and also another indenture of the same date, between the defendant of the one part, and D. of the other part, whereby, after reciting the demise to the defendant of the rectory and parsonage, with the tithes, except the parsonage-house; and also reciting, that, by a deed of even date therewith, D. had appointed the defendant his receiver, agent, and attorney, to collect the tithes, rents, &c., (except as in the lease excepted), with a declaration that the defendant might retain a per-centage for his trouble; and it was thereby agreed that he should apply the surplus of the tithes, rents, &c., as D. should direct; D. covenanted with the defendant, and directed, that the surplus of the tithes, rents, &c., should be applied (amongst other purposes) in payment of the debts due to V. and M., with interest, after payment of certain taxes, rates, and outgoings, and the premiums on policies of assurance on the life of D., for the benefit of V. and M. The plea then alleged, that the lease was executed as part of the same transaction; that D. well knew that the defendant was the attorney and agent of V., and that the indenture was made by D. with the defendant as such agent and attorney, and to enable him to apply the rent reserved by the lease, in the manner above mentioned that there was due from D. to V. and M. monies exceeding the damages in the declaration mentioned, and the rent due under the lease; and that the de fendant had applied the monies alleged to be due for rent according to the provisions of the second indenture.

The defendant pleaded also, that, before the execution of the lease, D. was indebted to V. and M. and others, and in consideration thereof, and of a further sum to be lent by V., and of the defendant consenting to be V.'s agent, D. agreed with the defendant and V. to charge the rec

tory of S. with that sum and the others, by making the lease in the declaration mentioned, and appointing the defendant receiver of the tithes, rents, &c., in order that he might apply the rent reserved by the lease in payment of the monies so to be charged on the benefice; that the money was advanced by V.; and that D., in pursuance of the agreement, and in order to charge the benefice, executed the lease, and also an indenture appointing the defendant receiver: that the lease was part of the same transaction, and was a charging of the benefice contrary to the statute.-On special demurrers to these pleas:

Held, that the former plea did not shew any defeasance of the covenant to pay the rent reserved by the lease; but that, under the second indenture, there was an equitable assignment or valid appropriation of so much of the rent as was necessary to pay V. and M. their debts; and that such assignment was a charge upon the benefice, and therefore the lease, which was part of the same transaction, was void under the 13 Eliz. c. 20. Walthew v. Crafts,

COALS.

See MINERALS.

1

A declaration stated, that the corporation of L., from time immemorial until the 1st Jan. 1836, (when the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 63, s. 9, came into operation,) had, by persons by them in that behalf appointed, the sole and exclusive privilege of measuring, and, from the 1st January, 1836, of weighing, all coals imported into the port of L.; and also the right and privilege of appointing to perform such work a sufficient number of fit and proper persons, and from time to time of fixing a reasonable rate of payment for such work, to be proportioned, previous to the 1st January, 1836, to the measured quantity, and subse

EXCH.

quently to that day to the weight of the coals: such payments to be made to the persons who should do the work, and to be for their own use and benefit. The declaration then alleged a right and privilege of the corporation, that every owner of a vessel arriving in the port of L. with coals should give notice to the corporation, in order that the work might be done by the said meters. It then averred, that the corporation had fixed a rate of payment for every score of tons weight, and had appointed a reasonable number of coal meters, of whom the plaintiff was one; that the defendant imported several tons of coal into the port of L., and that, although it was his duty, on the arrival of the vessel, and before landing the coals, to give notice, he did not do so, whereby the plaintiff was prevented from weighing the coals, and of earning the amount payable in respect thereof. The pleas traversed the right of the corporation to weigh the coals, and also the appointment of the plaintiff as coal meter. Evidence was given of a custom to measure all coals imported into the port of L. before the 1st of January, 1836, and after that date to weigh them; and that the corporation had ordered that the meters should be paid at a rate per ton on coals weighed instead of per chaldron as before. In proof of the plaintiff's appointment as a meter, he gave in evidence an entry, not under seal, in the corporation books, stating that he was so appointed. The plaintiff had ever since acted as a coal meter:-Held, first, that the right of the corporation by custom to measure coals imported was not converted by the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 63, into a right to weigh.-Secondly, that as the payment in respect of the measurement was for the benefit of the meter only, he was an officer and not a mere servant of the corporation, and therefore an appoint

An alien amy, who, while residing abroad, composes a literary work, and first publishes it in Great Britain, may acquire a copyright under the 8 Ann. c. 19, and 54 Geo. 3, c. 156.

If a foreign author resident abroad there assigns, according to the law of his domicile, his copyright to another foreigner, who assigns it in Great Britain to a British subject, the latter may acquire a copyright, if the work be first published there:Semble, that authors have a copyright in their works at common law. Boosey v. Jefferys,

580

CORPORATION AGGREGATE.

CORPORATE BODY.

A. en

An incorporated Company entered into a contract under seal with A., for the execution of certain works according to the terms of a specification annexed, which also contained provisions for extra work. tered upon the work under the superintendence of the Company's engineer, and also, under such superintendence and with the approbation of the engineer, executed certain extra works, which, however, could not be considered as coming within the provisions of the contract under seal. A. afterwards made a claim upon the Company to a much larger amount than that specified by the contract, and the directors paid him a large sum, generally on account. By the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, s. 97, the di- | rectors of such a Company may make parol contracts, without the same being reduced into writing, where such contracts would, if entered into between private persons, be valid; and, by the 98th section of the same Act, the directors are bound to enter minutes of such contracts in a book, and, by one of the clauses of the special Act of the Company, three directors constituted a quorum:~ Held, that, as there was not any evidence that the Company had contracted for this extra work under seal, or that they had entered into a contract for the same under the terms of their special Act, or of any general Act authorising the same, they were not liable to A. for the extra work so performed by him. Homersham v. The Wolverhampton Waterworks Company, 137

CORPORATION AGGREGATE.

