Where there is no evidence that a defendant had ever exhibited any sign of insanity, evidence tending to show that some of his uncles and aunts were insane is inadmissible. Cunningham, 72-469.

A defendant's own declarations just after the act are not competent to prove his insanity. Scott, 8 (1 Hawks), 24.

While the testimony as to mental capacity falls within the exception to the rule that no witness, other than qualified experts, shall be allowed to express an opinion in a matter submitted to the inquiry of a jury, yet insanity can not be proved by general reputation or hearsay. Coley, 114-879.

INSURANCE AGENT.

Sec. 292 (3077). Insurance agent guilty of felony, when. 1883, c. 57, s. 17. Any insurance agent doing business in this state, who shall unlawfully withhold or expend the funds of his principal, shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of felony.

INTENT.

When an act itself is equivocal, and becomes criminal only by reason of the intent with which it is done, both must unite to constitute the offence, and both must be proved to warrant a conviction. Smith, 93516.

Intent is defined to be a steadfast resolve and deeprooted purpose, or a design formed after carefully considering the consequences. Thomas, 118-1113.

Where an act is forbidden by statute the doing of it constitutes the offence, and the intent with which it was done is immaterial. Railway, 122-1052.

An intent to commit a felonious act, where the intent is only a misdemeanor, merges in the felony, if the act be committed; but not if the intent alone is a felony of the same grade with the act itself; and the defendant may be convicted of either upon evidence of the particular offence charged. Jesse, 20 (3 D. & B.), 98.

INTIMIDATION OF VOTERS.

Sec. 293 (2715). Intimidation of voters. 1868, c. 62, s. 4.

Any person who shall discharge from employment, withdraw patronage from, or otherwise injure, threaten, oppress, or attempt

to intimidate any qualified voter of this state, because of the vote such voter may, or may not have cast in any election, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Sec. 294 (2716). Bribery at elections. R. C., c. 52, s. 22. 1868, c. 62, ss. 1, 3. 1868-'9, c. 176, s. 1. 1876-'7, c. 275, s. 45.

Any person who shall, at any time before or after an election, either directly or indirectly, give, or promise to give, any money, property, or reward to any elector, or to any county or district, in order to be elected, or to procure any other person to be elected a member of the general assembly, or to any office under the laws of this state, shall forfeit and pay four hundred dollars to any person who will sue for the same, and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and any person who shall receive or agree to receive any such bribe shall also be guilty of a misdemeanor.

Sec. 295 (413). Judge to explain law, but to express no opinion on facts. C. C. P., s. 237. R. C., c. 31, s. 130. 1796, c. 452, s. 1.

No judge, in giving a charge to the petit jury, either in a civil or a criminal action, shall give an opinion whether a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, such matter being the true office and province of the jury; but he shall state in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in the case, and declare and explain the law arising thereon.

REFUSAL TO CHARGE THAT THE EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT.-Where the evidence is not sufficient to prove the offence charged in the indictment, the refusal of the judge to so instruct the jury is good ground for exception. Massey, 86-658.

OPINION MUST BE PREJUDICIAL.-The statute only prohibits the trial judge from expressing an opinion upon those facts respecting which the parties take issue or dispute, and, in order to constitute a violation of the statute, remarks complained of must be shown to have been an expressio of opinion on the facts and prejudicial to the party complaining of the same. Robertson, 121-551.

COLLATERAL EVIDENCE.-The trial judge is not required to repeat to the jury collateral evidence. Caveness, 78-484.

COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTE.-The court is not required to give instructions in the very words asked even when unobjectionable. A substantial compliance is sufficient. Booker, 123-713.

PROPER EXPRESSION.-A proper expression in charging the jury is, “if you find from the evidence," instead of "if you believe such a fact or facts." Barrett, 123-753.

STATING THE EVIDENCE AND DECLARING LAW.-A failure to "state in a plain and correct manner the evidence given in the case and declare and explain the law arising thereon," is not error when the court is not requested to do so, especially when the evidence is neither complicated or peculiar in its bearings, and when the court expressly directs attention to the evidence in defendant's behalf. Distinguishing State v. Boyle, 104 N. C., 800. Pritchett, 106-667.

