still remaius in the language, to mark the original standing in society of the soldier of the ranks. Finally, under Louis XIV., the armies were increased to such an extent, that the refuse of the population was admitted into them, and the pay reduced to the lowest rate of daily laborers' wages. The soldier now became a mere machine, a being who was to be moulded under the scourge and the cane, into an automaton. The system of conscription, introduced by the elder Frederic of Prussia, closed the course of degradation, by not giving even the appearance. of a voluntary service, and closing the door to all chance of rising even to subaltern command. At the close of the eventful war of seven years, so jealous was he of the privileges of the noble class, that he summarily dismissed from his army all those who, by merit and good service, had risen from the ranks, or were unable to exhibit their sixteen quarters. The consequences were severely felt in the disgraceful campaign of the Duke of Brunswick, and had no little influence in the route of Jena, and the utter destruction of the armed force of Prussia, at the mere breath of the invader. The conscription adopted by the revolutionary government of France was of a different class. Birth conferred no exemption from its action; wealth speedily ceased to be able to purchase a substitute, and every class of society was alike mingled in the ranks of the army. But education, intelligence, and an honorable spirit, soon found their proper stations in a system where the theory of equality, reduced to practice in its fullest extent, opened every rank to the private soldier. If our country happily can never resort to fill its regular army to the conscriptive system, still, the example of France is not of the less value to guide us to the true constitution of an army for a republic.

The social condition of the United States would seem to render it necessary that we should retrace the steps by which the degraded position of the private soldier has been reached in Europe. We can look for no efficient army by voluntary enlistment, except by wages which will draw the laboring class from their occupations, and by holding out hopes to young and gallant spirits, of eventual promotion. In short, until dismissal from the ranks of the army can be felt as a punishment, we can look for no desire to enter it, among our native born citizens.

Under the present system, even our scanty peace establishment cannot be kept full, and the deserters almost equal in number the enlistments. As it is now constituted, our people have, as a mass, no community of feeling with the army. It

does not contain their sons or brothers, or if it does, they groan at the hardship of their position, in association with those who would never have entered the service, had they possessed the qualities necessary to obtain them occupation in any branch of industry.

It is in this very feeling, that we see the greatest obstacle to the improvement of the condition of our army, for that which is the popular sentiment pervades and is reflected in our legislative councils. With them the army is far from popular, and is studiously kept down to the lowest limit, both of numbers and pay, which is consistent with its existing at all.

It appears strange that, in the dearth of recruits for our military service, the idea of employing foreign troops has never been suggested. There was a moment when this might have been acted upon with success. Numbers of Poles, fleeing from the oppression of Russia, reached this country, and others have been sent after, by them, in Austrian vessels. These refugees excited, as was natural, the sympathy of the public, and Congress attempted to relieve them by the grant of unoccupied land. This grant was to them useless. The labor of the agriculturist is repugnant to the military character of the Polish gentleman, and the whole nation is composed either of nobles or serfs. They are, in fact, as unwilling as our own Indians to earn their bread in the sweat of their brow. But had our government, at that time, made provision for receiving them into our army, as the members of a legion to be formed of their compatriots, it would have not only been a noble and well bestowed charity, but would have strengthened our national defences in the very place where they are the weakest. Nor is it yet too late; there can be little doubt that Russia would gladly encourage the removal of the more active and warlike of the Polish malecontents, to a service in which, by no possibility, could they be employed against her. It would be essential to the plan to grant to such levies their own officers, their national uniform and standards, with which privileges there are thousands of this brave and unfortunate people who would gladly serve for a moiety of the pay which cannot tempt a native American to enlist. In case of necessity, the idea might be carried further. Switzerland, which has a teeming population, on a barren soil, has, for ages, furnished many of the states of Europe with their best troops, and it is needless to shut our eyes to the fact, that Ireland already supplies many of the recruits of our army,

who might be rendered far more efficient if embodied by themselves.

Such are the remarks which have been suggested by the perusal of the documents which accompany the last message of the President of the United States. Did space permit, it would be possible to dwell on many of the subjects much longer, and there are many topics on which we have not even touched. We shall judge our purpose accomplished, however, if we can awake our countrymen to the necessity and importance of placing the nation in an attitude that will not provoke attack or insult, or which will enable it to exert its real energies in case it be assailed. The apathy which is shown on this subject, the neglect which it meets in our national councils, where every petty local consideration, where scrambles for the surplus revenue, or biddings for popularity in the national domain, are permitted to occupy the whole time of the legislature, lead us almost to despair of seeing any proper steps taken in respect to our national defence, except under the pressure of actual war. If this neglect continue, and if a war should arise with either France or England, we shall, as in the former instance, see our commerce made a prey in every sea, and our coast ravaged and kept in continual alarm. If the contest be with the latter nation, we may, in addition, see our pioneers of civilization driven in, and defenceless portions of our territory occupied. We shall, no doubt, in the end, regain our territory, and perhaps retaliate an equal degree of injury, but this will be no compensation for our own losses. British writers already begin, as during the wars of the French revolution, to point out our weakness, and it will not take much argument to satisfy so pugnacious an animal as John Bull, that he must infallibly be victorious. Situated as we now are, peace is not to be secured by our own exertions, or our own unwillingness to commit aggressions, but can only be made certain by making it apparent that we are too strong to be successfully attacked, and powerful enough to sweep, in a single campaign, all trace of European domination from the

