Case of Mingal Crawford. settle "the claim" of these three slaves. It is not probable that the attention of Congress was called to the fact of their servitude, nor that the Secretary of War was aware of it when he made his award. But, without attempting to go behind his decision, I shall endeavor to answer the questions proposed with reference only to the present condition of the case. The claim of the administrator has some color of equity, for at the time the military services were rendered, Gabriel Crawford was entitled to the time and to the earnings of the slave. But it is by no means clear that the allowance made by the law should be regarded as wages. I am disposed to consider them as bounty, and as bounty alone. But to take the other view will not help the administrator, because both the words of the act and adjudication of the Secretary of War name Mingal Crawford as the person who is to receive the money. Nothing is more certain than that where a payment is directed by an act of Congress to be made to a particular person, no other man cau entitle himself to it by showing that he was the meritorious cause of the grant. The officers of the Treasury cannot sit as chancellors to enforce such equities as this. The remaining propositions are, whether the slave himself can receive the amount awarded to him, or whether his present master can receive it for him. These may be properly considered together, because the possession of the slave being the possession of the master, a payment to either would be attended with the same practical result. The most pertinent legal analogy upon this point is that of a devise or bequest of property to a slave. It was formerly held in South Carolina, that such a devise was absolutely void, (4 DeSaussure, 267.) But this decision was subsequently modified by the chancellor who made it in the case of Fable vs. Brown's Executors, (2 Hill Ch. Rep., 396) in which the Court of Appeals held that the incapacity of the slave was analogous to that of an alien enemy, who may take lands, but cannot hold them; and as a chose in action given to him is not void, although he cannot main Heintzelman's Accounts. tain an action on it, so a slave may take, but cannot hold land, and his master could only hold until office found for the State; and so of a legacy given to a slave: it is not void, but it cannot be recovered from the executor, by either slave or master, but may escheat to the State in the hands of the executor. I do not think that your obligation to pay the amounts awarded to the slaves in the present instance is any stronger than that of the executor in the case just cited; and it is clear that he was neither legally nor morally bound to give the fund to the legatee named in the will. I am therefore of opinion, that neither the slave himself, nor his former owner, nor his present master, can lawfully demand payment of the sum which has been adjudicated to him. The slave cannot take it, because of his legal incapacity; and it cannot be paid to anybody else, because Congress has authorized nobody else to receive it. It is as if the donation had been made to a person not in being. Very respectfully, yours, &c., Hon. HOWELL COBB, Secretary of the Treasury. J. S. BLACK. HEINTZELMAN'S ACCOUNTS. The accounting officers had no authority in 1850 to reopen the accounts of Captain Heintzelman without his consent, after they had been finally and conclusively settled by the proper department in 1847, and charge him with a sum of money behind his back and without notice to him. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: Captain S. P. Heintzelman, of the first infantry of 1838, held a staff appointment as assistant quartermaster in Florida. In 1847, after he had ceased to hold this appointment, his accounts were settled, and a small balance was found to be due to him, which was paid. The account remained closed until 1850, when it was reopened without Heintzelman's Accounts. his consent, and he was then charged with the sum of $910, under the following circumstances: Prior to 1838, Captain Skinner, a quartermaster of Alabama volunteers, in the service of the United States, advanced $910 to Colonel Pouncy. Two persons, named Crews and Cooper, who had separately furnished forage for the use of the army to an amount exceeding this sum, consented that the debt of Colonel Pouncy should be paid to Skinner out of the money coming to them from the Government. The claim of Crews was for $1,300, that of Cooper for $980. On the 10th of July, 1838, Skinner addressed a letter to Heintzelman, requesting him, when he should pay certain claims, to retain in his hands the amounts which had been previously advanced by Skinner to the respective claimants. He also said in this letter, "Colonel Pouncy will also leave in your hands $910, advanced by me, which you will please give him a certificate for, as paid by him on my order." When the claims of Crews and Cooper were presented to Heintzelman for payment, the contemplated arrangement was carried out. They gave receipts to him for the full amount of their several demands,. allowing him to retain the sum of $910, due from Pouncy to Skinner. Heintzelman informed Skinner of the fact, and authorized him to draw upon him for the amount, stating that he had his funds deposited in the Union Bank, and that the draft would be paid in the funds of that bank, then at a slight discount. Skinner, unwilling to suffer the loss of exchange and discount, declined to draw as requested, but made a demand for payment at the hands of the War Department in Washington, in par money. His claim was referred to the proper accounting officers, and twice considered and disallowed. This was in 1844 and 1845. It was again reconsidered in 1849, and again disallowed. In the meantime, in 1847, as already stated, the accounts of Heintzelman were settled, and he was allowed a credit for the full amount of the claims of Crews and Cooper. Case of J. P. Brown. In 1850 the claim of Skinner was again considered by the accounting officers, and allowed. At the same time the sum of $910, which was paid to him by the Government, was carried to the account of Heintzelman, and charged to him. It does not appear that Heintzelman received notice of this until 1855, when he protested against it, on the ground that his account as assistant quartermaster had been settled finally in 1847. The amount, however, was still allowed to stand against him, and his pay as an officer in the line has been accordingly stopped. From these facts it is very apparent that Heintzelman's accounts were honestly settled. He received no credits but what he had true vouchers for. His arrangement with Skinner was a personal matter between them, and it was Skinner's own fault that it was not carried out. He had a good cause of action against Heintzelman for the amount that was due him, and no shadow of claim against the Government. The accounting officers were right in 1844 and 1845, when they threw out his claim as inadmissible. Under these circumstances, their action in 1850 was grossly illegal. It was an attempt to change Heintzelman's account behind his back, and without notice to him, after it had been finally and conclusively settled by the proper department. It was worse: It was charging Heintzelman with money which he did not owe, in order to atone for paying Skinner what he had no claim to. Very respectfully, yours, &c., Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War. J. S. BLACK. CASE OF J. P. BROWN. By decision of the Supreme Court, a person holding two compatible offices or employments under the Government is not precluded from receiving the salaries of both, by anything in the general laws prohibiting double compensation; but the prohibition in those laws extends to every case where Case of J. P. Brown. the duties for which extra compensation is claimed are performed without a regular appointment authorized by law. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 24, 1860. SIR: You have submitted to me several propositions in relation to the compensation of J. P. Brown, who has occupied various diplomatic and consular offices in Turkey since the year 1855. It is necessary to treat the items of his claim in detail, for they arise under different acts of Congress, and cannot all be disposed of under one principle. 1. In the first place, he was appointed dragoman, and held that office from July 1, 1855, until after the act of 1856 took effect. During this same time he was also authorized by your department to act as consul. I am disposed to regard him during that period as a vice-consul regularly appointed. The office was recognized in the legislation which existed previously to 1856, and the appointment was one which the State Department had the right to make, (7 Opin., 512.) According to the decision. of the Supreme Court in Converse vs. the United States, (21 How., 463,) a person holding two compatible offices or employments under the Government is not precluded from receiving the salaries of both by anything in the general laws prohibiting double compensation, and this principle would appear to be applicable to this portion of Mr. Brown's claim. 2. On February 19, 1857, Mr. Brown was appointed consul-general. He also, from that date until the 23d of September, 1858, discharged the duties of secretary of legation and dragoman. It is very clear that he cannot be compensated for discharging these additional duties under the ninth section of the act of August 18, 1856, which provides for the case "when to any diplomatic office held by any person there shall be superadded another," because the office of consul-general which he held was not a diplomatic one. Nor do I think that the performance of these additional duties will entitle him to compensation under the decision of the court in the case of Con |