such advanced age, the new task of combating the pertinacious importunity of every clamorous claimant for indulgence, through out an extensive diocese?

"In fine, quis custodict ipsos custodes? It is by no means absolutely impossible, that a bishop himself may be obnoxious to the charge of neglecting the duty of residence. And how then would he interpose to enforce the performance of it in another? With what propriety could, for instance, a bishop of Llandaff (I refer to the known delinquency of this learned prelate-clarâ et multâ virtute redempti,-with the respectful and anxious embarrassment of a child, compelled to remonstrate against the misconduct of a parent); with what propriety could that prelate, possessing a bishopric in South Wales, a professorship of divinity in Cambridge, and a parochial benefice in Leicestershire, yet holding his residence on a lay estate in Westmoreland; with what propriety, consistency, or decency, with what sincerity, or seriousness, I ask, could he undertake to censure, for neglect of the duty of which we speak, the beneficed clergy of Monmouthshire or Glamorganshire? But let us turn aside from this mortifying contemplation of reality, to the supposition of some other possible but fictitious case. Let us suppose an English bishop, of ample revenues, and in no lack of episcopal mansions, induced to pay a long visit to foreign countries, by some, in itself, innocent, but voluntary motive; a wish perchance to "survey the sumptuousness of palaces, or the stateliness of temples, to make accurate measurements of the remains of antient grandeur, or to form a scale of the curiosity of modern art;

to collect medals, or to collate manuscripts." In his absence, if haply he could find within his bishopric a man, who, to the consideration and dignity resulting from the appointments of parish priest, chancellor of his diocese, prebendary of his cathedral, and chaplain to our royal master, should add the still higher dignities of eminent talents, a benevolent heart, and spotless integrity of life; he would eagerly devolve on such a character the vicarious discharge of his high and weighty functions.

"Of such a case Dr. Sturges will allow, that the occurrence is not impossible. And let me ask him, with what feelings he, as such vicar-general, would set about to exercise a discretional power of coercion, on the non-resident clergy of his non-resident bishop?"

On the other topics which Dr. Sturges has introduced into his pamphlet, our author does not enlarge, as they are either totally unconnected with the grand question at issue between them, relative to the justice and necessity of enforcing, by statute, the parochial resi dence of the clergy, or merely respecting matters of subordinate regulation. Whatever may be Dr. Sturges's opinion of the weight and conclusiveness of the author's strictures, he will find no reason to complain of the acerbity of any of his remarks; and the doctor's friends will be gratified by the delicate compliments which his opponent has paid him.

IT will not be denied, we presume, that a large proportion of the disgraceful quarrels which are continually springing up between the clergy and laity, arise from the institution of tythes. In a few instances, the clergy themselves, by unnecessary rigour, and harassing punctiliousness, in the collection of their dues, have become justly odious to their parishioners. For the most part, however, on this point, they are rather sinned against than sinning: the moral sense of a farmer is apt to be much less acute than his sense of profit; and a dexterous imposition on his rector, troubles his conscience about as much as a successful voyage does a smuggler. From whatever cause, however, they arise, it is greatly to be wished, that these eternal bickerings could be put an end to, or at least mitigated. Various

substitutes for the ecclesiastical revenue from tythes have been proposed by individuals among the clergy, as well as among the laity; but the church, with a wise preference of landed to funded security, has shewn little disposition to acquiesce in a temporary augmentation of income, at the hazard of its stability. Landed property equivalent to the value of the tythes, is not at the disposal of the community; it is obvious, therefore, that no other plan than a modification of the present system, can be proposed by the one party, and accepted by the other. In this point of view, Mr. Poul. ter's proposals are entitled to serious consideration. They would abolish the odious practice, and with it the disagreeable necessity of taking tythes in kind, would, in a great measure, put a stop to personal disputes between the

clergyman and the farmer, and would neither alter the security, diminish the present value, nor prevent the progressive improvement of the revenue of the established church.

The observations of Mr. P. with respect to the duty of residence, and the necessity of enforcing it, are temperate, judicious, and convincing. A strict at

tention to this important branch of ec. clesiastical discipline might delay, for a time, the arrival of that state which is fast approaching, when every parish in England, as is now almost universally the case in Scotland, shall contain a larger number of seceders than of adherents to the national church.