American continent.

ART. IV.—1. History of Europe, from the Commencement of the French Revolution, in 1785, to the Restoration of the Bourbons, in 1815. By ARCHIBALD ALISON, F. R. S. Edinburgh and London: 1836-1839. Vols. 1-7, 8vo.

2. Histoire de la Révolution Française. Par M. A. THIERS. Paris: 1836. 10 vols. 8vo.

3. The French Revolution: a History. By THOMAS CARLYLE. London: 1837. 3 vols. 8vo.

By J. H. Perkins.

WE have heard the question asked more than once, within a twelvemonth, "How can any man at this day think of writing another History of the French Revolution ?" The answer is obvious to all who have studied that great social and political phenomenon, for to them it is known that we have not yet a truly complete history of it; and, until the publication of the three whose titles we give above, we had scarce an approximation to one. Madame de Stael, Mignet, Scott, and a host of inferior writers, had done something toward presenting in one view the thousand events of that strange movement; but until Thiers and Alison published their first volumes, there had not been an approach made to a thorough and complete view. Nor is the want yet supplied. Alison and Thiers are clear, minute, sensible, and worthy of deep study; Carlyle is bold, sagacious, profound, comprehensive, and demands deep study; but neither of the three gives us what we want. Thiers is superficial, Alison commonplace, and neither presents to us with power a picture of the causes of the revolution; and Carlyle, whose insight is far greater, and whose imagination is a thousand-fold more mighty, still lacks simplicity, distinctness, and an earnest unconsciousness. Thiers tells his story with the flow, and glitter, and shallowness that mark the French mind so very generally; Alison talks like a good sound advocate, very sensibly, and to the point, but not as one whose eye can see far into a millstone; while Carlyle, with the power of a true poet, and the grasp of a true philosopher, lays before us the wonderful story with such grimaces, and so sneeringly, that wonder, admiration, disgust, and regret, divide our bosom, and baffle our judgment.

In truth, to comprehend the French revolution, we must have

written for us a work yet unattempted; a full and living picture of the seventy years which preceded the meeting of the States General. Of this time, there are extant records innumerable, in the shape of memoirs, journals, letters, and writings, but there is as yet no connected view of it. Carlyle, in his pictorial way, gives us the results of his reading upon that time, and in doing so, does more to make the revolution intelligible, than all other writers with whose works we are acquainted; but we want more than this; we want a true and complete history of the changes of mind, the developments of first principles, the disappearance of old landmarks, the rise of new ones,-in short, a history of France, commercially, socially, intellectually, and morally considered, from 1715, or thereabouts, to 1789. We know not a field upon which a man of industry, impartiality, and imagination, could better employ twenty years of his life, than in the preparation of such a work. Of the conquests and amours of Louis XIV., we have records enough; but of the far more important conquests of the thinkers, writers, and scoffers, that followed him, we have only piecemeal sketches, or biographies, that by their extent set the reader at defiance. And yet, it was from the conquests last named, as the world is coming to see, that the great social tornado, known to us as the French Revolution, received its bent and character.

It is true, that not many years have passed since reviewers seriously contended, that it was not merely the financial troubles of France, that rent her whole frame asunder; and it is also true, that most writers are still busily demonstrating, when the question arises, that it was not La Fayette and Mirabeau that produced the general overturn, but Louis XV. and his followers, with all their sins of commission and omission; — but it is none the less true, that there are yet others who see that the sins of Louis were only those of the most noted man in the kingdom, that the cause of the revolution lay deeper than the character or acts of king or court, that it came from a source of universal extent, and tore in pieces the whole society of France, because the whole social system, from court to hovel, was wrong, and out of joint.

In this paper, it is our purpose, not to criticise the works before us, but to inquire into the causes and extent of that social disease which led to the great convulsion, and to apply the lessons drawn from that time and land, to our day and our country. Some may doubt the possibility of showing that we are in any danger from those causes which were operating in