Cession of Jurisdiction by States. authorized, shall have the right and authority to purchase the fee simple of a sufficient quantity of land in the city of Columbia on which to erect a post office and a court-house: Provided, That the said purchase does not exceed four acres; and that all process, civil or criminal, issued under the authority of this State or any officer thereof, shall or may be served and executed on any part of said land, and on any person or persons there being and implicated in matters of law." The question which you have referred to me, is whether this is such a cession of jurisdiction as is contemplated by the joint resolution of Congress, approved September 11, 1841? (5 Stats. at Large, 468.) The Constitution (art. 1, sec. 8, clause 18) confers upon Congress the power to exercise exclusive legislation over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings. The act of the Legislature of South Carolina above quoted, gives a complete and unequivocal consent to the purchase. This is all that is necessary, for the Constitution confers federal jurisdiction over places conveyed under such circumstances. It has often been held that the reservation of the right to serve and execute all State process on land sold to the United States does not conflict with the power of Congress to exercise exclusive legislation over it. Where the conveyance is for purposes enumerated in the act of March 2, 1795, the right of serving State process exists, whether specifically reserved or not. It is unnecessary to inquire whether that act extends to property purchased for other uses. It is enough to know, that both by legislative and judicial construction, the right retained by the State of South Carolina has been regarded as consistent with exclusive federal jurisdiction. Mr. Cushing, while Attorney General, discussed this subject with his usual ability (6 Opin., 577; 7 Opin., 628.) I fully concur in his conclusions. The preamble of the act of cession, now under consideration, recites that the appropriation for the purchase of the Marshal's Fees. land in Columbia was made by Congress at the thirty-third session. This is a mistake; but it has no effect upon the enacting clauses, which are independent of the preamble, and in themselves intelligible and free from ambiguity. I am of opinion that the act of cession is sufficient. Yours, very respectfully, Hon. HOWELL COBB, Secretary of the Treasury. J. S. BLACK. MARSHAL'S FEES. 1. A marshal of the United States is entitled to compensation for serving a subpœna in a criminal case on a witness beyond the limits of his own district, and also for executing an attachment on the same witness for failing to appear. 2. It may be doubted whether a circuit court has power to send criminal process beyond the limits of the district in which the court is held. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have considered yours of December 18, 1858, proposing certain questions concerning the power of a United States marshal to execute the process of the Federal courts in certain cases beyond the limits of his own district. The points suggested arise on the settlement of the accounts of S. B. Jewett, marshal of the northern district of New York, who claims compensation (1) for serving a subpoena in a criminal case on a witness in the State of Michigan; (2) for executing an attachment against the same witness, who disobeyed the order of the subpœna; and, (3) for arresting in the State of Iowa a person indicted for forging pension papers, and transporting him to Utica, New York, the place of trial. In each instance the process was issued by the circuit court for the northern district of New York. The first question presented is easily answered by a reference to the sixth section of the act of March 2, 1793. (1 Stats. at Large, 335.) The subpoena issued by a United Marshal's Fees. States court in any district for a witness in a criminal case, will "run into any other district." This is the language of the act, and it cannot be made plainer. The second inquiry, is whether an attachment for failing to' appear follows the subpoena. Upon this point it is unnecessary to add anything to the reasoning of Justice Nelson, who ordered the attachment which is now the subject of controversy. I see no reason to question the soundness of the opinion which he delivered after mature consideration of the subject. He maintains that the Federal courts have the power to enforce their own process. This is certainly neither new nor startling. The usual and universally recognized method of compelling obedience to a subpoena ad testificandum is by attachment. The power to issue it would seem to be inherent in the court by its very nature. (7 Craneh, 34.) But there are abundant statutory provisions to confer it. The act of 24th September, 1789, section 17, empowers the courts of the United States "to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same;" and the act of March 2, 1831, defining contempts, expressly includes the disobedience or resistance by any officer of the said courts, party, juror, or witness * * to any lawful suit, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts." In Beebee's case, "In (2 Wall, jr., 129,) Justice Grier, at Philadelphia, refused an attachment against a witness in New York for reasons which it is unnecessary to mention, but he appears to have entertained no doubt of his power to order the writ, for he said that if it appeared that there would be a failure of justice unless the attendance of the witness were enforced, "the court would be bound to issue the compulsory process." I think these decisions and acts of Congress fully sustain the doctrine that the Federal courts can compel obedience to a subpoena which is sent beyond the limits of the district where the court is held, in the same manner as in other cases. For reasons hereafter stated, I will consider here the Marshal's Fees. fourth question presented, which is, substantially, whether the marshal of the district in which the court is held can execute process in the instances under consideration, and receive the usual fee therefor. Justice Nelson has answered this question, also, in the affirmative, and I am satisfied that he is right. The Comptroller has presented an elaborate and ingenious argument to prove the contrary. I cannot undertake to answer all the points which he has suggested in detail. I think the error into which he has been led consists in assuming that the 27th section of the act of 24th September, 1789, prohibits a marshal from executing process in any other district than his own. The provision of that section is that it shall be the duty of the marshal "to execute throughout the district all lawful precepts directed to him and issued under the authority of the United States." This does not forbid the courts to impose upon the officer the duty of going beyond the district to serve process authorized by subsequent acts of Congress. Nor does the provision that the marshal shall execute within his district all "precepts directed to him," require him to execute precepts directed to some person else. The numerous references to particular statutes and to the practice of the courts which have been made by the Comptroller, only establish that in general the duties of a marshal are confined to his district. This may be freely conceded. But they do not show that the principle is universal and without exception. And yet this is the very point which he was bound to prove, for we are not dealing with the usual process of the Federal courts in their ordinary jurisdiction, but with those anomalous cases in which they are invested with the power to issue their writs beyond the boundaries of the districts in which they are held. Besides this, the argument which he adduces proves too much. If it shows anything, it demonstrates that neither the subpoena nor the attachment for a witness in cases similar to those now under consideration, can ever be served or legally executed by any body. If the marshal cannot serve process out of his district, he cannot return Power to appoint Commissioners. process out of his district. If the circuit court in the case before me could not compel the marshal of its own district to go to Michigan, it certainly could not compel the marshal of Michigan to come to New York. I am satisfied, however, that in both instances the direction of the process to its own officer was proper, and that he ought to be paid his legal fees for the service according to the usual mode of computation. The power to send a writ implies the authority to send an officer with it. Mr. Jewett, the applicant in this case, has expressed a desire to withdraw his appeal from so much of the decision of the Comptroller as involves the charges made for the arrest of a criminal in Iowa. For this reason I shall not discuss the third. proposition which you have presented. While I am inclined to doubt the power of a circuit court to send criminal process beyond the limits of the district in which the court is held, it is to be hoped that a question of such magnitude may be settled by the judiciary before it shall be again involved in the action of the executive departments. Yours, very respectfully, Hon. JACOB THOMPSON, J. S. BLACK. Secretary of the Interior.. POWER TO APPOINT COMMISSIONERS. 1. The district court of the United States for the western district of Virginia, had power, under the act of February 4, 1819, to appoint commissioners. 2. When a question on a statute made to regulate the conduct of the courts, arises incidentally before an executive department, the lead of the judges ought to be followed. 3. An accounting officer has undoubted power to disallow a fee charged by a person who is not an officer, and who had no right to perform the services for which he seeks to be paid. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: Your letter of the 3d ultimo asks two questions: |