feloniously conveyed or made away with by the servant or agent. Wilson, 101-730.

SERVANT. If a servant entrusted with the custody of goods by his master fraudulently take them to convert them to his own use, he is guilty of larceny. Jarvis, 63-556.

SERVANT EMPLOYED BY MARRIED WOMAN.-A married woman engaged in the business of selling milk in her own name, her husband having nothing to do with the business, is competent to make a valid contract in respect to such business, though she is not a "free trader," and one employed by her to sell milk and collect the money for it, may be convicted for embezzling the money collected. Lanier, 89-517.

WHO IS A SERVANT.-Where one employed by a merchant "to sweep out the store, and wait about the store, but not as clerk," is authorized by the merchant to take a lot of shoes and sell them during his visit to a neighboring town, and he does sell them for a less price than he was authorized to receive, and converts the money to his own use, he is a servant within the meaning of the act, and guilty of embezzlement. Costin, 89-511.

29. HORSE-STEALING.

Sec. 379 (1066). Larceny; horse-stealing.

s. 2. 1866-'7, c. 62.

1868, c. 37, s. 1. 1879, c. 234,

Every person who shall steal any horse, mare, gelding or mule, shall suffer imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than twenty years, at the discretion of the judge.

A count under this section may be joined in a bill of indictment with a count under the succeeding section.

INDICTMENT ARREST OF JUDGMENT.-Where there is a general verdict of guilty on an indictment charging in the first count the larceny of a horse, and in the other the receiving of the same, knowing it to have been stolen, and both counts conclude against the statute, no judgment can be pronounced, since the punishment is different for each offence, and the court can not determine upon which count to give judgment. Sections 379, 375. (The Code, sections 1066, 1074). Goings, 98-766.

STEALING AND RECEIVING HORSE.-A Count for the larceny of a horse, concluding at common law, may be joined with a count for the statutory offence of. receiving same, and the indictment thus drawn will warrant a general verdict of guilty. Lawrence, 81-522.

Sec. 380 (1067). Larceny, stealing horse for temporary use or purpose. 1879, c. 234, s. 1.

If any person shall unlawfully take and carry away any horse, gelding, mare or mule, the property of another person, secretly and against the will of the owner of said property, with intent to deprive the owner of said property of the special or temporary use of the same, or with the intent to use said property for a special or temporary purpose, the person so offending shall be guilty of larceny, and punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary or county jail, not less than four months nor more than ten years, and fined, in the discretion of the court: Provided, this section shall not be construed to repeal or in any way affect the preceding section.

An indictment for stealing the temporary use of a horse is not defective because it charges the stealing of the temporary use of a buggy also. Darden, 117-697.

30. LARCENY OF LIVE STOCK.

Sec. 381 (1068). Larceny, the felonious injury to, or pursuit of, live stock, with intent to appropriate the same, a misdemeanor. 1866, c. 57.

If any person shall pursue, kill or wound any horse, mule, ass, jenny, cattle, hog, sheep or goat, the property of another, with the intent unlawfully and feloniously to convert the same to his own use, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punishable in all respects, as if convicted of larceny, though such animal may not have come into the actual possession of the person so offending. And all persons commanding, counselling, advising, aiding or abetting any of such unlawful acts shall be puni hed in like manner and may be prosecuted alone, or with the principal actor.

INDICTMENT. An indictment charging the killing of a "certain cattle beast," is sufficiently definite in stating the kind of cattle killed. Credle, 91-640.

EVIDENCE.-Parol evidence of the contents of a notice posted by the prosecutor, forbidding all persons from trading for or buying his cattle, is competent on the trial for killing cattle under this section, since such notice is entirely collateral to the issue, and defendant is not a party to it. Credle, 91--640.

KILLING DONE WITHOUT SECRECY.-Evidence that the killing was done openly and without secrecy may be submitted to the jury on the question of a felonious intent, but it does not necessarily disprove it. Credle, 91-640.

STOCK LAW.-The fact that the stock law prevails in a county, is no defence to an indictment for injury to stock running at large. Rivers, 90-738.

