THE civil list has given occasion to much idle jealousy of the influence of the crown; and to much popular discontent with the expenditure of the sovereign. If those expences, which would still be necessary were our government republican, such as the salaries of judges, ambassadors, &c. were withdrawn from the civil list, and provided for like other current services, naval, military, &c.: the residual cost of royalty would appear so trifling, that this ground of dislike would wholly be abandoned, Whenever, therefore, the Civil List undergoes investigation, it would be wise in the king's friends to attempt such a separation; it would then appear that the debts on the Civil List result from ministerial, not royal, extravagance; from party, not personal, favouritism; from national, not family, considerations.

The following historical particulars will interest our readers:

"By an account presented in 1760, the average of the ten preceding years was 823,9551.; it had been from 1730 to 1740, 825,8541. In the last seven years of the period ending in 1760, the secret service money was, on an average, 83,000l. a year, of which 65,000l. to the secretaries of the treasury.

The accounts, here referred to, make it perfectly clear, that, during the last ten years of King George the Second, the Civil List revenues had considerably exceeded 800,000l. a year; the arrangement, therefore, made on the accession of his present majesty to the throne, for a specific annuity of 800,000l. a year, was evidently not an advantageous one for the Civil List. In 1769, a debt on it had been incurred of upwards of 500,000l. with which his majesty acquainted the houses of parliament; at the same time, an account was laid, consisting of eighteen articles in gross. Orders were thereupon made for more detailed accounts of the Civil List expences, from 1752 to 1760, and from 1760 to 1769; which were followed by a motion, that the consideration of his majesty's message should be deferred till an inquiry should take place respecting the cause of the debt; but that was negatived, and the sum of 518,8001. was voted to pay the amount of it. The accounts were afterwards laid in January 1770. The examination of these led to a motion in April following for an address to his majesty, stating the excess

of the expenditure in the Civil List, and humbly recommending retrenchments, which was lost without a division. Under such discouragement, the party, then in opposition to government, made an attempt the second day following to obtain merely an account of pensions and increased salaries since the commencement of the present reign, and on that they ventured a division, but were again foiled, the question having been carried in the negative-Mr. Fox one of the tellers for the majority. A strong proof how differently parliament, as well as the individual alluded to, thought at that time, from what they fortunately do at present, respecting the propriety of investigating matters of this sort, where grants of the public money are called for.

"In the course of the seven subsequent years, a further debt was incurred to the amount of more than 600,000l. and in April 1777, his majesty acquainted the houses therewith: at the same time accounts were laid by the king's command, by which it appeared that the duties, &c. which were in the former reign granted for the Civil List, had averaged in the fifteen years, including 1777, the annual sum of 964,000l.; then again the sums paid for secret service are worthy of observation, amounting from the time the debt was last paid in 1769 to 438,000l. equal to 54,000l. a year, exclusive of large sumns for special service unexplained, and for royal bounty to persons whose names were not mentioned. No investigation of accounts, however, took place; but, after a long debate on the subject, the sum of 618,000l. was voted to pay the debt, and an additional annual sum of 100,000l. was granted for the Civil List; notwithstanding which the expences could not be kept within the income of it, and, in 1782, his majesty sent another message to both houses, requesting the aid of parliament to discharge the debt incurred, without laying fresh bur thens on his subjects; the amount appeared by an account presented to be 295,000l. A provision was accordingly made for raising the sum of 300,000l. by exchequer bills charged on the aggregate fund, to be cancelled by quarterly instalments of 12,5001. which was to be effected by the abolition of many employments (considered as of little use), paid out of the revenues of the Civil List, and by other savings. Many of these offices were suppressed by the act which granted the relief, and several others by the treasury, under the authority of it, and various economical arrangements were made which it was hoped would keep the expences within the required limits; this expectation

to attract the custom of the bankers: and the singularity of the parody has given to such notes a selling value analogous to current value: but they are never offered in change; they do not circulate in lots.

The following passage will give an idea both of our author's strain of style and sentiment:

"The intention and object of all bankers, it must be obvious, is to use the coin which they get in exchange for their paper; and let it be remembered, that it is scarcely possible for them to employ it to the disadvantage of the country. They may, though they seldom do, employ it unskilfully; but even in that case, the employment may have its utility. When we recollect that it is the real interest of the bankers to employ with great caution the coin which they borrow of the public, and we consider the property which they have at stake, the most timid reasoner can see but little danger to the holders of country bank-notes in general. It is seldom that persons without real bona fide property can engage in banking concerns; and if we examine the firms of the banks throughout the country, we shall find that they consist

very generally of gentlemen of well known, and often of very large property; and as the bankrupt laws are very wisely framed, and very sprightly administered, we have very little to fear from fraudulent failures, which can hardly ever happen in banking partnerships. If, therefore, from any sudden run upon any of these banks, they should not be able, as might accidentally happen to the most respectable of them, to pay in gold or silver on such occasion, no person who really believed in the validity of the assets of the firm, would have any real cause of alarm, for, though he might experience an inconvenience, he could not ultimately be a loser by such an occurrence. The credit, it is true, of such a house, would receive a shock, but it is with pleasure, that every honest man, has seen the recovery of some firms from blows of this kind, malignantly aimed by illiberal competitors. To comprehend fully the utility of any establishment it must be examined in various points of view. I have endea voured to treat my subject in this manner; and if I am not mistaken, the arguments in favour of the banking system are drawn from facts fully admitted, and established by the best writers, and most accurate political enquirers."

