question. It has been assailed on the most opposite grounds. Macaulay, while admitting the accuracy of the process, denied its efficiency, on the ground that an operation performed naturally was not rendered more easy or efficacious by being subjected to analysis.1 This objection is curious when confronted with Bacon's reiterated assertion that the natural method pursued by the unassisted human reason is distinctly opposed to his; and it is besides an argument that tells so strongly against many sciences, as to be comparatively worthless when applied to any one. There are, however, more formidable objections against the method. It has been pointed out, and with perfect justice, that science in its progress has not followed the Baconian method; that no one discovery can be pointed to which can be definitely ascribed to the use of his rules, and that men the most celebrated for their scientific acquirements, while paying homage to the name of Bacon, practically set at naught his most cherished precepts. The reason of this is not far to seek, and has been pointed out by logicians of the most diametrically opposed schools. The mechanical character both of the natural history and of the logical method applied to it, resulted necessarily from Bacon's radically false conception of the nature of cause and of the causal relation. The whole logical or scientific problem is treated as if it were one of co-existence, to which in truth the method of exclusion is scarcely applicable, and the assumption is constantly made that each phenomenon has one and only one cause. The inductive formation of axioms by a gradually ascending scale is a route which no science has ever followed, and by which no science could ever make progress. The true scientific procedure is by hypothesis followed up and tested by verification; the most powerful instrument is the deductive method, which Bacon can hardly be said to have recognized. The power of framing hypotheses points to another want in the Baconian doctrine. If that power form part of the true method, then the mind is not wholly passive or recipient; it anticipates nature, and moulds the experience received by it in accordance with its own constructive ideas or conceptions; and yet further, the minds of various investigators can never be reduced to the same dead mechanical level. There will still be room for the scientific use of the imagination, and for the creative flashes of genius.

1 Compare what Bacon says, N. O., i. 130.

Brewster, Life of Newton, 1855 (see particularly vol. ii. 403, 405); Lasson, Veber Baco von Verulam's wissenschaftliche Principien, 1860; Liebig. Ueber Francis Bacon von Verulam, &c., 1863 (a translation of the last appeared in Macmillan's Magazine for July and August, 1863). Although Liebig points out how little science proceeds according to Bacon's rules, yet his other criticisms seem of extremely little value. In a very offensive and quite unjustifiable tone, which is severely commented on by Sigwart and Fischer, he attacks the Baconian method and its results. These results he claims to find in the Sylva Sylvarum, entirely ignoring what Bacon himself has said of the nature of that work (N. O. i. 117; cf. Rawley's Pref. to the S. S.), and thus putting a false interpretation on the experiments there noted. It is not surprising that he should detect many flaws, but he never fails to exaggerate an error, and seems sometimes completely to miss the point of what Bacon says. (See particularly his remarks on S. S., 33, 336.) The method he explains in such a way as to show he has not a glimpse of its true nature. He brings against Bacon, of all men, the accusations of making induction start from the undetermined perceptions of the senses, of using imagination, and of putting a quite arbitrary interpretation on phenomena. He crowns his criticism by expounding what he considers to be the true scientific method, which, as has been pointed out by Fischer, is simply that Baconian doctrine against which his attack ought to have been directed. (See his account of the method, Ueber Bacon, 47-49; K. Fischer, Bacon, p. 499-302.)

Mill, Logic, ii. pp. 115, 116, 329, 330.

Whewell, Phil. of Ind. Sc., ii. 399, 402-3; Ellis, Int. to Bacon's Works, 1. 39, 61; Brewster, Newton, ii. 404; Jevons, Princ. of Science, ii. 220. A severe judgment on Bacon's method is given in Dühring's able but one-sided Kritische Gesch. d. Phil., in which the merits of Roger Bacon are brought prominently forward.

