is not an undue interference with the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution, although the language used falls short of being a nuisance. Warren, 113-683.

DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN COUNTIES.-A statute which discriminates between the different counties of the state as to the time when the payment of taxes can be compelled is not unconstitutional, since its provisions affect every one alike in the localities to which they are applicable and contain no violation of the principle of equal taxation. Jones, 121--616.

One state can not enforce the penal or criminal laws of another or punish crimes or offences committed in and against another state. Hall, 114-909.

FISHING IN NAVIGABLE WATERS.-The regulation of fishing in the navigable waters of the state is within the power of the legislature. Woodard, 123-710.

CRIME COMMITTED IN ANOTHER STATE.--The legislature of this state can not define and punish crimes committed in another state. Knight, 4 (Tay.), 44.

NINE MEMBERS OF GRAND JURY INSTEAD OF TWELVE.-An act of the legis lature making the concurrence of nine members of the grand jury suffi cient, is unconstitutional. Barker, 107-913.

CONTEMPT.

SEC. 91. Disobedience to order; pun-
ishment.

SEC. 92. What constitutes contempt.
SEC. 93. Punishment for contempt.
SEC. 94. Court may punish summa-
rily.

SEC. 95. Who may punish.
SEC. 96. Commissioners may punish.

SEC. 97. When offender to appear and
show cause.

SEC. 98. Punish as for contempt.
SEC. 99. Proceedings as for contempt.
SEC. 100. What necessary to sustain
proceeding.

SEC. 101. Railroad officers; contempt.

Sec. 91 (500). Disobedience to order; punishment. C. C. P., s. 274. 1869-'70, c. 79, s. 3.

If any person, party, or witness, disobey an order of the court or judge or referee, duly served, such person, party or witness, may be punished by the judge as for a contempt. And in all cases of commitment under this sub chapter, the person committed may in case of inability to perform the act required, or to endure the imprisonment, be discharged from imprisonment by the judge committing him, or the judge having jurisdiction, on such terms as may be just.

DEFENDANT MAY BE INDICTED AS WELL AS PUNISHED FOR CONTEMPT.-If the act which constitutes the contempt is an offence against the criminal law, it may be prosecuted as such though the contempt has already been punished. Griffin, 98-225.

ALTERNATIVE JUDGMENT.-A sentence to "pay a fine of $40, and in default thereof be imprisoned thirty days," is erroneous, since alternative judgments are not allowed. Deaton, 105-59.

Sec. 92 (648). What constitutes contempt. 1868-'9, c. 177, s. 1. 1870-'1, c. 216, ss. 2. 3.

Any person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt:

(1) Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of any court of justice, in immediate view and presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings, or to impair the respect due its authority;

(2) Behavior of the like character committed in the presence of any referee or referees, while actually engaged in any trial or hearing pursuant to the order of any court, or in the presence. of any jury while actually sitting for a trial of a cause, or upon any inquest or other proceedings authorized by law; '

(3) Any breach of the peace, noise or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of any court;

(4) Wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by any court;

(5) Resistance wilfully offered by any person to the lawful erder or process of any court;

(6) The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness, or when so sworn, the like refusal to answer any legal and proper interrogatory;

(7) The publication of grossly inaccurate reports of the proceedings in any court, about any trial, or other matter pending before said court, made with intent to misrepresent or to bring into contempt the said court; but no person can be punished as for a contempt in publishing a true, full and fair report of any trial, argument, decision or proceeding had in court;

(8) Misbehavior of any officer of the court in any official transaction:

(9) The several acts, neglects and omissions of duty, malfeasances, misfeasances, and nonfeasances, above specified and described, shall be the only acts, neglects and omissions of duty, malfeasances, misfeasances and nonfeasances which shall be the subject of contempt of court. And if there be any parts of the common law now in force in this state which recognized other acts, neglects, omissions of duty, malfeasances, misfeasances and nonfeasances besides those specified and described above, the same are hereby repealed and annulled.

COSTS PRIMA FACIE GUILTY.-One who is prima facie guilty of a contempt in disobeying an order of court may be required to pay the costs,

though he purge himself of any intentional disobedience to the order and the rule is discharged. Bond v. Bond, 69-97.

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-MANDAMUS.-County commissioners can not be put in contempt for failure to pay a debt against the county in obedience to a writ of mandamus, when the fund raised by taxation is the full constitutional limit, and all of it is required to meet the necessary expenses of the county government. Cromartie v. Commissioners, 87–134.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED BY SUPREME COURT BECOMES FINAL.-After a judg ment of a subordinate court imposing a punishment for disobedience of its order has been affirmed by the supreme court it becomes final, and the superior court has no power to remit or modify it. Griffin, 98-225.