DECLARATIONS OF ONE PRISONER AGAINST ANOTHER.-A general charge that the jury should not consider any admission or declaration of one prisoner against the others on trial, unless they were present when made, is not a sufficient compliance with the law, which excludes evidence of the declarations of one of the prisoners as against the others unless they were made in the presence of the others. Oxendine, 107-783.

JURY NOT THE JUDGES OF THE LAW.-It is not error to refuse to tell the jury that they are the judges of the law as well as of the facts. Peace, 46 (1 Jones), 251.

GOOD CHARACTER IN PLAIN CASE.-It is error to charge the jury that "in a plain case a good character would not help the prisoner, but in a doubtful case, he had a right to have it cast into the scales and weighed in his behalf;" the true rule being that in all cases a good character is to be considered. Henry, 50 (5 Jones), 65.

MAJORITY OF JURY YIELDING TO ONE.-It is not error for the court to refuse to charge that in case one of the jury had a doubt as to the guilt of the prisoner, the other jurors should yield to him. Bowman, 80— 432.

CAUTION BEFORE ADJOURNMENT.-A failure of the judge to instruct the jury before a short adjournment pending the trial of a capital case that they should not discuss the case among themselves or with third parties during the recess, is not sufficient cause for a new trial where it does not appear that an improper verdict resulted from such omission, or that the jury were tampered with. Edwards, 79-648.

JURY NOT BOUND TO BELIEVE UNIMPEACHED WITNESS.-It is error to charge the jury they are bound to believe a witness unless he is impeached. Smallwood, 75-104.

TESTIMONY OF RELATIONS REGARDED WITH SUSPICION.-It is not error to instruct the jury that the law regards with suspicion the testimony of near relations when testifying for each other. Nash, 30 (8 Ired.), 35.

The testimony of a witness related to the party for whom he testifies is thereby affected, and his evidence must be received with some degree of allowance. Boon, 82-637.

CASE RELIED ON BY DEFENCE.-A charge that a certain case relied on by the defence was the law in North Carolina, "but it was the extreme verge of the law," is no ground for a new trial. Harrison, 69-264.

SINGLING OUT WITNESS.-While the court may not single out a witness or witnesses and charge the jury that they must find in a designated way if they believe such witnesses; yet, if the opposite state of facts and the law applicable thereto have been called to the attention of the jury, it may properly tell the jury that if they believe a certain state of facts as deposed to by certain witnesses, then the law applicable is so and so, for thus the attention of the jury is directed not to the credibility of the witnesses, but to a certain state of facts or hypothesis. Rollins, 113-722.

UNPREJUDICIAL INSTRUCTION.-The defendants can not complain of an erroneous instruction which was not prejudicial to them, but in their favor. Freeman, 122-1013.

NO EXPRESSION OF OPINION.-A charge that perjury is very much a matter of intent, and that as to that the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt upon "all the facts and circumstances of the case deposed to by the witnesses" contains no expression of opinion by the judge. Journigan, 120-568.

Where, on the trial of an indictment for seduction, the prosecutrix in reply to a question tearfully and energetically denied that she ever had carnal intercourse with any one but the defendant, and the crowd of bystanders laughed boisterously, and thereupon the trial judge, in attempting to quell the disturbance, remarked, "If I could discover the infernal fiends who laugh in such a manner, I would send them to jail for contempt," such remarks are not an expression of opinion on the facts involved in the prosecution. Robertson, 121-551.

READING NOTES WAIVED-EFFECT.-The consent of the defendant that the judge need not read over his notes of the testimony is not a waiver of his right to have the law applied to the facts in the case as the law requires. Groves, 121-563.

PRAYER CORRECT ONLY IN PART.--Where an instruction prayed for is correct in part and incorrect as an entirety, the court is not called upon dissect it and give so much of it as is good. Neal, 120-613.