Although it must be admitted that the Baconian method is fairly open to the above-mentioned objections, it is curious and significant that Bacon was not thoroughly ignorant of them, but with deliberate consciousness preferred his own method. We do not think, indeed, that the notiones of which he speaks in any way correspond to what Whewell and Ellis would call "conceptions or ideas furnished by the mind of the thinker:" nor do we imagine that Bacon would have admitted these as necessary elements in the inductive process. But he was certainly not ignorant of what may be called a deductive method, and of a kind of hypothesis. This is clear from the use he makes of the Vindemiatio, from certain hints as to the testing of axioms, from his admission of the syllogism into physical reasoning, and from what he calls Experientia Literata. The function of the Vindemiatio has been already pointed out; with regard to axioms, he says (N.O., i. 106), "In establishing axioms by this kind of induction, we must also examine and try whether the axiom so established be framed to the measure of these particulars from which it is derived, or whether it be larger or wider. And if it be larger and wider, we aust observe whether, by indicating to us new particulars, it confirm that wideness and largeness as by a collateral security, that we may not either stick fast in things already known, or loosely grasp at

If, then, Bacon himself made no contributions to science, if no discovery can be shown to be due to the use of his rules, if his method be logically defective, and the problem to which it was applied one from its nature incapable of adequate solution, it may not unreasonably be asked, How has he come to be looked upon as the great leader in the reformation of modern science? How is it that he shares with Descartes the honor of inaugurating modern philosophy? To this the true answer seems to be, that Bacon owes his position not only to the general spirit of his philosophy, but to the manner in which he worked into a connected system the new mode of thinking, and to the incomparable power and eloquence with which he expounded and enforced it. Like all epoch-making works, the Novum Organum gave expression to ideas which were already beginning to be in the air. The time was ripe for a great change; scholasticism, long decaying, had begun to fall; the authority not only of school doctrines but of the church had been discarded; while here and there a few devoted experimenters were turning with fresh zeal to the unwithered face of nature. The fruitful thoughts which lay under and gave rise to these scattered efforts of the human mind, were gathered up into unity, and reduced to system in the new philosophy of Bacon. It is assuredly little matter for wonder that this philosophy should contain much that is now inapplicable, and that in many respects it should be vitiated by radical errors. The details of the logical method on which its author laid the greatest stress have not been found of practical service; yet the fundamental ideas on which the theory rested, the need for rejecting rash generalization, and the necessity for a critical analysis of experience, are as true and valuable now as they were then. Progress in scientific discovery is made mainly, if not solely, by the employment of hypothesis, and for that no code of rules can be laid down such as Bacon had devised. Yet the framing of hypothesis is no mere random guess work; it is not left to the imagination alone, but to the scientific imagination. There is required in the process not merely a preliminary critical induction, but a subsequent experimental comparison, verification, or proof, the canons of which can be laid down with precision. To formulate and show grounds for these laws is to construct a philosophy of induction, and it must not be forgotten that the first step towards the accomplishment of the task was made by Bacon, when he introduced and gave due prominence to the powerful logical instrument of exclusion or elimination.

Of the general characteristics of Bacon's philosophy, and of the consequent place he holds in the history of modern speculative thought, this is not the place to speak. It is curious and significant that in the domain of the moral and metaphysical sciences his influence has been perhaps more powerful, and his authority has been more frequently appealed to, than in that of the physical. This is due, not so much to his expressed opinion that the inductive method was applicable to all the sciences, as to the generally practical, or, one may say, positive spirit of his system. Theological questions, which had tortured the minds of generashadows and abstract forms, not at things solid and realized in matter." (Cf. also the passage from Valerius Terminus, quoted in Ellis's note on the above aphorism.) Of the syllogism he says, "I do not propose to give up the syllogism altogether. S. is incompetent for the principal things rather than useless for the generality. In the mathematics there is no reason why it should not be employed. It is the flux of matter and the inconstancy of the physical body which requires induction, that thereby it may be fixed as it were, and allow the formation of notions well defined. In physics you wisely note, and therein I agree with you, that after the notions of the first class and the axioms concerning them have been by induction well made out and defined, syllogism may be applied safely; only it must be restrained from leaping at once to the most general notions, and progress must be made through a fit succession of steps."-("Letter to Baranzano," Letters and Life, vii. 377.) And with this may be compared what he says of mathematics (Nov. Org., ii. 8: Parasceve, vii.). In his account of Experientia Literata (De Aug., v. 2) he comes very near to the modern mode of experimental research. It is, he says, the proce dure from one experiment to another, and is not a science, but an art or learned sagacity (resembling in this Aristotle's ȧyxivoia), which may, however, be enlightened by the precepts of the Interpretatio. Eight varieties of such experiments are enumerated, and a comparison is drawn between this and the inductive method; "though the rational method of inquiry by the Organon promises far greater things in the end, yet this sagacity, proceeding by learned experience, will in the meantime present mankind with a number of inventions which lie near at hand." (Cf. N. O., i. 103.)

