tainable until after the defendant has been guilty of a default in making such compensation. By the 47th section of the Act in question, the Company may, by leave of the owners and occupiers of the property, enter upon the land; and it shall thereupon become the sole property sessed by such juries in manner respectively as aforesaid, for the purchase of any such lands, &c., or as a recompense for the yearly produce or profits thereof, or as a compensation for damages, as herein before mentioned, to the proprietor or proprietors of such lands and premises, or to such other person or persons as shall be interested therein or entitled to receive such money, rent, or compensation respectively, at any time after the same shall have been so agreed for, determined, or assessed; or if the person or persons so entitled or interested, or any of them, cannot be found, or shall refuse to receive the same, then upon the investment thereof in such public funds or Government securities, bearing an annual interest, as the said commissioners shall by writing under their hands appoint, in case the same shall exceed the sum of 100%, and if the same shall not exceed the said sum, then on leaving or depositing the money in the hands of the treasurer to the said company of proprietors, for the use of such person or persons so interested or entitled as aforesaid; and in all or in any of the said cases, as often as the same shall happen, it shall be lawful for the said company of proprietors, and their agents, workmen, and servants, immediately to enter upon such lands, grounds, and other hereditaments respectively (or, before such payment or tender, by leave of the owners or occupiers thereof); and then and thereupon such lands and grounds, waters, mills, and other hereditaments, together with the yearly profits thereof, and all the estate, trust, and interest of any person or persons therein, shall from thenceforth be vested in and become the sole property of the said company of proprietors, to and for the purposes of this Act for ever; and such tender, payment, investment, or deposit shall not only bar all right, title, claim, interest, and demand of the person or persons to whom the same shall or ought to have been made, but shall also extend to and be deemed and construed to bar the dower of the wife of every such person, and all estates tail, and other estates in reversion and remainder, of his, her, or their issue, and of every other person whomsoever therein: Provided, nevertheless, that before such payment, security, tender, investment, or deposit as aforesaid, it shall not be lawful for the said company of proprietors, or any person acting under their authority, to dig or cut the lands or grounds of the person or persons entitled to such payment or security, for the purpose of making the said canal, without the leave and consent of such person or persons respectively." 1851. DOE d. PATRICK v. DUKE OF BEAUFORT. 1851. DOE d. PATRICK บ. DUKE OF of the Company for the purposes of the Act. [Parke, B. -The case of Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Company (a) has a strong bearing on this question. There a Canal Company purchased a copyholder's interest in certain BEAUFORT. lands, under the powers given them by the 33 Geo. 3, c. 80; and it was held by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, that upon the death of the copyholder, no other person having been admitted, the lord might treat the Company as mere trespassers. This is the simple case of a tenant holding over after the expiration of his lease; and then comes the question, whether there is anything in the Act to prevent the reversioner, upon the accrual of his title, from recovering the possession of his property. Pollock, C. B. The consent of the owners mentioned in the 47th clause cannot be taken as a consent wholly irrespective of any tender or payment. Parke, B.-The reversioner cannot create such an interest as that for which you contend, except by deed. There is no evidence whatever that the defendant is a tenant at will. He has, therefore, no ground whatever for resisting this claim.] POLLOCK, C. B.-We entertain no doubt whatever in this case that the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment of the Court. In the course of the argument it was admitted that the claimants had a good title to this property, unless there is something in this Act of Parliament or something done in pursuance of it, which has altered their position. Now, the 47th section is in reality out of the question. It was indeed contended for the defendant, that these parties are precluded from adopting this form of proceeding, as the owners and proprietors of the property had consented to what had been done. It was conceded by Mr. Brown, that nothing turns upon the word "approved." But the consent of the lessees to an arrangement for the construction of certain works upon the land demised cannot affect the rights of these reversioners, and consequently, at the ex (a) 9 Q. B. 469. piration of the term, they have clearly a right to maintain ejectment. PARKE, B.