31. GROWING CROPS.

Sec. 382 (1069). Larceny of growing crops or vegetables. 1811, c. 816. R. C., c. 34, s. 21. 1868-'9, c. 251.

If any person shall steal, or feloniously take and carry away any maize, corn, wheat, rice, or other grain, or any cotton, tobacco, potatoes, peanuts, pulse, or any fruit, vegetable, or other product cultivated for food or market, growing, standing or remaining ungathered, in any field or ground, he shall be guilty of larceny, and punished accordingly.

INDICTMENT-UNGATHERED FIGS.-An indictment for the larceny of ungathered figs which fails to allege that they were "cultivated for food or market," is fatally defective. Liles, 78-496.

Where the indictment simply charges the stealing of "seed cotton and lint cotton," an instruction that if the jury believe that the cotton was gathered from the field with a felonious intent, defendant would be guilty, is erroneous. To render such evidence and charge proper the

indictment should have been drawn under the statute, and describe the crop as "growing, standing or ungathered" in the field, and cultivated for food or market. Bragg, 86-687.

WATERMELON.-An indictment under this statute for stealing a watermelon, which fails to allege that it was cultivated for food or market, is fatally defective, since the word watermelon is not used in the statute. Thompson, 93-537.

UNGATHERED CORN.-An indictment for stealing ungathered corn need not allege that the crop was "cultivated for food or market," as these words of the statute are limited to "any fruit, vegetable or other product," and do not apply to the articles specifically named. Ballard, 97-443.

CABBAGE. An indictment charging the larceny of cabbage standing ungathered in the field, and concluding at common law, can not be sustained. Foy, 82-679.

SEED COTTON AND LINT COTTON.-Where the indictment simply charges the stealing of "seed cotton and lint cotton," an instruction that if the jury believe that the cotton was gathered from the field with a felonious intent, defendant would be guilty, is erroneous. To render such evidence and instruction proper the indictment should have been drawn under the statute, and describe the crop as "growing, standing or ungathered" in the field, and cultivated for food or market. Bragg, 86-687.

32. STANDING TIMBER.

Sec. 383 (1070). Larceny of wood or other property, growing or being upon land. 1866, c. 60.

If any person, not being the present owner or bona fide claimant thereof, shall wilfully and unlawfully enter upon the lands of another and carry off or be engaged in carrying off any wood or other kind of property whatsoever, growing or being thereon, the same being the property of the owner of the premises, or under his control, keeping or care, such person shall, if the act be done with felonious intent, be guilty of larceny, and punished as for that offence. And if not done with such intent, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

TITLE MAY BE SHOWN IN A THIRD PERSON.-A tenant who leases a certain portion of a larger tract of land, on indictment against him for cutting timber upon the land outside of that embraced by his lease, is entitled to show title to the land in a third person, and that he entered and cut the timber, after having been forbidden to cut timber outside of his lease, as the agent or employee of such third person, since the purpose of the statute is not to prevent a simple trespass affecting merely the possession, but to prevent the taking of personal property from the land by some person other than the owner, and one who cuts and carries away timber as the servant of the owner is not guilty. Boyce, 109-.

TENANT NOT ESTOPPED TO DENY LANDLORD'S TITLE.-The tenant in such case is not estopped to deny his landlord's title to that part of the tract not embraced in his lease and from which the timber was cut, since he had no possession nor right of possession beyond the boundary of the land leased to him. Boyce, 109-.

OWNER NOT INDICTABLE THOUGH NOT IN POSSESSION.-The owner, or bona fide claimant, is not indictable for cutting and carrying away timber

from the land, though he is not in possession. The statute does not prohibit the simple invasion of the prosecutor's possession. Boyce, 109—.

This statute does not embrace or contemplate a taking and carrying away of money; it means only such property as was not, at common law, subject to larceny. Vosburg, 111-718.