See RAILWAY COMPANY, (5).

(1). Under 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 5.

The 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 5, does not entitle a plaintiff to the costs of the issues in fact found for him, where his declaration does not disclose a

good cause of action.

To an action of assumpsit the defendant pleaded seven pleas, upon five of which issues in fact were joined, and the plaintiff demurred to the other two pleas. At the trial, the plaintiff succeeded upon the issues in fact; but afterwards, on argument of the demurrer to the pleas, the declaration was held bad, and the defendant had judgment:-Held, on error, that the plaintiff was not entitled under the 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 5, to the costs of the issues in fact found for him. Partridge v. Gardner, 621

(2). Under Municipal Corporation

Act.

The 133rd section of the Municipal Corporation Act, 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, which, for the protection of persons acting in the execution of that Act, enacts, that "all actions" and prosecutions shall be tried in the county &c., and entitles the defendant, in case of success, to his full costs as between attorney and client, applies to the action of replevin, although one of the provisions of the section, by which a month's notice of action is to be given, is not applicable to that form of action. Jones v. Johnson, o o o 2

133

COUNTY COURT.

See LONDON SMALL DEBTS ACT.

(1). A plaint in replevin and for an excessive distress having been entered in a county court against a landlord and bailiff, the defendants, by leave of a judge, on affidavit that the rent exceeded 20%., sued out a writ of certiorari to remove the cause into the Court of Exchequer. The writ was returnable on the day the plaint stood for trial; and the defendants' attorney then presented the writ to the judge, and offered, on the part of one of the defendants, to make the declaration required by the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 121, stating that the other defendant, the bailiff, was unable to make it. The defendant, the landlord, was too ill to attend: but he had executed a power of attorney to one W., authorising him to sign and seal the bond required by the above section, and generally to perform all such acts about the conduct of the writ as he should think proper. The defendants' attorney tendered the bond, which was conditioned to prove, in the superior Court, that the rent exceeded 207.; but the clerk of the court did not approve of the sureties, in consequence of not having had notice of them in time to inquire into their sufficiency. The judge refused to allow the certiorari, and tried the cause on the ground of the want of time for the clerk of the court to inquire into the sufficiency of the sureties, but he did not fix the amount for which they were to be responsible:-Held, first, that there was no ground for quashing the writ of certiorari.

Secondly, that the judge was liable to an attachment for not receiving and returning the writ, although his disobedience was not wilful, but originated in an erroneous construction of an obscure statute.

Thirdly, that the declaration re

quired by the 121st section of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, may be verbally made, either by the attorney in the cause or the party; and that it is sufficient if made by one of several defendants; and that, in this case, the person named in the power of attorney was authorised not only to sign and seal the bond, but also to make the declaration.

Fourthly, that the act of the judge in receiving the declaration is ministerial; that, after receiving it, he ought to fix the amount of the security; and that, until he has done so, the question as to the sufficiency of the sureties does not arise.

Fifthly, that the provisions of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, ss. 1, 2, do not apply to plaints in replevin; and therefore the bond was properly conditioned for proving that there was ground for believing that the rent exceeded 20l. and not 50%.

Sixthly, that a certiorari, under the 121st section of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, ought to be made returnable so as to allow sufficient time for the preliminary inquiries which the section directs.

Seventhly, that replevin cannot be joined with any other form of action in the county court.

Semble, that the 90th section of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, which enables a defendant in a county court to obtain a certiorari by leave of a judge of the superior Courts, does not apply to plaints in replevin; but that the removal of such plaints is regulated by the 121st section. Mungean v. Wheatley, Same v. Same,

88

(2). Power of Removal of Plaint by Certiorari.

Semble, the power given by the 9 & 10 Vict. 95, s. 90, to remove a plaint by certiorari from a county court, is not taken away by the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 16.

COUNTY COURT.

(5). Suggestion to deprive Plaintiff of Costs.

An affidavit for a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of costs, under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, stated, "that the plaintiff now dwells, and at the time of the commencement of this action dwelt, at Birmingham, which is within twenty miles from Bilston, the place where the defendant now dwells, and also within twenty miles from Wolverhampton, the place where the defendant dwelt and carried on his business at the time this action was commenced:-Held, insufficient, as

not shewing that the plaintiff's residence was within twenty miles of the defendant's. Fry v. Whittle, 411

(6). Construction of Word "may" in 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 13.

1. The 13th section of the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, by which the Court, or a Judge at Chambers, are empowered to make an order that the plaintiff shall have his costs, is discretionary and not compulsory. Jones v. Harrison,328. See M'Dougal v. Paterson, 387, n.

2. The Court will not review the discretion of a Judge in refusing or granting a certificate for costs under the County Courts Act, 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, s. 13. Palmer v. Richards, 335

(7). Certificate of Judge for Costs.

Semble, that a Judge may grant a certificate to entitle the plaintiff to costs under the 129th sect. of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, at any time before the taxation of costs. Tharratt v. Trevor, 187

(8). Writ of Trial.

1. Quære, whether a writ of trial under the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 17, can be directed to the Judge of a County Court, established under the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. Per Pollock, C. B., and Alderson, B., it may; per Parke, B., and Platt, B., it cannot.

A Judge's order, directing such writ to be issued to the judge of a County Court, but to be returned by the sheriff is irregular. Breese v. Owens,

413