INDIANS AND INDIAN TREATIES.
1. In the treaty with the Delawares, a provision was inserted, that there
shall be confirmed by patent to the Christian Indians, subject to such
restrictions as Congress may provide, a quantity of land equal to four
sections, upon certain conditions, which were complied with. No
restrictions were imposed by Congress, and the Christian Indians,
desiring to sell the land, made application for a patent.
Held, that,
(a.) A patent for the four sections of land mentioned in the first
article of the treaty with the Delawares should be issued to the
Christian Indians in the common form.
(b.) Such patent will enable the patentees to hold the land, not by
the original title of the Delawares, but as absolute owners in
fee under the United States.
(c.) The rights which patentees would otherwise have to alien their
lands may be restricted by act of Congress after the patent shall
issue as well as before.
(d.) No such restriction can be rightfully made if it would have the
effect of invalidating the title of a bona fide purchaser by a legal
conveyance from the patentee.
(e.) The title of the Christian Indians will not be vested in the
individuals comprising the tribe called by that name, as tenants
in common, but in the tribe itself, or nation.
(f) No private person can procure a conveyance from the tribe, or
even negotiate with it for that purpose, without making him-
self an offender against the act of Congress of June 30, 1834.
(9.) The tribe may part with its lands by a treaty or convention,
pursuant to the Constitution and the law, 24.
2. The treaty with the Wyandots requires that certain funds of that tribe
shall be invested in United States stock, and the act of 1841 contains
the same command, 44.
3. The funds of the Wyandots can, therefore, not be invested otherwise
than in stock of the United States, though the high price which that
stock commands in the market may justify the Secretary of the Interior
in not making any investment at all for the present. Ibid.
4. The treaty with the Delawares requires the investment to be made "in
safe and profitable stocks." Any stocks which come up to this de-
scription may be taken for them. Ibid.
5. Where a certain class of Indians were entitled to a certain sum per head,
but the appropriation is not large enough to pay all of them, it must
be divided pro rata, 48.
6. The Kansas nation of Indians and the half-breed reservees are in lawful
possession, and have a perfect right to enjoy the peaceful occupation
of their lands, 110.
7. The power of the Government ought to be used to protect them against
all lawless trespassers, without reference to the question whether their
title be a fee or only a usufruct. Ibid.
8. The trade and intercourse law, passed 30th June, 1834, is applicable to
the Indian reserved land in Kansas and Nebraska, and ought to be
executed for their protection. Ibid.
1. As a general rule, the Government never pays interest upon a debt
except under a special contract, or a special law expressly providing
for the payment of interest, 57.
2. An act of Congress authorizing the payment of interest on a debt, with-
out fixing any time when it shall cease to be paid, authorizes interest
to be computed as long as any part of the principal remains unsatisfied.
Ibid.
1. A cruiser of one nation has a right to know the national character of any
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Continued.)
strange ship she may meet at sea; but the right is not a perfect one,
and the violation of it cannot be punished by capture and condemna-
tion, nor even by detention, 455.
2. The party making the inquiry must raise his own colors, or in some
other way make himself fully known before he can lawfully demand
such knowledge from the other vessel. Ibid.
3. If this is refused, the inquiring vessel may fire a blank shot, and in case
of further delay a shotted gun may be fired across the bows of the de-
linquent. Ibid.
4. Any measure beyond this which the commander of an armed ship may
take for the purpose of ascertaining the nationality of another vessel
must be at his peril. Ibid.
5. This right of inquiry can be exercised only on the high seas, and no
naval officer has the right to go into the harbor of a nation with which
his government is at peace to inquire into the nationality of a vessel
which is lying there. Ibid.
6. To make the fire of one vessel into another a piratical aggression within
the statute of March 3, 1819, it must be a first aggression, unprovoked
by any previous act of hostility or menace from the other side. Ibid.
ISTHMUS OF PANAMA.
1. The act of the government of New Granada, conceding to a company
the exclusive right to construct a railroad across the Isthmus of
Panama, must be construed so as to give that right within the true
geographical boundaries of the Isthmus, 391.
2. Those boundaries do not extend on the north to the Costa Rica line,
nor do they include the Isthmus of Chiriqui. Ibid.
JURISDICTION.
1. It may be doubted whether a circuit court has power to send criminal
process beyond the limits of the district in which the court is held, 265.
2. The judicial authority of the United States commissioner to China is
restricted to the five ports mentioned in the treaty with that nation,
294.
3. Under the act of August 11, 1848, the United States consuls in Turkey
have judicial powers only in criminal cases, 296.
1. Under the act of Congress organizing the territorial government of
Kansas, the Governor had three clear days to consider a bill passed by
the Territorial Legislature, and if he failed to return it, such bill did
not become a law unless the Assembly was in session three days after
the day on which the bill was passed, 132.
2. After the passage of the act of March 3, 1855, appropriating twenty
thousand dollars for public buildings in the Territory of Kansas,
and the act of the Territorial Legislature, passed in pursuance thereof,
fixing the permanent seat of government at Lecompton, the Terri-
torial Legislature had no right to remove the seat of government from
that town, 271.
