That of the light the sun on earth doth spend; Mr. Bland was the original editor of the Collections from the Anthology, which after his death were published, under the superintendance of Mr. Merivale, for the benefit of the former's children. His version of this Mimnermian elegy is "pretty good," and its defects are so obvious, that to particularly point them out seems needless; they are such departures from the sense of the original, as it requires no critical acumen to discover. Elton's, and Hay's, we feel to be faulty, but in what respects, is not at first so apparent. We believe their weakness lies in not marking, with distinctness, the transitions of the sentiment. This gnomic, or sententious elegy of the sweet-souled poet of Colophon, is not a mere fasciculus of melancholy aphorisms, without order or logical connexion. It is a whole. Hay's and Elton's versions are mere aggregates. This will be more easily understood by a perusal of them, and of the Greek, in reference to this idea, than by any further explication of it by us. Contemporary with Mimnermus was Theognis of Megara; and preceding both by half a century, Solon of whom Plato declared, that had he applied himself to poetry, he would have excelled Homer and Hesiod. From Theognis we have made no versions. His poems defy translation and scarcely deserve it. Solon was a poet, as he was a man, of a different order,condensed, pregnant, and sublime. More philosophic than imaginative, (in the commonly received senses of both words,) he teaches the loftiest truths with dignity, but in a manner rather forcible than persuasive. We shall give no other specimen of his works (our limits forbidding more) than the following passage from his Prayer to the Muses. It is a simile;the vigor of the style can scarcely be lost even in a translation : δηώσας καλὰ ἔργα, θεῶν ἕδος, αἰπὸν ἱκάνει Quarterly Review. (No. XCV.) Sudden, as when the winds of spring The sinking billows of the main, XII. and suddenly, As when the wind the clouds at once hath scattered, The wind of spring-which, of the billowy sea The barren depths hath roused,· the works hath shattered To the Gods' seat, high Heaven, hath then ascended, And caused to appear again the blue serene : Shines Sol's bright strength-o'er earth the wide-extended, A noble description it is, and justifies the praise of Plato. We necessarily omit all mention of many great names appertaining to this era; Sappho, Archilochus, Anacreon, Alcmæon, Stesichorus: our limits oblige us to content ourselves for the present with these brief notices of Solon, Mimnermus, and Simonides. ART. III. — Message of the President of the United States, to the two Houses of Congress, at the commencement of the Third Session of the Twenty-fifth Congress. Washington: 1838. Thomas Allen. 8vo. pp. 620. Ir is only four years since we were threatened with a war with France, and but a few months have elapsed since the whole nation was agitated with the prospect of a dispute with England. On the former occasion, a vessel bearing dispatches on the subject in dispute, from the French government, anchored in the harbor of New York, and when the commander sent the usual message to the fort, offering to salute, he received for a reply, that his salute could not be returned, because there was not a single gun mounted in any of the works intended to protect the commercial metropolis of these United States. This was during the administration of one who, from the supposed predominance of his military over his civic virtues, was styled a military chieftain. It is now time to inquire whether, under the government of a chief magistrate, whose profession has been of a more peaceful character, our state of preparation is more advanced than on the former occasion. It is a truth beyond all question, that a nation whose strength is not superior to that of its neighbors, or of those with whom it may possibly come into collision, will be best able to preserve the blessings of peace, if it should be known to be capable of defending itself in war, or even of retaliating any injury which it may sustain. One of the last legacies bequeathed us by the father of our country, was the adage, "in time of peace prepare for war," and it was to the neglect of this, that we are in a great measure to ascribe the fact, that a regard for our national honor forced us into a contest with Great Britain in 1812. On this occasion, we had a choice between two enemies. The pretensions, the insults, and the spoliations of the French emperor, not to mention the arrogance and robberies of his predecessors the Directory, were not a whit less humiliating to us, than the impressions, the searches, and the blockades of the British ministry. From a war with the former, however, we were freed by the simple fact, that a declaration of hostilities must have been a dead letter, because France had neither ships, colonies, nor commerce, on which to execute reprisals. On the other hand, it was a fair calculation, that, pressed as Great Britain was by her gigantic opponent, her neighboring colonies would fall an easy