made. Transportation of Mails by Ocean Steamers. But the fact that the fees were uncollectable must be made to appear by evidence satisfactory to the accounting officers, before the credit can be lawfully given. Very respectfully, yours, &c., Hon. JACOB THOMPSON, Secretary of the Interior. J. S. BLACK. TRANSPORTATION OF MAILS BY OCEAN STEAMERS. The fourth section of the appropriation act of June 14, 1858, does not affect the carrying of mails destined for ports of the United States, and not subject to sea postage. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, June 26, 1858. SIR: I have considered your communication of this date, in relation to the construction of the act of June 14, 1858, entitled "An act making appropriations for the transportation of the United States mail by ocean steamers, and otherwise, during the fiscal year ending the 30th of June, 1859." The first section of the act contains several specific appropriations. One of them is as follows: "For transportation of the mails from Panama to California and Oregon and back, three hundred and twenty-eight thousand three hundred and fifty dollars." The second and third sections make some appropriations for foreign and domestic mail service. The fourth section enacts "that it shall not be lawful for the Postmaster General to make any steamship or other new contract for carrying the mails on the sea, for a longer period than two years, nor for any other compensation than the sea and inland postages." (11 Stat. at Large, 364.) The question submitted for my opinion is, whether this section provides a mode of compensation for carrying the mails between Panama and Oregon, and thereby controis Transportation of Mails by Ocean Steamers. the previous provision making a specific appropriation for that purpose? My conviction is very clear that it does not. In the first place, you have an unequivocal appropriation of a specific sum for a particular route. No man could doubt that it is a perfect warrant to you to give that sum for the service required. It is, perhaps, the most important within your jurisdiction, and it is provided for in unmistakable language. It would require little short of an absolute repeal of the appropriating clause to prohibit you from applying the fund in the manner directed. It seems to be thought by some persons that the fourth section of that act provides a different mode of compensation for this route. I do not think so. It allows, for carrying the mails on the sea, no other compensation than "the sea and inland postages." But what compensation would this be for a portion of one great route uniting New York with Astoria? It is now divided into three contracts. Suppose it to be sub-divided still further, what is to be the compensation of each section? The postage is a fixed sum for the whole distance. Will each contractor take a sum equal to the whole, or will they divide it, and if so, how? Who can fix a rule of distribution? Such obvious inquiries as these, which could not have escaped the attention of Congress, compel us to conclude that the fourth section of the act was not meant to affect the carrying of mails destined for ports of the United States, and not subject to sea postage. But there is a broader and more general reason for holding that Congress did not intend to provide, by "sea and inland postages," for the payment of the Atlantic and Pacific mail service. That service is not a portion of our foreign postal system. The mail matter carried by it is not subject to sea postage. And though both lines of its mail steamers have points of termination at foreign ports, separated by a narrow isthmus, they are considered as parts of one great mail route between portions of the same country. The fourth and fifth sections of the act of June 14, 1858, refer only to the transportation of mails between the Courts Martial. United States and foreign countries, and contemplate mail service subject to sea postage. They have no relation to the domestic mail service, and cannot be considered as applicable to the route between Panama, California, and Oregon. Yours, very respectfully, Hon. A. V. Brown, Postmaster General. J. S. BLACK. COURTS MARTIAL. 1. Where charges were preferred against an officer in the army for disobedience of orders in June, 1856; and in September following, for other reasons, he was dismissed the service by the President, no court martial having been ordered to investigate the charges against him, it was held that, on his being restored to the army, he could not be tried on the charges pending against him at the time of his dismissal, after the lapse of two years since the commission of the alleged offenses. 2. The question, whether an officer who has been dismissed the service is liable to be tried by a court martial for offenses previously committed, examined, but no opinion given thereon. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, August 16, 1858. SIR: I have considered the question proposed in your letter of the second on the subject of a court martial. It appears, by your statement of the facts, that in the month of June, 1856, charges were preferred against a lieutenant in the army for disobedience of orders, &c. In September following, for other reasons connected with the condition of his accounts, he was dismissed the service by the President, and no court martial was ever ordered to investigate the charges against him. The officer has recently been restored to the army in the rank which he would have reached, and his trial has been demanded on the charges which were pending at the time of his dismissal. The question submitted is, whether the lapse of time since the offense is now a bar to the proceeding. Courts Martial. The 88th article of war (act of April 10, 1806, sec. 1) declares that "no person shall be liable to be tried and punished by a general court martial for any offense which shall appear to have been committed more than two years before the issuing of the order for such trial, unless the person, by reason of having absented himself or some other manifest impediment, shall not have been amenable to justice within that period." (2 Stat. at Large, 369.) In the present case more than two years have already elapsed since the commission of the alleged offenses, and a trial has not yet been ordered. Unless, therefore, the case comes within the exception mentioned in the article, it would be manifestly contrary to law to order a trial either now or hereafter. The exception is when the person, "by reason of having absented himself or other manifest impediment, shall not have been amenable to justice." In the case submitted the alleged impediment is the dismissal of the officer. It is by no means clear that this circumstance placed him beyond the jurisdiction of a court martial. If it did not, he was still amenable to justice, and the period of limitation continued to run in his favor. I am not aware that the question, whether an officer who has been dismissed from the service is liable to be tried by a court martial for offenses previously committed, has been settled in this country. In England the jurisdiction of a court martial under such circumstances was unanimously sustained by the twelve judges in the case of Lord George Sackville, and their decision is recognized as the law by Tytler, p. 118, in Griffith's notes, p. 32, and in other respectable works on military law and courts martial. The subject has also been ably discussed in this country by De Hart, (pp. 27, 30,) who cites a decision of Justice Wilde, of the supreme court of Massachusetts, in a case of habeas corpus, where a seaman in the navy, who had been arrested for an offense committed a few days before his term of service expired, applied for his discharge. The writ was returned after the end of the relator's term of enlistment; but it was held that he was, nevertheless, liable to be tried Courts Martial. by a court martial, and he was accordingly remanded. The bief Justice and Justice Putnam concurred in the opinion. The reasoning of the court favors the doctrine of Sackville's case, although the precise point was not decided. It may be said, with some force, that if a dismissal were held to be a bar of trial by a court martial, a resignation accepted should have the same effect; and it would be thus in the power of an officer guilty of an offense to shield himself from punishment by resigning before the discovery of his crime. I have introduced this question not for the purpose of pronouncing an opinion upon it, but to avoid misconception, because silence would have been regarded as an admission that the jurisdiction of a court martial expires with the soldier's term of service. But upon principles less liable to question the case presented is not within the exception in the 88th article. The circumstances which may cause delay in bringing an officer to trial can be arranged in three classes: 1st. Those that are created or interposed by the act of the party; 2d. Circumstances arising independently either of his action or that of the Government; and 3d. Such as are controlled by the Government itself. Causes of delay arising from the conduct of the party accused are manifest impediments within the meaning of the 88th article. It is a broad principle of law and of natural justice that no man can take advantage of his own wrong; accordingly, wherever we find statutes of limitations in favor of offenders, they are coupled with an exception against persons beyond the jurisdiction of the proper court, and fugitives from justice. Hough, in a note on the words "manifest impediment" in the English statute, says it is "preventing witnesses appearing against him, or the like." In Colonel Johnson's case, cited by that author, the charge was mutiny in arresting the captain general of New South Wales, who was the principal witness for the crown, but who did not arrive in England, where the court martial |