3. Under the act of May 30, 1854, organizing the Territories of Nebraska
and Kansas, two-thirds of a quorum of the Territorial Legislature
constitute the majority necessary to pass a bill which the Governor
has vetoed, 410.
1. Where there is a conflict between two titles derived from the same
source, either of which would be good if the other were out of the way,
the elder must prevail, 253.
2. A grant by Congress does of itself, proprio vigore, pass to the grantee
all the estate of the United States, except what is expressly excepted.
Ibid.
LANDS, PUBLIC (Continued.)
3. Under the act of September 28, 1850, granting to the State of Arkansas
all the swamp lands within her limits, the title vested in the State be-
fore a patent issued. Ibid.
4. The general description of all swamp lands within the limits of the
State, was certain and definite enough for purposes of notice. Ibid.
5. Where Congress, after the grant of September 28, 1850, made another
grant to the State of Arkansas to aid in the construction of a rail-
road, under which a part of the lands previously granted under the
denomination of swamp lands was included, it was held, that the State
took the lands under the first grant. Ibid.
6. An act of Congress repealing all laws authorizing the sale of military
sites which are or may become useless for military purposes, did not
repeal an act granting to a railroad company the right of way over
the military reserve at Fort Gratiot, 282.
7. Under the act of May 23, 1844, the mayor of a town has authority to
make an entry of the public lands occupied as a town site as the offi-
cial organ of the corporate authorities, 308.
8. Where a person claiming a pre-emption right was shown to have located
Louisiana internal improvement scrip on more than three hundred
and twenty acres of other land, at the time he made his entry of the
land in question, it was held, that his title thereto was defeated, 499.
9. By the act of June 15, 1832, "authorizing the inhabitants of Louisiana
to enter the back lands," the right of back pre-emption is not given
to a person whose front land does not border upon a stream, but is a
tract through which the stream runs, 511.
10. The river, creek, bayou, or watercourse must be navigable. Ibid.
11. Where entry was made of lands bordering on an unnavigable stream,
by mistake of law, a patent should not be granted to the claimant.
Ibid.
12. Under the act of June 26, 1856, erroneous or informal entries or loca-
tions of lands made in ignorance or mistake of matters of law and
not of fact, cannot be confirmed. Ibid.
13. The ownership of the front lands on a river, creek, bayou, or water-
course at the date of the passage of the act of June 15, 1832, is essen-
tial to the right of back pre-emption, 513.
14. When the grantor of a claimant of a right of back pre-emption, under
the act of 1832, was on June 15, 1832, the owner of a confirmed
Spanish claim, which was not located on the tract in question, front-
ing on a navigable stream till the year 1835, it was held, that the
grantor of the claimant was not the owner of the tract fronting on
such stream at the date of the statute of 1832. Ibid.
15. The claimants under Spanish grants have no title to any specific tract
until their grants are lawfully located upon it. Ibid.
16. The ownership at the date of the passage of the act of 1832, contem-
plated by the statute, is that of some specific piece of land bordering
on a navigable stream. Ibid.
17. Where a settler made a mistake in his declaratory statement as to the
particular tract intended to be claimed, but failed for three years to
make the necessary proof and payment, and during his lifetime the
land in controversy was granted away by Congress, it was held, that a
pre-emption entry of his heirs was not confirmable by the Commis-
sioner of the Land Office, 515.
1. Where the claim of a mail contractor is referred by an act of Congress
to the Comptroller of the Treasury for an adjustment of the damages
which he alleges have been occasioned by the abrogation of the con-
tract, the Postmaster General has a right to be heard before the
Comptroller in vindication of the acts of his department, 10.
2. Having such right to be heard, the Postmaster General may take the
MAIL CONTRACTS (Continued.)
advice of the Attorney General upon any question of law involved in
the case. Ibid.
3. A contract with the Postmaster General for carrying the mail to a
foreign country, which by its terms is to commence when it is rati-
fied by Congress, and to be void in case such ratification is withheld,
does not bind either party until the ratification stipulated for is given.
Ibid.
4. In such a case, if Congress does not ratify the contract, the contractor
has no right to carry the mail, and the Postmaster General has no
lawful authority to permit letters or packages to be transported by
him from one post office to another. Ibid.
5. Such a contract does not bind the Postmaster General who makes it,
or his successor, to recommend the ratification of the contract to Con-
gress. Ibid.
6. If the Postmaster General be of opinion that such a contract is unwise
and impolitic, it is his duty to denounce it as such in his report. Ibid.
7. Neither the expression of an opinion in favor of such a contract by the
Postmaster General, nor his order to the postmasters not to deliver
mail matter to the contractor, can be regarded as a bargain, rescission,
or violation of the contract. Ibid.
8. If the act of Congress requires the comptroller to adjust the damages
due on account of the abrogation of the contract, those words do not
require him to regard the contract as having been abrogated or vio-
lated, when in point of fact it was faithfully kept, and all its condi-
tions performed by the Post Office Department. Ibid.