See the vigorous passage in Herschel, Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, 105; cf. 96 of the same work.

7 Bacon himself seems to anticipate that the progress of science would of itself render his method antiquated (Non. Org., i. 130). Nov. Org., i. 127.

his more celebrated namesake.1 In this view there is certainly a considerable share of truth, but it is much exaggerated. As a general rule, no man can be completely dissevered from his national antecedents and surroundings, and Bacon is not an exception. Those who take up such an extreme position regarding his merits have known too little of the state of contemporary science, and have limited their comparison to the works of the scholastic theologians. We never find in Bacon himself any consciousness of originality; he has no fresh creative thought or method to introduce whereby the face of science may be changed; he is rather a keen and systematic thinker, who is working in a well-beaten track, from which his contemporaries were being drawn by the superior attractions of theology and metaphysics.

Roger Bacon was born in 1214, near Ilchester, in Somersetshire. His family appears to have been in good circumstances, for he speaks of his brother as wealthy, and he himself expended considerable sums on books and instruments; but in the stormy reign of Henry III. they suffered severely, their property was despoiled, and several members of the family were driven into exile. Roger completed his studies at Oxford, though not, as current traditions assert, at Merton or Brazenose, neither of those colleges having then been founded. His great abilities were speedily recognized by his contemporaries, and he came to be on terms of close intimacy with some of the most independent thinkers of the time. Of these the most prominent were Adam de Marisco and Robert Grosseteste (Capito), afterwards bishop of Lincoln, a man of liberal mind and wide attainments, who had especially devoted himself to mathematics and experimental science.

Very little is known of Bacon's life at Oxford; it is said he took orders in 1233, and this is not improbable. In the following year, or perhaps later, he crossed over to France, and studied for a considerable length of time at the university of Paris, then the centre of intellectual life in Europe. The years Bacon spent there were unusually stirring. The two great orders, the Franciscans and Dominicans, were in the vigor of youth, and had already begun to take the lead in theological discussion. Alexander of Hales, the author of the great Summa, was the oracle of the Franciscans, while the rival order rejoiced in Albertus Magnus, and in the rising genius of the angelic doctor, Thomas Aquinas.

The scientific training which Bacon had received, partly by instruction, but more from the study of the Arab writers, made patent to his eyes the manifold defects in the imposing systems reared by these doctors. It disgusted him to hear from all around him that philosophy was now at length complete, that it had been reduced into compact order, and was being set forth by a certain professor at Paris. Even the great authority on which they reposed, Aristotle, was known but in part, and that part was rendered well-nigh unintelligible through the vileness of the translations; yet not one of those professors would learn Greek so that they might arrive at a real knowledge of their philosopher. The Scriptures, if read at all in the schools, were read in the erroneous versions; but even these were being deserted for the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Physical science, if there was anything deserving that name, was cultivated, not by experiment in the true Aristotelian way, but by discussion and by arguments deduced from premises resting on authority or custom. Everywhere there was a show of knowledge covering and concealing fundamental ignorance. Bacon, accordingly, who knew what true science was, and who had glimpses of a scientific organon or method, withdrew from the usual scholastic routine, and devoted himself to languages and experimental researches. Among all the instructors with whom he came in contact in Paris, only one gained his esteem and respect; this was an unknown individual, Petrus de Maharncuria Picardus, or of Picardy, probably identical with a certain mathematician, Petrus Peregrinus of Picardy, who is perhaps the author of a MS. treatise, De Magnete, contained in the Bibliothèque Impériale at Paris. The contrast between the obscurity of such a man and the fame enjoyed by the fluent young doctors of the schools seems to have roused Bacon's indignation. In the Opus Minus and Opus Tertium he pours forth a violent tirade against Alexander of Hales, and against another professor, not mentioned by name, but spoken of as afive, and blamed