prey, while her extended commerce was vulnerable in every sea. Such indeed was the exposed position of her foreign possessions, and her mercantile marine, that it cannot be doubted that had we possessed a naval strength of more than six fir frigates, and a disposable force of a division of disciplined troops, the aggressions which finally roused us to engage in the war would never have been committed. Or even should the arrogance of the islanders have tempted them to pursue the course they actually held, the first campaign would have witnessed the siege of Quebec, and the destruction of the naval arsenal at Halifax. The politicians who urged the nation, almost reluctantly, into a war, if they were unable to plan a campaign which should lead to such brilliant results, fondly anticipated equally glorious consequences. They saw in prospect the British flag replaced by the American on every rampart from Mackinac to the Isle aux Noix, seeking by a simultaneous movement along the whole extended frontier, the success which was only to be gained by striking boldly with an adequate force at the keys of the British position. Familiar as we were with all the circumstances of that campaign, we often asked ourselves whether our administration had formed any plan. If they had, it was certainly the most unlikely to be attended with success, of any which was ever projected. It is not therefore to be wondered that the close of the first campaign left us not only with the appearance of disgraced arms, but with the actual loss of a vast portion of territory. From Sandusky, every spot to the north and west, was in possession of the British and their savage allies; western New York, to the Genesee river, was depopulated; and so confident had the people of England become of a successful issue, that it was seriously proposed that no condition of peace should be accepted, but one which should change our northern boundary from the middle of the great lakes to the sources of the streams which run into them. It was under this unexpected reverse, that the peculiar strength of our institutions was developed. In the republics of Greece, the authors of the war and the leaders of the armies would have been ostracised; in the despotic governments of Asia, the occupant of the throne would have been deposed, or his viziers strangled; in the constitutional monarchies of western Europe, the ministry would have been impeached; but in the United States, where the people are the state, these reverses only tended to destroy all party feeling, to change the opponents of the war into the most strenuous advocates for measures of defence, and to leave hardly the trace of an opposition in the halls of Congress. As respects the other arm of our national defence, it appeared to be so feeble, that little was expected of it except to perish with honor, before the overwhelming superiority of the enemy. The same party by which a war with Great Britain was urged, had shown itself the uncompromising opponent of the navy. The measures taken by a former administration for its gradual increase, by the construction of ships of the line, had been repealed, and many vessels of a smaller class had been sold. Had it not been for the necessity of guarding our commerce against the pirates of the Mediterranean, our navy might have been found as inefficient as our army in its first attempts. But even this skeleton of a navy possessed the essential quality of habits of strict and military discipline, its officers had the confidence in their resources which skill and habit alone can give, and this neglected and calumniated arm redeemed the national honor, and soothed the feeling of wounded pride. The subsequent events of the war proved, that had similar discipline, skill, and confidence, been possessed in the outset by our army, its early career must have been equally honorable. The close of the war left us nothing to blush for; not only had our naval heroes shown themselves the superiors of the comrades of Nelson, but our soldiers had proved themselves the equals of those who after no long interval shattered the wellearned trophies of Napoleon. Still, the war closed, without any of the conquests for which it was waged. Our army had hardly begun to acquire habits of discipline, and skill in manœuvring, before the first reverse of the French emperor rendered the whole force of the British empire disposable for our annoyance, and our whole energies were required for the purpose of defending our own soil. We recur to the history of the wars of 1812, as affording lessons which ought never to be forgotten by the American people. These lessons cannot be repeated too often, and it is even necessary that they should be urged upon our consideration. In the well-founded belief, that our national character was elevated by that struggle, we are too apt to forget the sufferings, the losses, the destruction of property, and the enormous cost by which it was attended. Such forgetfulness did not, however, exist in the years which immediately followed the peace of Ghent. A military force of tolerable |