Cession of Jurisdiction. pensation for the time he was occupied in receiving them, and in making the passage to Calcutta. But it must be disallowed; for the act of 1855, then in force, gave no salary, except for the time spent at the post of duty. I am, most respectfully, yours, &c., Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of State. J. S. BLACK. CESSION OF JURISDICTION. 1. The general act of the Florida Legislature, passed June 6, 1855, is a sufficient cession of jurisdiction over land purchased in that State by the Federal Government for public works. 2. The opinion of Mr. Attorney General Cushing on the same point reaffirmed. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, September 24, 1857. SIR: I have examined the act of the Florida Legislature, passed June 6, 1855, and am of opinion that it is a sufficient "cession of jurisdiction" over land purchased in that State by the Federal Government for public works. It is all that you are required, by the resolution of 1841, to ask from the Legislature of any State. For further information on the general subject, I refer you to the opinions of my immediate predecessor, who discussed it very thoroughly. (7 Op., 628; 8 Op., 30.) I am, most respectfully, yours, &c., Hon. HOWELL COBB, Secretary of the Treasury. J. S. BLACK. Irregular Application for Advice. IRREGULAR APPLICATION FOR ADVICE. A person intending to make application for a patent asks the Secretary of the Interior beforehand whether it will be granted. The Secretary is advised to decline giving any answer. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, September 24, 1857. SIR: You have enclosed me a letter from O. J. E. Stuart, Esq., of Mississippi, in which he asks your department to inform him whether he can get a patent for a machine invented by his slave. It seems that he has not yet made the application, and for aught that can now be known, he never will. I do not consider it my duty or yours to decide questions like this before they arise in the regular and proper course of business. Mr. Stuart can apply for a patent if he sees proper; but he must do so at his own risk, and not upon an invitation from the officers of Government, which will commit them in his favor beforehand. It is due to applicants themselves, as well as to the public, that legal opinions should not be given in any but actual cases, since nobody is officially responsible for what may be said about cases which are merely supposed. I am, with great respect, yours, &c., Hon. JACOB THOMPSON, J. S. BLACK. Secretary of the Interior. Spanish Deserters. SPANISH DESERTERS. 1. Under the treaty with Spain, and the act of Congress which was made to carry it out, the apprehension and delivery of a seaman, who is alleged to be a deserter from a Spanish ship, is a judicial duty, and the State Department cannot change what a judge has done. 2. To prove the fact of desertion, the treaty requires the exhibition of the ship's roll, with the name of the deserter upon it, and this is not met by the mere certificate of a Spanish consul. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, September 24, 1857. SIR: I have read the note addressed to you by the Span ish minister on the case of Manuel Castro, a deserter from the Spanish schooner San Juan Baptista, at Key West. From that note, and from other papers on the same subject which you have sent me, it appears that the deserter was arrested after the vessel had put to sea, on a warrant issued by a justice of the peace. But he was discharged by a State judge on a writ of habeas corpus. The Spanish consul then applied to the district judge of the United States for another warrant, which was refused. This is the subject of complaint. You ask whether it is well founded, and what can be done to prevent a repetition of such grievances. Under the treaty with Spain, and the act of Congress which was made to carry out that and other treaties of the same kind, the apprehension and delivery of a deserter is a judicial duty. It must be performed according to the judgment and conscience of those to whom it is assigned. The judges are sworn to administer it faithfully according to the best of their learning and ability; and that is all that can be demanded of them. You cannot require them to decide a given question in a particular way; much less can you reverse a sentence already pronounced. When a cause is pending before the courts in which our own or a foreign Government has a special interest, the President will always see that the facts and the law shall Spanish Deserters. be properly presented by competent counsel, and sometimes he prescribes what line of argument shall be used. But the judges must be left to act upon their own separate responsibility. Inasmuch, therefore, as this is a judicial duty, you cannot change what has been done, even if you are sure it was done erroneously. Nor do I see what measures you can take which will be absolutely sure to prevent the same judge or another from doing the like hereafter. But I think the decision was right. The treaty requires that in such a case the Spanish consul in American ports shall exhibit the ship's roll, and the name of the deserter must appear in it before he can be arrested, held in custody, or delivered. The act of Congress (4 Stat. at Large, 360) declares that the arrest may be made on proof by exhibition of the register of the vessel, ship's roll, or other official document. Here there was no exhibition of the roll, or any other corresponding document which contained the names of the ship's crew. The consul produced an extract from the roll, certified by himself, but he did not exhibit the original roll carried by the vessel, as the treaty in plain terms required him to do. It might be convenient, in cases like this, to dispense with the production of the original document, and let the rights of the person claimed as a deserter depend on the mere certificate of a consul; but a written compact between two nations is not to be set aside for a shade or two of convenience more or less. The law is so written, and that is a sufficient answer to all that can be said against this proceeding. I am, with great respect, yours, &c., Hon. LEWIS CASS, J, S. BLACK. Secretary of State. Rent and Furniture of Court Rooms. RENT AND FURNITURE OF COURT ROOMS. 1. No marshal of a district can be allowed in his accounts for the expenditure of more than twenty dollars for furniture, and fifty dollars for rent, unless previously to the expenditure he obtain the approbation of the Secretary of the Interior. 2. The Secretary has no authority to give the approval after the expenditure is made. 3. The powers of the Secretary in this respect are not enlarged by the law which authorizes an appeal to him from the accounting officers. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: It seems that the late marshal of southern Ohio claims credit of $161 20, for furniture of rooms occupied at Cincinnati by the federal courts, and the marshal of southern California asks to be allowed for rent of a courthouse building at the rate of $3,500 per annum. These expenses were, in both cases, incurred without the knowledge, and, of course, without the previous approbation, of your department. Can you legally allow them now? The act of 1853 declares that "the marshal shall not incur an expense of more than twenty dollars in any one year for furniture, or fifty dollars for rent of building and making improvements thereon, without submitting a statement and estimates to the Secretary of the Interior, and getting his instructions in the premises," (10 Stat. at Large, 165.) This is a plain law, if there ever was one; and in both the cases which you submit it was palpably violated. Will you sanction an expenditure made in the teeth of the statute? If you do, you must make yourself' a party to the guilt. The statute authorizes a marshal to spend twenty dollars for furniture and fifty dollars for house rent without consulting the department, but forbids him to go beyond that, unless he has your previous approbation. Now if you say he may spend what he pleases, and count upon your sanction afterwards, you obliterate the distinction between the smaller sums and the larger ones. He cannot be allowed |