THE statute of Henry VIII. respect ing the clergy, subjected them for nonresidence, and for engaging professionally in certain secular occupations, to be prosecuted by information, in the civil courts. Many instances of such prosecutions having lately occurred, especially for non-residence, Sir W. Scott proposed a bill to parliament for the

purpose of quashing all such prosecu tions, and rendering, for the future, the clergy amenable only to their ecclesiastical superiors for breaches of ecclesiastical duty. How far this will con duce to the interest of the church, and the welfare of society, time will show. For our own part, we think it an injudicious measure.

FROM the time of Barclay till within a few years past, the society of Friends, as far as can be gathered from the few notices that have been published concerning them, neglecting literature, science, and the various branches of profane knowledge, appear to have confined their attention to the prudent management of their individual and common concerns: and it is a singular fact, that a religious association, distinguished in its origin for the wildest and most frantic enthusiasm, should, without changing its principles, have reduced its practice to the strictest discipline of sobriety and good sense. By prudence and frugality the sect is become rich: and wealth, in many of them, seems to have produced, as is natural in all sectaries strictly educated, both good and bad effects, which have almost an equal tendency to separate them from the connexions in which they have been brought up. In the idly disposed it has fostered a foolish vanity, a mean sensibility of shame and contempt for the plain habits and manners of their ancestors. In the more ingenuous, the more serious, the more inquiring, by affording leisure and means, it has fostered a curiosity for literature, a taste

for investigation, an ardent desire of exerting the faculties upon subjects interesting either for their novelty or importance. Hence the religious and political maxims of the society begin to be canvassed, and, in consequence, examples of schism have made their ap pearance. Expulsion has, in some cases, been resorted to, and the expelled have published their reasons for dissent. Of this number is W. Matthews, the author of the present work. The subjects on which he differs from the society, are, 1st. With regard to the payment of tythes, which he considers as a mere tax levied by the authority of the state, and therefore no more to be resisted than the payment of any other impost. 2d. He differs from the established religious creed of his sect, in denying the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the eternity of future punishment.

Several of the tracts in this volume, refer to the transactions against Hannah Barnard, a preacher in the society, who has been silenced for unsound notions on the subject of the Fall, and the Atone. ment,which her accusers, with the ustal candour of zealots, represent is leadin directly to delam and atheism.

&

JOHN HANCOCK, of Lisburne, is another of the expelled members from the society of Friends. His objections are partly to the discipline of the sect, and partly to their religious tenets. He accuses them of pride, of worldly-mindedness, and differs from them on the doctrine of the Trinity, the Atonement, the

inspiration, and, as appears to us, the authenticity of the Scriptures.

Both this and the preceding article are interesting, as again introducing the quakers into the pages of ecclesiastical history, from which they have been so long absent.

IT has always appeared to us that far too great stress has been laid upon the purely metaphysical arguments by which various learned, ingenious, and pious men have endeavoured to confirm and illustrate the principal dogmas of our holy religion. The existence of a powerful and intelligent first cause, is clearly demonstrated from the deductions of reason, upon a survey of the inanimate and animated wonders of creation, that every where present themselves to our view. The profusion of life, the vast variety of forms in which it resides, the infinitely diversified, yet admirable means by which its great ends are accomplished, all bespeak the stupendous and adorable wisdom of God. His general goodness, in apportioning a large balance of happiness to his creatures, is deducible from the experience of every day; and the murmurs which impatience would raise, the anxious doubts which reason is incapable of repressing, when vice appears triumphant, and virtue sinks in the dust, are most satisfactorily relieved by the Christian revelation. Our hope and faith thus highly authorised, thus divinely assured, render us, we confess, somewhat indifferent to those more circuitous, and less satisfactory methods, by which the human intellect, without superior aid, has endeavoured to arrive at the same conclusions. The natural arguments for a future state, the materiality or immateriality of the human soul, the freedom of the will, or its necessary subservience to motives, are subjects upon which the most ardent and ingenuous inquirers after truth have differed, and will continue so to do to the conclusion of time," and find no end, in wandering mazes lost."

