JUSTICE'S WARRANT.-A justice's warrant which fails to charge that defendant "unlawfully and wilfully" entered on the land after being forbidden, is fatally defective. Whitaker, 85-566.

A warrant will not be quashed because it does not contain the necessary descriptive words of the offence, when it refers to an "annexed affidavit" in which all the essential averments are made. Winslow, 95-649.

A justice's warrant which concludes "contrary to law" without using the words "against the form of the statute," is fatally defective. Lowder, 85564.

A justice's warrant may be amended in the superior court to charge that the entry was "wilful and unlawful" and "against the peace and dignity of the state" even after verdict. Smith, 103-410.

VARIANCE.—Where the indictment charges a trespass on the lands of A, and the proof is that the lands were in the possession of B, the variance is fatal. Sherill, 81-550.

JURISDICTION.-Justices of the peace have exclusive original jurisdiction of the offence of entering on land after being forbidden. Dudley, 83-660. EVIDENCE OF TITLE INCOMPETENT.-AS forcible trespass is essentially an offence against the possession of another and does not depend upon the title, it is proper to exclude evidence of title in defendants on trial for such offence. Webster, 121-586.

WHO MAY BE CONVICTED.--One who hauls cross-ties across a tract of land after having been forbidden to enter on the land is guilty, though he, in good faith, believed he had a right to do so as the agent of the railroad company, since the railroad company had no right to transport its crossties over the prosecutor's land, or to direct defendant to do so. The mere belief that one has a right to enter on land after having been forbidden is not sufficient to excuse unless there is reasonable ground for such belief. Fisher, 109-817.

The prosecutor sold a field to the lessor of defendant and permitted the use of a way for tree years over his land to the field which was being cultivated by defendant, but withdrew such permission by notice forbidding further entry, there being another way over the lessor's land which adjoined a public road, though of greater distance to the field. Defendant entered after having been forbidden: Held, not to be error to refuse an instruction that if defendant believed he had a right to travel over the prosecutor's land because he and former tenants had done so for some time he would not be guilty. Bryson, 81-595.

One who enters land after being forbidden, pending an appeal from an adverse adjudication upon his title to the land, can have no reasonable ground for his belief in his right to enter. Glenn, 118-1194.

An alleged entry of pu...c lands without survey or grant is insufficient ground upon which to base a claim of right to enter. Calloway, 119-864. Defendant testified that he believed he had a right to follow an old road across the land in question, but admitted that the road had been blocked for 10 or 11 years by wires put up for that purpose: Held, that the defendant's evidence of a bona fide belief, being unsupported by any evidence of a reasonable ground for such belief, was immaterial. Durham, 121-546.

WHO MAY NOT BE CONVICTED.-Where defendant, after having been forbidden by a landlord to enter on his land, enters a part in the possession of a tenant upon the invitation of the tenant, he is not guilty of a wilful trespass. Lawson, 101-717.

One who enters on the land of another after having been forbidden, as

the servant, and at the command of the bona fide claimant, is not guilty. Winslow, 95-649.

One who enters on land in possession of another, after being forbidden to enter, claiming it as his, can not be convicted for a wilful trespass. Ellen, 68-281.

One who enters on land in the possession of another, after being forbidden to enter, under a warrant of survey, having made an entry believing the land to be vacant, is not guilty of a wilful trespass. Hanks, 66-612. An employee of a railroad company, who, under the orders of the company, cuts trees on land conveyed by the owner for a right-of-way, can not be convicted for a wilful trespass by the original owner. Crosset, 81-579.

CLAIM OF RIGHT--BONA FIDE BELIEF.-It is not sufficient for defendant to show that he entered under a claim of right, but he must show reasonable grounds for such belief. Glenn, 118-1194.

A mere belief that defendant had a valid claim of title will not suffice; he must satisfy the jury that he made the claim in good faith, and had reasonable ground to believe that his claim was well founded. Crawley, 103-353.

It is incumbent on the state to prove the entry after being forbidden, but this being done the defendant must show a license or that he entered under a bona fide claim of right. Glenn, 118-1194.

It is not sufficient that defendant believed he had a right to enter, but he must go further and show that he nad reasonable ground for such belief, and if he fails to do this the judge should instruct the jury that, if they believe the evidence, the defendant is guilty. Durham, 121-546.