1 See Dühring, Kritische Ges. d. Phil., 192, 249–51.

even more severely than Alexander. This anonymous writer, he says, who entered the order when young (puerulus), who had received no proper or systematic instruction in science or philosophy, for he was the first in his order to teach such subjects, acquired his learning by teaching others, and adopted a dogmatic tone, which has caused him to be received at Paris with applause as the equal of Aristotle, Avicenna, or Averroes. He has corrupted philosophy more than any other; he knows nothing of optics or perspective, and yet has presumed to write de naturalibus; he is ignorant of speculative alchemy, which treats of the origin and generation of things; he, indeed, is a man of infinite industry, who has read and observed much, but all his study is wasted because he is ignorant of the true foundation and method of science.*

It is probable that Bacon, during his stay in Paris, acquired considerable renown. He took the degree of doctor of theology, and seems to have received from his contemporaries the complimentary title of doctor mirabilis. In 1250 he was again at Oxford, and probably about this time, though the exact date cannot be fixed, he entered the Franciscan order. His fame spread very rapidly at Oxford, though it was mingled with suspicions of his dealings in magic and the black arts, and with some doubts of his orthodoxy. About 1257, Bonaventura, general of the order, interdicted his lectures at Oxford, and commanded him to leave that town and place himself under the superintendence of the body at Paris. Here for ten years he remained under constant supervision, suffering great privations, and strictly prohibited from writing anything which might be published. But during the time he had been at Oxford his fame had reached the ears of the Papal legate in England, Guy de Foulques, a man of culture and scientific tastes, who in 1265 was raised to the papal chair as Clement IV. In the following year he wrote to Bacon, who had been already in communication with him, ordering him, notwithstanding any injunctions from his superiors, to write out and send to him a treatise on the sciences which he had already asked of him when papal legate. Bacon, who in despair of being ever able to communicate his results to the world, had neglected to compose anything, and whose previous writings had been mostly scattered tracts, capitula quædam, took fresh courage from this command of the Pope. Relying on his powerful protection, he set at naught the many obstacles thrown in his way by the jealousy of his superiors and brother friars, and despite the want of funds, instruments, materials for copying, and skilled copyists, completed in about eighteen months three large treatises, the Opus Majus, Opus Minus, and Opus Tertium, which, with some other tracts, were despatched to the Pope by the hands of one Joannes, a young man trained and educated with great care by Bacon himself.

The composition of such extensive works in so short a time is a marvellous feat. We do not know what opinion Clement formed of them, but before his death he seems to have bestirred himself on Bacon's behalf, for in 1268 the latter was released and permitted to return to Oxford. Here he continued his labors in experimental science, and also in the composition of complete treatises. The works sent to Clement he regarded as mere preliminaries, laying down principles which were afterwards to be applied to the several sciences. The first part of an encyclopædic work probably remains to us in the Compendium Studii Philosophie, belonging to the year 1271. In this work 2 It is difficult to identify this unknown professor. Brewer thinks the reference is to Richard of Cornwall; but the little we know of Richard is not in harmony with what is said here, nor with the terms in which he is elsewhere spoken of by Bacon. Erdmann conjectures Thomas Aquinas, which is extremely improbable, as Thomas was unquestionably not the first of his order to study philosophy. Cousin and Charles think that Albertus Magnus is aimed at, and certainly much of what is said applies with peculiar force to him. But some things do not at all cohere with what is otherwise known of Albert. The unknown is said to have received no regular philosophic training; we know that Albert did. The unknown entered the order he did not enter till nearly twenty-eight years of age. Albert, too when very young; unless the received date of Albert's birth be false, could not be said with justice to be utterly ignorant of alchemy, and his mechanical inventions are well known. It is worth pointing out that Brewer, in transcribing the passage bearing on this (Op. Ined. p. 327), has the words Fratrum puerulus, which in his marginal note he interprets as applying to the Franciscan order. In this case, of course, Albert could not be the person referred to, as he was a Dominican. But Charles, in his transcription, entirely omits the important word Fratrum. There are other instances in which Brewer and Charles do not agree, e.g., according to Brewer, Bacon speaks of Thomas and Albert as pueri duorum ordinum; according to Charles, he says, primi duorum ordinum; a discrepancy not unimportant.