—I am entirely of the same opinion. This is the simple case of a person in possession of land, who with the consent of the tenant of the term and of the owner of the property, makes a canal upon it, but who at the expiration of the term continues in possession against the consent of the owner. He may be treated as a trespasser, and may be ejected. Here the defendant became interested in the term, and obtained possession subject to the liability of being ejected at the expiration of the term; and that liability still existed, unless he had then become tenant at will. But there is no evidence in the present case that such a tenancy was created. The real question therefore is, whether anything has passed, the effect of which is to oblige these parties to seek their remedy under the Act of Parliament, by compelling the defendant to purchase their interest in the land. It is said, that the 47th section has that effect. But that section applies only to those cases where there has been either a contract between the parties or an adjustment by the commissioners, or an assessment by a jury of the value of the property. If, after a contract of purchase with the owner, the Company enter upon the land, they do not become trespassers; but the owner has to seek his remedy upon the contract or under the Act, as the case may be. But the mere entry by a party on the land by permission of the owner does not give the former any title. Here the defendant was a mere tenant at sufferance, as there was no evidence of a tenancy at will. He might therefore be treated either as a trespasser or as a tenant at will, at the option of the owner. PLATT, B.-Upon the termination of the lease the plaintiff had a right to the property, and could enforce that right by an action of ejectment, unless the Act of Parliament interfered; and I am clearly of opinion that it did not, as it has no application to the circumstances of this case. 1851. DOE d. PATRICK v. DUKE OF BEAUFORT. 1851. DOB d. PATRICK ย. DUKE OF BEAUFORT. MARTIN, B.—I am of the same opinion. The case, when rightly understood, is extremely simple and clear. It appears that the Duke of Beaufort purchased part of the lessees' interest in this property, with a view to the enjoyment of the benefit of this canal; and that this canal was constructed during the term with the consent of the owner of the property. But at the end of the term the reversioners were clearly entitled to recover possession of their property, which has never passed out of them. Judgment for the plaintiff. May 12. By the 38 Geo. 3, c. 5, which was an Act for granting a land tax for the year 1798, it was enacted, that all manors, messuages, lands, tenements, &c., tolls, &c., and all hereditaments, of what nature or kind soever they be, situate, lying, and being, happening, or arising, should be charg ed to the landtax. By the 38 Geo. 3, c. 60, for making the land-tax perpe tual, it was enacted, that the sums charg ed by the 38 THE VAUXHALL BRIDGE COMPANY v. SAWYER. THIS was an action of trespass, for breaking and entering the plaintiffs' premises and carrying away their furniture. The defendant pleaded the general issue; and, after issue joined, the following case was stated for the opinion of this Court. The plaintiffs were incorporated by the 59 Geo. 3, c. cxlii., and are the owners of the tolls hereinafter mentioned. The defendant is the collector of land-tax, and distrained on the plaintiffs' goods for one year's land-tax. The plaintiffs deny their liability to be rated for their tolls. By the 38 Geo. 3, c. 5, for granting a land-tax for the year 1798, it was enacted, that all personal estate, except &c., should be charged with 4s. in the pound; and all manors, messuages, lands, tenements, &c., tolls, &c., and all hereditaments, of what nature and kind soever they may be, situate, lying, and being, happening or arising, Geo. 3, c. 5, in respect of the manors, lands, tenements, and hereditaments in the said Act mentioned, should be raised for ever. The Act incorporating the Vauxhall Bridge Company authorised them to take tolls, and enacted, that the shares of the proprietors should be personal estate, and not in the nature of real property:-Held, that the Company were liable, under the 38 Geo. 3, c. 60, to be rated to the land-tax in respect of their tolls, as being a tenement and hereditament within the true meaning of that Act. should be charged with a pound rate. By the 38 Geo. 3, c. 60, for making the land-tax perpetual, it was enacted, that the sums charged by the 38 Geo. 3, c. 5, in respect to the manors, messuages, lands, tenements, and hereditaments, in the said Act mentioned, should be raised for ever. The Company was created by the 49 Geo. 3, c. cxlii.; and by the 1st section they were declared to be a body corporate, and by the name of the Vauxhall Bridge Company were authorised to purchase land for the purposes of the bridge and the roads leading to it, and to raise money among themselves for the payment of the purchase-money, and the expenses of the erection of the bridge and approaches. By the 89th section, they were authorised to erect turnpike gates across the bridge and across a road leading to it, and other side gates and turnpikes, and to take and receive from the persons using the bridge certain specific tolls, being the tolls in respect of which the landtax is demanded. By the 3rd section, the shares of the proprietors were declared to be personal estate, and not in the nature of real property. The question for the opinion of the Court was, whether the Company of proprietors were liable to be rated to the land-tax for their tolls, and judgment was to be entered accordingly, either for the plaintiffs or the defendant. The case was argued in the present term (April 30), by Bovill for the plaintiffs.-The Company contend that their tolls are not subject to land-tax, under the 38 Geo. 3, c. 5, and 38 Geo. 3, c. 60. The Company were established by the 49 Geo. 3, c. cxlii., and are entitled to the tolls by virtue of the 89th section of that Act. And by the 3rd section it is enacted, "that all and every the shares and proportions of all bodies politic, corporate, and collegiate, and all other person and persons, of and in the said undertaking or the joint stock or fund of the said Company of proprietors, shall be deemed personal estate, and transmissible as such, 1851. VAUXHALL BRIDGE CO. v. SAWYER. |