colour, and the East civilised means an extension of the community of the civilised world. If so, what ground is there to fear it? Civilised Europeans do not fear their civilised brethren in Europe; why, then, should they fear their civilised equals in the East? The remaining point which may cause apparent disadvantage to the Europeans when the Eastern people become civilised is the fact that they can no more be treated in the way similar to that with which some early European settlers in America treated the native Indians, or Vasco da Gama and his followers treated uncivilised natives of India. In these cases it was the abuse of power of civilisation on the part of those who were superiors over the people who were their inferiors in civilisation, and these instances do not at all show why these inferiors should not be raised to the higher level. The abuse is certainly no argument against the proper use. If these abuses of civilisation and unfair treatment of inferior people could be stopped by spreading of higher civilisation, it would be an extension of the principle of justice and fairness for regulating the intercourse among nations, and truly a heavenly blessing conferred on the wider community of human race.

Your article explains away all the follies and absurdities of the Yellow Peril in a most powerful way, and I have no doubt that it has produced good effects in enlightening the public on the subject. I hope and trust that no sensible men will ever lend their ears to a preaching so ridiculous as that of the Yellow Peril.

You will excuse me, dear Professor, for making these remarks; it is from my sincere appreciation of your article that I do so. Believe me,

I remain,

Yours very sincerely,

TADASU HAYASHI.

I dare say the argument brought forward by the distinguished Japanese diplomatist will not fail to convince the reader of the utter fallacy of the so-called Yellow Peril; and, as far as regards the dangerous influence of the Japanese victories upon the Moslems in India, we ought not to forget that the growing civilisation among this section of the King's subjects must, and will essentially, alter their character. I mean to say they will do away, as they have already begun to do away, with the stubborn opposition against Western culture, and the more they approach to the views of their civilisers, the more will they get convinced of the blessings of British rule, and the less will they feel inclined to shake it off, knowing that dire confusion and endless bloodshed will set in as soon as the British leave the country. Of course, what relates to India cannot be said with regard to Russian Mahometans. The despotic rule of the Tsar has never been favoured by his own Christian subjects, and still less by the Mahometans, who quite recently complained bitterly, in a letter published in a Turkish paper in Egypt, about the many wrongs unde: which they suffer in Kazan, Ufa, and in other places of the Russian Empire, and it is but natural that they rejoice in the defeats of their oppressor, and that the prowess of the Japanese raises their hope for a future retaliation. If Islam in general had but now attained the high degree of civilisation which has helped the Japanese under the present circumstances, the position of the Christian rulers over Mahometans would undoubtedly become critical, and the Western

Powers could not feel any security in their outlying colonies. But as matters stand to day the modern civilisation of the Moslem world is still in its infancy, and it must take a very long time before getting free from the shackles of orthodoxy. They may turn their full attention towards the modern culture, and it will be only then that they may be able to follow the example of the Japanese, and prove to Europe that energy and vitality do not belong exclusively to the Western world, but also to Asia. It would be idle to deny the moral effect of the Japanese successes on Asiatics in general, for we read that Tokio is gradually becoming the place where Hindus, Indian Mussulmans, Javanese, and Siamese like to go to acquire modern culture. We must not be astonished at that. Asiatics will always give preference to an Asiatic teacher over the European one, since they have so many views and modes of thinking in common; but such a predilection cannot be regarded as any open sign of hatred or of revolutionary tendencies. If the Japanese could be nearer to the Mahometan world than they are, their example might well serve as a keener encouragement; but the geographical distance cannot be overlooked under present circumstances, and, however full of enthusiasm certain modernised Mahometans may be on seeing their archenemy thrashed, and on finding that there are Asiatics who can triumph over a Western Power, nay, over the most dreaded and gigantic Western State, their joy will hardly have any practical result. The spirit of Islam is too deeply seated in its votaries to be shaken by the example of a heathen nation like the Japanese. It will take a long time before the doctrine of the Prophet will give way to modern views like the teaching of Buddha, and the victories of Japan will work only a passing influence over the Mahometan world.

VAMBÉRY.

THIBET AND THE INDIA OFFICE

A BLAZING INDISCRETION'

THE unveiling of Lhassa in the autumn of last year was an event of the highest significance and widest importance. It is difficult to say which of the sciences has gained most by the complete success of that arduous mission to the capital of the Forbidden Land, and of the subsequent expedition into the recesses of Thibet; but few will deny that the world of science lies under a debt of gratitude to Colonel Younghusband and his gallant band for their contribution to general knowledge from the storehouse of the great unknown. Interesting volumes have already appeared, dealing with the popular and pictorial, military and melancholy aspects of the journey, leading us with dexterous hand through forests and over mountains, past valleys and villages of tribes unknown, into conflicts on the battlefield and in the council tent, until at last, after direst privations and unexampled forbearance, we are privileged to witness the signing of a treaty between Great Britain and Thibet in the throne-room of the hallowed Potala.