9. Such a law authorizes the Comptroller to award damages exclusively
for the abrogation of the contract, and if it never was abrogated, 1
damages at all can be allowed. Ibid.
10. Collins & Co agreed with the Navy Department to build a certain num-
ber of steamships, and to carry the United States mails upon them.
The ships were built accordingly. But some of them were wrecked;
and in place of one of them an inferior vessel was substituted, with
the consent of the Secretary. Held, that no deduction could lawfully
be made from their pay for carrying the mail on this account, 32.
11. The contract containing no provision for any forfeiture of pay except
when a whole trip was lost, the slowness of the voyages did not justify
a deduction, provided they were regularly made. Ibid.
12. The loss of the vessels that were wrecked did not justify a deduction,
because Collins & Co. complied with their contract in building them,
and were not insurers of them against the perils of the sea.
13. Under a contract for carrying the mails between Cairo and New Orleans,
agreeably to a schedule appended, which regulates the time of arrival
and departure only at the ends of the route, the Postmaster General
cannot be required to deliver the mails in Memphis at a particular
hour of the day, 252.
14. Under the act of March 3, 1845, the maximum allowance for the con-
vevance of any number of mails in the daytime is three hundred
dollars per mile, 295.
15. Where proposals were invited for carrying the mail on a certain route,
and the contract was awarded to certain parties who afterwards
transferred it to others who were simply competitors at the bidding
for the contract, it was held, that the Postmaster General had no au-
thority to annul the contract under the statute providing for the
dismissal of a mail contractor who shall have combined to prevent
bidding for a mail contract, 331.
16. Where a statute authorized the Postmaster General to contract for the
conveyance of the entire letter mail from a point on the Mississippi
river to San Francisco for six years, at a cost not exceeding three
hundred thousand dollars per annum for semi-monthly, four hundred
and fifty thousand dollars for weekly, or six hundred thousand del-
MAIL CONTRACTS (Continued.)
lars for semi-weekly service, to be performed semi-monthly, weekly,
or semi-weekly, at the option of the Postmaster General; and where,
in pursuance of the statute, a contract was made by the Postmaster
General with certain parties for that service, who agreed to perform
it semi-weekly for the allowed maximum compensation, but which
contract made no provision for any reduction of the service, nor for
the carriage of the mails according to any other schedule; it was held,
that the Postmaster General had no legal right to reduce the amount
of service, and the compensation with it, below what was stipulated
for in the contract, 342.
1. Where a temporary appointment of United States marshal has been
made by the President, the recital in the official bond should be in
conformity with the nature of the appointment, 53.
2. Where the marshal of a Territory expended upwards of twenty thous-
and dollars in carrying the judges to the courts with a guard, he can-
not be allowed such expenses, either by the accounting officers or by
the President, under the act of 1852, 73.
3. The expenses of a judge in traveling to his courts are his own expen-
ses, and not those of the marshal, and are, therefore, not properly
incurred by a ministerial officer in the execution of the law. Thid.
4. No marshal of a district can be allowed in his accounts for the expendi-
ture of more than twenty dollars for furniture, and fifty dollars for
rent, unless previously to the expenditure he obtain the approbation
of the Secretary of the Interior, 98.
5. The Secretary has no authority to give the approval after the expendi-
ture is made. Ibid.
6. The powers of the Secretary in this respect are not enlarged by the law
which authorizes an appeal to him from the accounting officers. Ibid.
7. A marshal is chargeable with all the fees which accrued to him, whether
they were actually collected or not, 176.
6. He may entitle himself to a credit for such of them as he shows that he
could not recover by any reasonable effort. Ibid.
9. A marshal of the United States is entitled to compensation for serving
a subpoena in a criminal case on a witness beyond the limits of his own
district, and also for executing an attachment on the same witness for
failing to appear, 265.
10. The President may make such regulations as he deems expedient for the
keeping, support, and removal of negroes captured and delivered to a
marshal of the United States, under the acts of March 3, 1819, to pro-
hibit the slave trade, 302.
11. He may allow compensation to the marshal for the duties required of
him beyond his commissions for disbursements, and such compensation
is payable out of any appropriations to carry the act into effect. Ibid.
12. The marshal's accounts are not required to be certified by a judge under
the act of August 16, 1856, nor to be taxed under the act of August 31,
1852, but should be certified and taxed in accordance with such
regulations as the President may deem expedient for their authentica-
tion. Ibid.
13. The compensation is to be made in accordance with the regulations pre-
scribed by the President for the safe-keeping, support, and removal of
the negroes, and not by analogy to any fees prescribed by the act of
February 18, 1853. Ibid.
14. The judiciary fund is not applicable to such charges, and they can only
be paid out of a specified appropriation by Congress for the
purpose of
carrying into effect the act to prohibit the slave trade. Ibid.
15. The sureties of the marshal of Utah need not be residents of the Terri-
tory, 429.
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