ADVICE OF ATTORNEY NO EXCUSE.-A party who intentionally violates an interlocutory judgment of the court is guilty of contempt, although he may have acted in good faith upon professional advice honestly given. Green v. Griffin, 95-50.

ALIMONY NOT A DEBT.-An allowance decreed to a wife pending an action by her against her husband for divorce is not a debt within the meaning of the constitution, and the defendant may be held to answer a rule for contempt in default of payment. Pain v. Pain, 80-322.

FINDINGS OF FACT BY JUSTICE NOT CONCLUSIVE.-Though on appeal from the superior to the supreme court the findings of fact by the superior court are conclusive, it is otherwise on appeal from a subordinate court to the superior court, since the case is to be heard in the superior court de novo, and it is the duty of the judge to review the findings of fact of the subordinate court as well as the rulings of law, and the judge, in furtherance of justice, may hear additional testimony, either orally or by affidavit, in making up his own findings of fact. Deaton, 105-59.

CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT REFUSING TO SEND TRANSCRIPT.-A clerk who wilfully refuses to make out the transcript of a record on appeal may be attached for contempt. Te-gan-tossee v. Rogers, 2 Hawks, 567.

DISAVOWAL OF INTENT NOT SUFFICIENT, WHEN.-One who wilfully disobeys a judicial mandate is guilty of contempt whether an indignity to the court or contempt of its authority was intended or not, and a disavowal of the imputed intent can not purge the contempt nor exonerate the defendant. The rule that a disavowal of the intent purges the contempt is confined to "the class of cases where the intention to injure constitutes the gravamen" of the offence. Baker v. Cordon, 86-116.

MISTAKE AS TO THE MEANING OF DOUBTFUL LANGUAGE AN EXCUSE.-A mistaken interpretation of doubtful language used in an order of court is a defence to a charge for contempt in disobeying the order, but where the language is plain and the attempt is made to escape the force and defeat the manifest purposes of the order by indirection, the penalty must be enforced, or the court would be unable to perform many of its most important functions. Baker v. Cordon, 86-116.

JURY NOT ALLOWED.-The defendant in contempt proceedings is not entitled to a jury trial upon the controverted facts, though the judge, in his discretion, may avail himself of a jury and have their verdict upon a disputed and doubtful matter of fact. Deaton, 105-59.

FAILURE TO PAY MONEY INTO COURT UNDER ORDER.-Where a party is ordered to pay money into court or be attached for contempt in failing to do so, and swears that after every effort it is out of his power to pay it, the rule will be discharged, since the court will not require an impossibility nor imprison a man perpetually for a debt; but where, on a return to the rule, he does not swear that he can not borrow the money, but does show that he has some personal property, though exempt from seizure under final process for the payment of debts, the rule will not be discharged, since his personal property exemption is not more sacred than the money which he wrongfully withholds. Smith v. Smith, 92-304.

CONSTITUTION-TAMPERING WITH JURY.-Giving hand-bills, on a day before the beginning of a term of court, to a juror summoned to serve at such term when a case in which respondent is interested stands for trial, with a request to read the same and hand to the other jurors, said handbills containing an account of the suit prejudicial to the adverse party, does not constitute a contempt within the meaning of this statute; and the statute by confining such offence to the acts specified therein, and thus depriving the court of the inherent power to punish for contempt one who attempts, by improper influences brought to bear on a juror, to prevent the course of justice, is not in conflict with Const. N. C., art. 4, section 12, providing that "the general assembly shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any power of jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a co-ordinate department of the government," since the power to punish by a criminal prosecution for an attempt to corruptly influence the administration of justice will afford as ample protection to the court as the exercise of the denied power to act summarily after the perpetration of an act not committed during a session of the court. Oldham, 89-23.

INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER OF COURT.-A rule was obtained for alleged contempt in not performing a judgment of court, based on an affidavit declaring a belief that the respondent "is able and has sufficient means" to do so, but which set forth no facts upon which such belief was grounded, and in answer the respondent made affidavit that his inability to perform the judgment resulted from his misfortune and necessitous condition, and that he had no intention or desire to injure the opposing party or disobey the mandate of the court: Held, that the rule should have been discharged. Boyett v. Vaughan, 89-27.