The present essay appears before us with three recommendations to our special notice. In the first place, it has arrived, in a few months, at a second edition, a circumstance of itself suffi ciently remarkable in a work of this nature, which is not calculated to suit the taste of the great mass of theologi cal readers. In the second place, it is dedicated to that pillar of orthodoxy in the Anglican church, the rev. J. Whi taker. Superior to those local prejudices," says Mr. Drew, "which might have influenced a mind devoid of magnanimity, you have more than called yourself my friend; while, stimulated by your encouragement, I have prosecuted with vigour the present work, which, abstracted from this circumstance, would, in all probability, never have seen completion-the link which united completion to publication, originated also with you." In the third place, the preface to this edition is (perhaps a little ostentatiously) preceded by the high sanction of a work which peculiarly devotes itself to the detection of heresy, both civil and ecclesiastical, in all its protean forms, and which thus terminates a panegyric upon Mr. Drew, in terms that savour more of blasphemy than sound judgment: "he is the untutored child of nature, deriving no advantage from education, indebted only and immediately to heaven for a reach of thought astonishingly great! for a mind to which all the matter of the universe seems but an atom; and in himself exhibiting a splendid proof, that the soul of man is immortal." Such being the circumstances under which this book presents itself to us, we think ourselves obliged to pay more attention to it than its merits

alone can, in our opinion, justly demand. The first part of the work is an illustration of the immateriality of the human soul. After reading the chapters relative to this subject, two or three times, in order to familiarize ourselves with the style, and peculiar strain of thought which the author has adopted, we hope to be able to convey to our readers a tolerably clear idea of as singular a tissue of absurdity and contradiction as ever was woven by metaphysical artist.

Every thing that exists, is either material or spiritual substance. The essential properties of matter are solidity, magnitude, and figure. The qualities that characterize the human soul, are consciousness, perception, &c. "If the substance from which these qualities flow be material, it then follows, that matter itself must think. And if mere matter, considered as such, be capable of thinking, thinking must be an essential property of its nature; and if so, no portion of matter can exist abstracted from it: without admitting this, its essentiality is done away." Now, if thought is the property of every portion of matter, as matter is infinitely divisible, consciousness must be so too, which is absurd.

This is the first step of Mr. Drew's demonstration; upon which we need only remark, that no one has ever asserted, that every portion of matter is essentally possessed of thought, except the author himself, who advances a hypothetical absurdity for the sake of refuting it. He proceeds, to shew, that " conscious nesss cannot be the result of matter;" for this must be either "from matter as a substance, or from some peculiar modification which it assumes." In the first of these cases; since "the influence of matter can extend no further than the contact of its surfaces," and since, "if the mutual contact of material bodies be entirely annihilated, in that instant all influence must cease to exist;" it thence follows, that matter cannot possibly extend itself beyond its own existence, nor ever act where it is not:" and, therefore, "consciousness cannot result from any material substance." For,

"If matter be not infinite in its extension and that it is not, I hope soon to make appear), there must be, in the immensity of space, pure expansion where no matter is. In this case I would ask, Is the mind of man capable of extending its actions through

this pure distance, which is thus supposed to be devoid of matter, or not? If it be, we have then a clear idea of consciousness acting where no matter is; and if it can exist lows, that it neither results from matter, nor and act where matter is not, it undeniably folcan be dependent on it for its existence."

In other words, matter can act only by "physical contact" with other mat. ter, but the human mind can act in pure space devoid of matter, ergo, mind is

not matter.

This, we imagine, is one of those "reaches of thought" for which Mr. D. is "indebted immediately to heaven." It was reserved for this last revelation to inform us, that because the sun and planets mutually act on each other, they must therefore be in physical contact'; that the mind of man can act in empty space, not only deprived of organs wherewith to act, but of any thing to act upon; and that it can exist in space thus busity employed about nothing, without occupying space: for, according to Mr. D.'s own definition, if the soul occupies space, it must have both magessential attributes of matter. nitude and figure, which are two of his

To prove that thought cannot result from any modification of matter, he observes:

"An assemblage of atoms may produce an increase of magnitude. A modification of parts may produce a change of figure. A new disposition of surfaces may produce different sensations, and variously affect the organs of vision; but all changes which maiter is capable of undergoing, are only capable of entging or lessening the extent of those essential properties of its nature, which always exist in proportion to the specifie quantity of matter which is thus modified. If all consciousness result from any modifi cation of matter, it is certain, that consciousness could not have existed previously to the existence of that modification from which it have existed prior to the existence of matter. results; and if so, no consciousness could The arrangement of materials must necessarily be posterior, in point of time, to the existence of those materials which are thus arranged; and if we admit the pre-existence of those parts which are thus modified, and consciousness itself to be the result of a modification which depends upon those parts for its own existence; we behold, not only the preexistence of matter, but the pre-existence even of that modification from which consciousness itself must be supposed to result. And yet, to make consciousness result from any modification of matter, we must deny the existence of all consciousness previously to