an aggravation, and, as has been sometimes warmly as serted, as an insult, that cause of complaint is now entirely removed. By the order in council of the 26th April, 1809, all trade with France and Holland, and the ports of Italy, comprehended under the denomination of the kingdom of Italy, is simply prohibited altogether. No option is afforded, and consequently no transit duty is required to be paid. In another respect, the order in council of the 26th April must be admitted to be more restrictive than those of November, 1807.

The trade with enemies' colonies which was opened to neutrals at the commencement of the present war by the order in council of the 24th June, 1303, was continued to be left open by those of November, 1807. The order in council of the 26th April retracts this indulgence. But it is to be observed, that since the period, when the orders in council of November, 1807, were issued, the opening of the ports of Spain, of Portugal, of the south of Italy, and of Turkey, has afforded a more ample scope to neutral commerce; and that by the capture of Martinique in addition to that of almost all the colonies of the enemies of Great Britain, together with the blockade of Guadaloupe, the extent to which the liberty of commerce with enemies' colonies applied, has been so far narrowed, that there is little of practical hardship in recurring to the rule which, however occasionally mitigated in its application, Great Britain can never cease in principle to maintain. It is farther to be observed, that the order in council of the 26th April, has this operation highly favourable to neutrals, that restricting the regulations of blockade to France, Holland, and their colonies, and to the territories. denominated the kingdom of Italy, it lays open to the direct trade of neutrals the ports of the north of Europe. Under the order of the 26th of April, therefore, while there are on the one hand fewer points of difference to stand in the way of a satisfactory arrangement between Great Britain and the United States, it is possible that there may be less temptation to the latter to enter into such an arrangement, as the extent of their commerce may be, if they please, nearly as great under the order in council of the 26th April, as it would be under any ar rangement which should affect the indispensable objects to which that order applies; or as it would be even with

out any such order, so long as France and the powers subservient to France, continue to enforce their decrees. It is, in the same proportion, matter of indifference to Great Britain, whether the order in council be continued, or an arrangement by mutual consent, substituted in its

room.

Such, sir, are the grounds on which it has appeared to his majesty to be unnecessary to command me to propose to the government of the United States any formal agreement to be substituted for that which his majesty has been under the necessity of disavowing; but I am directed to receive and discuss with you any proposal which you may be authorized to make to me on this head.

As no disposition has hitherto been shown on your part to make any such proposal, it has been impossible for me to state by anticipation, (nor was I instructed so to do) what might be the answer that I should eventually think it my duty to return to you; consequently I could not have made with that view the statement contained in the fourth section of your letter, and the three subdivisions of it. Such a statement would have been obviously inconsistent with the former part of my overture, which you very correctly record in the third section, viz.-that I was not instructed to make to you any proposal whatever upon this subject. I must necessarily reserve, until I hear from you what proposals it may be deemed proper to make on behalf of the United States, to state in how far they do or do not accord with the instructions which it has pleas ed his majesty to give me for my guidance in this negotiation.

I will only add, sir, in conclusion of this letter, that his majesty is very sincerely desirous of maintaining a perfect and cordial understanding with the United States, and of bringing to a complete and satisfactory adjustment, all the points of difference that have arisen between the two governments; and that, agreeing as I do with you, most heartily, as to the interest which both nations have in fostering a mutual and solid friendship and cordiality, no zeal or exertions shall be wanting on my part to carry into effect his majesty's commands for this most salutary purpose.

have the honour to be, &c.

F. J. JACKSON.

From the Secretary of State to Mr. Jackson. Department of State, Oct. 19, 1809.

SIR,-I have had the honour of receiving your letter of the 11th instant.

Before I proceed to the more material topicks, which it embraces, it is proper that I should take some notice of your construction which has unhappily converted an intimation of the expediency of conducting in a written form our further discussions, on this particular occasion, into a general prohibition of all verbal communications whatever, and into an unprecedented violation of the most essential rights of a publick minister requiring a formal protest and a resort to the commands of your sovereign.