How grateful had we been if volumes such as these had been the only publications concerned with this latest record of British endurance and British success; had we been left in undisturbed reflection of the incontestable wisdom of Lord Curzon in Council, who urged the undertaking of this inevitable mission, and of the high abilities of those to whose discretion the life or death, the honour or dishonour, of the British envoy and his escort were confidently entrusted! But the wisdom of the India Office directed otherwise; and the issue of the Thibet Blue-book (No. III.) affords the spectacle of divided councils, of a weak Indian policy, of pledges carelessly given, of immediate and inexcusable public censure, all of which have distressed beyond measure the public opinion of the Empire, but have delighted the Russian Government and the Daily News. It has done more than this, for it has undermined the confidence of the Indian Public Service, whether civilian or military, in the chivalrous advocacy of the Secretary for India, to whom that Service has always looked for support in the hour of trial and difficulty; it has weakened the theory,

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which is advanced in the case of Lord Milner and others, that the details of great policies should be left to the man on the spot,' and that the discretion of such a one should be unfettered by the interference of the transient political head of the corresponding department at home.

Let me here observe in passing how different the case would have been had a Radical Government thus left Colonel Younghusband and the Indian Government in the lurch, surrendered to Russia the legitimate fruits of hard-won negotiations, and censured before the whole world the agent of its choice. The imperial hosts would have assembled in Parliament, the tragic stories of 1880-85 would have been rehearsed by the Leader of the Unionist Opposition, and a trial of strength upon a question of Empire would have been conducted in the division lobbies. To-day the case is different: the India Office is supported by the Radical party in a Radical policy; the followers of the Government, though chafing acutely beneath the blister of Mr. Brodrick's 'blazing indiscretion,' cannot support an amendment to the Address, which is nowadays equivalent to a vote of censure upon the Government; and so, for the purpose of Parliamentary criticism, this question of supreme importance has to bow before the exigencies of the party system, and to await the day when the fortune of the ballot may select a private member's resolution dealing with it, or that distant moment at the far fag-end of the Session which is considered appropriate to discuss the Indian Budget and Indian affairs.

Meanwhile the Press of Imperial Britain, at home and beyond the seas, has denounced in scathing terms the publication of the last Blue-book, and only in a lesser degree the policy of the India Office therein revealed. It is my purpose and desire to show how well founded are these charges, and with what dismay we must anticipate the future conduct in India of Indian affairs by Indian officials when they are so ruthlessly snubbed and overruled by Downing Street.

The personal aspect of Colonel Younghusband's treatment is the least important of all. It is but an illustration of the principle with which we are concerned-namely, how far the Home Government is justified in abandoning its agent who, under most difficult circumstances and in the absence of clear and vital instructions, uses his best discretion in the course of negotiations on behalf of his country. It is not in the least likely that the career of the man whose knowledge of Central Asia is only rivalled by Sven Hedin and Lord Curzon will be checked by the injudicious reprimand of a Secretary of State. More probable is it that his achievements will endure in history long after the censure and the censor are forgotten. Yet he would be more than human were he to remain impervious to the treatment he has received. For what did he do for the Empire? He marched, at the risk of his own life and the lives of his escort, to the gates

of Lhassa, whither the Home Government despatched him, and returned with a treaty more favourable than they either expected or deserved. For this he was censured, although his diplomatic success resulted in securing for Britain a treaty so favourable that it gave us a margin of advantage which could have been surrendered at a convenient moment to Thibet, or ceded immediately as an act of grace. His King telegraphed congratulations, and subsequently decorated him; his Viceroy praised and supported him; the Secre tary of State alone censured him. One is left wondering what action Mr. Brodrick would have considered appropriate if Colonel Younghusband had returned from Lhassa with no treaty at all (as was expected), or with one which did not satisfy the demands of the situation. What refinement of punishment could have been invented to await the arrival in London of a non-successful envoy from Thibet? Let me here recapitulate briefly the story of the mission from its inception, to give some idea of the difficulties which had to be faced and shared by agent and principals alike. For years past the story of Russian intrigue in Thibet has been recounted with alarming frequency and persistence in the frontier bazaars of North-East India the aggressive attitude of the Thibetans themselves upon the British boundary lends colour to these tales of internal agitation; and the anxiety of the contiguous States of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal, whose interests are inextricable from our own, reaches a point at which it would have been folly to ignore their representations. The mission sets out, and then follows the narrative of the journey from Darjeeling to Yatung, to Chumbi, Thuna, and Gyangtse. I need not stay to recount the occasions upon which an inexhaustible patience was called upon to suffer delay after delay, and insult after insult at the hands of the priesthood of Thibet-the evil genii of a friendly race whose kindly spirit towards the mission is shown on every page of the Blue-book. Nor will I do more than recall-and this only to indicate the instinctive fairness of the man's character-Colonel Younghusband's dramatic ride alone with two subordinates into the Thibetan camp near Thuna, at a time when the monkish obstinacy was at its worst, in order to try unofficially and in a friendly way to gain their confidence or understand their opposition. These are episodes which fill the last Blue-book, and add not a little to the public indignation at the treatment finally meted out. The winter of 1903 closes in, and the mission experiences months of fearful hardship. During this time they learn more and more of Russian intrigue in Thibet-unofficial intrigue, of course—and of the reliance placed by the Lamas upon the assistance of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, they maintain the most friendly relations with the tribes through whose country they pass, paying instantly and in full for all they buy, and supplying medical comforts to the sick and wounded. But all the while the mission realises in a thousand ways that the Lamas have