ANSWER-INTENTION MATERIAL.—In a rule to show cause why a person shall not be punished for contempt the actual intention of the respondent is material, in which respect it differs from an indictment for the like offence; therefore, where the respondent meets the words of the rule by disavowing upon oath any intention of committing a contempt of the court, or of impairing the respect due to its authority, the rule must be discharged. Ex parte Moore, 63—397.

DEFAULTING WITNESS MAY APPEAL-From analogy to cases in which prosecutors are taxed with costs, an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding for contempt against a defaulting witness in a prosecution against R should be entitled “State v. R.; appeal by A, defaulting witness." Aiken, 113-651.

MAYOR MAY PUNISH.-The authority to punish for contempt given to justices by section 651 of The Code, is extended to mayors by section 3818 of The Code. Aiken, 113-651.

OFFICERS. An officer who refuses to obey an order of the court directing him to return the process on and bond on a ca. sa. on the first day of the court, instead of the second, as the law requires, and who sends a contemptuous message to the court inreply to its order, may be fined for contempt. Ex parte Summers, 27 (5 Ire.), 149.

MAY BE DISCHARGED ON HABEAS CORPUS.-Where the court states the facts on which it acts in a proceeding for contempt, a revising tribunal may, on habeas corpus, discharge the parties, if it clearly appear that the facts do not amount to a contempt. Ex parte Summers, 27 (5 Ire.), 149. CLERK REFUSING TO MAKE TRANSCRIPT.-Where the clerk of the superior court wilfully refuses to make out the transcript on appeal, the supreme court will, on affidavit and motion, grant a rule upon him to show cause why he should not be attached for contempt. Te-gan-tosse v. Rogers, 9 (2 Hawks), 567.

PRACTICE EXPLAINED.-The statute and punishment construed, practice explained, and the sufficiency of the return considered. Kane v. Haywood, 66-1.

Sec. 93 (649). Contempt; its punishment. 1868-'9, c. 177, s. 2.

Punishment for contempt for matters set forth in the preceding section, shall be by fine or imprisonment or both, in the discre tion of the court. The fine not to exceed two hundred and fifty dollars, and the imprisonment not to exceed thirty days.

FINE BELONGS TO THE STATE.—A judge has no authority to direct that a fine for contempt, imposed on a sheriff for failure to obey an order of the court directing him to deliver goods to the defendant in a case, shall be paid to the defendant as damages for such unlawful detention of the goods, since a fine for contempt is a punishment for a wrong to the state and goes to the state. Rhodes, 65-518.

A fine for a contempt for disobeying an injunction against the sale of goods can not be ordered to be paid to the party aggrieved, since the state alone is entitled to the penalty. Morris v. Whitehead, 65-637.

PUNISHMENT INDEFINITE IN DURATION.—A judgment that county commissioners, who have been adjudged in contempt for failure to levy and collect a sufficient tax to pay a debt in obedience to a writ of mandamus, be "imprisoned in the common jail until they pay to the plaintiff out of the general fund in the county treasury" a certain sum, is not in contravention of this statute, since the force of the mandamus is exhausted by rendering obedience, and every court has the power to coerce obedience to its lawful orders. Cromartie v. Commissioners, 85-211.

PUNISHMENT BY IMPRISONMENT.-Where the act constituting the contempt comes within the classes mentioned in the next preceding section, the court has no power to punish by imprisonment of indefinite duration, but may so punish when the proceeding is "as for contempt" under section 95 (The Code, section 654, et seq.) Cromartie v. Commissioners, 85-211.

FINE. A fine for contempt is a punishment for a wrong to the state and goes to the state, and can not be ordered paid to a party to a suit. In the matter of Rhodes, 65-518.

Sec. 94 (650). Court may punish summarily R. C., c. 34, s. 117. 1868-'9, c. 177, s. 3.

Contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court may be punished summarily, but the court shall cause the particulars of the offence to be specified on the record, and a copy of the same to be attached to every committal, attachment or process in the nature of an execution founded on such judg ment or order.

THE OBJECT OF THE STATUTE.-The object of the statute is to furnish evidence against a magistrate on trial for a malfeasance in office by an abuse of power, and to enable the person punished to obtain such redress as, by the law, he might be entitled to. Deaton, 105-59.

EFFECT OF THE STATUTE-HABEAS CORPUS.-The requirement that the court shall find the facts constituting the contempt and have them spread upon the record does not have the effect to give the right to an appeal nor to a writ of certiorari where the contempt is committed in the presence of the court, but such facts when found and spread upon the record may authorize a revising tribunal, on a habeas corpus, to discharge the party if it plainly appear that the facts as found in law do not justify a sentence for contempt. Deaton, 105-59.