Where the entry after being forbidden, is shown or admitted, the burden is on the defendant to show that he entered under a bona fide claim of right. Durham, 121-546.

Although the entry be peaceable, yet if after getting on the premises, defendant uses violent and abusive language, and threatens to strike, and does other acts calculated to and which do intimidate the owner, he is guilty. Wilson, 94-839.

COURT NOT REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A MERE ABSTRACTION.-Where a person is indicted for a wilful trespass on land, and in the proof there is no evidence of a bona fide claim of title, or no facts and circumstances showing that defendant could reasonably and in good faith have believed he had a right to do what he did, it is not the duty of the court to submit to the jury a mere abstract proposition as to defendant's belief that he had a right to enter. Bryson, 81-595.

Sec. 640 (1121). Trespass on public lands, penalty therefor. R. C., c. 34, s. 42. 1823, c. 1190. 1842, c. 36, s. 4.

If any person shall erect a building on any public lands, before the same shall have been sold or granted by the state, or on any lands belonging to the state board of education before the same shall have been sold and conveyed by them, or cultivate, or remove timber from, any of said lands, such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and, when any person shall be in possession of any part of said land, it shall be the duty of the sheriff of the county in which the land is situated, and he is hereby required, to give notice in writing to such person, commanding him to depart there

from forthwith; and if the person in possession, upon being so notified, shall not, within two weeks after the time of notice, remove therefrom, the sheriff is required to remove him immediately, and if necessary, shall summon the power of the county to assist him in so doing.

Sec. 641 (2828). Trespassing upon lands of another without permission; misdemeanor. 1889, cs. 118, 504.

If any person by riding or driving upon the lands of another without permission, or while driving live stock along any roadway, public or private, shall wilfully, deliberately or recklessly do, or permit to be done some actual injury to said lands, or to the crops or other property growing or being thereon, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not more than fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days.

Sec. 642 (2829). Wilful riding or driving of horses over cultivated lands, in stock-law territory; evidence. 1883, c. 391, ss. 1, 3 1885, c. 100. Any person, who, in any stock-law territory, shall wilfully, and not as the result of an accident, ride any horse or mule, or drive any horse or mule, either loose or to any vehicle or wagon, over the cultivated or enclosed lands of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction before any justice of the peace shall be fined not exceeding ten dollars, at the discretion of the court. Sec 643 2288). Trespass on boats a misdemeanor; penalty and damages, how recovered R. C., c. 14, ss. 1, 3. 1889, c. 378.

Any person who shall take away from any landing or other place where the same shall be, or shall loose, unmoor or turn adrift from the same, any boat, canoe or pettiaugua, oars, paddles, sails and tackle, belonging to or in the lawful custody of any person; or any person who shall direct the same to be done without the consent of the owner, or the person having the custody of such boat, canoe or pettiaugua, shall forfeit and pay to such owner, or person having the custody and possession as aforesaid, the sum of two dollars; and the owner may have his action for such injury; and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars or imprisoned not exceeding thirty days, in the discretion of the court. The penalties aforesaid shall not extend to any person who shall press any boat, canoe or pettiaugua by public authority.

NOTE. The words "and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," etc., which were inserted by the amendatory act of 1889, were evidently intended to be placed between the word "dollars" and the words "and the owner," so as to make the trespasser guilty of a misdemeanor instead of the* owner of the boat, but we have placed the amendment where the act directs it to be placed.

TRIAL.

Sec. 644 (1198). Piea of "not guilty" entered for defendant who stands mute. R. C., c. 35, s. 29. R. S., c. 35, s. 16.

If any person, being arraigned upon or charged in any indictment for any crime, shall stand mute of malice or will not answer directly to the indictment, the court shall order the plea of "not guilty" to be entered on behalf of such person; and the plea so entered shall have the same force and effect as if such person had pleaded the same.

PLEA ENTERED AFTER VERDICT.-The plea of "not guilty" may be entered under the direction of the court, even after verdict of guilty, where the omission is from mere inadvertence. McMillan, 68-440.

AFTER CONTINUANCE.—Where a case is continued in the absence of defendant, without any plea entered, he is entitled, on his araignment at a subsequent term, to plead in abatement, or to enter any other plea open to him at the former term. Jackson, 82-565.

