at close quarters and in compact formation. These conditions had two distinct advantages:

First, the regimental officers had complete control over their men throughout an action, while the men themselves had mutual moral and physical support.

Secondly, the officer in supreme command was kept fully and quickly informed while an engagement was being fought of everything that was taking place from end to end of the field.

But the greater accuracy and increased range of breech-loaders necessitated a considerable change in tactics; these advantages disappeared, and it is difficult to over-estimate how greatly regimental officers are now handicapped by not having complete control over their men, and how great is the loss to the men in not being able to feel the support of their comrades alongside of them once the fire zone is entered. Only those who have been in command under the altered conditions of war can fully appreciate the intense anxiety caused by being in ignorance of, or only partially acquainted with, what is going on in the more distant parts of the field.

Notwithstanding, however, the near proximity of the opposing forces in old days, if advantage were taken of the nature of the ground, it was possible for the actual disposition of the troops to be more or less hidden before the battle commenced-an advantage of which Wellington rarely failed to avail himself. But as soon as fighting began, concealment was out of the question, and it was probably on this account that in time of war no change was considered necessary in the ordinary brilliant military uniform, which consisted of a close-fitting coatee, with epaulettes, and a tight stock. It is difficult to understand how such an unsuitable costume could have been tolerated, or how, handicapped as they were by it, our troops could have fought and marched as they did.

Nowadays we are more practical; our soldiers are clad for war in a workman-like uniform, which it is difficult to distinguish from the prevailing colour of their surroundings even at quite a short distance. All distinctive badges and everything likely to glisten and attract notice are removed or covered over, the sole exception to this rule being the steel scabbard of the Cavalry sword, and this is a great mistake, for it has three distinct disadvantages: it is conspicuous at a considerable distance, it is noisy, and it blunts the sword. The scabbard should be made of wood and covered with leather, a method which for many years past has been adopted by our Indian Cavalry.

As regards transport and the great question of supplies, we can also boast of a vast improvement in the last half-century. In India, owing to the almost inexhaustible resources of the country, difficulty in producing these two essentials has never been experienced to any serious extent. Even during the Mutiny it was found possible to

meet the requirements of the several forces that had suddenly to be put into the field. But in Europe the transport and victualling of the Army in places where there were no railways have always been a work of the greatest difficulty.

Improvements in both these respects were gradually brought about by Wellington during the Peninsular War, but after peace was proclaimed in 1815 the lessons of that war were very soon forgotten, and the Supply and Transport Department was reduced to a minimum. Matters, indeed, were allowed to drift to such an extent that when the Crimean War broke out immense exertions had to be made to improvise a Commissariat Department."

It was under conditions such as I have endeavoured to describe that the Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny were carried on. They were essentially soldiers' campaigns, and that they were brought to successful conclusions we owe to the regimental officers possessing the qualities required in leaders of men, and the rank and file those of courage and endurance.

There are few finer records than the behaviour of all ranks at the battle of Inkerman, the Siege of Delhi, and the Defence, Relief, and Capture of Lucknow.

It was not to be expected that the country could be content with things as they were before the experience gained in these wars had proved the inefficiency of the various military departments. Many and serious defects were brought to light in the Report of the Select Committee on the Army before Sebastopol,' and in India it was necessary to form an altogether new Army to replace that which had mutinied and disappeared.

The Report showed clearly that when Great Britain, in concert with France, entered upon the war with Russia in 1854, neither the nation nor the responsible Ministers appreciated the magnitude of the step they were about to take. A forty years' peace had lulled the country into a feeling of security. The Army had been allowed to degenerate into a state of inefficiency which is almost inconceivable. It would appear as if the authorities had forgotten that war was a possible contingency, consequently none of the essentials necessary

5 The Colonies were denuded of their commissariat, from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, from Canada to China; every available officer was hurriedly summoned to join the Army in the East. The half-pay list was ransacked for its least effete members, . . . but still the number of working hands fell far below the requirements of the occasion, and volunteers were sought in the public offices in London and in the Irish Constabulary force, while the subordinate staff-that essential element in Army administration which is to the Commissariat what non-commissioned officers are to the Army generally-were got together wherever they could be found-in the Police and the Custom House, in shops and warehouses-without time or means of testing their capacity or characters. . . . But blood and treasure failed to cement the hurried fabric, and once more sad experience proclaimed the impossibility of improvising at a moment's notice the complicated machinery of military administration.'—Administion and Organisation of the British Army (Fonblanque).

to maintain an Army in the field, or to ensure success against a powerful enemy, were available when the time arrived for military operations in the Crimea."

After the Indian Mutiny matters began to mend, and during the forty years that followed, up to the breaking out of war in South Africa, many and great changes were brought about both in the Home and Indian Armies.

As I have already stated, the old smooth-bore musket was superseded by the Lee-Metford rifle, and an equally great revolution was made in the pattern of guns. The important part taken in the battle of Inkerman by the two 18-pounders which Lieut.-Col. Dickson 7 managed by the greatest exertion to drag on to the field, attracted the attention of a clever engineer-Mr. Armstrong, one of the early partners of the Elswick Company-and caused him to consider whether these old-fashioned heavy guns could not be replaced by some 'much lighter, but with equal or greater power, and equal or greater range.'

8

Mr. Armstrong did not meet with much encouragement at first, but early in 1858 the Superintendent of Experiments reported

that the very extraordinary power of range and precision of fire exhibited at Shoeburyness from the breech-loading gun of Mr. Armstrong's invention appear to afford a reasonable expectation that artillery will not only regain that influence in the field of which, to a certain extent, it has been deprived by the recent introduction of rifled small arms, but that influence will be most materially increased.

