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p. 78.

The Project was started by a Spanish Minister, British App. II, Don José de Carvajal y Lancaster, and was favourably received by the Portuguese Minister, the Count de Perelada, its ostensible object being 5 to carry out the Treaty of Limits of 1750. The Spaniards believed that, if the territories of Spain and Portugal could approach each other, they might surround the territories of the Dutch and the French, so that those nations should not 10 be able to go inland behind the Spanish and British App. 11, Portuguese territories; and that Spain and P. 77. Portugal, taking advantage of the assistance of runaway slaves, might make the two monarchies coterminous, "confined throughout the whole

15 extent of their territories by limits known to all." The real object of the proposal is mentioned by the Spanish Minister in May 1753.

British App. II,

p. 79.

"Being united," he stated, "the two may preserve British App. II, the advantage which Heaven has given them, of being p. 80.

20 the sole masters of the mines."

The method of carrying out the project was to

intrust the scheme to two Chief Commissioners, British App. II, who were to make secret reports, secretly incite p. 84.

British Counter

the rebellious negroes to hostilities against the Case, App., 25 Dutch, and obtain the support of the missionaries. pp. 204--207. As was stated in the secret instructions to the

Spanish Commissioner, Iturriaga

"Although the two Courts have not considered it British App. II, convenient to attack them with open force, neverthe- p. 88.

30 less they are agreed in the scheme of doing so by

intrigue."

The intrigue failed.

Although the history of the intrigue is apparent from the documents, the Venezuelan 35 Case makes no mention of it, and omits all

notice of the immediate and sufficient steps British App. II,
taken by the Dutch to defend the Colony, p. 94.
and oppose any aggression, as soon as they
received warning in August 1754, from the

40 English at Barbadoes.

p. 200.

In his letter of the 28th May, 1761, to the West India Company, the Director-General made British App. II, no suggestion that any more soldiers were required to oppose aggression by the Spaniards, but merely 45 suggested that if Customs regulations were to be

imposed at Demerara the garrison there ought to be increased, because he wanted his own men for patrol duty, remarking that at that time he had

Dutch Reinforcements.

Venezuelan
App. II, p. 144.

British App. II,
pp. 220, 225.

Venezuelan Case, p. 131.

British Case,
pp. 38-42.

The Carib Allies.

Venezuelan Case,
pp. 131-134.

Venezuelan Case, p. 132.

British App. II, p. 58.

British App. IV, p. 101.

sent one out to Waini in search of a party of
fugitives. This portion of the letter is not
quoted in the Venezuelan Appendix, and it may
be noted that when soldiers were wanted for
Moruka in 1762 the Company at once dispatched 5
soldiers to the Colony, and that in 1763 a further
detachment was sent.

The passage, described as a "wail," and cited at
the foot of p. 131 of the Venezuelan Case, was
written under a mistake. It was supposed 10
that the Spaniards had established a Post on
the Cuyuni. This, it is certain, they had not
done.

The Venezuelan Case points to the relations between the Dutch and the Caribs as a sign of 15 Dutch weakness. On the contrary, it was an element of strength, and materially confirmed and extended Dutch power in Guiana. The Caribs continually offered their assistance to the Dutch; the Dutch could call upon them 20 at any time to aid them either against revolted negroes, Dutch or slave deserters, or Spanish aggression, but the Caribs offered their services to friends, and came as allies of the strong, not as protectors of the weak. As is 25 shown by the quotation on p. 132 of the Venezuelan Case the Commandeur knew that if the Caribs rose no Spaniard would be visible any more above in Cuyuni, but the next sentence in the despatch is not quoted. It is as 30 follows: "I have always, but with great difficulty, restrained them, and prevented all hostilities by fair promises." As has been previously stated, the safety of the Spaniards depended upon the amity and discretion of the 35 Dutch Governor of Essequibo.