AMENDMENT OF RECORD.--The court has authority to amend the record by inserting the plea of not guilty after the verdict, when the omission to enter such plea at the proper time was through mere inadvertence of the clerk. Farrar, 104-702.

Sec. 645 (1241). Concurrent jurisdiction of inferior and superior courts in certain criminal cases, with a view to a speedy trial of criminals. 1879, c. 302, s. 1.

Wherever in any county, inferior courts have been or shall hereafter be established, the said inferior court and the superior court of such county shall have equal power and jurisdiction to inquire. of, try, hear and determine all criminal cases of which jurisdiction is given to said inferior courts, or of which jurisdiction may hereafter be given to them, whether such cases have been returned to the said superior court or to the said inferior court.

JURISDICTION IN SUPERIOR COURT, THOUGH DEFENDANT BOUND TO INFERIOR COURT. Where an indictment, charging an offence of which the superior and inferior courts have concurrent jurisdiction, is first found in the superior court, that court retains jurisdiction of the offence, notwithstanding a bill for the same offence is afterwards found in the inferior court, and defendant was first bound over by a justice to appear before the inferior court. Williford, 91-529.

Sec. 646 (1242). Pending cases remaining untried to be transferred to succeeding court, whether inferior or superior. 1879, c. 302, s. 3.

All such cases pending in either the inferior or the superior court of any county which shall not have been tried and determined at any term of said inferior or superior court, shall be transferred by the clerk of such court to the next succeeding court, whether the same be an inferior or superior court, and shall be proceeded

in the same manner and with like power and jurisdiction to said court (to which they are transferred) to hear, try and determine as if the bill of indictment therein had been originally found by the grand jury of the same: Provided, that this section shall apply only to those cases in which the defendants or accused are confined in jail: Provided further, that in such cases the handing over of the papers by the clerk of one court to the clerk of the other court where the trial is to take place, and the docketing of the cases, with the receipt of the latter on the docket of the former, shall be deemed and held a sufficient transfer of any such case from one court to another.

TRANSFER AS TO ONE DEFENDANT, LEAVING OTHERS TO BE TRIED IN INFERIOR COURT. Where three persons are indicted in the same bill, and two of them give bail for their appearance at the next term of the inferior court and the other is committed to jail in default of bail, it is not error to transfer the case of the one failing to give bail to the superior court, leaving the indictment pending in the inferior court as to the other two. Mott, 86--621.

RECEIPT FOR TRANSCRIPT.-An entry on the minutes of the inferior court, "transferred to the superior court," is a sufficient compliance with the requirement as to the receipt to be given, since the provision is merely directory. Mott, 86-621.

MISCELLANEOUS RULES OF PRACTICE.

RECAPITULATION OF TESTIMONY.-It is not necessary, in the absence of a special request, for the judge to recapitulate all the evidence in his charge to the jury, and if the defendant desires the entire testimony or any portion of it repeated to the jury he must make the request in apt time. If no such instruction is asked the failure to repeat the entire testimony is not error. Ussery, 118-1177.

Where the court omits evidence favorable to the defendant in his charge it is the duty of the defendant's counsel to call it to the attention of the court that the omission may be corrected; for,after verdict, an exception for such omission will not be sustained. Ussery, 118-1177.

APPEAL AFTER PLEA OF GUILTY.-Where a defendant pleads guilty, his appeal from a judgment thereon can not call into question the facts charged, nor the regularity and correctness of the proceedings, but bringɛ up for review only the question whether the facts charged and admitted by the plea constitute an offence. Warren, 113-683.

SUBMISSION OF ONE DEFENDANT DURING TRIAL.-After the close of the testimony, and after one counsel had addressed the jury, there being a pause for a few minutes, a member of the bar who appeared for another person who was indicted in a separate bill for the same offence as defendant, rose and said he wished to enter a submission, without stating in what case. The court received the submission over the objection of defendant, when the counsel stated he wished to submit for the other defendant; that he had examined the evidence, and found his client certainly guilty, and that defendant was more guilty than he. The court promptly stopped the counsel, and told the jury that his statement was not evidence, and they must not consider it, and that he would not have allowed the remark if he could have prevented it. Defendant did not