33. PUBLIC RECORDS.

Sec. 384 (1071). Larceny or obliteration of public records, or fraudulent removal of registration book; not necessary to allege ownership or value. R. C., c. 34, s. 31. 8 Hen. VI., c 12. 1881, c. 17.

If any person shall steal, or for any fraudulent purpose, shall take from its place of deposit for the time being, or from any person having the lawful custody thereof, or shall unlawfully and maliciously obliterate, injure or destroy any record, writ, return, panel, process, interrogatory, deposition, affidavit, rule, order or warrant of attorney or any original document whatsoever, of or belonging to any court of record, or relating to any matter civil or criminal, begun, pending or terminated in any such court, or any bill, answer, interrogatory, deposition, affidavit, order or decree or any original document whatsoever, of or belonging to any court or relating to any cause or matter begun, pending or terminated in any such court, every such offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and in any indictment for such offence it shall not be necessary to allege that the article, in respect to which the offence is committed, is the property of any person or that the same is of any value. And if any person shall steal, or for any fraudulent purpose shall take from the register's office, or from any person having the lawful custody thereof, or shall unlawfully and wilfully obliterate, injure or destroy any book wherein deeds or other instruments of writing are registered, or any other book of registration, or record required to be kept by the register of deeds, or shall unlawfully destroy, obliterate, deface or remove any record of proceedings of the board of county commissioners, or unlawfully and fraudulently abstract any record, receipt, order or voucher or other paper-writing required to be kept by the clerk of the board of commissioners of any county, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

INDICTMENT-VARIANCE.-An allegation that defendant stole a fi. fa. "issued from the superior court office" is not sustained by proof that the fi. fa. was made out, but retained by the clerk, at the instance of defendant, until the amount was paid to him. McLeod, 50 (5 Jones), 318.

INDICTMENT--OBSCURITY.-An indictment for larceny charging in one count the thing stolen to be "a certain writ of fi. fa. belonging to the superior court;" in another count "a certain process of and belonging to the superior court," and in a third "a certain record of and belonging to the superior court," is too vague to authorize a conviction under it. McLeod, 50 (5 Jones), 318.

34. LARCENY OF WILLS.

Sec. 385 (1072). Larceny, fraudulent concealment or destruction of wills. R. C., c. 34, s. 32.

If any person, either during the life of the testator or after his death, shall steal or for any fraudulent purpose destroy or conceal any will, codicil or other testamentary instrument, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

35. PUBLIC LAWS AND DOCUMENTS.

Sec. 386 (1073). Larceny, fraudulent disposition by clerk, or other custodian of the public laws, reports of supreme court or other public documents, a misdemeanor. 1881, c. 151.

It shall be the duty of the clerk of the superior court of each county, and every other person to whom the acts of the general assembly, supreme court reports, or other public documents are transmitted or deposited for the use of the county or the state, to safely keep the same in their respective offices; and if any such person having the custody of such books and documents, for the uses aforesaid, shall negligently and wilfully dispose of the same by sale or otherwise; or refuse to deliver over the same to his successor in office, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and punished by fine or imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the court.

36. GRAND AND PETIT LARCENY.

Sec. 387 (1075). Larceny, distinction between grand and petit larceny abolished. R. C., c. 34, s. 26.

All distinction between petit and grand larceny, where the same hath had the benefit of clergy, is abolished; and the offence of felonious stealing, where no other punishment shall be specifically prescribed therefor by statute, shall be punished as petit larceny is: Provided, that in cases of much aggravation, or of hardened offenders, the court may, in its discretion, sentence the offender to the penitentiary for a period not exceeding ten years.

EFFECT OF STATUTE.-The effect of this statute is to reduce all felonious stealing to the grade of petit larceny. Following State v. Tyler, 85—569. Stroud, 95-626.

37. MONEY-INDICTMENT FOR STEALING.

Sec. 388 (1190). In indictments for larceny of money, treasury notes or banknotes, sufficient to describe such money or notes simply as money without specifying the kind. 1876-'7, c. 68.

In every indictment in which it shall be necessary to make any averment as to the larceny of any money, or United States treas