The Caribs regarded the Spaniards as enemies not as rulers, and the conclusion deduced from the Director-General's letter of the 6th January, 1772, suggesting that the Caribs submitted 40 to the Spaniards, is quite unwarranted. The letter refers to the raid on Moruka in 1769, which may have had the effect of causing Indians to leave the neighbourhood, and, after alluding to the manner in which the English 45 claimed runaway slaves with a ship of war, regrets that an ally should deprive the Dutch of slaves who had escaped out of the Colony. But as to "submission to the Spaniards," there is no sign whatever that the Indians of the 50 Colony ever submitted, or thought of submitting

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The Venezuelan Case deals separately in this Chapter with the coast region and "the interior." The first portion, that dealing with the coast, opens as follows:

"1. THE COAST REGION.-From the Orinoco to the 10 Essequibo the Spaniards claimed dominion. They also exercised exclusive control there."

The first three pages devoted to the support of this proposition deal merely with that part of the Orinoco, where the Spaniards had a right 15 to exercise control if they could and would. In the same manner, in the Essequibo, trade regulations were enforced by the Dutch upon the Spaniards, who came to that river to trade. The Dutch did not dispute the Spanish right 20 in the Orinoco, and the Spaniards did not dispute the Dutch right in the Essequibo. The fluctuations of trade in the Orinoco depended upon the existence of war and the character of the Governors. This fact is frequently men- 25 tioned, and need only be briefly illustrated.

In 1731 the Commandeur wrote that "the trade to be done with the Spaniards in Rio Orinoco cannot be relied upon since they allow no trade above their fort with the Indians, but 30 only with themselves."

In June 1731 the Spanish Governor seems. abruptly to have notified that commerce was at an end. When the Dutch Commandeur retaliated by forbidding passes, the Spanish 35 Governor speedily changed his mind, and in November the trade was once more continued.

On p. 138 of the Venezuelan Case reliance is placed on the ruin of the Dutch fishery in the mouth of the Orinoco at the hands of the 40 Spaniards. This fishery had been enjoyed by the Dutch for a long period, and their right to it was never denied by the Spanish authorities till

1769. As has been shown in the British Case, British Case, all the captures of Dutch fishing craft before PP. 52-54. that year were either acts of piracy, disavowed by the Spanish Commander, who, in many cases, 5 procured redress for the owners, or were justified only on the ground that, under pretence of fishing, contraband trade was being carried on with the Spanish possessions. There is nothing to show that the Dutch fishery was permanently 10 abandoned after 1769.

With a view to show Spanish control of the coast itself, the Venezuelan Case refers to what occurred when, in 1732, the rumour spread that the Swedes were coming to Barima. The cir15 cumstances, to which allusion has already been made, are suggested to amount to a clear assertion of Spanish authority in the coast region between the main mouth of the Orinoco and the Essequibo. In the middle of the quotation 20 supporting this allegation the passage is omitted which stated that the Spanish Envoy sent from Trinidad to Guayana to verify the rumour concerning the Swedes was informed by the Caribs at Barima that the Indians had been told 25 by the Dutch not to show the Swedes a good

Alleged Spanish Control in the Barima. Venezuelan Case,

p. 139.

Ante, p. 83.

British App. III, p. 81.

p. 17.

place for their Settlement, and they themselves would give them all they required. The implication that the Dutch, under pressure of Spanish control, furnished supplies to the 30 Spaniards for an expedition to Barima is incorrect. Supplies of bread had, by request, British App. II, been forwarded to the Spanish Governor Arredondo in January 1734, in exchange for horses; but the letters announcing the rumours 35 of Swedes were written by a new Governor, Don Carlos Sucre, in March 1734. The history of the Swedish rumour is given in the British Case, p. 34, and need not here be further discussed.

[Omitted in
Venezuelan App.]

British App. II,

p. 18.

British Case,

P. 34.

Alleged Spanish Control in the Moruka.

On p. 139 of the Venezuelan Case another Venezuelan Case,

40 incident is referred to as showing Spanish control of the coast region. The statement is as follows:

p. 139.

"In 1755 the Spanish Prefect of the Capuchin Missions, in whose province this district lay, demanded of the 45 Dutch Postholder of Moruca some Indians who had for already over ten years been dwelling under the Post: adding that, in case of reluctance, he would come with sufficient force to fetch them, and take them away in

chains.

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