DEFENDANT GUILTY ON OWN EVIDENCE.-When justified by the evidence the judge may charge the jury that if they believe the testimony of the defendant who testifies in his own behalf, they should find him guilty. Woolard, 119-779.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES MUST BE STATED.-The rule that in the absence of a request no exception can be maintained for a failure to charge on any particular phase of the case does not exclude the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the nature of the offence and the general principles of law essential to their verdict. Fulford, 124.

EXCEPTION, WHEN MADE.-An exception for omission to charge must be made before verdict. Harris, 120-577.

CONSENT TO VERDICT OF MANSLAUGHTER OF ONE PRISONER-OPINION.Where two are on trial for murder, the fact that the court permits the solicitor to consent to a verdict of manslaughter as to one, is no expression as to the grade of the other's offence. Pratt, 88-639.

HARMLESS REMARK.-Where the judge in charging the jury remarks that the prisoner is charged with a "dastardly crime," but it does not appear that the remark was made in a spirit or tone unfriendly or hostile

to the prisoner, nor that it tended to prejudice him before the jury, an exception to the remark can not be sustained. McCarter, 98-637.

JURY NOT BOUND TO BELIEVE UNCONTRADICTED WITNESS.-It is error for the court in referring to a witness to charge that "If her character is of ordinary respectability, you will take her testimony to be true, unless she is fully and thoroughly contradicted." Parker, 66-624.

INSTRUCTION NEED NOT BE IN VERY WORDS ASKED.-The trial judge is not required to give a prayer for instructions in the very words in which it is asked, nor to give impertinent instructions, nor to recite the testimony of each witness in the order in which he was examined. Jones, 97— 469.

GIVING PROMINENCE TO TESTIMONY OF ONE WITNESS.-Where the evidence is conflicting, it is erroneous to separate and give prominence to the testimony of one witness, who is in conflict with others, but if the conflicting statements are put side by side, and the jury directed, as they might find the facts to be, to convict if they found the facts as testified to by one witness, but to acquit if they should find the contrary, but that all the evidence should be considered, and if not satisfied appellant fought willingly they should acquit, there is no error. Weathers, 98-685.

PREJUDICIAL REMARK CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL.-On disagreement of counsel as to the testimony of a witness, the court stated that both the counsel were wrong, but that he would so recapitulate the testimony that "it would be moral perjury for a juror to accept the statement of defendant's counsel:" Held, that such remark was an invasion of the province of the jury, and entitled the defendant to a new trial. Sykes, 80-618.

CHARGING ABSTRACT PROPOSITION OF LAW.-A charge in which the court deals in generalities and abstract propositions of law, merely reading "head notes" of reported cases, without making any application of them to the facts of the case, does not meet the requirements of the statute. Jones, 87-547.

EXPRESSION OF OPINION AS TO CREDIT OF WITNESS.-An instruction that from the testimony of the prosecutor, and from the nature of his testimony, otherwise it was not possible for him to be in error, is erroneous, since it takes from the jury the degree of credit to be given his testimony. Presley, 35 (13 Ired.), 494.

CHARGE MUST BE COMPLETE.-On the trial of defendant for perjury it appeared that on a former trial for forcible entry, defendant, who was then the prosecutor, swore that he was present and forbade the trespass. The evidence was that some of the trespassers had entered before defendant reached the place, that others were in the act of entering, and that he was fifty or seventy-five yards distant when he forbade them, and that they persisted notwithstanding his forbidding: Held, that the fact that defendant was not on the very spot when he forbade the entry, and that the trespass had been commenced but not completed before the forbidding, were immaterial, and that a charge that defendant's guilt depended on the fact of his presence, without further instructions was not a compliance with the statute. Lawson, 98-759.

EXPRESSION OF OPINION.-A remark of the judge, made before the trial began, that the jailer had said that the prisoner "would escape if he had the opportunity," is not an expression of opinion. Jacobs, 106-695.

TESTIMONY OF A DEFENDANT AFTER SEVERANCE.-Where there is a severance on the trial of defendants, and another party charged in the bill testifies in behalf of the accused, it is error, as indicating an opinion on the facts, to charge that the very fact that the witness is included in the same indictment will impair his testimony, and that his testimony should not