The Armstrong gun was accordingly adopted, but it did not remain long in favour. The naval and military authorities of the day considered simplicity all-important, and were opposed to any, even the most simple, mechanical contrivance, with the result that in 1864-extraordinary as it may seem-it was decided to revert to muzzle-loading guns-a retrograde step which might have had serious consequences had we been dragged into any European complication during the fourteen years that followed. Fortunately this did not occur, and in 1878 the Elswick Company were able to convince the Government that it was necessary to return to the breech-loading system, as it was impossible to obtain the required initial velocity with muzzle-loading guns without adding largely to their length.

Our Horse and Field Artillery were, therefore, given the breech

• The Report on the Army before Sebastopol showed that: The Administration which ordered that expedition had inadequate information as to the amount of force in the Crimea or Sebastopol. They were not acquainted with the strength of the fortresses to be attacked or with the resources of the country to be invaded. They hoped and expected that the expedition would be immediately successful, and, as they did not foresee the probability of a protracted struggle, they made no provision for a winter campaign. What was planned and undertaken without sufficient information was conducted without sufficient care or forethought.'

The late General Sir Collingwood Dickson, V.C., G.C.B.

• Afterwards Lord Armstrong.

loading guns now in use; but as these proved during the South African War to be deficient in range and power, it was determined in 1901 to replace them by more up-to-date weapons, which have now been approved, and the first issue of the new guns will shortly be made. They are quick-firing guns-12 pounders for the Horse, and 18 pounders for the Field Artillery-and it is believed that they will be found to be as good as, if not better than, any guns in use with foreign armies.

Another important result of the Crimean War was the establishment of the Staff College. The sufferings of the troops during their first winter in the Crimea, and the failure to take advantage of the opportunities which offered during the initial stages of the campaign, were, it was generally admitted, due almost altogether to want of scientific preparation. The Crimean War and the Indian Mutiny clearly brought forward the necessity for a training school where selected officers could be given opportunities for studying the art of war under practical conditions.

The senior division at Sandhurst, which had been in existence for nearly sixty years,' had signally failed to produce the stamp of officer required, and in 1858 it was superseded by the present Staff College. But even at this College the curriculum of work, as at first arranged, was far from satisfactory, having been drawn up apparently with a view more to a purely scientific than to a military education.

Men who excelled in the Higher Mathematics, Astronomy, Chemistry, and Geology, were given the first places, while the study of the campaigns of the great masters in the art of war, including Napoleon and Wellington, was entirely neglected. The capacity of students was judged more by the neatness and finish of the maps and sketches they produced, than by their ability to grasp quickly and depict intelligently the features of the country they prospected, or by their practical knowledge of strategy and of the duties of a staff officer.

As time went on, and the paramount importance of strategy-as exemplified by the wars of 1862-65, 1866, and 1870-71-came to be more fully recognised, some improvement took place, but it is only of late years that the study of this all-essential subject has been given the prominent place it should have in the Staff College course.

The late Lieut.-Colonel Henderson did more than anyone else to make the students appreciate the importance of military history. They read with the deepest interest his fascinating book, The Life of Stonewall Jackson, and his attractive manner of imparting knowledge made any subject he lectured upon clear and interesting to his audience.

At first the number of students at the College was limited to

9 It was formed at High Wycombe in 1799, moved to Farnham in 1812, and to Sandburst in 1820.

thirty, and, as the course lasted two years, only fifteen officers passed out annually-a quite insufficient number to meet the demands of the Staff even in peace time. An increase was sanctioned in 1871, and was gradually continued until 1891, when the present number of sixty-four was reached. But this number is altogether inadequate for home and Indian requirements, and it is very desirable not only that a further increase should be allowed to Camberley, but that a similar Staff College, such as has been proposed by Lord Kitchener, should be established in India 10

Another much-needed institution-the Ordnance College-has been established within the last forty years. It was practically started in 1864 as the Artillery Advanced Class to enable a certain number of officers to obtain the mathematical and mechanical science sufficient to grapple with questions of great interest and importance arising out of recent improvements in the science of Artillery.' This class was carried on at the Royal Artillery Institution until 1899, when its designation was changed to Ordnance College' and its functions considerably increased. Instead of an annual class consisting of eight officers, sixteen are now admitted. The course lasts for one year; at the end of that time half the number are selected to compete for a second year, and these eight on passing out are given a P.A.C."1 certificate.

Other changes were made from time to time:

6

In 1854 the War Department was separated from the Colonial Office and placed under a newly constituted official styled the Secretary of State for War.

In the same year the administration of the Commissariat Department was transferred from the Treasury to the War Office.

In 1855 the general charge of the Militia and Yeomanry was put under the War Office. Up to that time the Home Office had been responsible not only for these two services, but also for all general military questions relating to Great Britain.

In 1859 the Volunteer Force in its present form came into existence, as the result of the patriotic sentiment aroused by the threat of a French invasion. It was established in accordance with a circular dated the 12th of May, addressed by the Queen in Council to the Lords-Lieutenant of counties.

No further changes of any moment as regards Army administra

10 It is essential, however, that the home authorities should have a voice in the supervision of the Indian Staff College in order that it may be worked on exactly the same lines as that of Camberley. The military curriculum should be the same, the examination standards the same, the professors interchangeable. The diploma of P.S.C. should bear throughout the Army the same significance, regardless of the college in which it had been gained. If this be not done, we shall have growing divergence between the two armies which would greatly militate against their military efficiency when acting together.

"Passed Artillery College.