THIS pamphlet appears to have been written during the scarcity: it endeavours to prove, that the quantity of circulating medium, or bank paper, has enhanced the price of corn, by facilitat ing the speculations of provincial cornmerchants, whose competition produced the dearth: and it attempts to draw the very strange and disconnected inference, that, because many bankers have lent money to persons whose speculations raised the price of wheat, no bankers should be elected into parliament.

Granting that the abundance of circulating medium facilitated to the cornmerchants the obtainal of capital; and that they were thereby enabled, at an early period of the dearth, to speculate more profusely; is this an evil? They thereby sounded the alarm; put the productive counties, in time, on short allow. ance; equalized the pressure of the scarcity; invited fresh inclosures, and forced cultivation, and eager importations, and thus prevented the famine, which would probably have resulted from the more sluggish proceedings of an under-capitaled community. No annihilation of sorn, no increase of the body of con

sumers could result from their speculations; of course, no eventual increase of price.

The waste of war is considerable. Fleets and armies consume more than five times as much per man as the com ponent individuals would have consumed at home. This waste is aggravated by the purchases of government contractors, who receive a percentage on the amount of their purchases, and have consequently an interest to buy at the dearest. Wholesale buyers always regulate a market, not petty consumers. The war, therefore, was a powerful cause of inflicting the dearth; and if will be found that, notwithstanding the great increase of country banks, and consequently of circulating medium, the price of corn is now descending to a lower average.

As for bankers, they will prove safer representatives than country gentlemen. Their interests are identified with those of the productive, not of the idle, classes. They can provide for their children without exacting from ministers exor bitant establishments and multifarious places. They can afford to marry earlier, and do not set such immoral ex

this would be no reason for conceding it let it stop payment (its creditors would not eventually suffer, it is abundantly solvent), and be replaced, if ne. cessary, by the more natural, the cheaper, and more diffusively profitable system of open banking. The government, the bankers, the mercantile interest, would all gain by the change. If any financial emergency were approaching, the public too would have a strong interest in the diffusion and variety of its securities. When one banking house fails, another may stand its ground. But if an accidental deficiency of bullion in the bank of England were to be believed perpetual; if the detection of vast frauds were to shake all confidence in the printed statements of its accounts; if the want of frugality, as is not unusual in chartered companies, were supposed to have absorbed even monopoly profits; if the sums lent to the state passed themselves for debts in jeopardy; if public opinion, always changeable, always discoloured, like the cameleon, by surrounding circumstances, always prone to put faith in the extremes both of success and of danger, and always whisper. ing precautions even when it shouts confidence, were once to grow jealous of the only medium of circulation extant; where would be the remedy? Alarms and apprehensions of national bankruptcy now act on every holder of notes, on the whole metropolitan public, which erringly identifies the bank with the state; but, on the system of open banking, such alarms would not extend nearly so far. It is, therefore, worth the while of ministers and of parliament, for the sake of public credit, to consider whether, in case any future application were to originate with the bank of England for suspending its payments in cash, that ought not to be held a forfeiture of the charter, and a fit opportunity for getting under an institution no longer necessary,

nor even desirable.

Mr. Thornton appears to have a very different idea of the utility of the bank, which he thus describes:

"The bank has a capital of near twelve millions, to which it has added near four millions of undivided profits or savings: all this capital and savings must be lost before the creditors can sustain any loss.

"The bank of England is quite independent of the executive government. It has an interest, undoubtedly (of the same kind with Ass. Rev. Vol. I.

that of many private individuals), in the maintenance of our financial as well as commercial credit. It is also in the habit of lending out a large portion of its ample funds comparatively small part only, though a sum on government securities of various kinds, a not small in itself, being lent to the merchants in the way of discount. The ground on which the bank lends so much to government is clearly that of mutual convenience, as well as long habit. It is the only lender in the country on a large scale; the government is the only borrower on a scale equally extended; and the two parties, like two wholesale traders in a town, the one the only great buyer, and the other the only great Seller of the same article, naturally deal much with each other, and have comparatively small transactions with those who carry on only a more contracted business. The bank, moreover, in time of peace, is much bencfited by lending to government. It naturally, therefore, continues those loans, durall antecedent periods. It occasionally furing war, which it had been used to grant at nishes a considerable sum to the East India Company. If, indeed, it lent more to the merchants during war, and less to the government, the difference would not be so great as might, perhaps, at first view be supposed. If, for instance, it furnished a bills, that article might then be supposed to smaller sum on the security of exchequer higher and more tempting interest; and the fall in price, or, in other words, to yield a bankers, in that case, would buy more exchequer bills, and would grant less aid to the merchants; they would, at least, in some degree, take up whichever trade the bank of England should relinquish. The preference given by the bank to the government secur ties, is, therefore, no symptom of a want of independence in its directors: they are subject, in a much greater degree, to their own proprietors than to any administration. The strong manner in which the directors of the bank at the time antecedent to the suspension of their cash payments, insisted on having four millions and a half paid up to them by the government-a payment which, though demanded at a very inconvenient tioned as one sufficiently striking mark of the time, was accordingly made-may be menindependence of that company. There is, however, another much more important circumstance to be noticed, which is conclu sive on this subject. The government of Great Britain is under little or no temptation either to dictate to the bank of England, or to lean upon it in any way which is inconvenient or dangerous to the bank itself. The minister has been able to raise annually, without the smallest difficulty, by means of our funding system, the sum of no less than between twenty and thirty millions. The government, therefore, is always able to fessen, by a loan from the pabnic,