Advertisement of Contracts. "all contracts" as meaning only contracts for buildings at a particular place. Congress could easily have confined the operation of the statute within limits as narrow as it chose to prescribe, and the use of this comprehensive phrase, without any limitation, ought certainly to be regarded as a desire that no limitation should be imposed. If I am right in this view of the act of 1852, it is as necessary for the President to advertise for the building of a court house at Baltimore, as it would be for any Secretary to do the same thing in reference to a public building in the District of Columbia. There are considerations which might lead to a different conclusion, and I do not deny that I have been somewhat impressed by them. Perhaps in the absence of precedent I might have been inclined to the other side of the question. But it is not alleged that any authority exists in favor of the narrower construction, except that of Mr. Crittenden. There is no opinion of his in the books. Mr. Cushing cites it from manuscript. (See 6 Opinions, 407.) I have caused a search to be made for it among the records of the office, and it cannot be found. I am therefore wholly unable to ascertain the grounds upon which he held that the act of 1852 "applies only to contracts to be executed in the city of Washington." Mr. Cushing did not agree with him, but forbore to enter at length upon the discussion of the question, because the point then before him did not require it. This is all the light that my predecessors have furnished on the subject. But information which I have received from the Bureau of Construction satisfies me that ever since 1852 it has been the constant and uniform practice in all the departments of the Government to advertise for proposals in every case of a contract like this. This is authority not to be lightly disregarded in construing the law. The Supreme Court itself has often said that the practice of the Government is entitled to great respect, and in some cases to overwhelming weight where the question before a judicial tribunal is Construction of Act Organizing Kansas and Nebraska. upon the construction of the law under which such practice arose. On the whole, I am quite well satisfied that, whether you execute this law in your own proper person or through one of your subordinate officers, you should see that general competition is invited by an advertisement to be published for at least sixty days. I am, very respectfully, yours, &c., J. S. BLACK. The PRESIDENT. CONSTRUCTION OF ACT ORGANIZING KANSAS AND NEBRASKA. Under the act of May 30, 1854, organizing the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, two-thirds of a quorum of the Territorial Legislature constitute the majority necessary to pass a bill which the Governor has vetoed. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, January 31, 1860. SIR: The question proposed in your letter of the 19th, is "whether, under the act of May 30, 1854, entitled 'An act to organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas,' twothirds of all the members of each branch of the Legislature respectively, or two-thirds of a quorum only, constitute the majority required to pass a bill over the Governor's veto." (10 Stats. at Large, 286.) The twenty-fourth section of that act provides that "every bill which shall have passed the Council and House of Representatives of the said Territory, shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the Governor of the Territory; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the house in which it originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it; if after such reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the Mileage of District Attorneys. other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house it shall become a law." The question which you have submitted has arisen on the construction of the sentence last quoted. That sentence is in the very words of a part of the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, in relation to bills which have been returned to either house of Congress by the President, with his objections. But it appears to be well settled, that under the provision in the Constitution, two-thirds of the members present, when constituting a quorum to do business, can pass a bill which has been vetoed by the President. (Cong. Globe, 1st ses. 34th Cong., part ii, pp. 1542-50. Cushing's Law of Legislatives Assemblies, sec. 2387.) I have no doubt that this is the true construction of the clause, and that it should be applied to the same words when used in the act of May 30, 1854. I am therefore of opinion that two-thirds of a quorum of the respective branches of the Territorial Legislature constitute the majority necessary to pass a bill which the Governor has returned with his objections. Yours, very respectfully, Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary of State. J. S. BLACK. MILEAGE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS. 1. A district attorney is entitled, under the act of February 26, 1853, to mileage only from the place of his permanent residence to the place where the court is held. 2. He is entitled to mileage to and from court, as of right, in all cases of his lawful attendance on court at a distance from his place of abode. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, February 11, 1860. SIR: I have been able to give but a brief examination to the questions which you have referred to me in relation to Mileage of District Attorneys. the mileage of a district attorney. The act of 26th February, 1853, allows him "for traveling from the place of his abode to the place of holding any court of the United States in his district, and to the place of any examination before a judge or commissioner of any person or persons charged with crime, ten cents per mile for going and ten cents for returning." (10 Stats. at Large, 162.) By the "place of his abode" I understand the officer's place of residence. This is the usual meaning of the words, and it is moreover evident, from the clause immediately preceding the one above quoted, that they are employed in their ordinary sense. It provides that the district attorney shall receive "for each day of his necessary attendance in a court of the United States, on the business of the United States, when the same shall be held at the place of his abode, five dollars, and the like sum for his attendance for each day of the term when the said court shall be held elsewhere." This makes it clear that "the place of his abode" is the place of his permanent residence, and not some other place where he may be temporarily detained in the discharge of official duties. The other questions which you have referred to me are, I think, covered by the opinion of Mr. Attorney General Cushing, of January 3, 1857, in which he advises the allowance of mileage to and from court, as of right, in all cases of the lawful attendance of the attorney. Mileage, under the act of February 26, 1853, whether of a district attorney, juror, or witness, is required to be estimated for traveling from the place of his abode or residence to the place of holding court and returning. The law makes the reasonable and natural presumption that he comes from his place of residence and returns to it. And the only question seems to be whether in the settlement of accounts this presumption should not be held to be conclusive. It is certainly so regarded when it operates against the claim of mileage. The party is not allowed to show that he started to the court from some point more remote than his place Negotiability of Treasury Notes. of residence, and thus entitle himself to a greater compensation. But if the presumption is conclusive against him, why should it not be conclusive in his favor? The true reason why the law has named the points between which the mileage is to be computed, is not, however, to promote the convenience of the person claiming it, but to avoid the inconvenience of calculating the amount of mileage in a vast number of cases without some definite, fixed, and general rule of easy application. Such a rule is furnished in the construction of the law as given by my predecessor. In the case of jurors and witnesses it would be impracticable to audit accounts for mileage on the basis of actual travel. I believe it has never been attempted. But the law makes no distinction between the mode of calculating their compensation and that of a district attorney when attending a court or a hearing before a commissioner. Yours, very respectfully, J. S. BLACK. Hon. JACOB THOMPSON, Secretary of the Interior. NEGOTIABILITY OF TREASURY NOTES. When a treasury note was stolen after its maturity from its lawful holder, and was subsequently purchased by a party for a valuable consideration in the usual course of business, and without notice of the felony, it was held, that the purchaser was entitled to payment of the note. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have considered the points referred to me by your letter of January 15, in relation to the payment of a treasury note. For the purpose of presenting more distinctly the only important question of law involved in the case, I shall assume the truth of the allegations of the respective parties. They are consistent with each other, and would doubtless be proved by disinterested witnesses. They are briefly these: |