Accounts of the Public Printers.

our confidence; we must therefore look to the words of the law itself as furnishing the real elements of a judgment upon it.

The first clause of the resolution simply declares that the prices of the printing "be, and the same are, reduced forty per centum." It cannot possibly be said that this looks to anything but a reduction for future work. Then comes a provision which requires the superintendent to have the accounts made out as heretofore, deduct forty per cent. from the aggregate amount of each, and pay what remains. This last provision is expressly declared to be inserted for the purpose of giving full force and effect to the previous one. Now, if the first clause reduces the price only on future work, the superintendent would certainly not be carrying that into effect if he would make deductions upon what had been previously done. But the concluding clause seems decisive; for it declares that the law shall not take effect until after the passage of the resolution.

It is an established principle of interpretation that every statute shall be confined in its operation strictly to the future. The absurd intention of providing a rule for the past conduct of men, and making them responsible for the violation of it before it was in being, is never to be ascribed to any respectable legislature. This is not only the doctrine of English and American law, it runs through the civil law also, and is an incontestible rule of general jurisprudence. I think there is no civilized code that does not recognize it. (Dwar on Stat., 540; Burrows, 2460; 5 Watts & Serg., 252.) Numerous cases are to be found in the books where the legislature has seemed to express very clearly the intent that their enactment should operate upon the past, and yet the courts have held the true construction to be otherwise. For instance, an act of parliament was passed declaring that no action should thereafter be brought to charge any person upon any agreement made in consideration of marriage, unless such agreement be in writing. An action was thereafter brought upon an agreement without writing, but the agreement was made before the date of the

Accounts of the Public Printers.

law. The judges unanimously sustained the right of the plaintiff, because they could not presume that the act had a retrospect, and because it would be great mischief so to explain it. (Gilmore vs. Shooter, 2 Modern Reps., 310, case 189; S. C. 2 Shower's Rep., 17.) Although the statute of wills declared that all testamentary writing should be void without certain formalities of attestation, it was held not to apply to a case where the will had been executed without such formalities before the passage of the statute, though the testator died afterwards. (Cowp., 90; 5 Watts & Serg., 199.) This, it will be observed, was a very strong case in favor of the general doctrine, because the will might have been made in pursuance of the act after it was passed, and because no right whatever was vested under it at the date of the act. A similar construction was given to the mortmain act. (2 Atkins, 36.) But it is useless to multiply authorities or to refer to cases for the establishment of a principle which nobody denies.

Laws reducing the price of work done for the Government, without specifying the time at which the reduction shall go into effect, have heretofore been made, and I have endeavored to ascertain what construction they have received. As far as I can learn it has always been taken for granted by the executive departments, without question or scruple, that they operated only upon work ordered after their passage. For example, the compensation allowed to the printers of the report on the Pacific railroad for the dry pressing of the paper was at first fifty cents per ream; it was subsequently reduced to twenty-five cents per ream, but all the work of that kind which had been previously ordered by Congress was paid for at the original prices.

The resolution under consideration must be understood as requiring the superintendent to dock every bill presented to him after the 14th of June forty per cent., without regard to the time when the work was done, or else it must be construed as reducing the price only of work subsequently ordered. There is no middle ground upon which

Consular Fees.

we can stand. I think I have said enough to justify my opinion that the latter construction is the true one.

I am, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

Hon. JACOB THOMPSON,

Secretary of the Interior.

J. S. BLACK.

CONSULAR FEES.

1. No more than fifty cents can be charged for certifying invoices, and for certifying the place of growth or production of goods made duty free by the reciprocity treaty with Great Britain, although such certificate may be accompanied by an attestation of the official character of a magistrate, and of the value of the goods.

2. Consuls, as well as consular officers and agents, are subject to this restriction.

3. It applies to all the British North American Provinces included within the reciprocity treaty.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

July 16, 1860.

SIR: I have considered the questions which you have referred to me in relation to consular fees in certain cases.

The third section of the act of March 3, 1859, making appropriations for diplomatic and consular expenses, provides:

"That the fee for certifying invoices, and for certifying the place of growth or production of goods made duty free by the reciprocity treaty, to be charged by the consul general for the British North American Provinces, and subordinate consular officers and agents in said provinces, shall be fifty cents for each certificate, and no more." (11 Stats. at Large, 404.)

On referring to the forms prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury which were in use at the time of the passage of this act, and which are still employed, it appears that the consular certificate to an invoice is based upon an affidavit made by the shipper of the goods, either before the consular officer himself, or before some local magistrate. When the latter course is pursued, the consular certificate to the

Consular Fees.

invoice includes an attestation of the official character of the person who administered the oath. By the established tariff of fees, a consular officer is entitled to two dollars "for authenticating the signature of a governor, judge, notary public, or other officer," and it is contended that, notwithstanding the act of 1859, he may demand two dollars for that portion of the certificate to the invoice which attests the signature of the local magistrate. But this position cannot be maintained. Where an act of Congress gives a certain compensation for an entire service, including several other duties, for which, by previous laws or regulations, specific fees were allowed, no more can be charged for the whole than the sum named in the later statute.

Before the passage of the act of 1859, no person seems to have thought that the fee for a consular certificate to an invoice was more than two dollars, although it included a certificate of the official character of the magistrate before whom the oath was made. But the argument which would make the fee amount to two dollars or more now, would have made it at least four dollars then. The fact that only two dollars were allowed for the entire consular certificate prior to the 3d March, 1859, is important therefore in a double aspect. It shows that, by a settled construction of the tariff of fees, consuls were not permitted to make separate charges for two certificates included in one; and it also warrants the conclusion that the fee of two dollars for the combined services was the very thing which Congress intended to reduce.

The obvious purpose of the third section of the act of March 3, 1859, was to diminish the costs of reciprocal trade between the British North American Provinces and the United States, in accordance with the spirit of the treaty. It is our duty to carry that intention into effect, and not to defeat it by an ingenious construction which would practically maintain the original fee bill.

Another question which you have referred to me is, whether the words "subordinate consular officers and

Consular Fees.

agents," in the act of 1859, include consuls. As defined in the 31st section of the act of August 18, 1856, they would not; but the definitions therein established apply only to that act and to former acts which were not repealed by it. It would be strange indeed if Congress could declare that a particular word should have a certain meaning in all future legislation. This was not attempted by the section referred to, as its language plainly shows. We are therefore at liberty to construe the words "subordinate consular officers and agents" in the act of March 3, 1859, upon general principles, and I think it is clear that they were meant to embrace all consular officers below the grade of consul general. The subject-matter of the enactment was consular fees on goods made duty free by the reciprocity treaty. The intention of Congress was to reduce those fees, and no apparent reason exists why fees charged by consuls should be excepted. They are included by the words of the law according to their common acceptation, and they are also within the spirit and reason of the statutes.

I am therefore of opinion:

1. That no more than fifty cents can be charged for certifying invoices, and for certifying the place of growth or production of goods made duty free by the reciprocity treaty, although such certificate may be accompanied by an attestation of the official character of a magistrate, and of the value of the goods.

2. That consuls, as well as other consular officers and agents, are subject to this restriction.

3. That it applies to all the British North American Provinces included within the reciprocity treaty.

Yours, very respectfully,

Hon. LEWIS CASS,

Secretary of State.

J. S. BLACK.