Part VI. (pp. 445-477) treats of experimental science, "domina omnium scientiarum." There are two methods of knowledge: the one by argument, the other by experience. Mere argument is never sufficient; it may decide a question, but gives no satisfaction or certainty to the mind, which can only be convinced by immediate inspection or intuition. Now this is what experience gives. But experience is of two sorts, external and internal; the first is that usually called experimer, but it can give no complete knowledge even of corporeal things, much less of spiritual. On the other hand, in inner experience the mind is illuminated by the divine truth, and of this supernatural enlightenment there are seven grades. Experimental science, which in the Opus Tertium (p. 46) is distinguished from the speculative sciences and the operative arts in a way that forcibly reminds us of Francis Bacon, is said to have three great prerogatives over all other sciences (1.) It verifies their conclusions by direct experiment; (2.) It discovers truths which they could never reach; (3.) It investigates the secrets of nature, and opens to us a knowledge of past and future. As an instance of his method, Bacon gives an investigation into the nature and cause of the rainbow, which is really a very fine specimen of inductive research.

The seventh part of the Opus Majus, not given in Jebb's edition, is noticed at considerable length in the Opus Tertium (cap. xiv.). Extracts from it are given by Charles (pp. 339-348).

As has been seen, Bacon had no sooner finished this elaborate work than he began to prepare a summary to be sent along with it. Of this summary, or Opus Minus, part has come down and is published in Brewer's Op. Ined. (313-389), from what appears to be the only MS. The work was intended to contain an abstract of the Opus Majus, an account of the principal vices of theology, and treatises on speculative and practical alchemy. At the same time, or immediately after, Bacon began a third work as a preamble to the other two, giving their general scope and aim, but supplementing them in many points. The part of this work, generally called Opus Tertium, is printed by Brewer (pp. 1-310), who considers it to be a complete treatise. Charles, however, has given good grounds for supposing that it is merely a preface, and that the work went on to discuss grammar, logic (which Bacon thought of little service, as reasoning was innate), mathematics, general physics, metaphysics, and moral philosophy. He founds his argument mainly on passages in the Communia Naturalium, which indeed prove distinctly that it was sent to Clement, and cannot, therefore, form part of the Compendium, as Brewer seems to think. It must be confessed, however, that nothing can well be more confusing than the references in Bacon's works, and it seems well-nigh hopeless to attempt a complete arrangement of them until the texts have been collated and carefully printed.

All these large works Bacon appears to have looked on As preliminaries, introductions, leading to a great work which should embrace the principles of all the sciences. This great work, which is perhaps the frequently referred to Liber Sex Scientiarum, he began, and a few fragments still indicate its outline. First appears to have come the treatise now called Compendium Studii Philosophiæ (Brewer, pp. 393-519), containing an account of the causes of error, and then entering at length upon grammar. After that, apparently, logic was to be treated; then, possibly, mathematics and physics; then speculative alchemy and experimental science. It is, however, very difficult, in the present state of our knowledge of the MSS., to hazard even conjectures as to the contents and nature of this last and most comprehensive work.

Bacon's fame in popular estimation has always rested on his mechanical discoveries. Careful research has shown that very little in this department can with accuracy be ascribed to him. He certainly describes a method of constructing a telescope, but not so as to lead one to conclude that he was in possession of that instrument. Gunpowder, the invention of which has been claimed for him on the ground of a passage in his works, which fairly interpreted at once disposes of any such claim, was already known to the Arabs. Burning-glasses were in common use, and spectacles it does not appear he made, although he was probably acquainted with the principle of their construction. His wonderful predictions (in the De Secretis) must be taken cum grano salis; and it is not to be for

gotten that he believed in astrology, in the doctrine of signatures, and in the philosopher's stone, and knew that the circle had been squared.

