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ours. Britain and powers of Europe. nations, ought not t

easing remoteness of
the force of the famil
ticians have eve

4 blood, as feeble a
These circum
Sanguine in con
of danger.
Pous to the rev

the dishonest artifices of a sinister and unprincipled oppositionation, rendered dis
to a plan, which ought at least to receive a fair and candid ex-
amination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else,
he would say, could the authors of them have been tempted to
vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a point, in which
it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense of Amer-
ica as declared in its different forms of government, and in
which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard un-
known to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to
be a man of calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge
a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that
in a matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true
merits of the question should be perplexed and obscured by
expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and right determina-
tion. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that
a conduct of this kind, has too much the appearance of an in-
tention to mislead the people by alarming their passions, rather
than to convince them by arguments addressed to their under-
standings.

But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination, it will appear, that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature, in respect to military establishments, would be improper to be imposed; and, if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.

Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Eu-
rope, yet there are various considerations that warn us against
an excess of confidence or security. On one side of us,
stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to
the dominion of Britain. On the other side, and extending to
meet the British settlements, are colonics and establishments
subject to the dominion of Spain. This situation, and the vi-
cinity of the West India islands, belonging to these two pow-
ers, create between them, in respect to their American posses-
sions, and in relation to us, a common interest.
The savage

tribes on our western frontier, ought to be regarded as our
natural enemies; their natural allies: because they have most
to fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improve-
ments in the art of navigation have, as to the facility of com-

a constant n estern frontier.

Lame to be indis the ravages

as must eithe de militia, or at The f be perniciou weld oot long, if ons and fam they could ncreased expe zhes of labour. dinduals, wo uld be as bu Fous to private in the pay o e of peace: eing small. Bere is a sim propriety ents, and and P la propor Mite =

milit

munication, rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbours. Britain and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A future concert of views between these nations, ought not to be regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity, is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain. And politicians have ever, with great reason, considered the ties of blood, as feeble and precarious links of political connexion. These circumstances, combined, admonish us not to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the reach of danger.

These

Previous to the revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our western frontier. No person can doubt, that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should only be to guard against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is impracticable; and, if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia, in times of profound peace, would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their occupations and families, to perform that most disagreeable duty. And if they could be prevailed upon, or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the loss of labour, and disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as burthensome and injurious to the public, as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of government, amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small.

Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and prudence of the legislature.

In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their military establishments in our neighbourhood. If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenceless condition, to their insults or encroachments, we should find it

expedient to increase our frontier garrisons, in some ratio to the force by which our western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be, particular posts, the possession of which will include the command of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of the remainder. It may be added, that some of those posts will be keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it would be wise, to leave such posts in a situation to be at any instant seized by one or the other of two neighbouring and formidable powers? To act this part, would be to desert all the usual maxims of prudence and policy.

If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our Atlantic side, we must endeavour, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this purpose, there must be dockyards and arsenals; and, for the defence of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons. When a nation has become so powerful by sea, that it can protect its dockyards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the arsenals and dockyards, and sometimes of the fleet itself. PUBLIUS.

No. XXV.

BY ALEXANDFR HAMILTON.

The subject continued, with the same view.

It may perhaps be urged, that the objects enumerated in the preceding number ought to be provided by the state governments, under the direction of the union. But this would be an inversion of the primary principle of our political association; as it would in practice transfer the care of the common defence from the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to some states, dangerous to all, and baneful to the confederacy.

The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighbourhood, do not border on particular states; but encircle the union from MAINE to GEORGIA. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it, ought in like manner, to be the

objects of common councils, and of a common treasury. It happens that some states, from local situation, are more directly exposed. NEW YORK is of this class. Upon the plan of separate provisions, New York would have to sustain the whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate safety, and to the mediate, or ultimate protection of her neighbours. This would neither be equitable as it respected New York, nor safe as it respected the other states. Various inconveniences would attend such a system. The states, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burthen of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If, from the resources of such part becoming more abundant, its provisions should be proportionably enlarged, the other states would quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the union in the hands of two or three of its members; and those probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose to have some counterpoise; and pretences could easily be contrived. In this situation, military establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy, would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size; and being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines for the abridgment, or demolition, of the national authority.

Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition, that the state governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the union, the foundation of which will be the love of power: and that in any contest between the federal head and one of its members, the people will be most apt to unite with their local government. If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation, and too great facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the union. On the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things, than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national government. As far as an army may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be in those hands, of which the people are most likely to be jeal

expedient to increase our frontier garrisons, ir the force by which our western settlements mi There are, and will be, particular posts, th which will include the command of large distr and facilitate future invasions of the remaindadded, that some of those posts will be keys t the Indian nations. Can any man think it we leave such posts in a situation to be at any i one or the other of two neighbouring and for To act this part, would be to desert all the prudence and policy.

If we mean to be a commercial people, or on our Atlantic side, we must endeavour, as to have a navy. To this purpose, there m and arsenals; and, for the defence of these, probably garrisons. When a nation has be by sea, that it can protect its dockyards by hal persedes the necessity of garrisons for ti SININ

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risons will, in all likelihood, be found an ined. In that. against descents for the destruction of the mutual jealousy Wol. I be

yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.

No. XXV.

*proper size: and be in the ers, the Would be engines for of the national authority

BY ALEXANDFR HAMILT

Ten to induce a suppordion that naturally be prone to a rivalslip

The subject continued, with the sadation of which will be th IT may perhaps be urged, that the objecy contest between the federal preceding number ought to be provided the people will be most upt 65] ments, under the direction of the union. F. If, in addition to this un inversion of the primary principle of our of the members should be stu from the federal head to the individual meg a temptation, and too gd as it would in practice transfer the care ofendent possession of muhtar pressive to some states, dangerous to alprises upon, and finally to su

confederacy.

of the union.

On the oth

The territories of Britain, Spain, and would be less sale in this st

in our neighbourhood, do not border on

left the national forces in

encircle the union from MAINE to GE. As far as an army may though in different degrees, is therefore of power, it had better)

means of guarding against it, ought in

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