effected, unless the warship is going to be recruited by a sort of chaise-a-porteur pro

cess.

The Committee on Foreign Affairs borrow, also, from the British act (sec. 9), the following provision, constituting sec. 9 of the new project :

"SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That offences made punishable by the provisions of this act, committed by citizens of the United States beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, may be prosecuted and tried before any Court having jurisdiction of the offences prohibited by this act."

Now, as every "offence prohibited by this act" is expressly limited, in every one of its sections, to something done "within the territory and jurisdiction [or "within the limits"] of the United States," it is hard to see what object can be served by providing a place of trial for impossible offences. Possibly the Committee had forgotten that they had struck out of their scheme section 4 of the existing statute, which enacts against an

offence committed abroad; but as that section sufficiently provided, by itself, for a venue of trial of the offence therein specified, it would seem a piece of unnecessary imitation of the (obnoxious) British act to borrow its fetters after the criminal offence itself had been discharged.

Then, the important provision of sec. 10 of the new act -which, in its spirit, quite meets some of the views which I have had the honor of advocating in reference to free traffic in ships of war, as articles of commerce, in connection with the notice of the "Meteor" case, already referred to quite inadequately effects the intent of its authors, as I am inclined to believe. The first part of the section (for it is with that alone that I have occasion to deal at present, having already sufficiently commented on the latter part) reads thus :

"SEC. 10.— And be it further enacted, That nothing in this act shall be so construed as to prohibit citizens of the United States from selling vessels, ships, or steamers, built within the limits thereof, or material or munitions of war, the growth or product of the same, to inhabitants of other countries, or to governments not at war with the United States."

Now, I suppose the main intent of this new provision is to preserve to our neutral industry and trade, within the scope of our own judicature, the right of dealing in vessels adaptable to war, at a time when a foreign war exists, and with the belligerent powers, or their subjects, as purchasers. as purchasers. And yet neither of these three ideas finds expression as above.

Of course, all vessels, whether built within or without the limits of the United States, are an undoubted subject of free commerce with belligerents, on our part (we being neutrals), unless prepared for war, subject (it should be said) to the liability of capture as contraband, when declared to be contraband by the laws of the capturing power; and, when our laws are uttering their legislative behest, they cannot, of course, undertake to annul or contravene any such foreign definition of contraband, but only to point out what acts are punishable, within their own scope, or on the part of our own citizens. So that, until something" is said about the vessel being adaptable to

war, the first point of its being no offence under United States' laws, and in cases brought within their jurisdiction, "to sell vessels, ships, or steamers, built within the limits thereof' - is not once brought out, and declared with any significance.

The second and third particulars, of such a sale during the existence of a foreign war, and to belligerents as purchasers, is so obviously left unexpressed and unlegislated, that I will not add a further word of comment.

Then, again, what can be the motive in this new provision - intended to express the unhampering of neutral commerce from its present "criminal restrictions," as I understand itfor confining the sale of "vessels, ships, or steamers" to those owned by citizens of the United States, or built within the limits thereof? Will it promote American ship-building to provide that a foreign merchant who is doing business here, perhaps permanently, cannot sell the American ship, which he is thinking of buying or which he may already own, to a foreign belligerent, because he (the merchant) is not an American citizen? Or will it encourage American commerce to forbid the American merchant from selling his vessel for which he has received an advantageous offer from the same belligerentto that belligerent, in case such vessel shall happen to be of foreign build? In fact, I submit that both of these new provisions would amount to "criminal restrictions" of themselves (in General Banks's phrase) on the existing privileges of American commerce, under the neutral laws of the United States as they now stand, bad as General Banks believes those laws to be.

Then, again, can the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs find any authority in any dictum upon the subject of neutrals' selling materials or munitions of war to belligerents, which limits such materials and munitions to being "the growth or product of the same" (neutral country)? No such limitation, certainly, is contained in Mr. Jefferson's famous declaration to Mr. Ternant, the French minister, in 1793, to the effect that "our citizens have always been free to make, vend, and export arms;" and no such limitation was contained in President Pierce's presidential declaration upon the same sub

ject, at the time of the Crimean War in 1854. Why should it be brought in now to fetter our citizens, when the question is, not of narrowing, but of enlarging, neutral commercial privileges?

I ask this on the supposition that a foreign war prevails, in which we are neutrals, and that the question is one of selling such materials or munitions to belligerents, neither of which categories is brought out by the provision in question.

On the whole, without any intention of making an exposé of the defects of this (new) section, but, on the contrary, hoping that, in an amended form, it may make good its place on the statute-book, as a counter-declaration of what American law now is, in opposition to the condemnation of the steamer "Meteor" in the United-States District Court for New York, I most sincerely regret that the views of those promoting the passage of this section are so inadequately and ineffectually expressed by the statute-form in which the Committee and the House of Representatives have embodied them. It is bad enough to have subjected the control of the whole subjectmatter to executive dictation, as already noticed; 1 but it is worse still to have missed the mark at which the legislation was aimed, so totally and so thoroughly. I pray the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations not to allow this section to go upon the statute-book with its present imperfections on its head, and without taking more time to point its meaning than the House of Representatives and its committee have allowed themselves to devote to it.

One other stricture upon the legislative execution of the new neutral statute, and I have done.

Mr. Jenckes, of Rhode Island, has incorporated into the new act an amendment upon the old which borders upon the ludicrous. At any rate, it serves to show what need there is that even a very skilful lawyer should be well acquainted with the cotemporaneous history of a statute before he undertakes to add to or improve upon its terms.

1 I say this, of course, without any invidious reflection upon the present head of the nation, who, I have taken occasion already to remark, in my judgment, deserves the approbation and support of the country for the just and independent stand which he has taken against Fenianism.

Sec. 7 of the existing law (taken verbatim from sec. 6 of stat. 1794, ch. 50) reads as follows:

"SEC. 7.-That the district courts shall take cognizance of complaints, by whomsoever instituted, in case of captures made within the waters of the United States, or within a marine league of the coasts or shores thereof."

According to the "Globe" (July 30), Mr. Jenckes moved to amend this, when the Neutrality Bill was under discussion, "by inserting after the word 'complaints' the words informations, indictments, or other prosecutions;"" and, General Banks having signified his acquiescence, the House adopted the amendment; so that the whole section reads thus:

"SEC. 6. - And be it further enacted, That the district courts shall take cognizance of all complaints, informations, indictments, or other prosecutions, by whomsoever instituted, in cases of capture made within the waters of the United States, or within a marine league of the coasts or shores thereof."

Here, it will be seen, Mr. Jenckes uses "complaints" as a technical form of procedure, - ejusdem generis, -as "informations or indictments;" in the sense of a complaint for assault and battery, trespass, and the like, before a justice of the peace. Now, on reference to the cotemporaneous history of the statute (as referred to in a previous note to page 15, discussing the prize case, the "William"), it will clearly be found, as I think, that Hamilton, in framing the section, was not thinking of the form in which the proceeding should be embodied, but was indicating that the district court, on represeutation made by any person, whether President, AttorneyGeneral, foreign minister, consul, private owner of the prize, or who not, should take jurisdiction of the matter, and frame, if need be, the proper process to bring the case into judicature.

The substantial thing was the conferring of jurisdiction upon some judicial tribunal, and thus reliéving the executive from embarrassment about the mode and means of proceeding. Thus, take the case of the prize made by the French frigate, the "L'Embuscade," in Delaware Bay, already referred to. If Ternant and Genet had refused to restore the capture to its