Charles, Roger Bacon, sa Vie, ses Ouvrages, ses Doctrines d'après estimate and modern interpretation given in this work, des textes inédits, 1861. Against the somewhat enthusiastic Schneider in his Roger Bacon, Eine Monographie, Augsburg, 1873, has reclaimed. He points out very clearly certain aspects in which Bacon appears as a mere scholastic. The new matter contained in the publications of Charles and Brewer was summarized by H. Siebert, Roger Bacon: Inaugural Dissertation, Marburg, 1861. Cf. also, J. K. Ingram, On the Opus Majus of Bacon, Dublin, 1858; Cousin, Fragments, Phil. du Moyen Age (reprinted from Journal des Savans, 1848); Saisset, Revue de Deux Mondes, 1861); Prantl, Gesch. der Logik, iii Précurseurs et Disciples de Descartes, pp. 1-58 (reprinted from 120-129 (a severe criticism of Bacon's logical doctrines).

The best work on Roger Bacon is undoubtedly that of E.

(R. AD.)

BACONTHORPE, or BACON, JOHN, called The Resolute Doctor, a learned monk, born towards the end of the 13th century, at Baconthorpe, a village in Norfolk. After spending the early part of his life in the convent of Blakeney, near Walsingham, he removed to Oxford, and from that city to Paris, where he obtained great reputation for his learning, and was esteemed the principal of the Averroists. In 1329 he returned to England, and was chosen twelfth provincial of the English Carmelites. In 1333 he was sent for to Rome, where, we are told, he first maintained the Pope's sovereign authority in cases of divorce; but this opinion he is understood to have afterwards retracted. He died in London in 1346. His chief work was published in 1510, with the title Doctoris resoluti Joannis Bacconis Anglici Carmelita radiantissimi opus super quattuor sententiarum libris, 4 vols. folio; it has passed through several editions. The little that is known of this schoolman, who in his own day and order had a reputation rivalling that of Thomas Aquinas, may be seen in Brucker, Hist. Crit., iii. 865; Stöckl, Phil. d. Mittel. ii. 1044-5; Hauréau, Phil. Scol., ii. 476; Prantl, Ges. d. Logik, iii. 318.

BACSANYI, JANOS, a Hungarian poet, was born at Tapoleza, May 11, 1763, and died at Linz, May 12, 1845. In 1785 he published his first work, a patriotic poem, The Valor of the Mugyars. In the same year he obtained a situation as clerk in the treasury at Kaschau, and there, in conjunction with two other Hungarian patriots, edited the Magyar Museum, which was suppressed by the Government in 1792. In the following year he was deprived of his clerkship; and in 1794, having taken part in the conspiracy of Bishop Martinovich, he was thrown into the state prison of the Spielberg, near Brünn, where he remained for two years. After his release he took a considerable share in the Magyar Minerva, a literary review, and then proceeded to Vienna, where he obtained a post in the bank, and married. In 1809 he translated Napoleon's proclamation to the Magyars, and, in consequence of this anti-Austrian act, had to take refuge in Paris. After the fall of Napoleon he was given up to the Austrians, who allowed him to reside at Linz, on condition of never leaving that town. He published a collection of poems at Pesth, 1827 (second edition, Buda, 1835), and also edited the poetical works of Anyos and Faludi.

BACTRIA, or BACTRIANA, an ancient country of Central Asia, lying to the south of the River Oxus, and reaching to the western part of the Paropamisan range, or Hindu Kush. It was sometimes regarded as including the district of Margiana, or Merv, which was more frequently considered as distinct. The character of the country is very various, and has been well described by Curtius, whose account is confirmed by the few modern travellers who have passed through it. Some portions are remarkable for the beauty of their scenery, or the fertility of the soil, evidenced by a rich and varied vegetation, while other parts are stretches of barren and drifting sands. In early history Bactria is connected with some of the most important movements of the Indo-European races, and has no small claims to be regarded as the cradle of our present civilization. According to Persian tradition, it became the seat of the Iranian wanderers, who established the religion of Zoroaster, and expelled the Vedic inhabitants of the country. In the 7th century B.C. it passed under the dominion of the Medes, and not long after formed part of the conquests of Cyrus. In the reign of Darius it ranked as the twelfth satrapy