A recurrence to that intimation cannot fail to show, that its sole object was to avoid, in the further discussions of a case of unusual delicacy and importance, the misconceptions well known to be incident to oral proceedings, and of which the diplomatic intercourse between the two governments had furnished so many and such serious proofs; nay, of which your letter itself is an additional illustration. That a change in diplomatic discussions, from an oral to a written form is not without precedent, I cannot refer to one which will be more satisfactory to you, than the intimation recently given by Mr. Canning in the case of the proposal by Mr. Pinkney, on the subject of the orders in council and the embargo, that the discussions which had been previously verbal must thenceforth take a written form. And with this view I take the liberty of recalling your attention to the subjoined extracts (see A. and B.) of letters that passed on that occasion.

On the present, as on that occasion, the change from verbal to written communications was requested after two conferences, and when the subject appeared to one of the parties to have, by those verbal discussions, been brought to a point which required a precise understanding of the views and propositions of the other.

You will, sir, hence perceive, that in maintaining the right, which every government has as to the rules of intercourse with foreign functionaries near it, no encroachment has been made or intended on any right or customary privilege belonging to you in that character, nor any

thing done to impede the proper and usual course of negotiation.

You have been sufficiently apprized, by my letter of the 9th, of the light in which the President views the arrangement lately made by your predecessor with this government, and of the grounds on which he has expected a formal and satisfactory explanation of the reasons for the refusal of his Britannick majesty to carry it into effect. He persists in that expectation, and in the opinion that there has been given no explanation that is adequate, either as to the matter or as to the mode.

When one government has been solemnly pledged to another in a mutual engagement by its acknowledged and competent agent, and refuses to fulfil the pledge, it is perfectly clear, that it owes it, both to itself and to the other party to accompany its refusal with a formal and frank disclosure of sufficient reasons for a step, which, without such reasons, must deeply injure its own character, as well as the rights of the party confiding in its good faith.

"To refuse with honour, (says a high authority on publick law,) to ratify what has been concluded on by virtue of a full power, it is necessary that the government should have strong and solid reasons, and that he show in particular that his minister has violated his instructions."

Although it is particularly incumbent on the sovereign in such case to show that his instructions have been violated, yet it is not a mere violation of them on immaterial points that will be sufficient. It is indispensably requisite, moreover, that the reasons be strong and solid, that they manifestly outweigh, not only the general obligation to abide by what has been so done, but also the disappointment and injury accruing to the other party, And it is worthy of notice that the case under discussion is of a higher character and appeals with greater solemnity to the honour and justice of the refusing party than the case stated in Vattel, inasmuch as the transaction, now disavowed, was not a treaty or convention to be ratified by both parties, previous to an execution by either. It had, according to the terms of it (and this peculiarity appears to have been contemplated by your government) been actually and immediately carried into execution on the part of the United States. The refusal of his Britannick majesty is, therefore, not simply to ratify what had been

ratified by the other party, but to carry into effect on his part an arrangement which had been carried into full effect, with good faith on the part of the United States. Nay, the case is strengthened by the further peculiarity, that some of the circumstances, attending the execution of the arrangement on the part of the United States, render it unsusceptible of a full equivalent for the refusal to execute it on the other side.

It has not escaped observation that the obligation of your government to tender explanations on this occasion is admitted by your attempt to show that it has been sufficiently done in what passed in conversation between Mr. Canning and Mr. Pinkney, and by the instructions given to Mr. Erskine to communicate such explanations.

With every disposition to view in the most favourable light whatever may affect the relations between the two countries, it is impossible to mistake the conversations of those ministers for a discharge of such a debt to the good faith and reasonable expectations of the United States. Besides that they were mere conversations in a case, requiring the precision and respect of a formal communication, it is certain, that it was neither understood by Mr. Pinkney, nor intended by Mr. Canning, that those conversations were so to be regarded. Mr. Pinkney is explicit on this point. And Mr. Canning himself, after declining to recapitulate in writing what he had verbally remarked, signified to Mr. Pinkney in a letter dated May 27, that his observations on the subject would be more properly made through the successor of Mr. Erskine, who was about to proceed to the United States.

With respect to the instructions on this point given to Mr. Erskine, it might be sufficient to remark that they were never carried into execution; but it may be asked, whether it was a mark of friendly respect to the United States to employ for such a purpose a minister from whom, his government had thought proper publickly to withdraw its confidence, and to the peculiar delicacy and embarrassment of whose situation you have yourself referred, as accounting for his not having executed the task imposed upon him.

I must here repeat, what was suggested in my former letter, that the successor of Mr. Erskine is the proper functionary for a proper explanation. Nor can I perceive